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Abstract 
Contrary to what Europe’s image as a civilian or soft power suggests, the EU 
member states have had 50,000 – 100,000 troops deployed outside of their home 
countries for most of the post-Cold War period. Although the vast majority of these 
troops was active in operations with a strong European presence, the member states’ 
patterns of military engagement varies considerably. What explains this variation? 
What conditions motivate and block EU member state contributions to military 
operations? This dissertation addresses these research questions. More specifically, it 
aims to arrive at a generalizable and parsimonious explanation for the member 
states’ differing levels of contribution to five military operations: EUFOR RD Congo, 
the 2006 reinforcement of UNIFIL, EUFOR Chad/RCA, the 2011 military 
intervention in Libya and the air strikes against the self-proclaimed Islamic State 
(IS). Building on Qualitative Comparative Analysis, this study tests the explanatory 
value of conditions derived from research on military burden sharing, democratic 
peace, third-party intervention in internal conflicts and participation in 
peacekeeping operations. 
The main body of the dissertation consists of five articles. The first, co-
authored with Alrik Thiem, presents an analysis of the determinants of member state 
contributions to two CSDP operations: EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad. The 
subsequent three articles respectively aim to explain the pattern of contributions to 
the 2006 reinforcement of UNIFIL, the 2011 air campaign over Libya, and the 
airstrikes against IS. The fifth article examines member states’ contributions across 
the five operations. 
The results of the articles suggest that member states were inclined to 
participate in the five operations under investigation if sizeable military resources 
were combined with country-specific benefits related to regional trade, geographic 
proximity or the threat posed by foreign fighters. In addition, states with a high level 
of prior involvement in UN peacekeeping operations were inclined to participate in 
operations deployed in support of the UN peacekeeping system, irrespective of their 
military resources. However, actual contributions only materialized in the absence of 
significant competing deployments, while proximate elections and parliamentary 
veto power, in turn, resulted in lower levels of military support. Finally, depending 
on the goals of an operation and the national interests at stake, the ideological 
orientation of the member states’ governments also had an impact on their military 
commitments. 
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Abstract (Dutch) 
In tegenstelling tot wat Europa’s imago als civiele macht doet vermoeden, zijn 
de lidstaten van de Europese Unie bijzonder actief in militaire operaties. Sinds het 
einde van de Koude Oorlog waren er bijna voortdurend 50,000 tot 100,000 Europese 
troepen ontplooid buiten de grenzen van de Europese Unie. Er zijn echter grote 
verschillen tussen de militaire engagementen van de EU lidstaten. Zo namen 
Frankrijk en Groot-Brittannië de leiding over de militaire interventie die in 2011 het 
Qaddafi-regime ten val bracht, waaraan belangrijke lidstaten als Polen en Duitsland 
niets bijdroegen. Duitsland en Frankrijk leverden dan weer het merendeel van de 
troepen voor de EU-geleide operatie die in 2006 in Congo werd ontplooid, waaraan 
Groot-Brittannië enkel met twee stafofficieren deelnam. Twee jaar later besloten 
zowel Duitsland als Groot-Brittannië om niet deel te namen aan de EUFOR Tsjaad 
operatie, waaraan kleinere lidstaten Ierland en Oostenrijk respectievelijk 400 en 180 
soldaten bijdroegen. Wat verklaart deze verschillen? Onder welke omstandigheden 
neemt een EU-lidstaat deel aan een militaire operatie? Dit doctoraatsonderzoek 
zoekt een antwoord op deze vragen. De empirische focus ligt op vijf recente 
operaties: EUFOR Congo, EUFOR Tsjaad, de versterking van de UNIFIL-operaties, 
de militaire interventie in Libië en de luchtaanvallen tegen de zogenaamde 
Islamitische Staat. Met behulp van “Qualitative Comparative Analysis” tracht dit 
doctoraal proefschrift de verschillende bijdragen van de EU-lidstaten aan deze 
operaties te verklaren. 
Het proefschrift bestaat uit vijf wetenschappelijke artikels. Het eerste artikel 
focust op twee operaties ontplooid onder het Gemeenschappelijk Veiligheids- en 
Defensiebeleid van de EU: EUFOR Congo en EUFOR Tsjaad. De daaropvolgende 
drie artikels onderzoeken de bijdragen van de lidstaten aan de versterking van de 
UNIFIL-operatie, de militaire interventie in Libië en de luchtaanvallen tegen de 
Islamitische Staat. In het laatste artikel worden de militaire bijdragen van de 
lidstaten aan de vijf operaties vergeleken in één analyse. 
De resultaten van de artikels geven aan dat lidstaten deelnamen aan de 
onderzochte operaties als ze over redelijke militaire middelen beschikten en 
economische belangen hadden in de ruime regio van de operatie. Specifiek voor de 
interventies in Libië en de luchtaanvallen tegen de Islamitische Staat speelden 
respectievelijk ook de geografische ligging van de lidstaten en de potentiële dreiging 
van terugkerende Syriëstrijders een rol. Verder namen de lidstaten die traditioneel 
veel bijdragen aan VN-vredeshandhaving deel aan de operaties die een VN-
vredesoperatie ondersteunden. Lidstaten droegen daarentegen niet bij aan operaties 
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als een groot deel van hun troepen al ontplooid was in andere militaire missies. 
Afhankelijk van de specifieke doelstellingen van een operatie, speelde ook de 
ideologie van de regeringen van de lidstaten een rol. Ten slotte, zorgden 
parlementaire betrokkenheid bij beslissingen over militaire ontplooiing en nabije 
verkiezingen voor een lagere bijdrage aan militaire operaties. 
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1 
Introduction 
When looking at the record of European troop deployments, it becomes 
apparent that Europe is anything but a postmodern paradise with an “aversion to the 
exercise of military power” (Giegerich & Wallace, 2004; Kagan, 2002: 10). As shown 
in Figure 1, the EU member states consistently had between 20,000 and 80,000 
troops deployed outside of their home countries during the last two decades. Over 
the last ten years, member states made sizeable contributions to the NATO-led 
Kosovo Force, the ISAF operation in Afghanistan, the US-led coalition of the willing 
in Iraq and the 2006 enhancement of the United Nations peacekeeping operation 
(UNPO) in Lebanon. On top of that, the EU launched eleven military operations 
under the aegis of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP),1 while several 
member states participated in the air strikes against the self-proclaimed Islamic State 
(IS) and the military intervention that ended Qaddafi’s repression of the Libyan 
uprising. 
Although the bulk of the member states’ deployed forces operated alongside 
troops from other member states, there is considerable variation in the member 
states’ military commitments. The 2011 air campaign over Libya, for example, 
exposed major differences between the member states’ willingness to deploy military 
force. While France and the United Kingdom took the lead of the international 
coalition that would eventually cause the fall of the Qaddafi regime, other key 
member states like Poland and Germany did not deploy any military assets in 
support of the military campaign. Likewise, the majority of troops deployed in the 
2006 CSDP operation in Congo was provided by France and Germany, while the UK 
only participated with two staff officers in this operation. Two years later, both 
Germany and the UK decided not to contribute to EUFOR Chad, in which member 
states Ireland and Austria participated with 400 and 180 troops respectively. What 
explains these differing levels of contribution? Under which conditions do member 
states participate in military operations? 
 
                                                          
1 The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was renamed to “Common Security and 
Defence Policy” in the Treaty of Lisbon. The new name is used throughout this dissertation. 
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Figure 1. Troops Deployed by EU-28, 1995-2014 
 
 
Research Question 
This dissertation focusses on the variation in the member states’ military 
commitments. The general research question of the present study can be 
summarized as follows:  
What conditions motivate and block EU member state contributions to military 
operations? 
More specifically, this dissertation aims to arrive at a generalizable and 
parsimonious explanation for the member states’ differing levels of contribution to 
five military operations: EUFOR RD Congo, the 2006 reinforcement of UNIFIL, 
EUFOR Chad/RCA, the 2011 military intervention in Libya and the air strikes 
against IS.1 To address this research question, plausible explanatory conditions are 
                                                          
1 EUFOR RD Congo will be abbreviated to EUFOR Congo, EUFOR Chad/RCA to EUFOR 
Chad. The reinforcement of UNIFIL is also referred to as UNIFIL II, while the NATO code 
name “Operation Unified Protector” is used to refer to the 2011 air campaign  over Libya and 
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derived from the scholarly literature on military burden sharing, third-party 
intervention, peacekeeping operations and democratic peace. Subsequently, the 
explanatory value of these conditions is tested by systematically comparing member 
states’ contributions to the operations under investigation with Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA). 
By addressing the research question, this study contributes to the extant 
scholarly research on European security. The latter has devoted little attention to the 
conditions that motivate or block member state contributions to military operations 
(cf. infra). This constitutes an important gap in the literature on European security 
policy, not least because close cooperation between the member states is generally 
considered to be indispensable for Europe to meet the continuous demand for 
military crisis management (Biscop, 2015: 181). Moreover, by systematically testing 
the explanatory value of the conditions offered by the research on military burden 
sharing, third-party intervention, peacekeeping operations and democratic peace, 
this study adds to this vast body of scholarly work. 
Outline Dissertation  
The dissertation addresses the research question in five articles which examine 
the member states’ contributions to the operations under investigation. These 
articles are preceded by an introductory part and followed by a concluding chapter.  
The remainder of this introduction is constituted of three chapters. Chapter 
two situates the topic of this study in the relevant research field and surveys the 
academic literature for plausible explanations for the variation in member states’ 
military commitments. This literature review starts with a concise overview of the 
academic research that specifically focusses on the EU member states’ military 
engagements. The subsequent sections discuss relevant strands of academic research 
and assess whether these provide plausible explanations for member states’ differing 
military commitments. This results in a wide range of plausible explanatory 
conditions, which provide the ingredients for the causal frameworks of the empirical 
analyses presented in the articles.  
The third chapter defines the empirical scope of the study. The first section 
describes the universe of European military operations and justifies the case 
selection. The following sections offer an overview of the member states’ 
                                                                                                                                                      
the US’ operational code name “Operation Inherent Resolve” to refer to the air strikes against 
IS. 
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contributions to the operations under investigation and discuss their planning, 
launch and overall objectives. This provides the necessary empirical background to 
the study, which could not be discussed in the articles due to space constraints.  
The fourth chapter presents the methodology and research design of the 
dissertation. The empirical analyses presented in this study are based on QCA. This 
methodological approach is concisely introduced in the first part of this chapter, 
after which the research design and the structure of the dissertation are justified. 
The second part of this dissertation is composed of five articles, which present 
analyses that aim to explain member state contributions to the operations under 
investigation. Each of the articles builds on QCA to systematically compare the 
member states’ contributions to the operations. The first, co-authored with Alrik 
Thiem, presents an analysis of the determinants of member state contributions to 
two CSDP operations: EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad. The subsequent three 
articles respectively aim to explain the pattern of contributions to the 2006 
reinforcement of UNIFIL, the 2011 air campaign over Libya, and the airstrikes 
against IS. The fifth article examines member states’ contributions across the five 
operations. Table 1 provides an overview of the five articles in this dissertation. 
The last part of this dissertation aims to draw general conclusions on the 
research question. First, the results of the five articles are interpreted against the 
backdrop of the plausible explanations discussed in the literature review. The second 
section reflects on the contribution of this research to the relevant strands of 
academic research and its relevance beyond academia. The final section discusses the 
most important limitations of this dissertation and suggests areas for further 
research.  
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Table 1. Overview articles 
 Title  Status 
1 Burden Sharing in CSDP Military Operations  
(co-authored with Alrik Thiem) 
 
Under review in Foreign Policy 
Analysis 
2 Democratic Contributions to UN Peacekeeping 
Operations-A Two-Step Fuzzy Set QCA of UNIFIL II 
 
Published in Romanian 
Journal of Political Science 
3 NATO Burden Sharing in Libya - A Fuzzy Set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
 
Published in Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 
4 Democratic Participation in the Air Strikes against 
Islamic State - a Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
 
Forthcoming in Foreign Policy 
Analysis 
5 EU Member State Participation in Military 
Operations -A Configurational Comparative Analysis 
 
Under review in Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs 
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2 
Literature Review 
The extant research on European security has devoted little attention to the 
conditions that motivate and block EU member states’ contributions to military 
operations. Nevertheless, a number of studies on the security and defence policies of 
the EU and its member states provide relevant insights on the issue. Furthermore, 
the scholarly literature on military burden sharing, third-party intervention, 
peacekeeping operations and democratic peace offers a wide range of plausible 
explanations for the member states’ varying levels of military engagement. This 
chapter first provides a concise overview of the academic research that specifically 
focusses on the member states’ military engagements. The subsequent sections 
discuss relevant strands of academic research and assess whether these provide 
plausible explanations for the member states’ differing military commitments. As 
such, this literature review has a twofold objective. First, it situates the dissertation in 
the relevant strands of academic research. Second, the review derives plausible 
explanations for the member states’ differing levels of contribution to military 
operations, which provide the key ingredients for the theoretical frameworks that are 
tested in the articles. 
European Military Deployment 
Scholarship and policy analysis has produced an extensive literature on the 
security and defence policies of the EU and its member states. The bulk of the 
research that examines the member states’ military engagements focusses on the 
CSDP and the military operations deployed under its aegis. Most earlier work on the 
subject is descriptive, providing detailed analyses of the planning, conduct and 
impact of CSDP operations (cf. Asseburg & Kempin, 2009; Grevi, Helly & Keohane, 
2009; Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, 2008). More recently, a number of studies has 
examined which conditions determine whether or not a CSDP operation is launched 
(Engberg, 2014; Haesebrouck, 2015a; Pohl, 2014a). Since the preferences of the 
member states are crucial determinants of the launch of CSDP operations, these 
works provide some insights into the motives and interests that spur European 
military engagements (Ginsberg & Penksa, 2012: 61). Furthermore, a recent article 
of Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2014) examines the member states’ contributions to CSDP 
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operations from the perspective of collective action theory, and a number of case 
studies examines the decisions of one or two member states (not) to participate in a 
specific CSDP operation (Brummer, 2013; Koivula & Sipilä, 2011; Schmitt, 2012). 
However, a systematic analysis of the determinants of contributions to CSDP 
operations has not yet been produced. 
The operations deployed under the CSDP framework only account for a small 
portion of European troop deployments (Menon, 2009: 243). In fact, the majority of 
externally deployed European forces was active under other institutional 
frameworks, like NATO and the UN, as part of coalitions of the willing, or in 
unilateral operations (Haesebrouck & Van Meirvenne, 2015: 268-273). Yet, few 
studies on European military deployments do not narrowly focus on the CSDP. Two 
notable exceptions are a RAND study on the record of European-led nation-building 
operations (Dobbins, 2008a; 2008b) and a monograph by Mattelaer (2013) on the 
impact of friction on the strategies of European crisis response operations. However, 
explaining the differing levels of member state contributions to the operations under 
investigation falls beyond the scope of both studies. Other studies on European 
troop deployments generally focus on a single operation or only examine a limited 
number of member states. Davidson (2011), for example, compares the 
contributions of the UK, France and Italy to seven US-led interventions; an edited 
volume of Matlary and Petersson (2013: 7) analyses the “political willingness and 
military ability” of seven member states to use force within the context of NATO and 
Rathbun (2004) examines the responses of the UK, France and Germany to the crises 
in Bosnia and Kosovo. The most comprehensive analysis of the member states’ 
varying military engagements is presented in a study of Dorussen, Kirchner and 
Sperling (2009: 794). However, the latter only demonstrates that the pattern of the 
member states’ military commitments does not correspond to expectations of the 
pure public goods model and that NATO members are more likely to contribute to 
NATO and US-led operations (cf. infra).  
A systematic and comprehensive investigation into the determinants of the 
member states’ contributions to military operations has not yet been produced. 
Nevertheless, the aforementioned works, as well as the more general research on 
European Security Policy, do offer interesting insights into the subject. The 
following sections build on these insights to assess whether the variables invoked in 
other relevant strands of academic research constitute plausible explanations for the 
member states’ military commitments.  
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Military Burden Sharing and Collective Action Theory 
The rich body of scholarly work on military burden sharing constitutes a first 
area of academic research that postulates hypotheses that are relevant to the present 
study. Burden sharing can be defined as “the distribution of costs and risks among 
members of a group in the process of accomplishing a common goal” (Forster & 
Cimbala, 2005: 1). Military deployment produces significant financial and political 
costs, which are closely connected to the level of military support a state provides to 
an operation. In consequence, theories on burden sharing offer valuable insights into 
the determinants of contributions to military operations. Following a seminal study 
by Olson and Zeckhauser (1966), burden sharing research has been dominated by 
collective action theory. The first empirical tests of collective-action-based models 
focussed on the NATO allies’ varying levels of defence spending. More recently, 
insights from collective action theory have also been used to explain diverging 
contributions to military operations. This section first discusses the main arguments 
that have been put forward in this line of work, after which their potential for 
explaining the member states’ differing military commitments is assessed. 
Collective Action Theory and NATO Burden Sharing 
Research on military burden sharing has been dominated by quantitative 
studies that test whether collective action theory explains the NATO allies’ varying 
levels of defence spending. The first collective-action-based models characterized 
defence as a pure public good, marked by non-excludable and non-rival benefits 
(Hartley & Sandler, 1999: 666; Olson & Zeckhauser, 1966: 267). The former implies 
that non-contributors cannot be excluded from enjoying the benefits of a public 
good, the latter that consumption by one actor does not diminish the benefits 
available to anyone else. The pure public goods model predicts that larger, wealthier 
allies will bear a disproportionately large share of the burden of collective defence 
efforts (Olson & Zeckhauser, 1966: 268). Because larger allies place a higher absolute 
value on additional units of the good, they are expected to satisfy the amount desired 
by the smaller allies (Sandler & Hartley, 1999: 31). In consequence, small allies 
should spend very little on the good, relying instead on the amount that spills over 
from the larger allies (Sandler & Murdoch, 2000: 301).  
Collective action theory thus expects small states to attempt to take a free ride 
on the efforts of large states if military action mainly produces public benefits. 
Without any doubt, this so-called “exploitation hypothesis” constitutes the single 
most important collective-action-based explanation for military burden sharing. 
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During the Cold War period, the hypothesis was generally tested by assessing 
whether the NATO members’ GDP was correlated to the share of GDP they devoted 
to defence. In line with the expectations of the pure public goods model, most 
studies found a significant correlation up until 1967 (see inter alia Khanna & 
Sandler, 1996; Oneal, 1990; Sandler, 1993: 447; Sandler & Forbes, 1980). After 
NATO’s military doctrine changed from “Mutually Assured Destruction” to 
“Flexible Response” at the end of the 1960s, military expenditures no longer 
produced only alliance wide public benefits of deterrence, they also yielded impurely 
public and ally-specific benefits (Sandler & Hartley, 1999: 37-40). To account for 
these changes, researchers developed an alternative to the pure public goods model: 
the joint products model. This assumes that defence activities produce multiple 
outputs, which provide purely public as well as impurely public and private benefits 
(Sandler, 1993: 447). Impure public defence outputs occur when benefits are at least 
partially excludable by the provider, private benefits when a defence output only 
helps the providing ally. If the ratio of private benefits to total benefits is high, the 
joint products model expects contributions to collective defence efforts to 
correspond to the expected benefits rather than the size of the (potential) 
contributor (Sandler, 1993: 447; Sandler & Murdoch, 2000: 302). 
Burden Sharing in Military Operations 
During the Cold War period, the bulk of the research on military burden 
sharing focussed on explaining the variation in NATO allies’ levels of defence 
spending. As the importance of peacekeeping operations increased at the beginning 
of the 1990s, scholars started focussing on the division of the burden of military 
operations. A first strand of scholarship tests which collective-action-based model 
provides the best explanation for the distribution of the aggregated financial costs of 
the peacekeeping operations that were deployed in a given year. In line with the 
public goods model, many of the benefits of successful peacekeeping are non-
excludable and non-rival (Khanna & Sandler, 1997: 113). Peacekeeping aims to 
achieve greater worldwide peace and stability, which benefits all nations, regardless 
of whether they contribute to operations. Peacekeeping also produces some country-
specific benefits such as “(1) status enhancement for a contributing country; (2) 
greater stability for neighbouring countries and (3) economic benefits for trading 
partners” (Shimizu & Sandler, 2002: 656). Nevertheless, the bulk of the empirical 
studies demonstrate that larger states tend to carry a disproportionately large share 
of the burden of peacekeeping operations, hereby confirming the public goods 
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model (e.g. Khanna & Sandler, 1997; Khanna, Sandler & Shimizu, 1998; Shimizu & 
Sandler, 2002; Shimizu & Sandler, 2010). 
Following an article by Bennett, Lepgold and Unger (1994) on the 1991 
Persian Gulf War, a number of studies has examined military and financial 
contributions to single operations. Rather than narrowly focussing on collective 
action theory, these studies combine international and domestic level variables into 
sophisticated integrated models. The bulk of these frameworks include a variant of 
the exploitation hypothesis generally referred to as the “collective action hypothesis” 
(Oma, 2012: 563). Bennett, Lepgold and Unger (1997: 346) conclude that this 
hypothesis correctly predicted that the US would make a disproportionately large 
contribution to the Desert Storm Coalition, but failed to explain why any of the 
other states participated in the operation. Since the US was capable of achieving the 
goals of Operation Desert Storm without the help of the other allies, the latter could 
have gained the public benefits of this operation without contributing. In an in-
depth analysis of the contributions of South Korea, Turkey and Germany to the 2003 
Iraq War, Baltrusaitis (2010) arrives at the same conclusion: collective action theory 
erroneously predicted that all other states would take a free ride on the US. Such 
anomalous lack of free riding is the central research puzzle of Davidson (2011: 5), 
whose main objective is to explain why “America’s allies make rather costly 
contributions when they could have taken a free ride off American military might”.  
Studies that focus on specific operations thus suggest that the collective-
action-based exploitation hypothesis explains the disproportionately large 
contribution of the US, but does not account for the behaviour of other states. Since 
the US is generally capable of successfully conducting an operation by itself, the 
efforts of the other allies are not expected to produce more collective benefits, which, 
in turn, provides them the opportunity to take a free ride on the US. Mello (2014) 
does suggest that collective-action-based arguments can account for more than only 
the US’ contribution to multinational operations. More specifically, his research 
demonstrates that military power was linked to a state’s level of participation during 
the NATO-intervention in Kosovo and Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan (Mello, 2014: 187). Similarly, Auerswald (2004) concludes that the 
strong support of both the US and the UK for the military intervention in Kosovo 
corresponds to the expectations of collective action theory. However, Auerswald 
(2004:657) argues that the UK’s large contribution is best explained by its desire to 
secure the collective good of NATO viability, which confirms theories on alliance 
politics rather than the collective action hypothesis (cf. infra).  
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Collective Action Theory and Member State Military Deployment 
The single most important hypothesis of the literature that examines military 
burden sharing from the perspective of collective action theory is that small states 
will attempt to free ride on the efforts of large states if collective military action 
produces purely public benefits. Two recent articles present empirical tests that 
assess whether this exploitation hypothesis explains the variation in the member 
states’ military engagements. First, in a study on burden sharing in EU security 
governance, Dorussen, Kirchner and Sperling (2009) assess whether this hypothesis 
explains the variation in the member states’ deployed troops. Although their analysis 
shows that the member states’ troop commitments are correlated to their GDP, 
Dorussen, Kirchner and Sperling (2009: 802) conclude that the exploitation 
hypothesis is not confirmed by their data. More specifically, they argue that the 
found correlation mainly reflects the “higher willingness of the newer NATO 
members to contribute to NATO missions”, since it is not robust when the EU15 
and the ten states that joined the EU in 2004 are analysed separately.  
In an article that applies collective action theory to the CSDP, Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni (2014:96) also does not provide convincing evidence in support of the 
exploitation hypothesis. In fact, his empirical analyses demonstrate that, except for 
France, the large EU member states “all contribute less than their ‘fair’ share of 
troops” to CSDP operations (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2014: 96). The evidence for the 
exploitation hypothesis as an explanation for the member states’ diverging military 
contributions thus seems mixed at best. On top of that, member states are included 
in many of the studies that invoke the collective action hypothesis to explain 
contributions to single operations, which generally call into question its value for 
explaining anything but the disproportionately large contribution of the US (cf. 
supra).  
However, there are three good reasons not to rule out the exploitation 
hypothesis as a potential explanation for the member states’ contributions to the 
operations under investigation. First, previous studies that test whether collective 
action theory explains contributions to single operations generally focus on military 
interventions that were dominated by the US. Given the US’ abundant military 
resources, it is generally capable of achieving the goals of an operation without any 
military support. In consequence, all other states have the opportunity to take a free 
ride, irrespective of their military capabilities. However, the US did not participate in 
three of the operations that are examined in the present study and limited its 
military role in a fourth, the air campaign over Libya (cf. infra). In consequence, the 
collective action hypothesis is a more likely explanation for the member states’ 
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differing contributions to the operations examined here, than for the operations that 
were the subject of earlier research.  
Second, there are reasons to believe that the military operations to which the 
EU member states contribute mainly produce EU-wide benefits. Biscop and 
Coelmont (2013:16), for example, argue that EU member states no longer have 
national vital interests, but instead share the same vital interests. Moreover, given the 
political and economic interdependence within the EU, a threat to one member state 
inevitably threatens all member states (Dorussen, Kirchner & Sperling, 2009: 794). 
As a result, member states are likely to try to ride cheap on other member states’ 
efforts to balance these threats, hoping they “will do the job” without their support 
(Lepgold, 1998: 87).  
Third, the member states “vary greatly in their ability to contribute” to 
operations (Dorussen, Kirchner & Sperling, 2009: 794). The UK and France, for 
example, account for over 40% of EU defence spending (Menon, 2011: 40). In 
consequence, their involvement can determine the effectiveness of European 
military action, which denies them the opportunity to take a free ride if they want to 
gain the benefits of an operation (Dorussen, Kirchner & Sperling, 2009: 794). In 
contrast, the smaller member states do have the opportunity to take a free ride if an 
operation mainly produces EU-wide public benefits, since they can only have a 
modest impact on the provision of these benefits and cannot be excluded from 
enjoying them (Mello, 2014: 42; Ringsmose, 2010: 324).  
In conclusion, the collective-action-based expectation that large member 
states should be more inclined to contribute to military operations seems a plausible 
explanation for the member states’ varying military commitments. However, 
scholars have also argued that differing security concerns and economic interests 
cause the private benefits from military operations to vary considerable between the 
member states (cf. infra). Consistent with the joint products model, this would imply 
that contributions should correspond with expected benefits rather than the size of 
the (potential) contributor. The next section discusses plausible sources of private 
incentives, which might motivate member state participation in military operations. 
Direct and Indirect Benefits of Military Engagements 
In addition to the literature on military burden sharing, there is a vast body of 
scholarly research on the determinants of third-party intervention in civil war and 
participation in peacekeeping operations. In line with the joint products model, this 
work provides evidence that military deployments are linked to the benefits nations 
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(hope to) gain by participating in operations. These benefits can be structured in two 
main categories: (1) security and economic benefits that directly follow from 
successful military operations and (2) more indirect benefits, such as the ones 
produced by an alliance with a powerful state or the status enhancement that follows 
from contributing to peacekeeping operations. This section first discusses the most 
important direct and indirect incentives for participating in military operations, after 
which their potential for explaining the variation in member states’ military 
commitments is assessed. 
Security Concerns and Economic Benefits 
Scholarship provides extensive evidence that military engagements are linked 
to security concerns and economic interests. Studies that build on integrated models 
to explain burden sharing in military operations generally invoke the “balance-of-
threat hypothesis” (Oma, 2012: 564). In line with Stephen Walt’s (1987) neorealist 
theory of alliance formation, Bennett, Lepgold and Unger (1997: 10-11) expected the 
states that were threatened by Iraq’s offensive military capabilities to carry a high 
share of the burden of the Desert Storm Coalition. Davidson (2011: 16-17) builds on 
a more comprehensive definition of “threat” that encompasses threats to “the state’s 
territorial integrity or its citizens, the state’s economy (including significant 
economic interests abroad), or a natural resource of economic or security 
significance”. His study provides strong support for the explanatory value of such 
threats, which were the most important determinants of participation in US-led 
operations (Davidson, 2011: 174). 
Research on third-party intervention in violent conflict and personnel 
contributions to peacekeeping operations has tested the explanatory value of more 
specific variables related to economic benefits and security concerns. First, a  state 
with a high level of bilateral trade with the country at war should have a strong 
incentive to intervene, since conflicts have the potential to disrupt trade relations 
(Fordham, 2008: 745). However, empirical support for the link between bilateral 
trade and military commitments is mixed. On the one hand, Rost and Greig (2011: 
179-180) show that non-major powers are more likely to send peacekeepers to 
countries with which they have strong trade relations, while Aydin (2008) provides 
evidence that third parties are more inclined to join interstate conflicts if they have a 
high level bilateral trade with one of the conflicting parties. On the other hand, Yoon 
(1997: 594) and Fordham (2008) conclude that economic interests do not increase 
the probability that the US will intervene in an internal crisis. Likewise, the study by 
Perkins and Neumayer (2008: 906) does not establish a strong link between trade ties 
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and contributions to peacekeeping operations. Kathman (2011: 864) even suggests 
that the likelihood of third-party intervention in a civil war decreases with higher 
levels of bilateral trade. 
Second, the ramifications of civil wars are rarely confined to one state, as they 
generally also threaten the stability of the countries located in the civil war state’s 
wider region (Kathman, 2011). In consequence, potential interveners cannot be 
expected to narrowly base intervention decisions on economic interests in the civil 
war country itself. Instead, they might be driven by “regional, more economically 
consequential, interests” (Kathman, 2011: 864). More specifically, a third party that 
has a high level of trade with the civil war state’s wider region should be more likely 
to intervene, especially if there is a high risk of contagion. In one of the rare articles 
that test this conjecture, Kathman (2011: 865) provides extensive evidence that 
“third parties that are dependent upon the civil war state’s region for its [sic] 
economic well-being are increasingly likely to intervene as the risk of diffusion 
rises”. 
Third, prior research suggests there might be a link between military 
engagements and economically significant natural resources. Since oil is the most 
valuable commodity traded on international markets, the presence of oil reserves 
constitutes a potential incentive for military action (Colgan, 2013: 149). First of all, 
the opportunity to capture oil reserves constitutes a plausible motivation for 
territorial conquest. However, in a comprehensive overview of scholarship on the 
link between oil and conflict, Colgan (2013: 155) contends that systematic empirical 
evidence for the frequency of such “resource wars” is lacking. Second, states might 
intervene in international or domestic conflicts to ensure the continuing functioning 
of the global oil market and avoid supply disruptions. Colgan (2013:157) contends 
that this was one of the reasons for the US-led interventions in Iraq in 1991 and 
2003. Bove, Gleditsch and Sekeris (2015) provide more systematic evidence for this 
conjecture. More specifically, their analysis demonstrates that third parties are more 
likely to intervene in an internal war if the country at war has large oil reserves, the 
potential intervener has a higher demand for oil, and the level of bilateral oil exports 
from the conflict state to the potential intervener is high. 
A fourth plausible motivation for military deployments is the “perceived 
national security interest” in countering terrorist activities (Choi & James, 2014: 2). 
Especially after 9/11, western military interventions have been justified as an 
indispensable response to terrorist threats (Azam & Thelen, 2010: 239). However, 
scholarship provides only limited evidence that terrorist threats actually incite 
military deployments. The analysis of Choi and James (2014: 11) suggests that US 
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military campaigns are more likely in “countries where extensive and international 
terrorism is thriving”, but that this correlation does not hold against a range of 
model specifications. Azam and Thelen (2010), in turn, conclude that US military 
interventions are not mainly motivated by the war on terror, while Auerswald and 
Saideman (2014: 16) contend that a country’s experience with terrorist attacks is not 
at all correlated with the extent to which NATO-allies control their contingents in 
the ISAF operation in Afghanistan. In contrast, the study of Sandler and Shimizu 
(2014: 57) on NATO burden sharing does show that “terrorism motivates the most-
at-risk allies to spend more on defense”.  
Finally, scholarship provides extensive evidence that there is a strong 
correlation between geographic proximity and military engagements. Geographically 
close countries are more likely to experience the negative externalities of nearby 
conflict, such as increased refugee flows and the disruption of supply lines, which 
provide them with an incentive to support military operations (Murdoch & Sandler, 
2002; Shimizu & Sandler, 2002: 656). Extensive research demonstrates that countries 
in a conflict’s vicinity are indeed more inclined to participate in military operations. 
The studies by Perkins and Neumayer (2008: 905) and Uzonyi (2015: 751) provide 
statistically robust evidence that distance is negatively related to contributions to 
peacekeeping operations. Likewise, Mullenbach and Matthews (2008: 42) 
demonstrate that the US is more likely to intervene in geographically proximate 
countries, while the analysis of Kathman (2011: 863) shows that third parties that 
share a border with a civil war state are more likely to intervene. 
Alliance Value and UN Peacekeeping Tradition 
The previous sections focussed on contributor specific benefits that directly 
follow from successful military operations. However, contributions to military 
operations have also been linked to more indirect motives, such as securing the 
benefits produced by an alliance with a powerful state or the status enhancement 
that follows from large contributions to peacekeeping operations. 
A large number of studies has invoked theories of alliance politics to explain 
contributions to US-led and NATO operations (Oma, 2012: 565). Integrated burden 
sharing models generally build on Glenn Snyder’s secondary “alliance security 
dilemma” (1984) to formulate expectations on the link between alliance politics and 
contributions to multilateral operations. This postulates that members of military 
alliances face two countervailing pressures: fear of abandonment and fear of 
entrapment. The former involves the risk of being deserted by an ally; the latter of 
being entangled in a conflict central to the ally’s interests, but peripheral to one’s 
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own. A state’s choices in the alliance security dilemma are primarily determined by 
its relative dependence on the respective ally. The more a state depends on the ally 
for assistance against future security threats, the more likely it is that the costs of 
abandonment will outweigh the costs of entrapment (Snyder, 1984: 471-472). Several 
scholars have argued that alliance dependence provides the best explanation for the 
lack of chronic free riding in US-led military operations. Bennett, Lepgold and 
Unger (1994: 72), for example, conclude that American leaders pre-empted free 
riding during the Persian Gulf War by exercising leverage over the coalition 
partners; while Baltrusaitis (2010: 205) contends that alliance dependence was one of 
the most important determinants for burden sharing outcomes during the 2003 Iraq 
War. Similarly, Kupchan (1988: 330-334) concludes that European concerns about 
abandonment from the US explain why they cooperated with Washington to address 
the security problems in the Persian Gulf at the beginning of the 1980s. 
More recently, scholars have argued that alliance dependence does not 
constitute the only reason for states to support an ally. Davidson (2011: 15) prefers 
the term “alliance value” over “alliance dependence”, because states “may value an 
ally for myriad reasons and value does not necessarily entail dependence”. More 
specifically, he argues that alliance value also depends on the expected influence on 
an ally, which determines whether they will be “able to leverage their ally’s power 
into outcomes in their favor”. Ringsmose (2010: 330-331) agrees with this line of 
reasoning by arguing that there are two groups of NATO allies with a particularly 
strong interest in a good relationship with the US: “Article 5ers” and “Traditional 
Atlanticists”. The first group comprises the states that focus on NATO’s collective 
defence principle, as enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In line with 
the alliance dependence hypothesis, it comprises states that perceive a resurging 
Russian threat and “realize their security comes in the shape of American security 
guarantees” (Noetzel & Schreer, 2009; Ringsmose, 2010: 331). “Atlanticists”, in turn, 
are allies who perceive themselves as states with a special relationship with 
Washington, which they consider “an important key to their security and their 
political clout on the international scene” (Ringsmose, 2010: 331). States might thus 
value their alliance with the US because they are dependent on the US’ security 
guarantee or perceive a special relationship with Washington. While “Article 5ers” 
perceive contributions to NATO or US-led operations as “a fee to obtain American 
protection”, “Atlanticists” consider it “the price of political influence” (Ringsmose, 
2010: 332).  
Research on burden sharing in UNPOs also refers to benefits that are not 
directly related to the goals of an operation. A frequently invoked private incentive 
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to participate in UNPOs are the status gains from being recognized as a major 
promoter of world peace (Bobrow & Boyer, 1997: 729; Khanna, Sandler & Shimizu, 
1998: 182). Although these gains are available to all potential contributors, states that 
invested a large amount of resources to support the UN peacekeeping system in the 
past can reasonably be expected to accord more importance to these benefits. This 
corresponds to the expectations of Lebovic (2004: 915), who argues that 
“institutional involvement is self-perpetuating, that an act of participation commits a 
state […] to further action by creating and reinforcing roles, rules, and 
expectations”. Moreover, states with a strong tradition of participating in 
peacekeeping operations may also participate more because they “have already built 
up the infrastructure to do so” (Gaibulloev et al., 2015: 733; Uzonyi, 2015: 749). Prior 
peacekeeping involvement should thus have a positive impact on a state’s propensity 
to further contribute to UNPOs. Scholarship on troop contributions to UNPOs 
provides strong evidence for this expectation. The analysis of  Lebovic (2004: 928), 
for example, demonstrates that a country’s level of previous commitment to UNPOs 
is a significant determinant of future participation, while Bobrow and Boyer (1997: 
731) conclude that peacekeeping “activism can become a habit”. 
Country-Specific Benefits and Member State Military Deployment 
To sum up, scholarly research provides evidence that military engagements 
are related to the extent to which the target of an intervention poses a threat to a 
state’s economic or security interests and to more indirect benefits, like alliance 
dependence and peacekeeping tradition. None of the targets of recent European 
military deployments had the military capabilities or intention to directly threaten 
member states. In consequence, the balance of threats hypothesis, as originally 
formulated by Walt (1987), does not provide a plausible explanation for the member 
states’ varying military engagements. In contrast, variation in less existential threats 
to member states’ economic and security interests does constitute a plausible cause 
of the divergence in the member states’ military commitments. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 
(2014: 91), for example, argues that the member states are not equally affected by 
threats arising from political instability in Europe’s wider neighbourhood. “Due to 
geography, trade patterns and colonial ties, countries such as Spain or France are 
more likely to benefit from successful action to stem political unrest in North Africa, 
whereas East European states have a vested interest in ensuring stability in the 
Balkan” (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2014: 91-92). Similarly, Dorussen, Kirchner and 
Sperling (2009: 794) argue that “the line between threats against a core national 
interest as opposed to a core EU interest is ambiguous and contestable”, while Dyson 
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(2013b: 428) contends that differences in geographical position and energy 
dependency have important implications for the member states’ defence policies.  
The member states’ varying contributions to military operations might also be 
explained by the different value they accord to indirect benefits. First of all, the 
relative importance accorded to the relationship with the US varies considerably 
amongst the member states (Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013: 389-390; Dyson, 2013a: 
389; Meyer, 2006: 169). The East-European countries, for example, accord a 
relatively high value to good relations with Washington because they are dependent 
on the US to balance the potential threats of a resurging Russia (Ringsmose, 2013: 
411). Countries like Denmark, the UK and the Netherlands, in turn, perceive a 
special relationship with the US, which they consider “an important key to their 
security and their political clout on the international scene” (Ringsmose, 2010: 331). 
In line with theories on alliance politics, these member states can be expected to have 
an incentive to participate in NATO operations and US-led coalitions of the willing.  
Likewise, the Scandinavian and “neutral” member states are consistently 
mentioned in the literature on peacekeeping burden sharing as states with a tradition 
of strongly supporting the UN peacekeeping system and can thus be expected to be 
more inclined to participate in UNPOs (Devine, 2011: 341; Khanna, Sandler & 
Shimizu, 1998: 182; Shimizu & Sandler, 2002: 656). A strong peacekeeping tradition 
can also be expected to matter for operations that were deployed in support of 
UNPOs, like EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad. This corresponds to an argument 
presented in Pohl’s (2014b) study on the drivers behind CSDP operations, which 
links the significant engagement of Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden in EUFOR 
Chad to their national foreign policy traditions of strongly contributing to UN 
peacekeeping operations (Pohl, 2014a: 138-141; Pohl, 2014b: 200). 
Domestic-Level Variables and Resource Constraints 
Different strands of scholarship invoke domestic-level variables to explain 
military deployments. Research on military intervention provides ample evidence 
that domestic factors have an impact on decisions to resort to the use of force 
(Aubone, 2013: 291-294; Fordham, 1998; Mullenbach & Matthews, 2008: 28). 
Likewise, studies that build on integrated burden sharing models generally conclude 
that domestic-level variables are important determinants of contributions to 
multinational operations (Oma, 2012: 566). Finally, a recent strand of democratic 
peace research provides strong evidence that domestic differences between 
democracies influence their propensity to resort to military force (cf. inter alia 
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Hegre, 2014; Ireland & Gartner, 2001; Maoz & Russett, 1993; Mello, 2012). These 
partially overlapping areas of academic research offer a number of plausible 
domestic determinants of the member states’ varying levels of military engagement, 
which can be structured in four categories: institutional constraints, election cycle, 
public opinion and partisan politics. In addition, this line of research suggests that a 
state’s inclination to participate in military operations can be inhibited by resource 
constraints, which originate both at the domestic and international level. This 
section first discusses these domestic-level variables and resource constraints, after 
which their potential for explaining the member states’ varying levels of military 
engagement is assessed. 
Institutional Constraints 
A vast number of studies has established a strong link between the varying 
institutional constraints on executive action and military deployment decisions 
(Ireland & Gartner, 2001; Maoz & Russett, 1993: 626; Prins & Sprecher, 1999). This 
line of research generally builds on the structural model of democratic peace, which 
“views the constitutional and legal constraints on executive action as a key to 
understanding how governments act in their international politics” (Hegre, 2014; 
Maoz & Russett, 1993: 626). A more recent direction in democratic peace research 
emphasises the significant variation in the institutional constraints on democratic 
leaders and expects this to affect their international behaviour (e.g. Ireland & 
Gartner, 2001; Prins & Sprecher, 1999). First of all, democratic leaders were expected 
to be far less constrained in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems, 
since executives are far more dependent on support from the legislature in the latter 
(Maoz & Russett, 1993: 626). However, quantitative studies did not confirm this 
conjecture. Neither Reiter and Tillman (2002: 824), nor Leblang and Chan (2003: 
394) conclude that presidential regimes were significantly more likely to get involved 
in conflict.1  
Scholars did establish convincing evidence for the impact of a second 
institutional variable: the degree of parliamentary involvement in decision-making 
on the use of force. Legislative involvement is expected to open up governmental 
                                                          
1 Moreover, except for France, all EU members either have a parliamentary regime or semi-
presidential regime dominated by parliament, which suggests that the presidential-
parliamentary distinction explains little of the variation in member state military 
engagements (Armingeon et al., 2015). 
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decision-making to public scrutiny, forcing “governments to give reasons for 
political decisions” (Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2008: 4). In consequence, 
strong parliamentary involvement should significantly restrict a government’s 
freedom of action. A study of European involvement in the 2003 Iraq intervention 
by Dieterich, Hummel and Marschall (2015) confirms that high parliamentary war 
powers are associated with weak degrees of war involvement. Similarly, the study by 
Choi (2010: 438) shows that legislative constraints “are likely to discourage 
democratic executives’ use of force” and Reiter and Tillman (2002: 824) conclude 
that greater legislative controls over foreign policy are associated with lower 
propensity to initiate conflicts. 
The level of constraints on the chief executive is also determined by the nature 
of the ruling coalition (Reiter & Tillman, 2002: 814). Minority governments are 
generally considered the most constrained cabinet structures, since the parliament is 
always a potential veto player if the executive does not control a majority of 
parliamentary seats (Ireland & Gartner, 2001: 548-558). Multi-party coalition 
governments, in turn, should be more constrained than single-party majority 
governments, since they require members of multiple parties to agree on military 
contributions. The studies by Palmer, London and Regan (2004: 16) and Ireland and 
Gartner (2001: 561) convincingly demonstrate that minority governments are the 
least likely to get involved in militarized disputes. In contrast, research does not 
consistently support that coalition governments are less likely to get involved in 
international conflict. On the one hand, a study by Auerswald (1999: 498) suggests 
that coalition governments are less likely to use force, while Saideman and 
Auerswald (2012: 82) argue that they tend to impose more caveats on their deployed 
troops. Likewise, Palmer, London and Regan (2004: 16) conclude that governments 
with multiple pivotal parties are less likely to become involved in international 
disputes. In contrast, Leblang and Chan (2003: 397) and Ireland and Gartner (2001: 
561) suggest that there is no distinction between single party and coalition 
governments, while Prins and Sprecher (1999: 285) even conclude that coalition 
governments are more likely to reciprocate military disputes.  
The previously discussed domestic constraints are based on the assumption 
that the probability of military engagement is negatively related to the number of 
actors involved in the decision-making process on the use of force. Mello (2014: 34-
36) draws attention to a more structural and rigid constraint: constitutional 
restrictions. Democracies show substantial differences in the type of military 
operations they are legally permitted to participate in. Constitutional restrictions can 
prohibit participation “(a) on the ground of international law, (b) outside certain 
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organizational frameworks, (c) beyond a set of permissible tasks” (Mello, 2014: 36). 
Mello (2014: 185-186) provides strong evidence for the importance of this 
determinant: his analysis shows that the absence of constitutional restrictions was a 
necessary condition for democratic participation in the military operations in 
Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq.  
Election Cycle 
Two diametrically opposed expectations have been postulated on the impact 
of electoral cycles on the decision to send armed forces abroad (Aldrich et al., 2006: 
494-495; Williams, 2013: 450). Research that builds on the “diversionary theory of 
war” predicts that executives will be more inclined to initiate conflict at the end of an 
electoral cycle, since this constitutes an opportunity to create a rallying around the 
flag effect, thereby improving their prospect of re-election (cf Meernik & Waterman, 
1996; Ostrom & Job, 1986). Theories on casualty aversion and democratic peace, on 
the other hand, expect governments to be careful not to upset the public before an 
election by engaging in costly military adventures (cf. Auerswald, 1999; Gaubatz, 
1991). 
Very few empirical studies support the diversionary war hypothesis (cf. 
Fordham, 1998; Stoll, 1984). In contrast, there is extensive evidence that executives 
are reluctant to resort to the use of force when elections are forthcoming. Gaubatz 
(1991: 232), for example, shows that democracies are less likely to start a war in the 
pre-election period, while Williams (2013: 459) concludes that governments behave 
less aggressively when an election is imminent, and Tago (2009) contends that 
democracies were more likely to withdraw from the US-led coalition in Iraq at the 
time of national elections. Kisangani and Pickering (2007: 281-282) differentiate 
between socioeconomic and politico-strategic military interventions. The former are 
“essentially benevolent missions launched for low politics issues”, such as 
humanitarian interventions, missions to safeguard minorities or military 
deployments over economic issues; the latter are belligerent operations over high 
politics issues that are considered central to national power and prestige. Contrary to 
their theoretical expectations, Kisangani and Pickering’s empirical analysis shows 
that democratic leaders are less likely to launch both types of interventions during 
election campaigns (Kisangani & Pickering, 2007: 289). In sum, empirical evidence 
suggests that military deployments are less, rather than more, likely if national 
elections are looming.  
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Public Opinion 
One of the core assumptions of the democratic peace theory is that 
democracies are more peaceful because public opposition to military deployment 
can restrain “the war-making proclivities of leaders” (Holsti, 1992: 440). Since 
“public opinion is central to representation, democratic accountability and decision-
making”, it should be self-evident that it has an impact on the contributions of 
democracies to multinational operations (Aldrich et al., 2006: 477; Mello, 2014: 40-
41). Nevertheless, many scholars are sceptical on the link between public opinion 
and foreign policy. In a comprehensive review of scholarly research on the impact of 
public opinion on foreign policy, Holsti (1992) argues that public opinion was 
regarded as highly volatile, incoherent, and not very important for foreign policy 
decisions during the first two decades after World War II.  
Since the end of the 1960s, an increasing number of scholars has challenged 
this pessimistic view. Ostrom and Job (1986: 556-557) and James and Oneal (1991), 
for example, show that public aversion to war is negatively related to the probability 
of the use of force. Similarly, Baum (2004: 221) concludes that public opinion had a 
constraining effect on the policies of the Bush and Clinton administrations during 
the crisis in Somalia. Other recent studies, however, conclude that public opinion 
had a very limited impact on military deployment. Kreps (2010: 191), for example, 
contends that “public opinion hardly matters for NATO-led Operations in 
Afghanistan”, while Auerswald and Saideman (2014: 21, 213) argue that public 
support does not covary with the pattern of participation in the operations in 
Afghanistan and Libya. 
Risse-Kappen (1991: 480-486) steers a middle ground between the sceptic and 
optimistic view on the link between public opinion and foreign policy. Rather than 
assuming that “the general public has a measurable and distinct impact on the 
foreign policy-making process” or, conversely, that “popular consensus is a function 
of the elite consensus”, he argues that domestic structures and coalition-building 
processes must be taken into account to understand the impact of public opinion. 
More specifically, Risse-Kappen (1991: 480-486) maintains that public demands 
have more impact in states with “fragmented political institutions”, where executive 
power is not centralized in the hands of one decision-maker. In line with this 
assertion, Mello (2014: 41) expects the combination of public opposition and 
parliamentary veto rights to constitute a veto point. Similarly, Bennett, Lepgold and 
Unger (1997: 17-20; 348-350) conclude that public opposition only constrains less-
autonomous executives. Davidson (2011: 19), in turn, expects democratic leaders to 
refrain from acting against public opinion when this could have electoral 
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ramifications. The latter will be the case when elections are scheduled in “the near-
to-median future” and opposition parties offer the public an alternative policy 
option. However, Davidson (2011) argues that governments will rarely face an 
electorally relevant public, since government and opposition seldom disagree on 
contributions to multinational operations. 
Partisan Politics 
A rich body of literature discusses the link between government ideology and 
the foreign policies of established democracies. In a comprehensive study on the 
creation of European security institutions outside NATO, Hofmann (2013: 204), for 
example, demonstrates that a government’s preferences with regards to security are 
structured by their ideological orientation. Likewise, studies that examine the link 
between government ideology and military intervention consistently conclude that 
political partisanship matters for military deployments. Palmer, London and Regan 
(2004) assume that political leaders, above all, want to remain in office. Since the 
electoral platforms of right-leaning parties are generally more pro-military than 
those of left-leaning parties, right-wing governments should be more likely to resort 
to the use of force. The analysis by Palmer, London and Regan (2004), as well as the 
successive study of Arena and Palmer (2009), confirms this inference. Likewise, the 
study of Koch and Sullivan (2010) suggests that leaders whose base of support is on 
the left of the political spectrum are more constrained by the costs of war fighting, 
Stevens (2015) demonstrates that supporters of right-leaning parties are indeed less 
likely to disapprove of war, and Schuster and Maier (2006) conclude that rightist 
parties were more inclined to support the 2003 Iraq war. 
Given the great variety in military operations, the one-dimensional distinction 
between the pro-military right and pro-peace left might oversimplify the link 
between government ideology and military deployment. In this connection, several 
scholars have argued that the impact of ideology on foreign policy preferences 
depends on the context of the intervention (Martini, 2015: 432; Mello, 2014: 39; 
Rathbun, 2004). Brian Rathbun (2004), for example, develops an elaborate three-
dimensional model. This expects leftist parties to be more antimilitaristic, to prefer 
pursuing their interests through multilateral frameworks, and follow a more 
inclusive conception of the national interest, which comprises the promotion of the 
welfare of other countries (Rathbun, 2004: 18-21). Humanitarian interventions 
confront leftist parties with a value conflict between their preference for 
antimilitarism and their inclusive conception of national interests. Rathbun (2004: 
27-30) argues that a country’s historical experience is critical for how this value 
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conflict is resolved and expects the left-wing parties of countries with a “positive 
experience with the use of force” to support humanitarian interventions. Rightist 
parties have a more narrow conception of the national interest, consider the use of 
force an acceptable instrument in international relations, and are more reluctant to 
delegate control to multilateral institutions. In consequence, Rathbun (2004) only 
expects right-wing governments to support military crisis management if they 
believe this enhances narrow national interests.  
Recent research suggests that, depending on the level of legislative 
involvement in military deployment decisions, the ideological orientation of a 
country’s parliament might also have an impact on military deployment decisions. 
Williams (2014: 120), for example, argues that opposition parties are more likely to 
challenge ideologically dissimilar governments, while Choi (2010: 441) contends that 
the level of parliamentary constraints only increases if legislative veto players and the 
executive have different ideological orientations. Likewise, Mello (2012: 427) 
integrates hypotheses on partisan politics and institutional structures in a 
sophisticated multi-causal model, which expects only the combination of 
parliamentary veto power and a left parliament to create an effective veto point 
against military deployment. In contrast, a study by Kesgin and Kaarbo (2010) on 
Turkey’s involvement in the 2003 Iraq war shows that a parliament can constitute an 
effective veto point even if a single party government enjoys a parliamentary 
majority. This finding resonates with the research of Auerswald (1999: 475-480), 
who argues that executives will be reluctant to use force if their decision can be 
hindered or overturned by the legislature, irrespective of “the convergence or 
divergence of executive-legislative preferences”.  
Resource Constraints 
Military deployment requires the unexpected allocation of two kinds of 
resources: “military manpower and a special budget for sending and maintaining 
troops abroad” (Tago, 2014: 268). Even the resources of states with substantial 
military capabilities can be stretched too thin to allow for new military engagements 
(Aubone, 2013: 291). In consequence, participation should be less likely if military 
resources are already in short supply due to simultaneous engagements. First of all, 
military forces committed to concurrent operations are unavailable for other uses 
(Bove & Elia, 2011: 705; Fordham, 1998: 576). Moreover, additional military 
engagements would make the remaining military assets harder to use if other, 
perhaps more pressing, demands should arise. Several studies back this expectation 
with empirical support. Victor (2010: 223, 225) and Lebovic (2004), for example, 
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conclude that states that are engaged in external conflicts are less likely to participate 
in peacekeeping operations. Likewise, Ostrom and Job (1986: 556) and Fordham 
(1998: 584) show that the US is less likely to resort to the use of force during an on-
going war; the research of Bove and Elia (2011: 707) indicates that the number of 
concurrent operations is a significant obstacle to additional contributions to 
peacekeeping operations and Gaibulloev et al. (2015: 738) conclude that a country 
reduces it deployments in UNPOs as it participates in more non-UN peacekeeping 
missions. 
Budget deficits might also have a negative impact on a state’s propensity to 
decide on new troop deployments. Since defence is “the component of the budget 
with the greatest flexibility to accommodate fiscal pressure”, it is more sensitive to 
domestic fiscal pressures than other spending categories (Su, Kamlet & Mowery, 
1993: 225-227). Previous research has shown that budget deficits indeed restrain 
military spending (Kamlet & Mowery, 1987: 162). Similarly, Tago (2005: 588) has 
argued that US presidents facing budget constraints will be more likely to consider 
burden sharing with allies in order to accommodate the costs of military operations. 
In a more recent study, Tago (2014: 275) demonstrates that states facing significant 
challenges in their domestic economy will hesitate to contribute to coalition 
operations. 
Domestic-Level Variables and Member State Military Deployment 
To sum up, different strands of academic research have established strong 
evidence that military deployments are linked to domestic-level variables. Research 
on European security suggests that many of these domestic conditions provide 
plausible explanations for the member states’ differing levels of contribution to 
military operations. First of all, the studies of Meyer (2006: 11; 148) and Biehl, 
Giegerich and Jonas (2013) demonstrate that the member states’ governments face 
varying levels of institutional constraints when deciding on military intervention. 
Pohl (2013a: 180), in turn, concludes that the member states’ positions towards a 
CSDP operation generally correspond “to domestic considerations and priorities”. 
Likewise, Rathbun (2004) provides strong evidence that government ideology was an 
important determinant of the reactions of the UK, France and Germany to the 
Balkan wars. Matlary and Petersson (2013) conclude that ideology has a considerable 
and direct impact on European contributions to NATO operations, but argue that 
states with more strategic “military cultures”, like France and the UK, are less 
influenced by political factors. In contrast, Davidson (2011) contends that domestic 
variables are not decisive for European military engagements. More specifically, his 
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study concludes that domestic-level conditions only mattered in two of his twenty-
one cases of European (non-) participation in US-led interventions. 
Resource constraints also constitute a plausible explanation for member states’ 
varying military commitments. For most of the last decade, European states have 
had at least 50,000 troops deployed at any given time. Since this corresponds to the 
EU capability target set during the 1999 Helsinki European Council, the member 
states cannot be expected to have had a large reserve of uncommitted deployable 
military forces (Biscop, 2015: 174; Dorussen, Kirchner & Sperling, 2009, 794). 
Likewise, the decline in European defence spending after the 2007 financial crisis 
suggests that member states that are faced with tight budgets allocate their scarce 
resources to other policy areas than defence (Giegerich & Nicoll, 2012: 53). 
Strategic Culture 
The literature on strategic culture offers a last plausible explanation for the 
variation in the member states’ military commitments. The concept of strategic 
culture was introduced in modern security studies by Jack Snyder (1977) with a 
study about the Soviet Union’s nuclear strategy. Lacking a unitary definition, 
strategic culture is generally used to refer to the shared norms, beliefs and ideas 
within a society on the appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives 
(Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013: 12; Lantis, 2009: 38-39; Meyer, 2006: 20). The 
concept thus suggests that “different security communities think and behave 
somewhat differently when it comes to strategic matters” (Gray, 2009: 226). These 
differences stem from a wide range of material and ideational factors, like historical 
experiences, geographical positions and national mythologies (Lantis, 2009: 40). 
Since elites embedded in different strategic cultures can be expected to react 
differently to similar situations, strategic culture constitutes a plausible explanation 
for differing contributions to military operations (Gray, 2009: 226; Johnston, 1995: 
35). 
A vast body of scholarly research examines European security cooperation 
from a strategic culture perspective. Several scholars have examined whether and to 
what extent the EU is developing its own strategic culture (Chappell & Petrov, 2014; 
Cornish & Edwards, 2005: 820; Schmidt & Zyla, 2011: 489). Although most studies 
conclude that there are several shared norms, ideas and beliefs on the appropriate 
means and ends of the CSDP, there is a broad consensus that an “EU strategic 
culture” is unlikely to replace the strategic cultures of the member states. Scholars 
that examine these national cultures consistently conclude that there are persistent 
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differences between the member states’ norms, ideas and beliefs regarding the use of 
force. Writing in the aftermath of the European divisions over the 2003 Iraq War, 
Hyde-Price (2004: 324) argued that “European attitudes towards the use of force are 
characterized by considerable heterogeneity”, which reflects the diversity of their 
strategic cultures. Rather than being directly related to material power capabilities, 
these different European strategic cultures are rooted in the second half of the 20th 
century and reflect the member states’ diverging experiences during World War II 
and the Cold War (Hyde-Price, 2004: 325). Similarly, Howorth (2007: 179) 
maintains that it would only be a slight exaggeration to contend that there are 27 
distinct strategic cultures within the EU. Biehl, Giegerich and Jonas (2013) arrive at 
similar conclusions. In an edited volume that presents country studies of the (then) 
27 member states, they conclude that there are remarkable commonalities amongst 
the member states’ strategic cultures, but that “persistent differences are just as, if 
not more, frequent”. 
One of the most rigorous academic analyses of the member states’ strategic 
cultures is presented in a book length study by Christoph Meyer (2006), who 
examines whether the strategic cultures of France, Germany, the UK and Poland 
have converged since 1989. Meyer (2006:76) agrees with Hyde-Price (2004) that 
“collective memories of events of the first half of the 20th century still shape threat 
perceptions”. Nevertheless, the results of his study suggest increasing convergence 
on the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention, a stronger role for the EU as a 
framework for security and defence policy, the desirability of UN authorization, a 
growing concern for domestic authorization, the de-prioritization of territorial 
defence and the appropriateness of using force to tackle security threats (Meyer, 
2006: 11, 169, 185). However, Meyer (2006: 11) emphasizes that convergence implies 
that cross-national differences have narrowed, not that national beliefs have become 
fully compatible. Moreover, his analysis also suggests long-time incompatibility 
between the member states’ strategic cultures on the appropriateness of using force 
to advance economic and political interests, for the purpose of pre-emption, and in 
high risk situations. Meyer (2011: 680) provides evidence for a “relatively narrow 
European strategic culture as only a small set of norms is fully shared” amongst 
France, Germany, the UK and Poland. 
Many of the previously discussed works refer to the member states’ behaviour 
in military operations to illustrate the differences in their strategic cultures. Very few 
studies, however, aim to explain member state contributions to military operations 
from a strategic culture perspective. Schmitt (2012) examines Germany’s decision to 
participate in EUFOR Congo and not in EUFOR Chad, but his case studies mainly 
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describe how Germany’s political leaders used facets of their strategic culture to 
legitimize decisions made for other reasons. Davidson (2011) makes a similar 
argument in his study on European contributions to US-led operations (cf. supra). 
Although the latter builds on a neoclassical realist framework, one of his alternative 
hypotheses expects that consistency between a state’s identity and the “case of 
intervention” makes military participation more likely (Davidson, 2011: 27). This 
proposition is not convincingly supported by Davidson’s case studies, which do 
show that governments use identity and normative rhetoric to justify their decisions 
and disarm domestic opposition to military contributions (Davidson, 2011: 177). 
Other studies provide more compelling evidence for the importance of 
strategic culture. Dalgaard-Nielsen (2005: 340), for example, discusses the impact of 
two competing schools of thought within Germany’s strategic culture on its policy 
towards post-Cold War military operations, and “its categorical ‘no’ to participation 
in potential military actions against Iraq”. Her detailed analysis suggests that 
Germany’s strategic culture determines which type of military engagements do not 
provoke domestic resistance. In his work on the drivers behind CSDP operations, 
Pohl makes an argument that is similar to cultural explanations. More specifically, 
Pohl (2013a: 317) contends that the main drivers behind CSDP operations are 
governmental interests in “demonstrating that they are capable of influencing 
international events in line with domestic values and priorities”. In later articles, 
Pohl more explicitly refers to the explanatory power of cultural approaches, by 
arguing that the “CSDP is driven apart by diverging national preferences rooted in 
idiosyncratic political cultures” (Pohl, 2013b: 368) and that “national foreign policy 
traditions play an important role in explaining EU foreign policy” (Pohl & van 
Willigen, 2015: 181). 
Scholars that examine the member states’ strategic cultures thus consistently 
conclude that there are considerable and persistent differences between the member 
states’ norms, beliefs and ideas regarding the goals for which the use of force is 
considered appropriate or legitimate (Meyer, 2006: 11). Moreover, research provides 
evidence that strategic cultures have an impact on military engagements. In 
combination, this suggests that differences in the member states’ strategic cultures, 
rooted in their different national histories, constitute a plausible explanation for 
their varying levels of military engagement. 
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Conclusion Literature Review 
This literature review started by arguing that a systematic analysis of the 
variation in the member states’ military commitments has not yet been produced. 
The chapter continued with a discussion of the relevant strands of academic research 
and assessed whether these provide plausible explanations for member states’ 
differing military commitments. The collective-action-based exploitation hypothesis 
suggests that smaller member states will take a free ride on large member states if 
military operations mainly produce public benefits. Contrary to this pure public 
goods model, and in line with the alternative joint product model, studies on third-
party intervention and contributions to peacekeeping operations link military 
engagements to the direct and indirect benefits nations (hope to) gain by 
participating in operations. In addition, different strands of scholarship have 
established a link between military commitments and domestic and resource 
constraints. Finally, a vast body of academic research draws attention to the 
persistent differences in the member states’ strategic cultures, which might explain 
their differing military commitments.  
The explanations provided by the discussed theories are not necessarily 
contradictory or mutually exclusive. Prior research suggests that military 
contributions result from a complex interplay between conditions derived from 
different theoretical traditions. Studies that build on integrated models, for example, 
indicate that external benefits “fare pretty well in explaining political leaders’ 
incentives to contribute”, but need to be combined with domestic-level variables to 
account for a state’s ability to contribute (Oma 2012, 565). In spite of having a strong 
incentive to participate, an executive might, for example, refrain from contributing 
because of a potential parliamentary veto, constitutional restrictions, or forthcoming 
elections. Moreover, whether specific incentives lead to actual contributions might 
be contingent on the ideological preferences of the government or parliament. 
Because a member state’s decision (not) to participate in an operation is 
expected to result from a complex interplay between conditions derived from 
different theories, the articles combine insights from these different lines of 
academic research to arrive at a more complete understanding of the determinants 
of the member states’ military commitments. However, one plausible explanation is 
not taken into account in the empirical part of this dissertation: none of the articles 
that compose the second part of this thesis test whether the differences between the 
member states’ strategic cultures explain their varying military engagements. 
Although strategic culture approaches are definitely valuable and might provide 
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useful insights into the member states’ military commitments, there are several 
problems with applying cultural arguments in the present research. Most 
importantly, this dissertation aims to arrive at a general and parsimonious 
explanation for the member states’ military commitments. Many cultural theorists, 
however, do not seek to establish generalizations, but rather aim to explain or 
understand particular events or foreign policy decisions (Desch, 1998: 152-155; 
Glenn, 2009: 536-541). Perspectives on strategic culture that do attempt to produce 
general explanations for state behaviour still tend to focus on the particularities of 
different strategic cultures, which makes it difficult to operationalise and 
systematically compare cultural variables across the EU member states. 
In consequence, this dissertation assesses to what extent it is possible to 
explain the variation in the member states’ military commitments without taking the 
differences in their strategic cultures into account. If each member state’s military 
commitments are primarily determined by its specific strategic culture, current 
attempt to arrive at a parsimonious and generalizable explanation could only result 
in failure. However, as argued by Colin Gray (2009: 226), one of the leading scholars 
on strategic culture, those “who wear the badge of the “culturalist” are not claiming 
that culture is always, or even necessarily often, the prime determinant of decision 
and action”. In consequence, it should be possible to establish a clear cross-case 
pattern without taking the differences in the member states’ strategic culture into 
account. Moreover, some of the conditions that are examined in this study are 
closely related to cultural explanations. The bulk of the scholars that examine the 
member states’ strategic cultures, for example, emphasise the difference between 
“Atlanticists” and “Europeanists”, which is reflected in conditions related to alliance 
politics (Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013; Cornish & Edwards, 2001; Meyer, 2006). 
Similarly, scholarship on strategic cultures draws attention to the different norms 
with regard to the domestic authorisation required for the use of force, which are 
closely connected to variables related to institutional constraints. Finally, a high level 
of prior involvement in UNPOs might reflect a distinct foreign policy tradition of 
supporting multilateralism and the UN (Pohl, 2014a: 138-141). 
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3 
Empirical Domain 
This dissertation focusses on five military operations: EUFOR Congo, UNIFIL 
II, EUFOR Chad, the 2011 air campaign over Libya and the air strikes against IS. The 
first section of this chapter describes the universe of European military operations 
and explains the criteria that guided case selection. The subsequent sections provide 
an overview of member states’ contributions to the operations under investigation 
and discuss their planning, launch and overall objectives.1 
Population and Case Selection Criteria 
As argued at the outset of this study, the EU member states had a large number of 
troops deployed outside of their home countries for the last two decades (cf. supra). 
Table 2 lists thirty-five operations that were launched between 1995 and 2015 and 
involved at least 500 troops of the current 28 member states.2 The table indicates that 
the bulk of the externally deployed European forces operated in the Balkans, the 
Middle East, Africa and Afghanistan. The largest operations were deployed under 
the aegis of NATO, but member states also deployed troops under the aegis of the 
CSDP and the UN, as part of ad hoc coalitions and in unilateral operations. The EU 
members participated in a wide variety of operations, ranging from military training 
missions (e.g. EUTM Mali) and traditional peacekeeping operations (e.g. UNIFIL 
II), over more robust peace enforcement operations (e.g. EUFOR Chad), to intense 
  
                                                          
1 The sections on EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad build on parts of the appendix of Article 
1, which was co-written with Alrik Thiem. 
2 This table updates the operations selected by Giecherich and Nicoll, who list twenty-two 
military operations that were launched between 1995 and 2008 and deployed at least 500 
European troops (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008a: 17). On top of the 
operations listed in Table 2, several member states deployed a sizeable number of troops in 
operations that had been launched before 1995, like the UNPOs UNTSO and UNIFIL, and 
the French operations Boali in the Central African Republic and Epervier in Chad. Moreover, 
the EU members also launched several smaller operations under the aegis of the CSDP, like 
EUFOR Concordia and EUTM Somalia. 
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Table 2. Member State Participation in Military Operations 
Country Operation Start - End Date Framework 
Croatia UNCRO 03/1995-01/1996 UN 
Belgium (669), Czech Republic (170), Denmark (18), Finland (55), Ireland 
(18), Netherlands (19), Poland (21), Portugal (20), Slovakia (609), Sweden 
(109) and UK (29) 
 
UNTAES 01/1996-01/1998 UN 
Austria (10), Belgium (826), Czech Republic (41), Finland (15), Ireland (18), 
Netherlands (6), Poland (62), Slovakia (583), Sweden (44) and UK (1) 
Macedonia UNPREDEP 03/1995-02/1998 UN 
Belgium (2), Czech Republic (2), Denmark (45), Finland (370),Ireland (2), 
Poland (2), Portugal (1) and Sweden (107) 
 
Essential Harvest/Amber Fox 08/2001-12/2002 NATO 
Denmark (40), France (210), Germany (560), Netherlands (400) and Poland 
(25) 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
IFOR 12/1995-12/1996 NATO 
Belgium (420), Czech Republic (850), Denmark (907), Finland (450), France 
(7,500), Germany (4,000), Greece (1,000), Hungary (450), Italy (2,200), 
Netherlands (2,000), Poland (660), Portugal (900), Spain (1,400), Sweden 
(500) and UK (10,500) 
 
SFOR 12/1996-12/2004 NATO 
Austria (203), Belgium (550), Bulgaria (25), Czech Republic (636), Denmark 
(662), Estonia (46), Finland (480), France (3664), Germany (2,748), Greece 
(250), Hungary (310), Ireland (50), Italy (2500), Latvia (97), Lithuania (140), 
Luxembourg (25), Netherlands (1,220), Poland (450), Portugal (350), 
Romania (208), Slovakia (29), Slovenia (158), Spain 1600), Sweden (510) and 
UK (5,408) 
 
Althea 12/2004-ongoing EU 
Austria (360), Belgium (52), Bulgaria (197), Czech Republic (90), Estonia 
(33), Finland (184), France (477), Germany (1167), Greece (157), Hungary 
(170), Ireland (64), Italy (955), Latvia (3), Lithuania (1), Luxembourg (1), 
Netherlands (434), Poland (244), Portugal (237), Romania (120), Slovakia 
(45), Slovenia (182), Spain (512), Sweden (77) and UK (862) 
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Table 2. (continued) 
Country Operation Start - End Date Framework 
Albania Alba 04/1997-08/1997 Coalition 
Austria (100), Denmark (60), France (1,000), Greece (600), Italy (2,972), 
Spain (333) and Romania (390) 
 
AFOR 04/1999-09/1999 NATO 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy (2,531), Latvia, 
Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain and UK (130) 
Kosovo Allied Force 03/1999-06/1999 NATO 
Aircraft: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain and UK 
 
KFOR 06/1999-ongoing NATO 
Austria (623), Belgium (1,010), Croatia (28), Czech Republic (501), Denmark 
(900), Estonia (98), Finland (820), France (5,200), Germany (5,300), Greece 
(1,700), Hungary (484), Ireland (233), Italy (6400), Latvia (19), Lithuania 
(36), Luxembourg (20), Netherlands (1450), Poland (763), Portugal (340), 
Romania (226), Slovakia (196), Slovenia (389), Spain (1,300), Sweden (760) 
and UK (3,900) 
Sierra Leone Palliser 05/2000-06/2000 British 
UK (1,200) 
Afghanistan Enduring Freedom/ISAF 10/2001-12/2014 
Coalition/ 
NATO 
Austria (60), Belgium (577), Bulgaria (597), Croatia (317), Czech Republic 
(694), Denmark (750), Estonia (162), Finland (195), France (3,932), Germany 
(5,150), Greece (158), Hungary (507), Ireland (11), Italy (4,213), Latvia (175), 
Lithuania (250), Luxembourg  (11), Netherlands (2,160), Poland (2,580), 
Portugal (229), Romania (1,947), Slovakia (326), Slovenia (130), Spain 
(1,537), Sweden (614) and UK (9,500) 
 
Resolute Support 12/2014-ongoing NATO 
Austria (10), Belgium (43),  Bulgaria (110), Croatia (107), Czech Republic 
(236), Denmark (120), Estonia (4), Finland (80), France , Germany (850), 
Greece (4), Hungary (97), Ireland (7), Italy (740), Latvia (25), Lithuania (70), 
Luxembourg  (1), Netherlands (83), Poland (180), Portugal (10), Romania 
(618), Slovakia (39), Slovenia (7), Spain (20), Sweden (32) and UK (450) 
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Table 2. (continued) 
Country Operation Start - End Date Framework 
Mediter-
ranean 
Active Endeavor 10/2001-ongoing NATO 
Ships: Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain and UK 
 
EUNAVFOR Med 06/2015-ongoing EU 
Ships: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Slovenia, Spain and UK 
Iraq Iraqi Freedom 03/2003-12/2011 Coalition 
Bulgaria (500), Czech Republic (300), Denmark (517), Estonia (45), Hungary 
(500), Italy (3,100), Latvia (145), Lituania (90), Netherlands (1,100), Poland 
(3,200), Portugal (128), Romania (860), Slovakia (104), Spain (1,300) and UK 
(11,000) 
Côte d'Ivoire Licorne 09/2002-01/2015 French 
France (5,000) 
Congo Artemis 05/2003-09/2003 EU 
Austria (3), Belgium (66), France (1673), Germany (7), Greece (2), Hungary 
(1), Ireland (5), Italy (1) Netherlands (1), Spain (1), Sweden (81), UK (97) 
 
EUFOR RD Congo 07/2006-11/2006 EU 
Austria (3), Belgium (59), Finland (11), France (975), Germany (745), Greece 
(1), Italy (56), Luxembourg (1), Netherland (44), Poland (125), Portugal (53), 
Slovenia (1), Spain (132) and Sweden (50) 
Liberia UNMIL 09/2003-ongoing UN 
Croatia (5), Denmark (2), Finland(2), France (1), Ireland (471), Netherlands 
(266), Sweden (233) and UK (3) 
East Timor UNMISET 05/2002-05/2005 UN 
Denmark (2), Ireland (2), Portugal (639) and Slovakia (36) 
Lebanon UNIFIL II 08/2006-ongoing UN 
Austria (167), Belgium (375), Bulgaria (130), Croatia (1), Cyprus (2), 
Denmark (134) Estonia (67), Finland (205) France (1,867), Germany (903), 
Greece (228), Hungary (4), Ireland (426), Italy (2,446), Luxembourg (2), 
Netherlands (161), Poland (492), Portugal (146), Slovenia (14), Spain (1,277) 
and Sweden (68) 
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Table 2. (continued) 
Country Operation Start - End Date Framework 
Chad/CAR EUFOR Tchad/RCA 01/2008-03/2009 EU 
Austria (169), Belgium (64), Bulgaria (2), Croatia (15), Cyprus (2), Czech 
Republic (2), Finland (62), France (1770), Germany (4), Greece (4), Hungary 
(3), Ireland (447), Italy (104), Lithuania (2), Luxembourg (2), Netherlands 
(71), Poland (421), Portugal (30), Romania (2), Slovakia (1), Slovenia (14), 
Spain (112), Sweden (120) and UK (4) 
 MINURCAT 09/2007-12/2010 UN 
Austria (126), France (822), Finland (75), Ireland (418), Poland (325), and 
Sweden (2) 
Horn of 
Africa 
EUNAVFOR Atalanta 12/2008-ongoing EU 
Ships: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden and UK 
Arabian 
Gulf/Indian 
Ocean 
Ocean Shield 08/2009-ongoing NATO 
Ships: Denmark, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and UK 
Libya Odessay Dawn/ Unified Protector 03/2011-10/2011 
Coalition/ 
NATO 
Aircraft: Belgium, France, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden and UK; Ships: Bulgaria and Greece. 
Mali Serval 01/2013-08/2014 France 
France (2800) 
 
EUTM Mali 02/2013-ongoing EU 
Austria (8), Belgium (95), Bulgaria (4), Czech Republic (38), Estonia (8), 
Finland (12), France (207), Germany (209), Greece (4), Hungary (13), Ireland 
(8), Italy (15), Latvia (7), Lithuania (4), Luxembourg (1), Netherlands (1), 
Poland (20), Portugal (7), Romania (1), Slovenia (3), Spain (118), Sweden 
(16) and UK (40) 
 
MINUSMA 04/2013-ongoing UN 
Belgium (3), Denmark (17), Estonia (2), Finland (5), France (29), Germany 
(59), Italy (2), Netherlands (515), Portugal(2), Romania (1), Sweden (138), 
and UK (2). 
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Table 2. (continued) 
Country Operation Start - End Date Framework 
Sahel Barkhane 08/2014-ongoing France 
France (3,500) 
CAR Sangaris 12/2013-ongoing France 
France (2,000) 
 
EUFOR RCA Bangui 04/2014-03/2015 EU 
Austria (6), Estonia (55), Finland (30), France (250), Germany (4), Italy (49), 
Latvia (40), Lithuania (1), Luxembourg (2), Netherlands (1), Poland (50) and 
Spain (99) 
Iraq/Syria Operation Inherent Resolve 08/2014-ongoing Coalition 
Aircraft: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and UK 
Troops: Belgium (25), Finland (49), France (95), Germany (100), Hungary 
(116), Italy (120), Netherlands (130), Portugal (30), Spain (301) and  UK 
(250) 
Based on SIPRI (2015); UNDPKO (2015) and IISS “Military Balance 1995-2015”. 
 
 
counterinsurgency operations (e.g. ISAF) and offensive air campaigns (e.g. Unified 
Protector). On top of that, European warships patrolled the coast of Somalia and the 
Gulf of Aden to repress piracy, and the Mediterranean to neutralize refugee 
smuggling routes and deter terrorist activity. 
Table 2 estimates the maximum contribution of the member states to every 
operation. The data shows that the member states hardly ever participate with large 
numbers in operations to which other EU members do not make significant 
contributions. France did launch several unilateral interventions in Africa, and the 
UK also deployed one unilateral military mission, Operation Palliser. However, the 
other member states generally provided logistical support to such unilateral 
deployments and participated in missions set up to assist these operations.1 
Although the bulk of the member states’ armed forces was deployed alongside troops 
                                                          
1 Two recent examples are EUFOR RCA and EUTM Mali, which supported the unilateral 
French operations Sangaris and Serval. 
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from other member states, their specific contributions to several multinational 
operations varied significantly. The US-led intervention in Iraq probably revealed 
the deepest divisions amongst the EU members (Schuster & Maier, 2006). While 
member states like France, Germany and Belgium vehemently opposed the 
intervention, Denmark, Poland, the UK and many other member states provided 
strong military support. In 2011, the air campaign over Libya again exposed 
significant differences between the member states’ willingness to deploy military 
force. While France and the UK took the lead of the international coalition that 
would eventually cause the fall of the Qaddafi regime, other key member states like 
Poland and Germany did not deploy any military assets in support of the air 
campaign. Likewise, contributions to the CSDP operations in Congo, Chad and the 
Central African Republic and the enhancement of the UNIFIL operation in Lebanon 
varied significantly amongst the member states.  
This study examines five of the thirty-five operations listed in Table 2: EUFOR 
Congo, UNIFIL II, EUFOR Chad, Operation Unified Protector and Operation 
Inherent Resolve.1 The following criteria guided the selection of these cases. First, 
only operations that were launched between 2005 and 2015 are included in the 
dissertation. The study thus focusses on the military operations that were most 
recent at the time of writing. This should increase the generalizability of the study’s 
findings for future operations, as well as enhance the comparability of the operations 
by keeping some background conditions constant. Most importantly, all operations 
under investigation took place after the EU and NATO’s “big bang” enlargement of 
the first half of the 2000s, during which some of the accession states might have had 
“a strong incentive to prove their ‘reliability’ in terms of contributing to their future 
alliance partners” (Mello, 2014: 181).  
Second, the selected operations required the member states’ governments to 
decide on new military engagements, rather than enhancing or extending earlier 
commitments.2 This criterion excludes the gradual increase in European troop 
numbers in the ISAF operation; as well as EUFOR Althea and MINURCAT, which 
                                                          
1 UNIFIL II refers to the 2006 reinforcement of UNIFIL; “Operation Unified Protector” is the 
NATO code name for the 2011 air campaign  over Libya; and “Operation Inherent Resolve” 
the US’ operational code name to refer to the air strikes against IS (cf. footnote 2). 
2 Three member states did have troops in UNIFIL before its enhancement: France (210), Italy 
(52) and Poland (214). However, given the sizeable increase in troop numbers of these 
countries and the change of the operation’s overall goals, it is appropriate to consider 
UNIFIL II a new operation.  
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mainly involved troops that had already been deployed in the preceding SFOR and 
EUFOR Chad operations (Keohane, 2009: 214; Korski, 2009; Mattelaer, 2013: 59). 
Explaining the evolution of troop commitments throughout the course of an 
operation, or after a change in its operational framework, constitutes an interesting 
objective for future research, but falls beyond the theoretical and empirical scope of 
this study (for recent research on this question, see: Koch & Sullivan, 2010; Mello, 
2016; Palmer, London & Regan, 2004; Tago, 2009).  
Third, each of the selected operations involved at least five member states, 
which either deployed fighter jets that participated in offensive operations or, 
together, at least 2,000 ground forces. By focussing on the most sizeable 
deployments, the selected operations can be expected to have offered a majority of 
the member states the opportunity to make a significant contribution. Military 
interventions conducted by single member states are not included in the analysis, 
since the outcome of interest, i.e. military participation, was not probable for the 
member states that did not initiate the intervention. Therefore, unilateral operations 
would mainly add irrelevant cases to the population (Mahoney & Goertz, 2004).  
The member states’ contributions to the five operations that meet these three 
criteria vary considerably, with a large share of the EU members refraining from 
deploying any troops in the area of operations. This variation makes the operations 
particularly relevant for the purpose of this study, but is not fully representative of 
the complete universe of operations that deployed a significant number of European 
troops. In fact, nearly every member state made a substantial contribution to three of 
the largest operations involving European forces: SFOR in Bosnia, KFOR in Kosovo 
and ISAF in Afghanistan.1 Another limitation to the representativeness of the 
selected operations is that some of the most significant European troop deployments 
of the last twenty years are not included. Most importantly, the study does not 
examine the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which are not only the largest, but 
also the most intense and risky military operations to have involved European 
ground forces.2 In addition to the fact that the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan do 
                                                          
1 However, especially in the ISAF operation, there was significant variation in the relative 
burden each member state carried and in the caveats their governments imposed on the 
deployed troops (Ringsmose, 2010: 332-335; Saideman & Auerswald, 2012). 
2 The EU member states suffered 849 and 228 military fatalities during the operations in 
Afghanistan and in Iraq respectively (www.icasualties.org, accessed 29/02/2016). In contrast, 
there are no reported military casualties amongst EU member states’ troops during EUFOR 
Congo, Operation Unified Protector or Operation Inherent Resolve. Two French soldiers 
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not meet the aforementioned case selection criteria, these have been thoroughly 
examined in other studies, which provides a pragmatic reason not to include them in 
the present study (Auerswald & Saideman, 2014; Mello, 2012; Mello, 2014; Schuster 
& Maier, 2006; Siegel, 2009). Notwithstanding these limitations, the most important 
frameworks for European troop deployments are represented amongst the selected 
operations. Moreover, there are substantial differences between the goals, mandates, 
size, strategy and intensity of the five operations, which should enhance the 
inferential value of the analyses. 
EUFOR Congo 
EUFOR Congo was set up in response to a written request by UN Under-
Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guehénno, sent to the 
EU’s British presidency on 27 December 2005 (Engberg, 2014: 95). In this request, 
the UN invited the EU to deploy a military force during the elections in Congo to 
support the MONUC peacekeeping operation. The Council Secretariat started 
drafting an option paper for a possible operation at the beginning of January and EU 
fact finding missions were sent to Kinshasa and the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations in New York (Brummer, 2013: 399; Hagemann, 2010: 40). On 23 
January, French President Chirac and German Chancellor Merkel indicated that 
they were willing to participate in an EU-led operation in Congo (Schmitt, 2012: 68). 
However, Merkel insisted that this operation was to be “truly multinational”, and 
required substantial contributions from the other member states (Engberg, 2014: 99; 
Tull, 2009: 44).  
Two interrelated problems hampered the further planning of the operation: 
the designation of the operational headquarters (OHQs) and the lack of clear troop 
pledges from member states other than France and Germany. Since the EU does not 
have permanent OHQs, one of the member states had to agree to take the lead of the 
operation by making its national headquarters available.1 Five member states have 
indicated that they dispose of a sufficiently equipped OHQ that is available for EU-
                                                                                                                                                      
died during EUFOR Chad and the UN reports a total of seven fatalities caused by malicious 
actions in the UNIFIL operation after its enhancement (in addition to 22 fatalities caused by 
accidents) (Chivviss, 2014; Seibert, 2010; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 
2016). 
1 Alternatively, the member states can use NATO’s OHQ, as specified under the Berlin-plus 
agreement. However, this option was never really on the table for EUFOR Congo. 
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led operations: the UK (Northwood), France (Mont Valérien), Greece (Larissa), Italy 
(Rome) and Germany (Potsdam) (Simón, 2010: 15). After the former four declined, 
Germany came under increasing pressure to lead the operation (Major, 2008: 25). 
However, Germany refused to assume any responsibility before the other member 
states made significant troop pledges (Engberg, 2014: 99-100). High Representative 
Solana started an ad hoc force generation process, but this did not result in firm 
commitments from the member states. Only after an informal planning conference 
was organized in Berlin on 20 March, did Germany gain the necessary reassurances 
to provide Potsdam as the operation’s OHQ. Three days later, the Council of 
Ministers formally approved the launch of the operation. On 3 and 10 May, two 
formal force generation conferences were organized in Potsdam. After these 
conferences, shortfalls remained in the area of strategic and tactical air transport 
capabilities, which were only filled after France and Germany agreed to contribute 
the bulk of the missing capabilities (Engberg, 2014: 102; Hagemann, 2010: 45).  
In spite of the delays caused by Germany’s hesitance to take the lead and the 
lack of firm troop commitments from the member states, the planning process was 
concluded in time (Simón, 2010: 34). EUFOR Congo was deployed for four months, 
starting from the first round of the presidential elections on 30 July (Major, 2009: 
315). The force had been authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1671 and 
aimed to deter potential spoilers from undermining the electoral process, support 
MONUC, contribute to the protection of civilians, and protect Kinshasa airport 
(Major, 2008: 18). EUFOR Congo was composed of three pillars: an advanced 
element in Kinshasa (1), an on-call force stationed in Gabon (2) and a strategic 
reserve in Europe (3). Pillars 1 and 2 consisted of around 2,400 forces, roughly one 
third of which was stationed in Kinshasa, while the strategic reserve was composed 
of 1,500 troops (Brummer, 2013: 9; Major, 2009: 314). 
France and Germany contributed two thirds of the required military 
capabilities. France deployed 1,090 troops and provided the bulk of the strategic 
reserve in Europe. Germany participated with around 780 troops, most of which 
were stationed in Gabon (Schmidt, 2011: 574). Spain deployed 130 troops, which 
were deployed in Kinshasa and composed EUFOR’s rapid reaction capability. 
Poland contributed 130 military police, which were in charge of the protection of the 
operation’s headquarters in Kinshasa. The Netherlands participated with 50 troops, 
comprising an infantry platoon and a medical unit (Ministerie van Defensie, 2007). 
Belgium contributed four unmanned aerial vehicles and approximately 50 
supporting personnel (Verbraecken, 2006). Italy contributed a C-130 transport 
plane, with around 65 supporting personnel (Stato Maggiore della Difesa, 2007). 
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Sweden participated with 55 troops, most of which were special forces. Portugal 
participated with a special operations unit of 33 marines and a C-130 aircraft with 17 
air force personnel (Palma, 2009: 13). Finland seconded two surgeons and three 
medical teams of three persons each (Handolin & Elomaa, 2007). Greece allocated 
one C-130 military air transport plane. Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Slovenia and the UK only contributed 
staff members to the operational and/or force headquarters; Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Malta and Romania did not participate. 
UNIFIL II 
The enhancement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 
was a response to the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War (Mattelaer, 2013: 80). This so-
called “Summer War” started in July, after Hezbollah militiamen killed three Israeli 
soldiers and kidnapped two others during a raid on Israeli territory (Ronzitti & Di 
Cammillo, 2008: 59). Israel reacted with an intensive air campaign, followed by a 
ground offensive on 19 July (Mattelaer, 2013: 83). On 11 August, the UN Security 
Council adopted resolution 1701, which called for the immediate cessation of all 
hostilities and authorized a significant reinforcement of the UNIFIL operation 
(Mattelaer, 2013: 85). UNIFIL had been deployed in Lebanon since 1978, after Israeli 
defence forces had invaded Southern Lebanon to establish a geographic security 
buffer against the Palestine Liberation Organisation (Mattelaer, 2013: 81). By July 
2006, UNIFIL had been transformed into an observer mission with a troop strength 
of 2,000. With resolution 1701, the UN Security Council authorized augmenting the 
operation’s troop numbers to 15,000.  
The reinforced UNIFIL was tasked with monitoring the cessation of 
hostilities, confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, assisting the Lebanese armed 
forces in regaining control over the south of Lebanon, preventing illegal arms 
trafficking, and ensuring that the area of operations was not used for hostile 
activities (Mattelaer, 2013: 86; Ronzitti & Di Cammillo, 2008: 62). UNIFIL II aimed 
to achieve these general objectives by performing three broad functions: providing a 
military buffer between Israel and Hezbollah, de-escalating any potential 
confrontation between the Israeli Defence Force and Lebanese Armed Forces, and 
enabling the reconstruction of the area by repairing damaged infrastructure, 
demining, and training the Lebanese Armed Forces (Mattelaer, 2013: 96-100; UN 
Security Council, 2006). The UNIFIL force was divided over two sectors, Sector 
West and Sector East, which were supported by a rapid reaction force. In addition, a 
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Maritime Task Force (MTF) was deployed in Lebanon’s territorial waters to counter 
maritime arms smuggling (Mattelaer, 2013: 86-90). While the MTF was being 
prepared, an Interim Maritime Task Force (IMTF) was deployed. 
The reinforcement of UNIFIL was made possible by the substantial 
contributions of the member states, which provided more than half of the required 
forces (Mattelaer, 2013: 80, 88). The Council of Ministers and the member states had 
become involved in diplomatic initiatives at an early stage of the conflict. The 
General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), for example, issued a 
resolution on 17 July that called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, Italy co-
chaired an international conference on the crisis in Rome on 26 July, and together 
with the US, France had initiated the draft on which resolution 1701 was based 
(Engberg, 2014: 62-81; Ronzitti & Di Cammillo, 2008: 64). During an extraordinary 
GAERC meeting on 1 August, the member states indicated that they were ready to 
contribute to an operation in support of a political settlement of the conflict. The 
Council remained involved after the adoption of Resolution 1701. Most importantly, 
the member states formalized their troop contributions during an extra GAERC 
meeting, attended by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (Gowan, 2007: 70; 
Mattelaer, 2013: 88). 
The member states contributed over 7,600 troops to UNIFIL II. The bulk of 
the European forces were provided by Italy, France and Spain. At the end of 2006, 
the Italian contingent amounted to 2,400 troops (Ronzitti & Di Cammillo, 2008: 79). 
Italy took the lead of Sector West, to which it contributed two of the five battalions. 
Italy participated in the IMTF and, after 2008, in the MTF. France was participating 
with around 1,600 troops at the end of 2006 (Ronzitti & Di Cammillo, 2008: 79). 
More specifically, it provided UNIFIL’s quick reaction force and one of the four 
battalions of Sector West. Spain participated with around 1,200 troops by the end of 
2006 (Ronzitti & Di Cammillo, 2008: 79). It took the lead of Sector East and, after 
2008, participated in the MTF. 
At the end of 2006, seven other member states were also contributing ground 
forces to the operation. Belgium participated with around 350 troops, which were 
primarily tasked with mine clearance. In 2008 and 2009, Belgium also contributed a 
frigate to the MTF. Ireland contributed an infantry company of 165 troops, which 
operated as the protective unit of a Finnish engineering company of 200 troops 
(Defence Forces Ireland, n.d.; Finnish Defence Forces, 2015). Portugal participated 
with an engineering unit of around 140 troops (Armed Forces Supreme 
Commander, n.d.). Poland, which had been involved in the UNIFIL operation since 
1992, augmented its troop numbers to approximately 320. Slovenia participated with 
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12 troops, while Luxembourg and Hungary each contributed two troops. Six 
member states (initially) only contributed to the Maritime Task Force. Germany 
took the lead of the MTF, in which it participated with eight ships and around 900 
crew. In November 2006, Bulgaria and Greece were participating with a frigate (with 
around 220 and 130 crew respectively), Denmark with a corvette and a patrol boat 
(80 crew) and Sweden with a corvette (40 crew) (International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 2007: 233).1 The Netherlands started participating with a frigate (150 crew) 
in December 2006 (Ministerie van Defensie, 2008). The other member states, 
initially, did not contribute to the reinforcement of the UNIFIL operation.2 
EUFOR Chad 
The idea of deploying a European military operation in Chad was first 
mentioned in a diplomatic cable of the French ministry of foreign affairs, which was 
sent to its European counterparts on 21 May 2007 (Mattelaer, 2013: 41). Although 
the other member states reacted rather unenthusiastically to the French idea, the 
incoming Portuguese EU Presidency placed the idea on the Council’s agenda (Pohl, 
2014a: 129). On 23 July, the Council authorized the Council Secretariat to start 
planning a possible operation in Chad. France volunteered to make its OHQ in 
Mont Valérien available, which officially gained planning authority on 10 September 
(Dijkstra, 2010: 398; Mattelaer, 2013: 51). An informal force generation conference 
was organized at the end of September, but apart from France, no member state 
offered meaningful contributions (Mattelaer, 2013: 53). This was the beginning of a 
lengthy force generation process, which required five formal conferences to generate 
the necessary capabilities. Especially tactical air transport, medical facilities, 
reconnaissance assets and other logistical support units turned out to be in short 
supply (Dijkstra, 2010; Pohl, 2014a: 400). Most of these capability gaps were 
eventually filled in by France during the last force generation conference (Mattelaer, 
2013: 63). 
The Council formally launched EUFOR Chad on 28 January 2008, which was 
deployed in Chad and the Central African Republic from March 2008 till March 
                                                          
1 Greece also participated with a frigate in the IMTF. Denmark deployed a logistics company 
of 135 between 2009-2011.  
2 The UK did participate in the IMTF; Austria started participating in UNIFIL with around 
160 troops in 2011; while an Estonian detachment of 40 troops was integrated in the Finnish 
contingent in 2015 (Finnish Defence Forces, 2015).  
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2009 (Mattelaer, 2013: 64). With 3,700 troops, it is the largest autonomous CSDP 
operation to date (Mattelaer, 2013: 42). The force was authorized by Security 
Council Resolution 1778 and tasked with contributing to the protection of refugees 
and internally displaced persons, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid and 
protecting the civilian UN force MINURCAT (Mattelaer, 2013: 64). EUFOR Chad 
was conceived as a one year bridging operation, after which a military UNPO would 
take over (Styan, 2012: 664).1  
France was by far the biggest contributor to EUFOR Chad, providing around 
1,800 of the 3,700 troops (The European Security and Defence Assembly, 2008). 
Although it initially only wanted to provide one third of the required forces, France 
hereby accounted for over 50% of the required forces (Dijkstra, 2010: 399; Pohl, 
2014a: 134). Poland and Ireland each contributed 400 soldiers (The European 
Security and Defence Assembly, 2008). The Polish and Irish battalion were each 
responsible for one of the three major operational zones (Mattelaer, 2013: 60). 
Sweden participated with up to 200 troops, which were deployed in Chad for six 
months (Pohl, 2014a: 138; The European Security and Defence Assembly, 2008). 
Additionally, it supplied special forces to the initial entry force, which prepared the 
arrival of the main force (Seibert, 2010: 21). The Austrian contribution comprised 
160 troops, including special forces that participated in the initial entry force, 
logistics experts, and field hospital medical staff (Brettner-Messler, 2008: 86).  
Finland contributed around 60 soldiers, which were tasked with force 
protection and convoy escort (Government of Finland, 2007: 14). Belgium deployed 
70 troops, which were responsible for logistics, transport protection and intelligence 
(Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers, 2008). The Netherlands 
contributed a reconnaissance unit and a logistical element, accounting for around 70 
troops (Ministerie van Defensie, 2009: 7). Slovenia participated with 13 troops, while 
Italy supplied a field hospital with around 105 supporting personnel (Stato Maggiore 
della Difesa, 2009). Spain contributed two C-295 transport aircraft, supported by 
around 100 crew and maintenance personnel. Portugal and Greece each participated 
with a C-130 aircraft and, respectively, 30 and 40 accompanying personnel (Gros-
Verheyde, 2008b). Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Romania, Slovakia and the United Kingdom only contributed staff 
                                                          
1 MINURCAT managed to take over after EUFOR Chad’s one-year mandate ended. 
However, such a handover was anything but guaranteed at the launch of the operation 
(Dijkstra, 2010: 402-404; Pohl, 2014a: 143).  
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members to the operation and/or force headquarters; Denmark, Estonia, Lithuania 
and Malta did not participate.1  
Operation Unified Protector 
The Libya crisis began in mid-February 2011, when the (seemingly) successful 
revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt inspired protests in the east-Libyan city of 
Benghazi. Within a few days, rebels had secured control over the city and the revolt 
spread across the country. The Qaddafi regime, which had been ruling Libya for over 
forty years, responded with brutal repression. Regime forces managed to push the 
rebels back and, by 14 March, had started advancing on Benghazi. On 17 March, the 
UN Security Council adopted resolution 1973 (Bellamy & Williams, 2011: 844-845). 
Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council demanded “the 
immediate establishment of a cease-fire and a complete end to violence and all 
attacks against, and abuses of, civilians” (United Nations Security Council, 2011: 2). 
Moreover, the resolution authorized the UN member states to take all necessary 
measures to protect civilians under threat of attack, established a no fly zone over 
Libya, and refined the arms embargo it had imposed in an earlier resolution.  
Military action to enforce resolution 1973 began two days after the resolution 
was adopted (Chivviss, 2015). The operation started as an ad hoc coalition, but 
NATO took command of the operation ten days after its launch (Chivviss, 2014: 87-
88). The central element of “Operation Unified Protector” was an air campaign that 
targeted the Qaddafi regime’s military capabilities. In addition, a maritime operation 
was deployed to enforce the arms embargo and a small number of special forces 
provided support to the rebels. In the first days of the operation, Qaddafi’s air 
defence systems were attacked with air- and sea-launched weapons, while coalition 
air strikes managed to stop the advance of regime forces on Benghazi (Chivviss, 
2014: 81). By the end of July, the rebels began advancing on Tripoli, which they 
entered on 21 August. On 20 October, rebel fighters captured and executed Qaddafi. 
Eleven days later, NATO officially ended its seven-month military campaign. 
The United States dominated the first phase of operation, flying over half of all 
air sorties and nearly 50% of the strike sorties (Chivviss, 2014: 89). However, 
Washington reduced its contribution of strike assets after NATO took command 
and, in result, only flew around 27% of the air sorties during the NATO phase of the 
                                                          
1 Romania had initially pledged 120 soldiers, but backtracked on this commitment in July 
2008 (Gros-Verheyde, 2008a; The European Security and Defence Assembly, 2008).  
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operation. Although the US kept providing critical military enablers, capability 
shortfalls caused the operation to slack after the US had reduced its role (Chivviss, 
2014: 110-116). At a meeting of NATO’s defence ministers on June 9, US Secretary 
of Defence Robert Gates lamented that many of the NATO allies lacked the political 
will or the military capabilities to participate in the operation. However, he also 
noted that states like Belgium and Denmark punched well above their weight and 
made major contributions to the strike missions.  
Several member states played an important role in the international response 
to the crisis in Libya. As the Qaddafi regime cracked down on the protesters, French 
President Sarkozy and British Prime Minister Cameron became the leading voices in 
favour of military intervention (Chivviss, 2014: 34-37; Davidson, 2013). After the 
adoption of resolution 1973, several member states made vital military contributions 
to the operation. France was one of the major contributors to the intervention 
(Davidson, 2013). It participated with more than 40 aircraft, 30 helicopters and a 
dozen warships in the intervention (Grand, 2015: 191; Willett, 2012: IX). French 
aircraft flew nearly 5,600 sorties, accounting for 25% of the total sorties, 35% of the 
offensive missions and 20% of the air strikes. French attack helicopters provided 
close combat support to Libyan rebels and French ships participated in the 
enforcement of the naval embargo, fired at land targets and conducted 
reconnaissance missions (Chivviss, 2014: 126-130; Grand, 2015: 198). A limited 
number of French special forces was deployed to support rebel fighters and collect 
intelligence (Chivviss, 2014: 155). The UK deployed 37 aircraft in the operation 
(Chivviss, 2015: 14; Davidson, 2013: 320). These flew over 3,000 sorties, more than 
2,000 of which were strike sorties (Taylor & Smith, 2011: 24). British fighter jets 
hereby achieved around 11% of the overall sorties and 20% of the strike sorties. The 
UK also deployed five Apache attack helicopters and had special forces on the 
ground. Additionally, British vessels participated in the naval embargo, launched 
Tomahawk cruise missiles at regime capabilities, and played a central role in mine 
clearance (Davidson, 2013: 321; Goulter, 2015: 182; Willett, 2012).  
Italy initially tried to maintain its longstanding relationship with the Qaddafi 
regime, but eventually made a significant military contribution to the operation that 
ended its 42-year rule of Libya (Lombardi, 2011: 31). Italian fighter jets were first not 
authorized to bomb ground targets, but these restrictions were lifted at the end of 
April (Alegi, 2015: 221). Italian aircraft achieved around 10 per cent of the strike 
missions during the NATO phase of the operation (Chivviss, 2014: 90). Italy also 
made seven bases available for the operation, which supported around 200 aircraft 
throughout the operations (Alegi, 2015: 206). Moreover, it participated with sixteen 
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warships and two submarines in the naval operations and had special forces in Libya 
(Ceccorulli & Coticchia, 2015: 8; Chivviss, 2014: 155). Belgium, Denmark and the 
Netherlands participated with six F16 fighter jets, each flying around 600 sorties 
(Anrig, 2015: 301). While Belgian and Danish F16s participated in strike operations, 
Dutch fighter jets were not authorized to conduct air-to-ground strikes. Belgium and 
the Netherlands also deployed two minesweepers in the naval operations (Johnson & 
Mueen, 2012: X). Sweden participated with eight Griffin aircraft (Egnell, 2015). 
Swedish jets flew tactical reconnaissance missions and patrolled the no-fly zone, but 
were not allowed to strike ground targets. Spain contributed to the air operations 
with two support planes and four F18 fighter jets, which did not participate in strike 
operations (Dicke et al., 2013: 42; Johnson & Mueen, 2012: xi). Additionally, It 
supplied two submarines and three frigates to the naval operations and made two air 
bases available. Greece contributed one Embraer EMB-145H, which flew 173 early 
warning missions; participated with one frigate in the naval operations, and made 
two air bases available (Johnson & Mueen, 2012). Bulgaria and Romania each 
participated with one frigate in the naval operations. Aside from their membership 
in NATO, none of the other EU member states were involved in military operations 
in Libya. 
Operation Inherent Resolve 
The origin of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) is generally situated in the 
aftermath of the 2003 US intervention in Iraq, when al-Zarqawi declared his 
allegiance to Bin Laden and changed the name of his “Jama’at al-Tawhidw’al-Jihad”-
group to “al Qaeda in Iraq” (AQI) (Cronin, 2015: 89; Laub & Masters, 2015). The 
death of Zarqawi in 2006 and the reconciliation of Sunni tribes with Iraq’s central 
government significantly weakened AQI, which rebranded itself to the “Islamic State 
of Iraq” and later, the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL) (Laub & Masters, 
2015). Under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISIL benefited from the Syrian 
civil war and came to dominate territory in Syria’s northeast. In Iraq, it took 
advantage of the weakness of the central Maliki government, which had alienated 
Shiite Arabs by pursuing a divisive pro-Sunni agenda. ISIL captured the Iraqi cities 
of Fallujah and Ramadi in January 2014, and, by the end of June, had begun moving 
towards Bagdad (Cronin, 2015: 89).  
Meanwhile, an estimated number of 15,000 to 20,000 foreign fighters had 
travelled to Syria, a large share of which is thought to have joined IS (Lister, 2014: 94; 
Zelin, 2013). The vast majority of recruits came from the Arab world, but according 
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to estimates of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political 
Violence (ICSR), almost 4,000 foreign fighters had travelled from Western European 
countries to Syria and Iraq by the second half of 2014 (Neumann, 2015).1 In May 
2014, a returned foreign fighter linked to IS killed four people at the entrance of the 
Jewish museum in Brussels. This was the first of a number of terrorist plots linked to 
IS, including the November 2015 Paris attacks and the March 2016 Brussels 
bombings (Hegghammer & Nesser, 2015: 32; Schmidt & Tinnes, 2015). 
The US launched its first air strikes against the Islamic State on 8 August 2014, 
after IS forces began to pose an immediate threat to the Kurdish capital Erbil and 
created a humanitarian crisis in Northern Iraq by carrying out horrific attacks on 
Christian and Yezidi towns (Stansfield, 2014: 1337-1338; Zapfe, 2014: 2). Strike 
operations were initially limited to Iraq, but on 23 September the US also started 
carrying out air strikes over Syria. Unlike the Iraqi government, the Syrian regime 
did not consent to the operation. Since there was no UN Security Council mandate 
for the operation, this raises serious questions about the legality of the airstrikes over 
Syria. The US air strikes  against IS, code-named “Operation Inherent Resolve”, 
started as a unilateral intervention. Towards the end of August, the Obama 
administration began mobilizing a broad coalition of allies (Landler & Cooper, 
2014). At the time of writing in February 2016, this “global coalition to degrade and 
defeat ISIL” consists of sixty-six partners, but only twelve of these have actually 
participated in offensive air operations (U.S. Department of State, 2016). As a result, 
the US carried out almost 8,000 of the 10,000 air strikes (U.S. Department of 
Defense, 2016). 
Except for Malta, all EU member states are listed as members of the anti-IS 
coalition. At the time of writing, only five have participated in the strike operations. 
France was the first country to join the US in conducting air strikes (Mills, Smith & 
Brooke-Holland, 2015: 12). The French “Opération Chammal” deploys fifteen to 
twenty fighter jets, a refuelling plane and a maritime patrol aircraft (Howorth, 2015). 
Between February and April 2015, and again starting from November 2015, France 
also deployed the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle in the region, with an additional 
twenty-six fighter aircraft (McInnis, 2015: 4). Initially restricting its participation to 
                                                          
1 Estimates of the number of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria vary considerably and have 
continued to rise since the start of the military operation against IS (Schmidt & Tinnes, 
2015). In December 2015, Schmidt and Tinnes (2015: 27) estimate that the foreign fighters 
from Europe and other Western democracies number between 5,000 and 7,000. 
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Iraq, France started conducting airstrikes in Syria on 27 September 2015 (Mills, 
Smith & Brooke-Holland, 2015: 12). By January 2016, French aircraft had flown 
2,839 sorties and conducted almost 400 airstrikes (Etat-major des armées, 2016). In 
addition, France provides around 200 military advisors to train Kurdish and Iraqi 
forces. The British parliament voted in favour of air strikes in Iraq in September 
2014 (Mills, Smith & Brooke-Holland, 2015: 27-42). The UK initially participated 
with eight Tornado jets, one air-to-air refuelling and surveillance aircraft and an 
unspecified number of Reaper drones. In December 2015, air operations were 
extended to Syria and the UK deployed eight additional combat jets. By the end of 
2015, the UK had conducted 1,632 sorties, including 380 airstrikes. The UK also 
deployed a training contingent of 275 personnel in Iraq.  
Belgium participated in the airstrikes on IS in Iraq from September 2014 till 
July 2015 (Lievens, 2015). Six Belgian F16s conducted 796 sorties, 163 of which 
resulted in airstrikes. Belgium also deploys 45 instructors to train Iraqi forces. Since 
October 2014, the Netherlands has participated with between six and eight F16 
fighter jets in the strike operations over Iraq (Mills, Smith & Brooke-Holland, 2015). 
In February 2016, Dutch F16s also started conducting strike operations in Syria. 
Moreover, the Netherlands deploys 130 officials to train local forces. Denmark 
deployed seven F16s, which conducted airstrikes over Iraq between October 2014 
and October 2015, and up to 120 troops to train Iraqi and Kurdish security forces. 
Six member states have made non-offensive contributions to the fight against 
IS. Since October 2014, Italy has deployed four aircraft for reconnaissance and 
surveillance, one refuelling aircraft, and a contingent of up to 350 personnel to train 
local security forces (McInnis, 2015: 14). German paratroopers have been training 
Kurdish Peshmerga forces since October 2014 (Mills, Smith & Brooke-Holland, 
2015: 17). On 5 December 2015, the German Parliament authorized the deployment 
of 6 Tornado reconnaissance aircraft, refuelling aircraft, and up to 1,200 military 
personnel. Sweden, Finland, Portugal and Spain have contributed to the training of 
Iraqi and/or Kurdish forces (McInnis, 2015: 14). At the time of writing, the other 
member states have not participated in the military operations against IS. 
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Conclusion 
The member states’ contributions to each of the five operations varied 
considerably. While some EU member states made significant contributions, others 
did not contribute in any way to many of the operations under investigation. The 
latter is especially striking given the capability shortfalls that hampered the planning 
and course of the five operations. The planning process of EUFOR Congo and 
EUFOR Chad suffered from force generation problems, which can to a large extent 
be attributed to the reluctance of the member states to commit forces to the 
operations. Likewise, capability shortfalls caused the Libyan air campaign to slack 
after the US had reduced its role. Moreover, the infamous goodbye address of Robert 
Gates made clear that there was pressure on several member states to start 
participating in or augment their contribution to the operation. Similarly, as of the 
end of 2015, US Secretary of Defence Ash Carter has argued on several occasions 
that many members of “our so-called coalition” against IS have not been doing 
enough, that he had hoped the European countries would “do more than they had 
done so far” and that “all the Europeans” needed to contribute to the fight against IS 
(Agence-France Presse, 2016). Given these capability shortfalls and explicit requests 
for increased European participation, the disproportionately low contribution of 
many member states to the operations under investigations cannot be 
straightforwardly attributed to a lack of demand for additional contributions, which 
makes them especially relevant cases for the purpose of this dissertation. 
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4 
Methodology and Research Design 
The empirical analyses presented in this study are based on Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA). QCA refers both to a research approach and a set of 
analytical techniques. This section starts by concisely introducing the main features 
of QCA and justifying the choice for this method. This is followed by a brief 
discussion of the three QCA-variants that are applied in the articles and an 
introduction of the main steps of the QCA-procedure. The final section elaborates 
on more general research choices. 
Main Features of QCA 
QCA was originally developed by Ragin (1987: 83-85) as a middle way 
between case-oriented (or qualitative) and variable-oriented (or quantitative) 
approaches to comparative research. In line with quantitative approaches, QCA 
allows researchers to compare “more than a few cases”, arrive at parsimonious 
explanations, and produce (modest) generalizations (Ragin, 1987: 83-84; Rihoux, 
2003: 352-356; Rihoux & Marx, 2013: 168). Moreover, results produced with QCA 
are based on rigorous and replicable analytical techniques. QCA also embodies some 
key characteristics of qualitative, case-oriented approaches. First of all, each 
individual case is examined as a complex whole, as a specific combination of an 
outcome and plausible explanatory conditions. Second, in contrast to variable-
oriented approaches, QCA does not examine the average effect of independent 
variables (Mello, 2014: 50). Instead, it aims to identify the specific (combinations of) 
conditions under which an outcome occurs. 
QCA is geared towards establishing set-theoretic connections between one 
case property, defined as the outcome, and other properties, defined as the causal 
conditions (Wagemann & Schneider, 2010: 380). As extensively demonstrated by 
Ragin (2000: 203-260; 2008: 13-28) and Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 56-91), 
set-relations are intimately linked to the notions of sufficiency and necessity. A 
condition is sufficient if the outcome is always present when this condition is 
present. In consequence, a set defined by a sufficient condition constitutes a subset 
of the set defined by the outcome. Inversely, a condition is necessary if it is always 
present when the outcome is present. Therefore, a set defined by a necessary 
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condition constitutes a superset of the set defined by the outcome. The distinction 
between necessary and sufficient conditions suggests a complex conception of causal 
relations, generally referred to as “multiple conjunctural causation” (Rihoux, 2003: 
353). Multiple causation or equifinality implies that there are several paths towards 
the same outcome, conjunctural indicates that these paths consist of combinations of 
conditions. Multiple conjunctural causation thus suggests that multiple 
combinations of conditions can be sufficient for a given outcome. As a set-theoretic 
method, QCA is particularly apt to unravel these types of complex causal relations 
(Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 77). 
The present research builds on QCA to examine which combinations of 
conditions are consistently linked to (large) military commitments. QCA was 
preferred over other methods because there are good reasons to believe that 
contributions to military operations result from complex causal relations (Schneider 
& Wagemann, 2012: 276). In line with the notion of equifinality, member states can 
contribute to operations for different, mutually non-exclusive, reasons. While some 
member states might participate because they have close relations with the target of 
the intervention, others can decide to contribute because they are situated close to 
the area of operations, and still others because they believe it is necessary to continue 
receiving the benefits produced by their strong relationship with the US. In line with 
the notion of conjunctural causation, these incentives might only lead to 
contributions in the absence of institutional constraints or upcoming elections. 
A secondary, more pragmatic, reason for using QCA is that it is one of the few 
methods that is able to systematically compare an intermediate number of cases 
(Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 12). In contrast to case-oriented approaches, QCA’s 
analytical techniques allow for a rigorous, replicable analysis of the contributions of 
all member states. Unlike quantitative methods, QCA allows to examine the member 
states’ contributions to each operation in a separate analysis. Given the considerable 
differences between the operations, this constitutes a significant advantage over 
analytical techniques that require larger datasets (Mello, 2014: 49). A downside of 
conducting a separate analysis of each operation is that this makes it more difficult 
to arrive at clear conclusions on the pattern of contributions across the five 
operations. Section 4.3 elaborates on how this dissertation deals with this trade-off 
between accounting for the significant differences between the operations and 
producing results that apply across the five operations.  
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Variants, Instruments and Main Steps of QCA 
QCA is an umbrella term that entails different analytical techniques 
(Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 13-16). The three main QCA-variants are crisp set 
QCA (csQCA), fuzzy set QCA (fsQCA) and multi-value QCA (mvQCA). The crisp 
set version of QCA operates on conventional sets, in which an element is either 
present or absent. In consequence, variables can only be assigned a score of 1 
(variable present) or 0 (variable absent). This constitutes an important limitation of 
csQCA, since many social science concepts vary by level or degree. Ragin (2000) 
addressed this shortcoming by introducing the more sophisticated fuzzy set version 
of QCA. Membership scores in fuzzy sets can fall anywhere between full 
membership (value of 1) and full non-membership (value of 0), depending on the 
degree to which a variable is present in a given case. The qualitative status of a case 
depends on its position towards the 0.5 anchor, which indicates whether a variable is 
either more present or more absent in a given case.  
Multi-value QCA is capable of processing multiple-category variables 
(Cronqvist, 2003; Cronqvist & Berg-Schlosser, 2009). In mvQCA, each category of a 
multichotomous variable is represented by a natural number. In contrast to fuzzy 
membership scores, these values do not represent the extent to which a condition is 
present in a given case, but rather whether a specific category of a condition is 
present (Haesebrouck, 2016a: 3). Several leading methodologists have taken a 
sceptical stance on the added value of mvQCA and question its status as a set-
theoretic method (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 258-263; Vink & van Vliet, 2009; 
Vink & van Vliet, 2013). However, recent work of Thiem (2013; 2014: 315; 2015) 
provides convincing arguments that mvQCA is a valuable technique for comparative 
analysis, which should not be regarded as a QCA-variant “of doubtful set-theoretic 
status”. 
The choice between these three QCA-variants mainly depends on the nature 
of the conditions and the outcome. fsQCA should generally be preferred over 
csQCA, since fuzzy sets contain more information than crisp sets. However, fsQCA 
cannot be applied if the phenomenon under investigation presents itself in a 
dichotomous form,  since a binary outcome cannot be integrated into this QCA 
variant (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 277). mvQCA is preferable when dealing 
with categorical base-variables or when the intermediate category of a condition can 
have a different impact than both its full presence and its full absence (Haesebrouck, 
2016a). Finally, a more pragmatic reason to use mvQCA is that multichotomous 
conditions can be combined with binary outcomes. In consequence, mvQCA 
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provides a strategy to preserve some of the variation of continuous base-variables if 
the concept under investigation presents itself in dichotomous form. 
Notwithstanding their differences, the three main QCA-variants basically 
follow the same steps. First, the researcher has to construct a data table, in which 
each case is assigned a value on the conditions and the outcome. This process is 
called calibration. In csQCA, every case is assigned a score of 0 or 1, depending on 
whether the variable is absent or present. In fsQCA, cases are assigned a score that 
ranges from 0 to 1, depending on the degree to which the variable is present. In 
mvQCA, each case is assigned the natural number that represents the category of the 
variable that applies to the case.  
Subsequently, the empirical evidence for necessity and sufficiency can be 
assessed. Two parameters are used to evaluate both types of causal relations: 
consistency and coverage (Ragin, 2008: 44-68). The former provides a descriptive 
measure of the extent to which the empirical data confirms sufficiency or necessity, 
the latter reflects the relevance of a sufficient or necessary condition. Consistency 
approaches unity as the data provides stronger support for sufficiency or necessity, 
coverage does so as a sufficient or necessary condition becomes more relevant.  
The analysis of sufficiency is based on the “Truth Table Algorithm” (Ragin, 
2008: 124-144). A truth table contains a row for every possible combination of 
conditions. Each case is attributed to the row corresponding to the specific 
combination that characterises the case. Generally, not all logically possible 
combinations of conditions correspond to empirical cases. In consequence, a truth 
table usually contains rows without empirical cases, which are called logical 
remainders. Attributing cases to truth table rows is relatively straightforward in 
csQCA and mvQCA, since the values that can be assigned to the cases are 
represented in the truth table. The fsQCA-procedure is somewhat more 
complicated, since fsQCA builds on a binary truth table, but allows for every 
possible membership score between 0 and 1. In fsQCA, assigning cases to truth table 
rows first requires calculating the cases’ membership scores in the combinations of 
conditions with logical AND. Cases can have partial membership scores in several 
rows, but their membership score will only exceed 0.5 in one row. Since the latter 
signals that a case is a good instance of the corresponding combination, the cases are 
attributed to this row. After each case has been attributed to a truth table row, an 
outcome value is assigned to the rows that include empirical cases. A row is assigned 
a score of 1 if it corresponds to a sufficient combination. The extent to which the 
empirical data confirms the sufficiency of a truth table row can be assessed with the 
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consistency measure, but also depends on the type of cases that violate the statement 
of sufficiency (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 278-279).  
Once every row is assigned an outcome value, Boolean Algebra is used to 
minimize the truth table. Minimization involves removing redundant conditions 
from the solution. Depending on the logical remainders that are incorporated in the 
minimization procedure, Boolean minimization can result in different types of 
solutions (Ragin, 2008: 145-177). First, the complex (or conservative solution) 
results if no remainders are incorporated. Second, the parsimonious solution results 
if all remainders that lead to a less complex solution are incorporated. This solution 
only includes the conditions that distinguish truth table rows that correspond to 
sufficient combinations from those that do not. In consequence, “the ingredients 
from the parsimonious solution can be considered the core causal factors” (Ragin & 
Fiss, 2008: 202). Finally, minimization results in the intermediate formula if only the 
remainders that correspond to theoretical expectations are incorporated. Conditions 
added in this solution can only be removed using difficult counterfactuals: 
assumptions about logical remainders that are at odds with theoretical or substantive 
knowledge. In line with the suggestion of Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 279), 
most QCA applications focus on the latter solution. However, Baumgartner (2015: 
840) recently demonstrated that intermediate solution formulas cannot be causally 
interpreted, and argues that resource must be made to the parsimonious formula if 
QCA is applied to test causal hypotheses (Baumgartner, 2015: 854). 
Research Design and Structure 
This dissertation aims to arrive at general conclusions on the determinants of 
member state contributions across the five operations under investigation. However, 
there are substantial differences between the goals, mandates, size, strategy and 
intensity of the five operations. This makes it difficult to compare the member states’ 
contributions across the selected operations, let alone arrive at a parsimonious 
explanation that applies to all five cases.  
First of all, each operation required different types of military contributions. 
While Operation Unified Protector and Operation Inherent Resolve deployed fighter 
jets that carried out offensive air operations; EUFOR Congo, EUFOR Chad and 
UNIFIL II mainly consisted of ground forces that carried out peacekeeping tasks. 
Moreover, the size of the operations varies considerably. By contributing 400 troops, 
Ireland and Poland were the second and third largest contributors to EUFOR Chad. 
In contrast, the top three contributors to UNIFIL II all deployed over a 1,000 troops 
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in the area of operations. Given these differences, comparing the member states’ 
contributions across the selected operations seems somewhat like comparing apples 
and oranges (Berg-Schlosser & de Meur, 2009: 20). At the very least, it requires an 
outcome-variable that can be applied to each of these operations, which necessarily 
results in a substantial loss of information. 
On top of that, several of the explanations discussed in the literature review 
are not equally plausible for all five operations. Alliance value, for example, is a 
plausible explanatory condition for the air strikes against IS, but not for the 
reinforcement of UNIFIL or the two CSDP operations. Conversely, contributions to 
the latter operations might be related to a state’s tradition of participating in 
UNPOs, which is unlikely to have an impact on the air operations over Libya and 
against IS. Similarly, spatial proximity might explain the varying contributions to the 
air campaign over Libya, which was deployed in the EU’s immediate vicinity, but is 
unlikely to matter for more distant operations like EUFOR Congo and EUFOR 
Chad. Likewise, other direct incentives, like foreign fighters and trade ties, cannot be 
expected to have an (equal) impact on contributions to all five operations. Moreover, 
given the substantial differences in size, intensity and perceived legitimacy of the 
operations, domestic-level conditions like electoral distance and parliamentary 
involvement cannot be assumed to have the same impact across the operations. 
Likewise, partisan differences might be less relevant for a small crisis management 
operation like EUFOR Congo than offensive air campaigns like Operations Unified 
Protector and Operation Inherent Resolve. 
Given these substantial differences, the operations might be too dissimilar to 
compare in a single analysis (Mello, 2014: 8). As argued above, one of the reasons for 
using QCA is that it allows one to conduct a separate analysis of each operation and 
thus take the cross-case differences into account. Unfortunately, this will reduce the 
coherence of the study and make it even more difficult to arrive at clear conclusions 
on the determinants of member state contributions across the five operations. The 
study aims to strike a balance between accounting for the cross-case differences and 
arriving at coherent cross-case conclusions. It primarily focusses on comparing the 
member states’ contributions within each operation. However, to increase the 
coherence and the generalizability of this study’s results, a final analysis compares 
the member states’ contributions across all five operations. The analyses are 
presented in five articles. The first article, co-authored with Alrik Thiem, examines 
the varying military commitments to EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad. These 
operations share enough background characteristics to compare the member states’ 
contributions in a single analysis (Styan, 2012: 656). More specifically, both 
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operations were deployed in Sub-Sahara Africa, under the aegis of the CSDP and in 
support of a UNPO. Each of the subsequent three articles focusses on a single 
military operation, respectively the 2006 reinforcement of UNIFIL, the 2011 air 
campaign over Libya and the airstrikes against IS. Finally, the fifth article examines 
the pattern of contributions across the five operations.  
Every article has a similar objective, i.e. explaining contributions to military 
operations, and builds on the same analytical technique, QCA. Nevertheless, a 
number of differences between these articles, related to condition selection, 
operationalization and case-selection, requires further explanation.  
First, there are differences in the explanatory conditions that are tested in each 
article. The literature review resulted in an abundant number of plausible 
explanatory conditions. This constituted a challenge to the present research, given 
that the number of conditions in a QCA should be kept at a moderate level 
(Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 276).1 The theoretical frameworks of the articles 
include the conditions that were expected to be most relevant for the examined 
operation(s), based on empirical knowledge of these operations and conclusions of 
the relevant literature. In line with the iterative logic of QCA, the selection of 
conditions was subject to change throughout the research (Berg-Schlosser et al., 
2009: 14). Based on the results of preliminary analyses, conditions were dropped and 
added to the theoretical models in order to arrive at the model that best explained 
the variation in the outcome. In consequence, the first four articles do not test the 
relevance of every plausible explanatory condition. This provided an additional 
reason to conduct the last analysis, which tests the explanatory value of the 
conditions across all operations. To reduce the number of conditions included in the 
QCA, the fifth article applies a systematic technique for condition selection: 
MDSO/MSDO (De Meur & Berg-Schlosser, 1994).  
A second difference between the articles is related to the operationalization of 
the conditions and the outcome. To account for the  differences between the types of 
                                                          
1 Depending on the quantity and diversity of the selected cases, four to seven conditions can 
be included in a QCA (Berg-Schlosser & de Meur, 2009: 28). Two of the articles of the second 
part of this dissertation apply a strategy to increase the number of conditions in the analysis. 
In the first article, a large number of analyses is conducted with different combinations of 
conditions, from which the best-fitting models are distilled and interpreted. The second 
article applies two-step QCA, which allows to take into account a greater number of 
conditions (Schneider & Wagemann, 2006). Nevertheless, even these articles do not take into 
account every single condition. 
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military contributions that were deployed in the examined operations, different 
outcome-indicators were used across the articles. EUFOR Congo, EUFOR Chad and 
UNIFIL II mainly required ground forces. Therefore, the outcome of the first three 
articles is based on an indicator that primarily focusses on the number of 
contributed troops, relativized by an indicator that reflects the member states’ 
capability to carry this contribution. The most important difference between the 
member states’ contributions to Operation Unified Protector was whether or not 
they participated in the air operations, and if so, whether their fighter jets were 
allowed to attack ground targets. Therefore, the membership scores in the outcome 
of the fourth article are based on this qualitative difference. The variation in 
contributions to the operation against IS was best captured by a dichotomous 
variable, since there were no important differences between the member states that 
carried out air strikes. Finally, the fifth article required an outcome-variable that 
could be applied to the five operations. Therefore, a binary outcome was used, which 
straightforwardly reflects whether or not a state participated in the operation.  
A last difference between the articles is related to the population of cases 
examined in the presented analyses. While the first, second and fifth article focus 
exclusively on the member states, the third and fourth article also include other 
states. The motivation for widening the population of the latter two articles is 
twofold. First of all, both articles are situated in a specific strand of academic 
research. The third article is situated in the scholarly literature on NATO burden 
sharing, the fourth in the academic debate on democratic peace. In order to increase 
the inferential leverage for the main hypotheses of these strands of academic 
research, the population of these studies respectively include all NATO allies and all 
relevant democratic members of the coalition against IS. A second, more 
opportunistic, reason for widening the population is that examining a larger number 
of cases was expected to make the articles more publishable. To preserve the 
coherence of this study’s conclusions, the final article presents empirical tests that 
focus exclusively on the member states’ contributions to each of the selected 
operations. 
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5 
Article 1: Burden Sharing in CSDP Military 
Operations 
 
Status: in co-authorship with Alrik Thiem and currently under review in Foreign 
Policy Analysis 
 
Abstract 
Military burden sharing has been a subject of repeated debates in NATO and 
the UN. Despite more modest goals, the European Union’s (EU) Common Security 
and Defense Policy (CSDP) has experienced no fewer difficulties in garnering men, 
money and materiel. While this may not come as a surprise, the fact that some EU 
member states have carried higher shares of the burden of CSDP operations than 
others is a puzzle that remains unaccounted for. Employing a two-stage design, we 
address this gap by analyzing determinants of divergent levels of contributions to 
CSDP operations. First, we identify a joint-product model to be the best description 
of burden-sharing patterns. Second, and on the basis of this finding, we conduct 
configurational analyses of factors hypothesized to influence these patterns. Our 
results indicate that EU countries contribute in positive disproportion with their 
capabilities when they have a strong peacekeeping tradition and elections are distant. 
In contrast, they undercontribute in the absence of large trade volumes with the area 
of operations and a strong peacekeeping tradition. 
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Introduction 
Military burden sharing in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
the United Nations (UN) and ad hoc coalitions has long been a subject of intense 
debates among political scientists and economists. In particular, questions of 
contribution equitability in terms of men, money and materiel have produced a rich 
body of literature to date.1 However, as far as the group of international 
organizations is concerned, NATO and the UN are not the only game in town 
anymore. In the Maastricht Treaty of 1993, the European Union (EU) concluded an 
ambitious security and defense roadmap that has developed by now into its 
Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).2 After almost two decades of fits and 
starts, the CSDP, eventually, “is no longer an aspiration; it is a reality” (Council of 
the European Union, 2009). 
No less a reality is the fact that the CSDP has regularly experienced serious 
difficulties in staffing its military operations. Given the multitude of strains 
contributors have to cope with, the recurrence of burden-sharing problems may not 
be surprising. Nevertheless, some EU member states did contribute more than 
proportionately to CSDP operations, whereas others’ input was unexpectedly 
meager, and still others’ contributions commensurate with their capabilities. How 
can these patterns be explained? In contrast to the sizeable number of studies on 
burden sharing in NATO, the UN and ad hoc coalitions, previous attempts at 
answering this question for the case of the CSDP have tended to stop at the stage of 
empirical exploration. This lack of knowledge constitutes a major gap in the 
literature on European defense cooperation, not least because appropriate 
contributions have been considered decisive by the EU itself in realizing its ambition 
                                                          
1 For comprehensive reviews of the literatures on NATO and ad hoc coalition burden 
sharing, see Sandler (1993) and Oma (2012). To our knowledge, no separate reviews of UN 
peacekeeping operations exist, but major works that include the UN are Bove and Elia 
(2011), Gaibulloev, Sandler and Shimizu (2009), Khanna, Sandler and Shimizu (1998), 
Lebovic (2004) and Shimizu and Sandler (2002) 
2 The European Security and Defense Policy has been renamed to Common Security and 
Defense Policy in the Treaty of Lisbon. The new name is used throughout this article. 
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to act as an effective crisis manager of global reach across the full spectrum of 
Petersberg tasks.1 
In this article, we provide the first systematic analysis of military burden 
sharing within the CSDP on the basis of operations EUFOR RD Congo and EUFOR 
Chad/CAR.2 The theoretical component of our analysis is informed by collective 
action theory and integrated regularity theories of military burden sharing. While 
traditional variants of collective action theory regard the provision of defense as a 
non-excludable and non-rival good, joint product models allow for the presence of 
private products. We provide evidence for the appropriateness of a joint product 
model but, in contrast to studies on NATO, the UN and ad hoc coalitions, our 
results show that larger states have occasionally ridden cheap on the contributions of 
smaller ones. Across operations and different indicators, however, the hypothesis 
that either group has benefitted at the other’s expense cannot be corroborated. 
Integrated regularity theories of military burden sharing combine domestic 
and international factors to provide more accurate explanations, and they posit 
implicational instead of covariational relations between these factors and military 
contributions (Auerswald, 2004; Baltrusaitis, 2010; Bennett, Lepgold & Unger, 1994). 
We not only draw on integrated theories to accommodate joint products that have 
been shown to matter to their beneficiaries on different levels of analysis in previous 
work, but we also base our model on a logic of implicational regularity as outcomes 
are analyzed through complex co-occurrences of conditions. We find that 
contributions are insufficient when trade volumes with the area of operations are 
small and a country’s peacekeeping tradition is weak, when competing deployments 
are significant, or when public support is low. In contrast, large trade volumes 
matter to states for contributing in proportion with their capabilities, unless they 
simultaneously face a combination of competing deployments, significant 
parliamentary powers, high budget constraints, nearby elections and a left-leaning 
executive. Lastly, relatively large contributions result when a strong peacekeeping 
tradition combines with a large election distance. 
                                                          
1 The Petersberg tasks include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, 
military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, and tasks of 
combat forces in crisis management. 
2 EUFOR RD Congo will be abbreviated to EUFOR Congo, EUFOR Chad/CAR to EUFOR 
Chad. 
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The article is structured around four parts. In the first section, we justify our 
operation selection criteria, define the target population, introduce the study’s 
research design, and mention our data sources. In the second section, we first 
analyze the distribution of burden shares to ascertain the most appropriate model of 
collective action theory. On this basis, we develop the theoretical component 
underlying the second stage of the analysis in the third section. Subsequently, the 
operationalization and calibration of the variables is discussed in the fourth section. 
In the fifth and final section, the results are presented and interpreted before we 
recapitulate the argument in the conclusions. 
Operation and Country Selection Criteria, Method and Data 
Despite its short lifespan, the CSDP has already experienced difficulties in 
staffing its military operations. Before troops can be deployed, agreement about the 
designation of leading positions and issues of force generation is required. Two 
operations afflicted by problems in this regard were EUFOR Congo and EUFOR 
Chad. The former was officially launched on 12 June 2006 and primarily charged 
with protecting civilians and supporting MONUC; the latter on 28 January 2008 
with the main objective of creating a secure environment for 170,000 displaced 
persons and 240,000 refugees from Darfur, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian 
aid and protecting personnel of the UN’s civilian mission MINURCAT.1 
Our analysis focuses on EUFORs Congo and Chad because the other five EU 
military operations involving the deployment of ground forces exhibited three 
characteristics that justify their exclusion.2 First, operations Concordia, EUTM 
Somalia and the EU support mission to AMIS demanded only token commitments.3 
Second, operation Artemis followed a request by the UN which was filed only after 
Jacques Chirac had assured Kofi Annan that France would lead the operation, long 
before the issue was raised within the CSDP. Third and finally, operation Althea 
took over from NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR), 80% of whose personnel were 
already European. As most EU contributors remained in Bosnia, their soldiers 
merely replaced SFOR by EUFOR insignia (Keohane, 2009: 214). Hence, it follows 
                                                          
1 A detailed description of these burden-sharing problems is provided in the appendix. 
2 We focus on ground-troop missions because all member states possess the capabilities to 
contribute, unlike the naval assets required for EU NAVFOR Atalanta, for example. 
3 Military personnel in Concordia was 350, in EUTM - a military training mission for Somali 
security forces- 45, and in the EU support mission to AMIS only 17. 
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that EUFORs Congo and Chad were the only two missions in which governments 
had to decide on new commitments of a non-trivial size. 
The target population of the analysis is given by all EU member states that 
have been formal parties to the CSDP at the time of the Council decision officially 
launching an operation, and that could have contributed to one or both operations. 
These criteria exclude Denmark due to its opt-out from the CSDP and external 
contributors such as Albania, Russia and Turkey. As Romania and Bulgaria joined 
the EU in 2007, they enter the target population as potential contributors only for 
EUFOR Chad. In sum, 24 member states could have contributed to EUFOR Congo, 
26 to EUFOR Chad. 
Methodologically, we employ an innovative two-stage, multi-method 
approach. In the first phase, we ascertain whether the public good or the joint 
product model is the more appropriate variant of collective action theory by means 
of non-parametric rank tests. Informed by the results of these tests, we import a set 
of nine purported determinants of burden sharing from previous work on burden 
sharing. Drawing all possible subsets of these factors of a constant cardinality that 
are consistent with the results of the first phase, we identify the best fitting among all 
competing models in the second phase. Identification is achieved by employing a 
generalization of multi-value Qualitative Comparative Analysis (mvQCA), an as yet 
rarely used technique in configurational comparative research.1 Detailed 
descriptions of our data sources, base variables, target factors and calibration 
procedures are provided in the article’s appendix. 
Burden sharing in CSDP Military Operations 
Contributions to military operations create a variety of burdens. For instance, 
sustaining soldiers and equipment in the area of operations may strain defense 
budgets, particularly those of smaller states. While EUFOR Congo’s price tag was 
relatively small at about €100m, EUFOR Chad already cost its participants €1bn 
(Helly, 2009: 339). Not to be underestimated, either, are the political risks military 
operations in far-flung areas create. Political leaders have to justify to their 
constituencies why soldiers’ lives are put in danger, and at their country’s own cost 
at that. Virtue may be its own reward, at best, electoral punishment at worst, 
                                                          
1 For more details on mvQCA, see Thiem (2013). To our knowledge, the only study so far 
that has made use of QCA in the context of European security and defense cooperation is 
Thiem (2011). 
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especially when the benefits of an operation are not immediately visible or when it is 
perceived at home as a failure. Participating states may also incur image costs by 
provoking negative international reactions. These ramifications are further 
aggravated if a state occupies the limelight by assuming leadership positions (Forster 
& Cimbala, 2005: 22).1  
In this section, we analyze the distribution of burdens in order to test whether 
CSDP military operations follow a public good rather a joint product model of 
collective action theory.2 In brief, the former builds on Olson and Zeckhauser’s 
(1966) economic theory of alliances, at whose core are the so-called “exploitation 
hypothesis”, which predicts that the larger countries will shoulder much of the 
burden for the smaller ones, and the “suboptimality hypothesis”, which says that the 
provision level of a public good will be too low. The joint product model has been 
introduced as an alternative, more general approach to understanding collective 
action, which it assumes to be driven by a mix of purely public, impurely public and 
private goods. When only private goods matter, the level of provision will be optimal 
and no cheap-riding occurs. With exclusively purely public goods, the model 
degenerates to the classical public good model. 
Studies suggest that international peacekeeping and crisis management 
operations, if not financially or militarily coordinated by a central authority, follow 
the public good model (e.g. Dorussen, Kirchner & Sperling, 2009: 794; Gaibulloev, 
Sandler & Shimizu, 2009: 849; Shimizu & Sandler, 2002: 665). Testing which one of 
the two models provides a better fit is important insofar as the subsequent 
identification of explanatory factors closely hinges on the distributional pattern of 
burden shares. At least with respect to the issue of suboptimality, the public good 
model seems more applicable since the optimal number of troops that was requested 
by the operations commander in EUFOR Chad had to be cut by about 20% for lack 
of sufficient pledges. Yet, the more important question is whether the exploitation 
hypothesis also holds. 
                                                          
1 For example, some high-ranking officials in the German defense ministry privately feared 
that if Germany took on the leading role in EUFOR Congo and the mission would fail for 
reasons of insufficient strength, they would have to endure Washington’s scornful laughter 
(Von Szandar, 2006). 
2 We do not summarize the tenets of either model herein as this has been done in previous 
work. See Hartley and Sandler (1999: 666-668); Khanna, Sandler and Shimizu (1998: 181-
183); Sandler (1993: 448-474), Sandler and Murdoch (2000: 300-304), Shimizu and Sandler 
(2002: 655-657) and Shimizu and Sandler (2010: 1480-1481). 
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For assessing the distribution of military burden, three variables are relevant: 
the indicator that operationalizes the burden, the indicator used to relativize the 
burden measure, and the method employed in testing their relation. 
Notwithstanding that different measures and methods have led to partly conflicting 
evidence, a high degree of concept-indicator consistency should be of primary 
importance. Following Beeres and Boger’s (2012: 4-7) two-tiered production process 
framework of armed forces performance, we situate burden sharing in CSDP 
military operations at the input side of the crisis response sub-process, focusing on 
the number of deployed units. The number of sustained units is irrelevant because 
both operations had a clear mandate known and adhered to by all participants. 
Under the EU framework of CSDP rules established in 2004, only certain 
“common costs” are paid for out of the central budget provided by the Athena 
mechanism, but all other costs related to the operation, usually about 90%, are borne 
by the individual states in the form of their actual contributions. Unlike in the case 
of UN peacekeeping operations, we can therefore be confident that the size of a 
deployed contingent in a certain troop category mirrors a state’s financial 
contribution. Although troop numbers and financial contributions have been the 
most widely-used indicators, an increasing number of scholars have begun to 
criticize these measures as deficient (Beeres & Bogers, 2012: 13-14; Oma, 2012: 570). 
Three further aspects have stood out: risk exposure, headship responsibility and 
mission duration. 
Unequal risk exposure rates are experienced by different unit types (UT). 
Thus, we complement the baseline dimension of troop numbers (TN) by 
distinguishing between staff, medical, logistic and combat unit-dominated 
contingents on a risk exposure dimension.1 On the dimension of headship 
responsibility, we take into account whether a country took on a leading role (LR) on 
the strategic or tactical level by providing the chief or deputy operations commander 
or/and the chief or deputy force commander. Filling either of these posts places a 
considerable burden on governments because if things go awry, the blame is quickly 
laid on them. An operation’s mandate (OM) feeds into the size of the burden on the 
dimension of mission duration. Arguably, the longer troops have to be sustained, the 
                                                          
1 See the appendix for details. In the context of the Iraq War, Mello (2012) also takes account 
of the deployment phase. This criterion is irrelevant for our purposes because the only major 
situation of a late deployment or an early redeployment occurred when Sweden pulled most 
its troops out of EUFOR Chad before the end of the mandate. 
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larger the burden that has to be carried, not least because mission-bound 
contingents cannot be earmarked for parallel, possibly more urgent operations 
elsewhere.1 
So as to allow for variability in dimension significance, a two-component 
weighting scheme is applied. The contribution component captures the quantity as 
well as the quality of the burden, while the time component accounts for the period 
over which this burden is carried. So as to reflect their importance, troop numbers 
enter the contribution component at 60%, unit types at 30% and leadership roles at 
10%. On the unit-type dimension, we assign different risk exposure coefficients: 4 
for combat units; 3 for logistic units, 2 for medical units and 1 for staff. With respect 
to headship responsibility, the coefficients are 2.5 if a country provided the 
operations or force commander and the deputy operations or deputy force 
commander, 2 if it provided either the operations or force commander, 1.5 if it 
provided the deputy operations or deputy force commander, and 1 otherwise.2 The 
time component uses a unit weighting because mission duration as its only 
dimension is already measured by the relative mandate of the mission set. The size of 
the burden each country i carries in mission set M of k missions with n internal 
contributors is then given by Equation (1): 
 
BUi,M=  OMm∑ OMjkj=1 
TNi
α1UTi
α2LRi
α3
∑ TNiα1UTiα2LRiα3n+ei=1  ,
k
j=1
 (1) 
 
where α1, α2 and α3 are the respective dimension weights, and e is a correction factor 
for external contributors.3 In line with previous studies on military burden sharing, 
we compute Kendall rank coefficients (τ) to test the following null hypothesis (H0) 
against its two-sided alternative (HA):4  
                                                          
1 We use the official start of the mandate as stipulated in the Council Joint Actions rather 
than the date of initial or full operational capability since troop mobilization and 
transportation already add to a country’s burden. 
2 Other schemes may be applied but we consider the present one a realistic baseline. 
3 Turkey contributed 16 troops to EUFOR Congo, Albania and Russia 130 troops to EUFOR 
Chad. 
4 Dorussen, Kirchner and Sperling (2009), Khanna and Sandler (1996), Khanna, Sandler and 
Shimizu (1998), Shimizu and Sandler (2002), Shimizu and Sandler (2010) and Siegel (2009). 
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H0:  The relative burden resulting for a state from its contribution to a 
CSDP mission set is commensurate with its relative capability to carry it. 
 
HA:  The relative burden resulting for a state from its contribution to a 
CSDP mission set is incommensurate with its relative capability to carry it. 
 
We use the three most common relativity indicators of a country’s 
capabilities: its share of total GDP, its share of the total population, and its share of 
an equally weighted percentage average of the former two. Table 1 reports simple as 
well as partial τs for each mission set. For the latter, the share of armed forces 
personnel is held constant. Positive coefficients indicate distributions to the 
disadvantage of larger states, negative coefficients distributions to the disadvantage 
of smaller states. Substantively small coefficients signal an absence of cheap-riding 
on either part.  
The results show that contributions to CSDP operations are consistent with 
the public good model in the case of EUFOR Congo for all indicators of capability, 
but the association is of only moderate strength when GDP is used to measure 
capability, and rather weak when population replaces GDP. For EUFOR Chad and 
across both operations, the results are inconsistent with the public good model. Its 
core prediction not just fails in the case of EUFOR Chad, but is actually turned on its 
head. When capability is based on population, larger states have ridden cheap on the 
contributions of smaller ones. The magnitude of inequitable burden sharing to the 
disadvantage of smaller states proves weak to moderate when both missions are 
assessed in combination. Thus, if larger states seek to argue in public that they have 
been contributing more than their fair share to CSDP operations, their assessment 
can be expected to be based on GDP, whereas smaller states could argue likewise on 
the basis of population size. In sum, our results show little support for the public 
good model. Instead, they suggest the existence of joint products. In the next section, 
we introduce the exogenous factors that will inform our integrated regularity model. 
                                                                                                                                                      
In contrast, Sandler and Murdoch (2000) and Sandler and Shimizu (2014) use Spearman 
coefficients, while Solomon (2004) conducts Wilcoxon rank tests. As to software, we use R 
and the ppcor package by Kim (2011). 
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Table 1. Kendall rank correlation coefficients 
  Relativized Burden Indicator 
Mission Set  BU / % GDP BU / % population 
BU / ((% GDP +  
% population) / 2) 
Congo ,	  0.260 0.138 0.214 
 ,;  0.150 0.026 0.102 
Chad ,	  −0.012 −0.074 0.006 
 ,;  0.076 −0.020 0.104 
Combined ,	  0.062 −0.040 0.062 
 ,;  0.119 −0.012 0.117 
a simple Kendall rank coefficient 
b partial Kendall rank coefficient, controlling for total armed forces personnel 
 
An Integrated Regularity Model of Burden Sharing 
This section introduces the components of our integrated regularity model, 
which incorporates two particularities. First, as we have shown military burdens not 
to be inequitably shouldered by larger states, the joint product rather than the public 
good variant of collective action theory informs the factor selection. Joint products 
in the context of CSDP operations result from a mixture of different goods that 
produce public and/or private benefits, which can, in turn, either be positive and/or 
negative. The former create incentives to contribute, whereas the latter inhibit 
contributions by producing disincentives. 
Second, we draw on integrated regularity theories of military burden sharing 
to identify the location of these four types of benefits. Benefits located on the 
domestic level are private to the contributor but usually public within it (Mello, 
2012; Saideman & Auerswald, 2012). International-level benefits are public within 
the global community of states, but may or may not generate second-order benefits 
that are private to the contributor (Auerswald, 2004; Baltrusaitis, 2010; Bennett, 
Lepgold & Unger, 1994; Davidson, 2011).1 Based on this two-by-two structure of the 
type and ownership of benefits, the set of factors we draw from in trying to explain 
contributions to CSDP operations is provided in Table 2. 
                                                          
1 A state with a long tradition of international peacekeeping provides a public good to the 
global community of states but may derive private benefits through its reputational status 
within that community (Shimizu & Sandler, 2010: 1481) 
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Table 2. Condition factors by benefit type and ownership 
 Benefit type 
Ownership Positive Negative 
Public peacekeeping tradition competing deployments 
Private 
trade volume 
public support 
budget constraints 
election distance 
parliamentary powers 
executive and legislative partisanship 
 
Positive Public Benefits 
EUFORs Congo and Chad were both assistance missions set up within the 
framework of a UN peacekeeping operation. It has repeatedly been shown that these 
operations conform to the traditional public goods model of collective action theory 
(Gaibulloev, Sandler & Shimizu, 2009; Khanna, Sandler & Shimizu, 1998; Perkins & 
Neumayer, 2008; Shimizu & Sandler, 2010). States supporting them should thus be 
expected to value worldwide stability, trade, democracy or human rights enough to 
be prepared to contribute to their production at least in proportion with their private 
resources.  
Lebovic (2004: 915), for example, reasons that if nations have invested sizeable 
amounts of resources over a long time in an international institution they also have 
more to lose should it break down. During the planning phases of EUFOR Congo 
and EUFOR Chad, warnings about overstretch and underperformance of the UN 
peacekeeping system were indeed high on the agenda, and countries with deep prior 
involvement in UN peacekeeping operations should therefore have had strong 
incentives to contribute to these missions (Jones, Gowan & Sherman, 2009). 
A country would only be expected to champion the cause of free trade, 
democracy and human rights if its own record in these areas was impeccable. 
Andersson (2002) as well as Perkins and Neumayer (2008: 899) argue on this 
assumption that not past investments in the UN peacekeeping system are directly 
relevant but their actual sources. More precisely, Andersson (2002: 379) holds that 
democracies are imbued with a desire for spreading their norms and values, and 
presents results that ‘must be described as providing unambiguous support for the 
hypothesis’ that democracies commit more than non-democracies to UN 
74 
 
interventions. Perkins and Neumayer (2008) extend this line of reasoning by arguing 
that both democratic polities and polities that highly value human rights are more 
likely to contribute to peacekeeping operations. Among their twelve explanatory 
variables, the authors find these two factors to be the third and sixth most important 
determinants of peacekeeping contributions. As adhering to certain standards of 
democratic governance is a fundamental prerequisite for becoming an EU member 
state, any variation above which should be explanatorily irrelevant, we expect 
contributions to CSDP missions to be influenced by the degree to which a state has 
previously sought to provide a public good to the global community by diffusing its 
own values through the UN system via contributions to peacekeeping operations. 
Negative Public Benefits 
Out-of-area operations of the kind increasingly conducted since the end of the 
Cold War by ad hoc coalitions, the EU, NATO and the UN often take place 
simultaneously and at great distances to the contributing states. For example, when 
EUFOR Congo was launched in 2006, NATO’s KFOR and ISAF missions were still 
active, as were Operation Iraqi Freedom and several UN peacekeeping operations. 
Since all states face military resource constraints, considerations regarding their 
contribution to an operation-in-planning are likely to be negatively affected by 
present commitments, less so if a future operation is to follow hard on the heels of a 
completed one, but very much so if ongoing operations to which they have already 
contributed would continue to run in parallel. Simultaneous commitments are 
unproblematic as long as sufficient resources exist, but they impact a state’s capacity 
to contribute once forces begin to operate at full stretch. 
Committing resources to an operation also makes them harder to use when 
other, possibly more important, demands for military crisis management arise 
(Fordham, 1998: 575). Member states whose available assets already ran short due to 
other missions might not have been willing to further constrain their future freedom 
of action by committing resources to EUFOR operations. British and German 
officials, for instance, justified their non-participation in EUFOR Chad by pointing 
to the distraction of forces from more important commitments in Afghanistan 
(Pohl, 2014b: 201). 
Positive Private Benefits 
Studies suggest that geographical distance is negatively related to the size of 
private benefits gained from regional stability in an area of operation (Bove & Elia, 
2011; Gaibulloev, Sandler & Shimizu, 2009; Perkins & Neumayer, 2008). EUFORs 
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Congo and Chad both had the goal of restabilizing the situation on the ground, but 
while spatial proximity may matter for adjacent countries at risk of experiencing 
negative externalities, it is implausible that refugee inflows, let alone conflict 
spillover, impacted the calculations of EU member states. Instead of spatial 
proximity, we consider relational proximity in terms of trade volumes as appreciably 
more relevant. Several authors have hypothesized that economic interests drive 
countries to commit troops to peacekeeping operations (Gaibulloev, Sandler & 
Shimizu, 2009: 833; Perkins & Neumayer, 2008: 903; Shimizu & Sandler, 2010: 
1479).1 Anecdotal evidence for the significance of trade motives also exists for 
EUFOR Congo. The UK has only little economic stakes in the country and did not 
contribute, whereas France has strong interests in uranium abstraction, and was the 
largest contributor to the operation (Cumming, 2011: 566-567).2  
The second factor in the set of positive private benefits is public support, 
whose impact has been a major area of research at the intersection of foreign policy 
and democratic representation.3 The core argument is that decision-makers monitor 
public opinion to adjust their behavior at the margin in order to avoid political 
predicaments. For example, policy executives may come to copper over the human 
costs of a military engagement for which their publics have lost enthusiasm, if they 
have ever shown any in the first place. Although the literature on the nexus between 
EU military operations and public opinion is not nearly as extensive as that for US 
military interventions, its findings call for more attention to this factor. For instance, 
Pohl (2014b: 193-195)  argues that CSDP policies are the consequence of political 
ambition under domestic constraints. In contributing to EU military operations 
political leaders seek to demonstrate their ability to influence international events in 
line with public opinion without creating the risk of having to pay a 
disproportionate price. 
                                                          
1 In contrast, Andersson (2002: 380), doubts that trade considerations have influenced 
commitment to UN peacekeeping operations, and Gegout (2009: 204) concludes that French 
trade interests have been irrelevant in EUFOR Congo. 
2 Decisions to contribute can also be based on current expectations of future trade 
opportunities. For example, conservative parliamentarians in the German Bundestag argued 
that participation was important as Congo possessed some of the largest copper and tantalite 
reserves worldwide. See Bundestag plenary protocol 16/36, 19 May 2006, p. 3105. 
3 For a review of the extensive literature in this area, see Aldrich et al. (2006). 
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Negative Private Benefits 
Negative private benefits are incurred by the effect of a contribution on a 
government’s budget situation. The price a government is willing to pay for an 
operation can therefore be expected to also depend on the budget situation. 
Governments that face budgetary constraints should not yield in the negotiating 
process as readily as those not facing such constraints.1 CSDP military operations are 
of a size which does not significantly affect the budget of most states, but the 
possibility that financial considerations have fed into a country’s decision cannot be 
ruled out a priori. 
Decisions on contributions to an operation involve political calculations at the 
highest level in all EU member states. As has been argued above, public support may 
provide a legitimizing argument for governments to deploy troops, but research also 
shows a hostile public to influence the size and type of contributions. For instance, 
Isernia (2000) traces Italy’s political behavior during the Kosovo Crisis. When 
NATO air attacks were launched against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999, 
the Italian government was forced to tread a tightrope in assuring the US of its 
alliance commitment while appeasing public opposition to the raids at home. 
Similarly,  Saideman and Auerswald (2012: 78-80)  argue that President Chirac 
sought to minimize the risk of domestic criticism to France’s ISAF contribution by 
restricting the largest and most visible part of its forces to the safe area around 
Kabul. However, in spite of negative popular sentiments in Italy and France, these 
countries still contributed towards the Kosovo bombing campaigns and Operation 
Desert Storm. Baltrusaitis (2010: 214),  Tago (2009) and Williams (2013) argue that 
the temporal distance of a country’s general election helps explain this seeming 
instability in the effect of public opinion because political executives only become 
responsive towards the end of an electoral cycle. 
Besides election distance, the effect of public opinion on the type and size of 
military contributions to international peacekeeping operations is moderated by the 
scope of the executive’s discretion vis-à-vis the legislature. Parliamentary powers in 
this area vary considerably among EU member states, in some of which foreign 
policy is the exclusive prerogative of the executive, whereas the legislature enjoys far-
reaching competencies of co-decision and oversight in others (Dieterich, Hummel & 
                                                          
1 In contrast, Domke (1991) argues, based on data for six advanced industrial democracies 
over the years 1955-1985, that a state’s budget situation does not influence its defense 
spending. 
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Marschall, 2008). Parliamentary powers, however, only form a legal frame that 
requires activation to become effective.  
A significant body of work has also addressed the reasons of opposition 
towards military deployments, both at the legislative and executive ends of 
government, and should thus not be neglected, in particular because it infuses the 
bare institutional relations between different branches of government with concrete 
explanatory meaning. On the basis of the tested assumption that the electoral 
platforms of right parties are more pro-military than those of left parties, Palmer, 
London and Regan (2004) conclude that governments from right parties are more 
likely to resort to the use of force in their external policies, but the orientation of 
parties by itself does not influence contributions directly. Its impact is conditional on 
the branch of government that parties dominate and the institutional rules under 
which they operate. These interrelations are captured in the as yet most 
differentiated model of domestic factor interaction proposed by Mello (2012) in the 
context of contributions to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Mello (2012) finds that, 
provided no constitutional restrictions exist, large contributions result when a right 
executive is either unconstrained by parliamentary war powers or forms a unified 
right government with parliament in the presence of such powers, or when the 
executive leans to the left and parliament enjoys considerable veto rights.1  
In summary, research offers alternative explanations for disproportionately 
low or/and constrained contributions. If elections are nearby or parliament enjoys 
considerable influence over deployments, negative public opinion is expected to 
constrain contributions. Furthermore, left-leaning executives are expected to face a 
greater risk at electoral punishment and therefore less inclined to contribute at the 
end of an election cycle, whereas left-leaning parliaments are more likely to veto 
military deployment decisions. In contrast, the extensive work by Auerswald and 
Saideman supports the hypothesis that the cause of limited involvement is the 
presence of institutionally weak executives, who are reluctant to advocate the 
deployment of military forces abroad for fear of future punishment for failure, 
irrespective of public opinion or partisan politics (see Auerswald, 1999; Auerswald, 
2004; Saideman & Auerswald, 2012). 
                                                          
1 Constitutional restrictions are irrelevant in the context of the CSDP, since all EU member 
states participate, except Denmark.  
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Synthesis 
When the relevant components of these different models of military burden 
sharing are synthesized, complex interactions between positive and negative benefits 
on both the private-domestic and public-international level are to be expected. For 
example, a right executive governing a country with close trade relations to the 
target country should have strong incentives to contribute, but it will be constrained 
if confronted with a left parliament that is vested with extensive war powers. The 
share of the burden a state is willing to carry thus becomes a function of domestic-
level factors that yield positive and negative private benefits as well as international-
level factors that produce positive and negative public benefits.  
Yet, for burden shares to acquire a substantive meaning in debates on the 
equity of distributions and regularity theories of burden sharing, the relative size of 
contributions first has to be associated with concrete labels. We divide the factor 
relative size of contributions into three distinct levels to this end. Underprovision 
refers to negatively disproportional contributions, equiprovision is present when 
contributions are proportional, and overprovision implies positively disproportional 
contributions. Before specific configurational functions for each provision level are 
derived in the second phase of our analysis, we briefly explain the operationalization 
of the base variables and the calibration of the target factors.1 
Operationalization of Base Variables and Calibration of 
Target Factors 
The multivalent outcome factor contributor status (CS) comprises three levels: 
underprovider (u), equiprovider (e), and overprovider (o). Membership in each set 
formed by these factor levels is assigned as follows. First, we compute the base 
variable as the ratio between a country’s expected burden share and its observed 
burden share. A ratio below unity signals underprovision, one above unity 
overprovision, and unity indicates equiprovision. Second, we apply two thresholds 
to calibrate factor levels on the basis of ranges in burden ratios. A country is 
categorized as a member in the set of underproviders if it contributes at least a third 
less than expected. Taking the reciprocal value as the second threshold, it is 
categorized as a member in the set of overproviders if contributions are at least 50% 
above expectations. If a country contributes roughly in accordance with expectations 
                                                          
1 Detailed descriptions are provided in the appendix. 
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as demarcated by these two values, it is classified as an equiprovider. Figure 1 
visualizes the distribution of countries for each level of the outcome factor by 
mission set and capability indicator. 
Positive public benefits from contributing to CSDP operations result from a 
country’s peacekeeping tradition (PT), which can be strong (s) or weak (w).1 
Operationalization of the base variable and calibration was performed as follows. We 
first calculated a country’s relative total personnel contributions to all UN 
peacekeeping operations since 1991 before relativizing these contributions by a 
dispersion factor to obtain a reflection of “tradition” as consistent engagement rather 
than single bouts of activity. These scores were then weighted by a country’s relative 
capability to participate in such operations. If the resulting ratio was at least unity, 
the country was categorized as having a strong peacekeeping tradition. 
Negative public benefits are generated by competing deployments (CD), with 
significant (s) and insignificant (i) as its two levels. In order to reflect the impact of a 
set of simultaneous commitments on military stretch, we divide a country’s deployed 
units in all military operations other than EUFOR missions during their first year by 
its deployable units. Set in relation to NATO’s force usability targets, which have also 
been adopted by the EU, countries with at least 15% stretch are categorized as having 
significant competing deployments(International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
2008a: 13). 2  
Positive private benefits to a country from contributing involve two condition 
factors: trade volume (TV) and public support (PS). The former has two levels: large 
(l) and small (s). We used information on bilateral export and import statistics, 
expected costs of contribution and estimated mission costs for operationalizing the 
base variable.3 Countries whose average trade volume prior to an operation 
amounted to at least 50% of the respective costs expected from contributing were 
categorized as having a large trade volume. The two levels of public support are high 
(h) and low (l). Operationalization of net public support as the base variable was 
achieved by subtracting the percentage of Eurobarometer survey respondents who 
either opposed or had no opinion on the CSDP from the percentage of respondents
                                                          
1 For binary factors, each level represents the Boolean negation of the other level. 
2 NATO usability targets for ground forces consist of a 40% deployability target and an 8% 
sustainability target. 
3 For operation EUFOR Chad, trade volume figures take into account exports and imports 
for both Chad as well as the Central African Republic. 
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Figure 1. Observed and Expected Burden Shares 
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who expressly supported it. Countries with a net rate of at least 30% were 
categorized as having high public support. 
The class of negative private benefits comprises three condition factors: budget 
constraints (BC), election distance (ED) and parliamentary powers (PP). Budget 
constraints can be high (h) or low (l). This factor takes into account the limits on 
deficit and debt ratios stipulated by the EU for both Euro-zone members and non-
members back to three years prior to the year in which the operation was launched. 
If the deficit or debt ratio limit had been breached in the year before an operation, 
the country was categorized as having a highly constrained budget. The two levels of 
election distance are large (l) and small (s). Its base variable is defined as the time 
between an operation, as referenced through the date between the first mentioning 
of its possibility and the official adoption date of the launching Council Joint Action, 
and the next general election. If the reference date is more than one year away from 
the next general election, the country is categorized as having elections at large 
distance. Parliamentary powers as the third factor has two levels: significant (s) and 
insignificant (i). Assignment to these sets is based on the extent to which war powers 
were vested in the legislature and the status of the government. If not only 
information or consultation, but explicit parliamentary approval was required for 
military deployment, or if the country had a minority government at the time when 
contributions to an operation were discussed, a country was categorized as having 
significant parliamentary war powers. 
Positive or negative private benefits may result from legislative (LP) or 
executive partisanship (EP), which can either be right (r) or left (l). Drawing on the 
ParlGov database, we measured the ideological orientation of either branch by 
summing up individual party positions on a left-right scale before relativizing by the 
proportion of the total number of seats (Döring & Manow, 2012). Due to 
considerable variation in the distribution of ideological orientations, we categorized 
a parliament as right if it scored at least 5.25 on the ideology scale, a government as 
right if it scored at least 5 on the same scale. 
Results and Interpretation 
The joint product model of collective action theory was identified as 
preferable. Each set of factors subjected to model testing in the second stage should 
thus involve a combination of public and private benefits. As nine condition factors 
yield a disproportionate property space in relation to the number and diversity of 
cases, we limit the size of any analyzed frame to five factors. The number of frame 
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combinations is  −  = 105 since public benefits are generated by two factors, 
and at least one factor that belongs to the class of public benefits, positive or 
negative, must be included. Based on the minimization results of each frame, we 
distil the best-fitting models inasmuch as they meet standards for minimum 
inclusion scores, show no model ambiguities, and hold up to further within-case 
analysis. We use R in conjunction with the package QCA to perform the Boolean 
minimization process (Duşa & Thiem, 2014; R Development Core Team, 2014; 
Thiem & Duşa, 2013). 
Our interpretation of the results focuses on GDP as the capability indicator 
because it is the single most widely-used measure in academic and policy debates 
about burden sharing. To test the robustness of these findings, cross-checks are 
conducted with the other two indicators. Table 3 lists the results for GDP and 
population, respectively, Table 4 for the combined measure. 
Table 3 shows that countries have contributed more than expected when they 
combined a strong peacekeeping tradition with distant elections. For GDP, the first 
path adds large trade volumes and high public support to this combination, 
suggesting that immediate private benefits exert a positive impact on the 
contribution level as long as a country generates positive public benefits. General 
public approval of the CSDP alone thus seems too ambiguous to spur 
disproportionate contributions to specific operations (Brummer, 2007). Large trade 
volumes alone did not induce large contributions, either, but they certainly had an 
amplifying impact in some of the overproviders, notably France, which was often 
accused of trying to bolster its economic interests in contributing disproportionately 
to EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad (Bono, 2011; Koepf, 2012). 
While the first combination accords closely with our theoretical expectations, 
the absence of large trade volumes and public support in the second path does not. 
However, the group of countries covered by this path commands attention in this 
connection. It only includes contributions to EUFOR Chad by the so-called ‘neutral’ 
EU member states, viz. Sweden, Austria, Ireland and Finland (Devine, 2011). 
Although public opinion about the CSDP in these four countries was amongst the 
least enthusiastic of all states, such reservations did not seem to have inhibited 
contributions (Brummer, 2007: 190). In fact, the neutrals declared that the operation 
in Chad represented an opportunity to demonstrate that the primary objectives of 
CSDP were about peacekeeping and supporting the UN, and thus entirely in 
accordance with their national foreign policy traditions’ (Pohl, 2014b: 200). The 
absence of large trade volumes with the area of operations is an advantage for these 
 
 
 
Table 3. Results for individual capability indicators 
Indicator  GDP  Population 
Outcome  CS{u}  CS{e}  CS{o}  CS{u}  CS{e}  CS{o} 
  Path  Path  Path  Path  Path  Path 
Condition  1 2 3 4 5  1 2  1 2  1 2 3 4 5  1 2  1 2 
PT{s}                         
CD{s}                         
TV{l}                         
PS{h}                         
BC{h}                         
ED{l}                         
PP{s}                         
LP{r}                         
EP{r}                         
Cases Congo  2 3 2 1 2  6 0  3 0  2 3 4 3 2  4 1  1 0 
Cases Chad  2 3 0 4 4  1 1  1 4  2 3 7 8 0  1 0  3 5 
Inclusion  1.00 0.83 1.00 0.80 0.83  0.86 1.00  1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 0.91 0.82 1.00  0.80 1.00  1.00 0.80 
Coverage (r)  0.16 0.20 0.08 0.16 0.20  0.60 0.10  0.27 0.27  0.14 0.21 0.36 0.32 0.07  0.50 0.13  0.29 0.29 
Coverage (u)  0.12 0.08 0.04 0.16 0.08  0.10 0.10  0.27 0.27  0.07 0.07 0.07 0.14 0.04  0.50 0.13  0.21 0.21 
Incl. Total  0.889  0.875  1.000  0.913  0.833  0.875 
Cov. Total  0.640  0.700  0.533  0.750  0.625  0.500 
Note: / Condition present/absent; Incl. = inclusion; Cov. = coverage; (r) = raw; (u) = unique. 
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Table 4. Results for combined capability indicator 
Outcome  CS{u}  CS{e}  CS{o} 
  Path  Path  Path 
Condition  1 2 3 4 5  1 2  1 2 
PT{s}             
CD{s}             
TV{l}             
PS{h}             
BC{h}             
ED{l}             
PP{s}             
LP{r}             
EP{r}             
Cases Congo  2 3 2 1 2  1 2  4 0 
Cases Chad  2 3 0 4 4  0 1  2 2 
Inclusion  1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 1.00  1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 
Coverage (r)  0.15 0.23 0.08 0.15 0.23  0.14 0.43  0.35 0.12 
Coverage (u)  0.12 0.08 0.04 0.15 0.08  0.14 0.43  0.35 0.12 
Incl. Total  0.94  1.00  1.00 
Cov. Total  0.65  0.57  0.47 
Note: / Condition present/absent; Incl. = inclusion; Cov. = coverage; (r) = raw; (u) = 
unique. 
 
contributors since close trade ties may endanger an operation’s neutrality, one of the 
guiding principles of UN peacekeeping. 
In summary, our results on the basis of GDP as the capability indicator 
suggest that a strong peacekeeping tradition constitutes the most important 
incentive for contributing in positive disproportion to CSDP operations. The results 
for population as the capability indicator not only reinforce these conclusions but 
also correspond to theoretical expectations on the impact of competing deployments 
and executive ideology: the absence of simultaneous military engagements and the 
presence of a right-leaning executive are associated with overprovision. 
However, as Table 4 shows, the best-fitting model for overprovision with the 
combined capability indicator does not include peacekeeping tradition. The first 
path, which combines large trade volumes, high public support and institutionally 
weak parliaments, provides a particularly convincing explanation for some of the 
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cases it covers. Especially the overprovision to EUFOR Congo by Belgium, a country 
that largely retreated from peacekeeping since the disastrous events of 1994 in 
Rwanda, squares with its economic ties: almost a third of the DRC’s exports are 
attributable to Belgium, which actively rallied for support to launch the CSDP 
operation (Gegout, 2009: 239; Nasra, 2011: 172).  
The second path, covering the Swedish and Irish contribution to EUFOR 
Chad, however, creates a puzzle for all existing theories of burden sharing. On the 
one hand, low budget constraints should indeed have a positive impact on the level 
of contributions, but on the other, small trade volumes, low public support and 
significant parliamentary powers are all expected to combine in inhibiting 
contributions. The seeming irrelevance of peacekeeping tradition thus renders this 
explanation of sizeable contributions by the neutral countries to EUFOR Chad 
implausible. We cannot determine at this stage of research whether this finding is 
simply an artefact of the capability indicator or due to another, substantive source. 
The analysis of equiprovision indicates that large trade volumes were 
consistently associated with commensurate contributions when specific 
combinations of negative benefits were absent. The two paths for GDP-based 
equiprovision associate large trade volumes with proportional contributions, but 
only if a state’s available resources are not stretched and parliament has significant 
war powers, or if its resources are stretched but parliament is not involved in 
decisions on the use of force and public support for the CSDP is high. Case-based 
evidence supports the interactive effect of these paths. For instance, in its final 
evaluation of the mission, the Netherlands alluded to the economic priority the 
Great Lakes area enjoys, which seems to have at least partly influenced its decision to 
contribute (Ministerie van Defensie, 2007: 5). Germany’s contribution to EUFOR 
Congo, in contrast, exemplifies the difficulties of making disproportionately large 
contributions if parliament must be involved. Several authors have argued in this 
respect that the German government could not dismiss the Bundestag’s concerns 
about troop safety, in consequence of which it had to restrict involvement 
(Brummer, 2013: 13; Schmitt, 2012: 69). 
In accordance with the analysis of GDP-based overprovision, results on the 
basis of the population indicator confirm that large election distance affects a state 
executive’s ability to contribute. One of the cases included in the first path 
emphasizing this condition is Germany’s contribution to EUFOR Congo. Schmitt 
(2012: 66), for instance, argues that, because of its recent election, the German 
government’s internal position was very secure when decisions on troop 
contributions were made, making substantial contributions less risky. The best-
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fitting model for the combined indicator mainly draws attention to the absence of 
significant competing deployments and high budget constraints. Furthermore, it 
shows that right-leaning governments are inclined to contribute even if elections are 
nearby while their left-leaning counterparts only participate if elections are far away.  
The results of the analysis of GDP-based underprovision confirm that states 
refrain from contributing in the absence of large trade volumes and a strong 
peacekeeping tradition. This is most clearly demonstrated by the fourth path, which 
indicates that states lacking both these conditions refrained from participation, even 
if they had no competing deployments. The first path, covering the second largest set 
of countries, suggests that for states without a peacekeeping tradition, the absence of 
a favorable public opinion inhibits contributions. This path, which covers the UK’s 
role in both operations, lends further support to the argument presented by Pohl 
(2014b: 201), who has attributed the lukewarm attitude towards EUFOR Chad to the 
British public’s Euro-skepticism, and Gross (2009: 88), who has argued that because 
‘the ESDP operation in DRC was not an easy sell domestically […] preference was 
for others to undertake the mission’.  
While popular opposition towards the CSDP can thus act as a constraint on 
contributions, paths two and five indicate that popular support alone is insufficient 
to spur contributions. These paths reveal that the benefits derived from such support 
do not cause states whose military capabilities are already stretched by simultaneous 
deployments to participate in an operation. The cases covered by these paths are the 
member states from Central and Eastern Europe, which at the time preferred 
deploying their available troops in the US-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq 
(Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013). Romania even had to backtrack on its commitment 
of 120 troops to EUFOR Chad because it lacked the capabilities for new 
engagements on top of its ongoing ones in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Further analyses with alternative capability indicators stand in no opposition 
to these interpretations. The results for the combined capability indicator are 
identical with those based on GDP. Only paths four and five for population-based 
underprovision diverge from the other results: neither includes a condition that was 
expected to have a negative impact on underprovision.  
Conclusions 
In this article, we have presented the first systematic investigation into the 
determinants of contribution patterns in CSDP operations. Building on insights 
from collective action theory and integrated regularity models of burden sharing 
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with respect to NATO, UN and ad hoc coalition operations, we have arrived at 
conclusions that complement, reinforce, but also partly contradict those of previous 
research. In the first stage of our two-stage design, we assessed whether patterns of 
burden distributions would confirm predictions from collective action theory-based 
models applied to other institutions of international military cooperation. In 
opposition to predictions of pure public good models, which would have been 
expected ex ante to be more appropriate in the case of the CSDP, our results did not 
indicate that burdens were consistently distributed to the disadvantage of larger 
states. Rather, a joint product model was identified as more appropriate, implying 
that both private and public benefits must be taken into account for explaining 
divergent contribution levels in CSDP operations. In the second stage, integrated 
models of military burden sharing have then been drawn on to identify nine types of 
benefits, public and private, that have been found to matter in previous research. By 
means of a novel generalization of mvQCA we have been able to derive 
differentiated results with respect to three levels of contributions. 
Countries that have been overproviders have made relatively large 
contributions to CSDP operations. We found that these contributions occur when a 
strong peacekeeping tradition is combined with distant elections. In contrast, large 
trade volumes are consistently associated with proportional contributions if a 
combination of competing deployments, parliamentary powers, high budget 
constraints, nearby elections and/or a left-leaning executive does not generate 
negative benefits outweighing the positive ones. Lastly, contributions have been 
found to be relatively low when trade volumes are small and a country’s 
peacekeeping tradition is weak, competing deployments are significant or public 
support is low. 
These results have been generated by employing an innovative two-stage 
design, in which an appropriate variant of collective action theory was identified in 
the first phase, and subsequently served as the basis for an ensuing configurational 
analysis of different contribution levels in the second phase. Besides presenting new 
substantive findings with regard to the CSDP, our study has thus also demonstrated 
how different tools of analysis usually employed in isolation in neighboring fields of 
research can be combined in order to generate richer explanations of burden-sharing 
patterns in international military operations. 
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Appendices: Burden Sharing in CSDP Military 
Operations 
Outcome Factor: Contributor Status (CS) 
Factor levels: underprovider (u), equiprovider (e), overprovider (o) 
Base variable: burden share ratio (bsr) 
Operationalization of Base Variable 
Burden sharing in military missions has been analyzed in terms of “what is and what 
ought to be” (Hartley & Sandler, 1999: 668). More specifically, the ratio between a 
country’s actual contribution of resources to a common effort and its ability to 
contribute has been widely considered the most appropriate index of equity 
measurement. But while the theoretical structure of this index has been 
uncontroversial, the operationalization of its two dimensions, actual contributions 
and ability to contribute, has been much debated. A significant part of this debate 
has centered on the type of the common effort towards which contributions were to 
be assessed among a group of countries. 
During the Cold War, the focus was on territorial defense within the 
framework of NATO, and equity was evaluated on the basis of overall military 
spending, armed forces personnel or military-industrial output. However, when the 
number of out-of-area peace-keeping operations sharply rose during the 1990s, this 
conceptual basis was subjected to increased scrutiny. In line with the earlier 
literature, a country’s burden continued to be assessed through the ratio of its actual 
contributions to its capabilities, but the former was now operationalized by mission 
or institution-specific contributions rather than aggregate measures of overall 
defense investments. In particular, financial and/or troop contributions were 
considered the most appropriate indicators of a country’s absolute costs (see, for 
example, Bobrow & Boyer, 1997; Bove & Elia, 2011; Dorussen, Kirchner & Sperling, 
2009; Gaibulloev, Sandler & Shimizu, 2009; Khanna, Sandler & Shimizu, 1999; 
Lebovic, 2004; Siegel, 2009). 
Undeniably, financial and military commitments are the two most relevant 
measures of the absolute size of a country’s carried burden, be it within the 
framework of NATO, the UN, an ad hoc coalition or the CSDP. EUFORs Congo and 
Chad had estimated price tags of around €100m and €1bn, respectively (Helly, 2009: 
339; Major, 2009: 315). Notwithstanding their popularity, however, these two 
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measures have been criticized as insufficient to reflect the multidimensional nature 
of the burden generated by out-of-area operations, in contrast to territorial defense 
endeavors where they may be fully appropriate. Most importantly, political risks 
have been suggested as a further significant factor (Beeres & Bogers, 2012: 14; 
Ringsmose, 2010: 328; Saideman & Auerswald, 2012). The costs from these risks are 
incurred in two ways. First, participation in military operations carries the danger of 
negative domestic ramifications when troops get involved in deadly combat actions. 
And second, the assumption of operation leadership not only creates expectations 
but also shifts responsibility for mission accomplishment to the lead nation(s) 
(Forster & Cimbala, 2005: 22). If these expectations are not met or the operation is 
perceived as a failure, either in full or parts, decision-makers may have to face 
political repercussions, and criticism or even ridicule may affect a country’s standing 
within the international community.1 As an improvement over previous ways of 
capturing absolute burden, we thus take into account not only financial and military 
costs, but also the political dimension of a country’s participation in an international 
peacekeeping operation. 
We assess financial and military contributions to both EUFORs solely by 
means of contributed troops. A separation is unnecessary since, unlike UN missions 
for which financial contributions do not necessarily mirror personnel contributions 
as these operations are financed out of a central budget with fixed assessments for 
each member state, the institutional rules of the CSDP framework tie them closely 
together by the principle of “costs lie where they fall”. This means that a country’s 
military and financial burdens strongly correlate. The remaining costs of an 
operation – the so-called “common costs” – are covered by the EU’s Athena 
mechanism. 
In order to assess the equity of burden-sharing, absolute costs have to be 
relativized by an indicator of a country’s ability to contribute. Two indicators lend 
themselves to this end: wealth and population.2  The former measures the amount of 
accrued material resources whereby contributions could be financed, whereas the 
latter sets absolute costs in relation to the amount of human resources from which a 
country could potentially draw. Table 1 provides our data on the number of 
                                                          
1 For example, high-ranking German officials were particularly afraid of US American 
mockery before the launch of EUFOR Congo (Von Szandar, 2006). 
2 Both have been widely used. See, for example, Andersson (2002), Dorussen, Kirchner and 
Sperling (2009), Lebovic (2004), Shimizu and Sandler( 2002), and Siegel (2009). 
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contributed troops, GDP and population.1 Data on troop contributions were 
retrieved from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) 
multilateral peace operations database, unless stated otherwise, including troop 
contributions in theatre, as well as staff contributions to the operation and force 
headquarters. Data on GDP and population size were retrieved from the World 
Development Indicators 
Conventional troops-to-GDP and troops-to-population indices do not take 
into account the distribution of political risks among participating states. The extent 
to which a state exposes itself to political risk in CSDP missions depends on the 
operational role(s) it assumes and the probability of its troops getting involved in, 
possibly deadly, combat actions. In the following two paragraphs, we list our data 
and their sources for each operation with respect to the main type of troops 
seconded as well as the operational role a country assumed. 
EUFOR Congo’s main task was to stabilize the region during the country’s 
election, and if necessary to intervene, which it eventually did on three occasions 
(Hagemann, 2010: 41; Major, 2008: 20). Eleven states seconded military personnel to 
the area of operation.2 Two of these made large contributions and also assumed a 
leading role: France provided the force commander and Germany the operations 
commander as well as the headquarters (Major, 2009: 315). Four other countries 
contributed troops that could participate in interventions if the need for the use of 
force arose, namely Spain, the Netherlands, Sweden and Portugal (Engberg, 2011: 
108-137; Hagemann, 2010; Ministerie van Defensie, 2007; Palma, 2009: 63). 
Furthermore, Poland contributed 130 military police, which were charged with the 
protection of EUFOR facilities (Major, 2008: 18). 
Four EU member states contributed personnel to the area of operations that 
did not risk getting involved in combat. Belgium participated with four unmanned 
surveillance airplanes and around 50 soldiers (Verbraecken, 2006).  Italy contributed 
one C-130 military air transport and also around 50 soldiers (Stato Maggiore della  
 
                                                          
1 Figures on armed forces personnel have been added for comparison. 
2 Additionally, seven nations only contributed staff members to the operation and/or force 
headquarters: Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Slovakia and the United 
Kingdom (Major, 2009: 311). 
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Table 1. Dimensions of burden indicator and capability indicators 
 Congo  Chad 
Country Troopsa) Armed F.b) Populat.c) GDPd)  Troopsa) Armed F.b) Populat.c) GDPd) 
Austria 3 40.0 8228 208744  169 35.0 8301 224424 
Belgium 59 37.0 10479 251841  64 39.0 10626 266011 
Bulgaria - - - -  2 75.0 7660 19106 
Cyprus 1 10.8 1033 10921  2 10.8 1063 11955 
Czech Rep. 0 28.0 10236 71857  2 27.0 10334 81312 
Estonia 0 8.0 1346 8018  0 7.0 1342 9489 
Finland 11 31.0 5246 138681  62 32.0 5289 152523 
France 975 359.0 63176 1436256  1770 353.0 64012 1505322 
Germany 745 285.0 82469 1943341  4 244.0 82266 2081124 
Greece 1 168.0 11104 151655  4 161.0 11193 165670 
Hungary 0 44.0 10087 56885  3 37.0 10056 59170 
Ireland 2 10.0 4160 124072  447 10.0 4357 137433 
Italy 56 445.0 58607 1159362  104 436.0 59375 1204797 
Latvia 0 5.0 2301 11610  0 17.0 2276 14331 
Lithuania 0 29.0 3414 16640  2 24.0 3376 19711 
Luxembourg 1 1.5 465 24154  2 1.5 480 27017 
Malta 0 2.0 404 4137  0 2.0 409 4410 
Netherlands 44 60.0 16320 411168  71 41.0 16382 441792 
Poland 125 162.0 38165 199364  421 142.0 38121 226149 
Portugal 53 93.0 10549 122236  2 91.0 10608 126939 
Romania - - - -  2 153.0 21547 55927 
Slovakia 0 20.0 5387 36495  1 17.0 5397 43691 
Slovenia 1 12.0 2000 23867  14 12.0 2018 26998 
Spain 132 220.0 43398 681374  112 222.0 44879 733821 
Swedene 50 28.6 9030 282365  120 17.6 9148 304259 
UK 0 217.0 60224 1707602  4 160.0 60987 1815652 
a) SIPRI (2013a) 
b) Armed forces personnel total in thousands; World Development Indicators 2005 (Congo), 
2007 (Chad) http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.  
c) Population in thousands; World Development Indicators 2005 (Congo), 2007 (Chad) 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.  
d) Millions of constant 2000 US$; World Development Indicators 2005 (Congo), 2007 (Chad) 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.  
e) According to SIPRI, Sweden only contributed 10 troops to EUFOR Chad. However, initially 
it contributed 120 troops, but these were largely withdrawn after operational capacity was 
reached (Seibert, 2010: 126). 
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Difesa, 2007). Finland seconded two surgeons and three medical teams of three 
persons each (Finish Ministry of Defense, 2006). Greece allocated one C-130 military 
air transport (Hellenic National Defense Staff, n.d.). The remaining states did not 
participate in the operation or only contributed staff members. As the only non-EU 
member state, Turkey contributed a C-135 cargo plane with 15 crew members 
(Turkish Armed Forces, n.d.). 
With respect to EUFOR Chad, twelve countries seconded military personnel 
to the area of operations. Three of them took on a leading role. France provided the 
operation headquarters and the force commander, and was responsible for the 
Central and the Birao Zone. Ireland provided the operations commander and was 
responsible for the Southern Zone. Poland provided the deputy operations 
commander and was responsible for the Northern Zone (Assemblée Européenne de 
Sécurité et de Défense, 2008: 10-11). 
The arrival of the main force was prepared by an initial entry force, which 
was composed of special forces from France, Sweden, Belgium, Ireland and Austria 
(Mattelaer, 2008: 24-25; Seibert, 2010: 18). These forces had a high risk of combat 
involvement. After having reached full operational capacity, the goal of the 
operation was to patrol the area and protect the population (Brettner-Messler, 2008). 
Besides the soldiers from the countries that comprised the initial entry force, Polish, 
Finnish, Slovenian and Dutch forces also participated in these patrols, and thus 
risked combat involvement (Government of Finland, 2007; Ministerie van Defensie, 
2009). 
Four countries provided only logistical support or medical units. Greece and 
Portugal contributed a C-130 military air transport each (Palma, 2009: 14; Hellenic 
National Defense Staff, n.d.). Italy set up a field hospital with 105 personnel and 
Spain participated with two C-295 aircraft and around 100 soldiers tasked with air 
transport logistics (Stato Maggiore della Difesa, 2009). Three non-EU countries also 
seconded a substantial number of troops. Russia sent four helicopters with around 
70 accompanying personnel. Albania contributed around 60 troops who were tasked 
with guarding two camps (Gros-Verheyde, 2008c; 2008d). Croatia contributed 15 
special forces that also participated in patrols (Parlov, 2009: 31). Table 2 lists the unit 
types, leadership roles and burden rankings for each country and operation. 
Observed rankings result from a country’s score on the burden index, whereas 
expected rankings are calculated on the basis of GDP, population and the averaged 
percentage share combination of GDP and population. 
 
  
 
Table 2. Dimensions of burden indicator and burden shares 
 Dimension Indicators Burden Shares 
 Unit Type Leadership role a) Observed b) 
Expected;  
GDP b) 
Expected; 
population b) 
Expected; 
 combined b) 
Country 
Congo 
c) 
Chad d) Congo c) Chad d) /            / /            / /            / /            / 
Austria staff staff - - 0.006 0.066 0.048 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.020 0.021 
Belgium logistic logistic - - 0.046 0.037 0.040 0.028 0.027 0.028 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.025 0.024 0.025 
Bulgaria NA NA NA -    NA 0.003    NA    NA 0.002    NA    NA 0.016    NA    NA 0.009    NA 
Cyprus staff staff - - 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Czech Rep. - - - - 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.022 0.021 0.022 0.015 0.015 0.015 
Estonia - - - - 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Finland medical medical - - 0.015 0.036 0.030 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.013 
France combat combat FC/DOC FC 0.298 0.289 0.292 0.158 0.154 0.157 0.138 0.130 0.138 0.148 0.142 0.147 
Germany combat combat OC/DFC - 0.254 0.005 0.077 0.214 0.213 0.214 0.180 0.167 0.179 0.197 0.190 0.197 
Greece logistic logistic - - 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.024 0.023 0.024 0.020 0.020 0.021 
Hungary - - - - 0.000 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.022 0.020 0.022 0.014 0.013 0.014 
Ireland staff staff - OC/DFC 0.004 0.129 0.093 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.012 
Italy logistic logistic - - 0.045 0.040 0.041 0.128 0.123 0.126 0.128 0.121 0.128 0.128 0.122 0.127 
Latvia - - - - 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Lithuania - - - - 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.005 
Luxembourg staff staff - - 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Malta - - - - 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Netherlands combat combat - - 0.042 0.039 0.040 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.036 0.033 0.036 0.040 0.039 0.040 
a)  (D)F/OC: (deputy) force/operations commander; b) mission set: EUFOR Congo / Chad / combined; c) mandate: 5.5 months; d) mandate: 
13.5 months 
  
 
Table 2. (continued) 
 Dimension Indicators Burden Shares 
 Unit Type Leadership role a) Observed b) 
Expected;  
GDP b) 
Expected; 
population b) 
Expected; 
 combined b) 
Country 
Congo 
c) 
Chad d) Congo c) Chad d) /            / /            / /            / /            / 
Poland Combat combat - DOC 0.079 0.119 0.107 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.083 0.078 0.083 0.053 0.050 0.053 
Portugal Combat combat - - 0.047 0.004 0.017 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.018 0.017 0.018 
Romania NA staff NA -   NA 0.003    NA    NA 0.006    NA    NA 0.044    NA    NA 0.025    NA 
Slovakia - staff - - 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.008 0.008 0.008 
Slovenia Staff combat - - 0.003 0.015 0.011 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 
Spain Combat logistic - - 0.082 0.047 0.057 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.095 0.091 0.096 0.085 0.083 0.086 
Sweden Combat combat - - 0.046 0.054 0.051 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.020 0.019 0.020 0.025 0.025 0.026 
UK - staff - - 0.000 0.005 0.003 0.188 0.186 0.188 0.132 0.124 0.132 0.160 0.155 0.160 
a)  (D)F/OC: (deputy) force/operations commander; b) mission set: EUFOR Congo / Chad / combined; c) mandate: 5.5 months; d) mandate: 
13.5 months 
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Calibration of Target Factor 
The outcome factor contributor status (CS) comprises three levels that 
constitute the outcome sets: underprovider (CS{u}), equiprovider (CS{e}) and 
overprovider (CS{o}). The base variable underlying the calibration of these sets is the 
burden share ratio (bsr) between a country i’s expected burden share, as given by its 
capability indicator cii, and its observed burden share, as given by its burden 
indicator bui, in relation to all contributors n. It is given in equation (1): 
 bsri=
bsi;expected
bsi;observed
=
cii/ ∑ cijnj=1
bii/ ∑ bijnj=1 . (1) 
Table 3 lists all burden share ratios for each mission set and capability 
indicator. We apply two thresholds to calibrate the three outcome sets on the basis of 
ranges in burden ratios. A country is categorized as a member in the set of 
underproviders if it contributes at least a third less than expected. Taking the 
reciprocal value as the second threshold, it is categorized as a member in the set of 
overproviders if contributions are at least 50 percent above expectations. If a country 
contributes roughly in accordance with expectations as demarcated by these two 
yardsticks, it is classified as an equiprovider. Table 15 at the end of this document 
lists all set membership values. 
Condition Factor: Peacekeeping Tradition (PT) 
Factor levels: strong (s) / weak peacekeeping tradition (w) 
Base variable: prior peacekeeping involvement (ppi) 
Operationalization of Base Variable 
EUFORs Congo and Chad were both deployed in support of a UN 
peacekeeping operation (UNPO). While supporting the UN is a declared goal of all 
EU member states, some have shown a higher commitment to such activities than 
others. We measure prior peacekeeping involvement using the relative size of 
personnel contributions to UNPOs and the degree to which these contributions were 
dispersed over different UNPOs. Accounting for dispersion is important insofar as 
high nominal contributions can be caused by large contributions to only one or two 
missions, indicating bouts of peacekeeping activity rather than a genuine 
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Table 3. Burden share ratios 
 Mission Set and Capability Indicator 
 Congo  Chad  Combined 
Country GDP Pop. Comb.  GDP Pop. Comb.  GDP Pop. Comb. 
Austria 0.243 0.311 0.273  2.862 3.897 3.300  2.096 2.693 2.357 
Belgium 1.674 2.028 1.835  1.348 1.700 1.504  1.433 1.724 1.566 
Bulgaria    NA    NA    NA  1.548 0.195 0.346     NA    NA    NA 
Cyprus 2.405 1.282 1.672  2.474 1.401 1.789  2.453 1.313 1.710 
Czech Rep. 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.364 0.144 0.207  0.264 0.096 0.141 
Estonia 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Finland 0.983 1.310 1.123  2.307 3.351 2.733  1.931 2.617 2.222 
France 1.888 2.163 2.016  1.872 2.217 2.030  1.860 2.109 1.977 
Germany 1.187 1.410 1.289  0.022 0.027 0.024  0.358 0.429 0.390 
Greece 0.241 0.166 0.196  0.376 0.281 0.321  0.337 0.235 0.277 
Hungary 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.638 0.189 0.292  0.444 0.126 0.196 
Ireland 0.321 0.482 0.385  9.181 14.58 11.27  6.683 10.06 8.032 
Italy 0.353 0.352 0.352  0.324 0.331 0.327  0.329 0.323 0.326 
Latvia 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Lithuania 0.000 0.000 0.000  1.501 0.441 0.682  1.112 0.292 0.462 
Luxemburg 1.087 2.847 1.574  1.095 3.104 1.619  1.097 2.912 1.593 
Malta 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Netherlands 0.938 1.191 1.049  0.864 1.174 0.995  0.882 1.128 0.990 
Poland 3.620 0.953 1.508  5.114 1.528 2.353  4.728 1.293 2.031 
Portugal 3.526 2.060 2.600  0.324 0.195 0.244  1.260 0.728 0.923 
Romania    NA    NA    NA  0.529 0.069 0.122     NA    NA    NA 
Slovakia 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.447 0.182 0.259  0.333 0.121 0.178 
Slovenia 1.100 0.662 0.827  5.337 3.596 4.297  4.180 2.594 3.201 
Spain 1.094 0.866 0.966  0.627 0.517 0.567  0.759 0.597 0.668 
Sweden 1.474 2.324 1.804  1.719 2.879 2.153  1.643 2.599 2.013 
UK 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.025 0.037 0.030  0.017 0.025 0.020 
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peacekeeping tradition. Absolute prior peacekeeping involvement (appi) is 
calculated as given in equation (2): 
 
 appii=
pci(1- ∑ ppm2)Mm=1∑ (pci(1- ∑ ppm2Mm=1 ))nj=1 , (2)
 
where pci is the total number of country i’s personnel contributions and ppm is the 
proportion of personnel contributed to operation m = 1, 2,…, M, which is used to 
capture the degree of dispersion.1 The more contributions are spread across different 
operations, the higher the value. Absolute contributions have to be relativized by an 
indicator of a country’s ability to contribute. This is accomplished by dividing the 
absolute contribution of each case by its share of total GDP of all cases during the 
timeframe that is taken into account as given in equation (3): 
 
 ppii=
appii
(GDPi/∑GDPi)
, (3)
Personnel contribution to UNPO’s since 1991 until the year before the 
planning of the operation started are taken into account (2005 for EUFOR Congo, 
2006 for EUFOR Chad).2 The indicator was first constructed for each year separately, 
after which the average yearly value was calculated so that the indicator also takes 
into account the number of years troops were deployed in operations. Personnel 
contributions are based on the contributions in December of each year, based on 
data from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2013). 
  
                                                          
1 In essence, this is the inverse Herfindahl-Hirschman index, which was originally developed 
to measure the concentration of companies in a market. The formula has also been used in 
political science for measuring the degree of ethnic fractionalization in a country and the 
fragmentation of party systems. 
2 For the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia, only personnel 
contributions since one year after their independence in 1995, 1993, 1992, 1992, 1995 and 
1992, respectively, are recorded. 
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Calibration of Target Factor 
In order to calibrate the set of states with a strong peacekeeping tradition, we 
set the threshold to 1, since countries with a score below unity contribute less to 
UNPOs than would be expected on the basis of their GDP. Table 4 lists the base 
variable values. Table 15 at the end of this appendix lists all set membership values. 
Table 4. Scores for prior peacekeeping involvement 
Country 
Congo  Chad 
ppi  ppi 
Austria 4.82  4.54 
Belgium 0.36  0.36 
Bulgaria NA  5.99 
Cyprus 0.00  0.00 
Czech Republic 1.07  0.99 
Estonia 0.60  0.51 
Finland 6.34  5.99 
France 1.08  1.07 
Germany 0.12  0.14 
Greece 0.29  0.32 
Hungary 3.13  2.93 
Ireland 5.49  5.41 
Italy 0.36  0.43 
Latvia 0.00  0.00 
Lithuania 0.06  0.05 
Luxembourg 0.00  0.00 
Malta 0.00  0.00 
Netherlands 0.58  0.57 
Poland 10.47  9.95 
Portugal 1.54  1.68 
Romania NA  3.61 
Slovakia 21.80  19.78 
Slovenia 0.63  0.70 
Spain 0.24  0.26 
Sweden 1.81  1.75 
UK 0.58  0.55 
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Condition Factor: Competing Deployments (CD) 
Factor levels: significant (s) / insignificant competing deployments (i) 
Base variable: military capability stretch (mcs) 
Operationalization of Base Variable 
When a country has already committed troops to other operations, 
contributions to EUFOR missions will be negatively affected if it is close to 
overstretching its resources. Competing deployments have often been 
operationalized with binary indicators of concurrent mission involvement (see, for 
example Fordham, 2004; Lebovic, 2004; Mullenbach & Matthews, 2008). These 
indicators, however, do not reflect the impact of a set of parallel operations on a 
country’s resources available for other missions. Many countries have long 
participated in multiple international operations at any given time. 
In order to construct a more accurate indicator of military stretch, the size of 
a country’s parallel deployments and military capabilities must be set in relation to 
each other. We operationalize the former as the number of troops committed to 
operations other than EUFORs Congo and Chad during their first year. With respect 
to military capabilities, these have often been measured through military spending 
(Fordham, 2004: 635). However, military spending is uninformative with respect to 
the output of the defense production process that generates the type of resources 
usable for CSDP missions (Beeres & Bogers, 2012) In order to increase the 
consistency of the indicator of a country’s military capabilities with respect to out-
of-area operations, we use deployable troop numbers as our measure. The ratio 
between deployed and deployable troop numbers (tn) then provides an indicator of 
military capability stretch (mcs) for country i. This is computed as given in equation 
(4): 
 mcsi=
tni;deployed
tni;deployable
 (4) 
Data for deployed and deployable troop numbers as well as the resulting 
scores for military capability stretch are given in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Military capability stretch 
 Congo  Chad 
Country De/ed a) De/ble b) mcs  De/ed c) De/ble d) mcs
Austria 1230 2050 60.00  1150 2100 54.77
Belgium 753 6984e) 10.79  1200 6984 17.19
Bulgaria 494 NA NA  789 5205 15.16
Cyprus 0 238e) 0.00  2 239 0.84
Czech Rep. 899 4566 19.69  858 8474 10.13
Estonia 221 563 39.26  197 644 30.60
Finland 706 6000 11.77  616 2300 26.79
France 9871 91000 10.85  10577 90000 11.76
Germany 7275 63004e) 11.55  6280 69591 09.03
Greece 1757 22182 7.93  1133 22182 5.11
Hungary 705 2122 33.23  862 2480 34.76
Ireland 624 850 73.42  174 850 20.48
Italy 5023 54800 9.17  7409 59000 12.56
Latvia 165 947e) 17.43  96 830 11.57
Lithuania 222 1140 19.48  243 1345 18.07
Luxemburg 37 311 11.90  34 241 14.11
Malta 0 149 0.00  0 159 0.00
Netherlands 2205 17724 12.45  1905 19054 10.00
Poland 4200 24300 17.29  2474 25100 9.86
Portugal 726 7168 10.13  670 6862 9.77
Romania NA NA NA  1545 10244 15.09
Slovakia 633 641 98.76  509 2347 21.69
Slovenia 312 1579 19.76  485 1850 26.22
Spain 1877 39617 4.74  2946 44784 6.58
Sweden 792 3122 25.37  581 4422 13.14
UK 16509 74570 22.14  12978 77287 16.80
a) Source: International Institute Strategic Studies (2008a: 14) Troops deployed in EUFOR 
Congo and UNIFIL II have been subtracted from deployed units. UNIFIL II is not included 
because the conflict that caused this operation erupted after EUFOR Congo had reached full 
operational capability. 
b) European Defence Agency (2008) 
c) Source: Giegerich and Nicoll (2012: 60). Troops deployed in EUFOR Chad according to 
International Institute Strategic Studies (2009) are subtracted from deployed units. 
d) Source: European Defence Agency (2009: 39) 
e) As data for 2006 was incomplete, data for 2007 was used to fill the gaps. 
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Calibration of Target Factor 
We use the official usability targets of NATO in order to calibrate the target 
set. At the 2004 Istanbul summit, NATO countries agreed on a deployability target 
for ground forces of 40 percent and a sustainability target of 8 percent. The 
European Defence Agency (EDA) has also used these figures for internal 
assessments of all participating member states (International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 2008a: 13). Based on this assessment, countries with at least 15 percent of its 
forces deployed and sustained in parallel are categorized as having significant 
competing deployments. Table 15 at the end of this document lists all set 
membership values. 
 
Condition Factor: Trade Volume (TV) 
Factor levels: large (l) / small trade volume (s) 
Base variable: trade volume relevance (tvr) 
Operationalization of Base Variable 
EUFORs Congo and Chad both had the objective of stabilizing the area of 
operations. In this connection, several studies in the burden-sharing literature have 
suggested that geographical distance is negatively related to the size of private 
benefits received from regional stability in the target area (Bove and Elia, 2011; 
Gaibulloev, Sandler & Shimizu, 2009; Perkins and Neumayer; 2008). However, while 
spatial proximity may matter for adjacent countries at risk of experiencing negative 
externalities created by social instability, all potential EUFOR troop contributors 
were so far away from the two areas of operation that conflict spillover or large 
refugee inflows did not impact their benefit calculations. Beyond a certain point of 
indifference to geographical distance, which seems to have been passed by all states 
without exception, any remaining variation becomes explanatorily irrelevant.1 
                                                          
1 We did not find any evidence in parliamentary debates that increased refugee inflows to a 
particular country were a concern, although it was occasionally mentioned in conjunction 
with importing terrorism to Europe as a whole. 
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Instead of spatial proximity, we consider relational proximity in terms of 
trade interests a positive private benefit that is appreciably more relevant.1 Several 
authors have hypothesized that economic interests drive countries’ decisions to 
commit troops to peacekeeping operations (Gaibulloev, Sandler & Shimizu, 2009: 
833; Perkins & Neumayer, 2008: 903; Shimizu & Sandler, 2010: 1479).2 With respect 
to CSDP military missions, the maritime operation NAVFOR Atalanta has been 
mentioned as an illustrative case in point. Although the protection of humanitarian 
aid deliveries to Somalia in response to a request by the UN has been cited by the EU 
itself as its main motivation, some argue that the operation was set up primarily to 
defend European trade interests.3 Anecdotal evidence for the significance of trade 
motives also exists for EUFOR Congo. While the UK has only little economic stakes 
in the DRC, and indeed did not contribute at all to the operation, France has strong 
interests in uranium abstraction and is the third largest exporter to the country 
(Cumming, 2011: 566-567).4 We thus expect positive private benefits to result from 
troop contributions to one or both EUFORs, either by maintaining existing levels of 
trade relations or by increasing the probability for their future intensification. 
The relevance of the trade volume for a country, however, is not only 
determined by absolute numbers. If the expected cost of contributing to an 
operation significantly outweighs the trade volume between a potential contributor 
and the country of operation, private benefits will be lower as when the trade volume 
was significantly higher than expected costs. The largest part of the data for bilateral 
                                                          
1 This does not exclude the case mentioned by Shimizu and Sandler (2002: 656), when trade 
flows are enhanced by stability in the proximity of states. We do not consider non-
contributions to generate negative private benefits from ensuing reductions in trade flows. 
2 In contrast, Andersson (2002: 380), doubts that trade considerations have influenced 
commitment to UN peacekeeping operations, and Gegout (2009: 204), concludes that French 
trade interests have been irrelevant in EUFOR Congo. 
3 Article 1, Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, Official Journal of the European Union, 
12.11.2008, L301/33–L301/37. Germany, France, the Netherlands and Spain, a large part of 
whose international trade passes through the Gulf of Aden, are permanent contributors to 
the operation, with 4-7 surface combat vessels and 2-3 maritime patrol and reconnaissance 
aircraft. 
4 Decisions to contribute can also be based on current expectations of future trade 
opportunities. For example, conservative parliamentarians in the German Bundestag argued 
that participation was important as Congo possessed some of the largest copper and tantalite 
reserves worldwide. See Bundestag plenary protocol 16/36, 19 May 2006, page 3105. 
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trade figures have been obtained from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics 
(DOTS).1 Gaps in the data were filled using other sources.2 The base variable of trade 
volume relevance (tvr) is calculated as given in equation (5). 
 tvri=
∑ expi,t+impi,t ∑ GDPjnj=1-6t=-1
6comGDPi
 (5)
where exp is the export volume and imp the import volume between an EU member 
state and the country of operation, and com is the estimated total cost of the mission. 
For operation EUFOR Chad, the trade volume takes into account exports and 
imports for both Chad and the Central African Republic.  
 
Calibration of Target Factor 
Countries whose average trade volume prior to an operation amounts to at 
least 50 percent of the respective costs expected from contributing are categorized as 
having a large trade volume. Trade volume figures and the resulting figures for the 
relevance of the trade volume are presented in Table 6. Table 15 at the end of this 
document lists all set membership values. 
 
 
  
                                                          
1 http://elibrary-data.imf.org/FindDataReports.aspx?d=33061&e=170921. 
2 The figures for Lithuania and Latvia have been obtained by e-mail contact from the 
Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Lithuania, 27 March 2013, and the Ministry of 
Economics of the Republic of Latvia, 3 April 2012. 
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Table 6. Trade volume relevance 
 Congo Chad 
Country 
Average Trade 
Volume a) 
GDP 
Share b) 
tvr  
Average Trade 
Volume a) 
GDP 
Share b) 
tvr 
Austria 1.4 0.023 0.28  3.5 0.023 0.17 
Belgium 851.4 0.028 140.73 85.5 0.027 3.53 
Bulgaria NA NA NA  0.3 0.002 0.19 
Cyprus 0.1 0.001 0.34  0.2 0.001 0.18 
Czech Rep. 1.4 0.008 0.79  2.4 0.008 0.32 
Estonia 0.1 0.001 0.76  0.0 0.001 0.00 
Finland 120.7 0.015 36.24  2.0 0.016 0.14 
France 151.0 0.158 4.38  160.6 0.154 1.17 
Germany 71.6 0.214 1.53  45.1 0.213 0.24 
Greece 0.5 0.017 0.14  0.1 0.017 0.01 
Hungary 0.5 0.006 0.39  0.4 0.006 0.08 
Ireland 13.2 0.014 4.42  0.6 0.014 0.05 
Italy 45.1 0.128 1.62  20.5 0.123 0.19 
Latvia 0.1 0.001 0.18  0.1 0.001 0.07 
Lithuania 0.3 0.002 0.83  0.0 0.002 0.01 
Luxemburg 1.0 0.003 1.80  0.1 0.003 0.06 
Malta 0.0 0.000 0.05  0.2 0.000 0.40 
Netherlands 54.2 0.045 5.49  33.1 0.045 0.82 
Poland 4.6 0.022 0.96  2.1 0.023 0.10 
Portugal 23.4 0.013 7.97  46.1 0.013 3.99 
Romania NA NA NA  0.2 0.006 0.04 
Slovakia 0.3 0.004 0.32  0.7 0.004 0.18 
Slovenia 0.1 0.003 0.20  0.7 0.003 0.30 
Spain 15.8 0.075 0.96  18.3 0.075 0.27 
Sweden 10.5 0.031 1.55  8.8 0.031 0.32 
UK 21.0 0.188 0.51  36.4 0.186 0.22 
a) in million US$; b) share of GDP among EU member  states.   
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Condition Factor: Public Support (PS) 
Factor levels: high (h) / low public support (l) 
Base variable: net public support (nps) 
Operationalization of Base Variable 
Condition membership is dependent on the public net support rate for the 
CSDP closely before the official request for participating in a possible operation has 
been issued. It is reasonable to assume that governments base their decision to issue 
a request themselves, or respond to one either positively or negatively, on the most 
recent information available to them. EUFOR Congo was set up in response to a 
written request by the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, 
sent to the EU’s presidency on 27 December 2005.1 The first mentioning of a 
possible operation in Chad can be found in a diplomatic cable of the French ministry 
of foreign affairs, sent to all EU foreign ministries on 21 May 2007. With regards to 
EUFOR Congo, we thus use public opinion figures which have been published in 
Eurobarometer 63.4 (September 2005). With respect to operation EUFOR Chad, we 
use public opinion figures from Eurobarometer 65.2 (January 2007).  
Public net support scores are based on the percentage figure for those 
respondents being for ESDP (F) minus the percentage figure for those being against 
it (A).2 Questions on specific military operations or questions regarding conditional 
support have neither been asked in the standard nor special Eurobarometer surveys. 
Although general support for ESDP did not directly measure support for any 
military operation in particular, we assume that endorsement implies approval with 
regards to the general principles of CSDP as set out in the European Security 
Strategy (ESS), including conflict prevention in weak states or regions of states.3 
We adjust these scores by an indicator of non-substantive responses (NSR). 
These may stem from various sources, including indifference to, lack of knowledge 
                                                          
1 See UN Security Council Document S/2006/219 “Letter dated 12 April 2006 from the 
Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council” and UN Security 
Council Resolution 1671 (2006). 
2 The specific question asked was “What is your opinion on each of the following statements? 
Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it: A common defence and 
security policy among European Union Member States”. 
3 See Solana (2003) for the original document. More detailed analyses of the ESS are provided 
by Rehrl and Weisserth (2010: 20-23) and Biscop (2005). 
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of or conflicting attitudes towards the issue being asked about, or even cost 
considerations on the part of the respondent (see, for example Berinsky, 2008; 
Francis & Busch, 1975; Gilljam & Granberg, 1993; Sicinski, 1970). Irrespective of 
their source, however, NSRs do not induce policy-makers to act either way. Net 
public support rates can be of the same magnitude, but at different ends of the 
continuum. A net public support rate of 20 percent may result from 25 percent 
positive and 5 percent negative responses or from 60 percent positive and 40 percent 
negative responses. Thus, ignoring NSRs in this example conceals the fact that in the 
former case, 70 percent of all respondents convey no information to policy-makers 
respecting the direction of action to take, whereas in the second case directional 
information is at a maximum. A low NSR rate in the case of a positive net support 
rate should therefore put more pressure on decision-makers to participate in a joint 
mission, whereas the same rate in the case of a negative net support rate should put 
more pressure on decision-makers to reject participation. In contrast, a high NSR 
rate in either case leaves room for decisional discretion on the side of executives. In 
order to factor in the degree to which policy-makers are confronted with directed 
public opinion, we subtract from the net support rate the figure for the share of 
respondents who answered “Don’t know” (DK) in relation to their support for 
ESDP. In summary, net public support scores are arrived at according to equation 
(6). 
 
nps=F-(A+DK) 
(6)
Calibration of Target Factor 
We assume that there is a magnitude continuum of net public support over 
which the propensity of governments to act in accordance with the direction of 
opinion increases. At the lower end, policy-makers prefer to allocate their limited 
resources of attention to issues where the corridor of action is narrower and ignore 
public opinion on CSDP. Such issues often include more pressing domestic 
concerns. However, as public opinion moves towards the mid-point of the 
continuum, governments register the issue as increasingly salient, and decide that it 
warrants closer attention. At larger magnitudes, governments cannot afford to 
remain inactive on the issue any longer. A clear majority for one direction exists, the 
policy corridor is narrow and any proposal for action seems unlikely to produce 
electorally unfavorable outcomes. Based on this presumed relation between public 
opinion and CSDP policy, countries with a net rate of at least 30 percent are 
categorized as having high public support. The resulting net public support scores 
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are given Table 7. Table 15 at the end of this document lists all set membership 
values. 
Table 7. Net public support 
 Congo a)  Chad b) 
Country F A DK nps F A DK nps
Austria 61 29 11 21  55 32 13 10
Belgium 89 10 2 77  85 13 1 71
Bulgaria NA NA NA NA  70 8 21 41
Cyprus 94 4 3 87  87 4 9 74
Czech Rep. 86 9 5 72  87 8 5 74
Estonia 87 5 9 73  78 8 14 56
Finland 63 33 5 25  61 32 7 22
France 81 12 7 62  80 13 6 61
Germany 85 10 5 70  86 10 4 72
Greece 80 15 5 60  82 17 1 64
Hungary 83 9 8 66  81 8 11 62
Ireland 58 23 19 16  59 20 21 18
Italy 78 10 12 56  74 13 13 48
Latvia 85 5 10 70  81 8 11 62
Lithuania 76 6 18 52  75 7 17 51
Luxembourg 87 9 4 74  82 9 9 64
Malta 61 15 24 22  55 18 27 10
Netherlands 81 16 3 62  78 17 5 56
Poland 86 6 8 72  85 8 7 70
Portugal 71 11 17 43  61 11 28 22
Romania NA NA NA NA  75 5 19 51
Slovakia 85 10 6 69  83 11 6 66
Slovenia 90 5 5 80  82 12 6 64
Spain 70 13 17 40  67 9 24 34
Sweden 58 36 6 16  59 33 8 18
UK 59 27 14 18  57 30 13 14
a) European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer Survey 63.4 (Field Work: June/July 2005, 
Publication: September 2005). Brussels: European Commission. 
b) European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer Survey 65.2 (Field Work: March/May 
2006, Publication: January 2007). Brussels: European Commission. 
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Condition Factor: Budget Constraints (BC) 
Factor levels: high (h) / low budget constraints (l) 
Base variable: budget constraint severity (bcs)  
Operationalization of Target Factor 
Fiscal policy is one of the main instruments available to governments to 
influence aggregate demand, which in turn affects interest rates and inflation. 
During the 1970s, many governments in Europe had to learn the hard lessons of 
letting inflation spiral out of control, and it was not until after the mid-1980s that 
inflation had been brought down again to a sustainable level. In consequence, the 
convergence criteria that have been laid out for Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) in the Maastricht Treaty included a number of measures which would 
prepare states for monetary integration and macroeconomic alignment.1 
Besides a common currency and a centralized monetary policy, the two most 
important components of EMU include the provisions stipulated in the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) for all Euro-zone members, and the multilateral surveillance 
system (MSS) as part of the SGP for all EU members (Nugent, 2010: 332-334).2 Two 
elements from the set of convergence criteria form its basis, namely ceilings on 
deficit-to-GDP and debt-to-GDP ratios.3 These have to be met by all prospective 
Euro-zone members and observed by all existing ones. The deficit reference value is 
set to 3 percent and the debt reference value to 60 percent.4 While the objective of 
these criteria is to ensure prudent fiscal policies, a breach is not consequential if it is 
exceptional or temporary, or if these ratios have declined substantially and 
continuously in previous years.5  
                                                          
1 For more details on the economic background to EMU, see Levitt and Lord (2000: 29-42) 
and Chang (2009:15-44). 
2 The MSS is also referred to as the “preventive arm” of the SGP. 
3 Article 140(1), consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, Official Journal of the European Union, 9.5.2008, C115/108-C115/109. The former 
usually receives more weight than the latter. 
4 Protocol 12 on the excessive deficit procedure, Official Journal of the European Union, 9.5. 
2008, C115/279-C115/280. 
5 Council Regulations (EC) No 1055/05 and (EC) No 1056/05, which entered into force in 
July 2005, have introduced more flexibility in interpreting the SGP. Generally, the excess of a 
government deficit is considered exceptional and temporary if it results from an unusual 
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As the MSS also extends to non-Euro-zone members, these states are obliged 
to submit a convergence program to the Commission on their budgetary situation 
and objectives each year, whereas Euro-zone members submit stability programs. 
Excessive deficits may lead to recommendations being issued by the Commission as 
to their correction and the opening of an excessive deficit procedure (EDP) by the 
Council.1 Ultimately, if a state against which an EDP has been filed does not comply 
in due time, usually two years, the Council may decide to impose financial sanctions 
if non-compliance persists after a second notice has been issued. As the UK and 
Denmark have received opt-outs from stage three of EMU, the European 
Commission does not assess these two countries in its convergence reports and they 
are not subject to certain procedures, but an EDP can be opened if any one or both 
of the two relevant criteria are not met.2 In 2003, Sweden decided by referendum to 
stay outside the Euro-zone. 
Irrespective of these concrete yet rather soft brakes on spending, all 
governments are exposed to pressures for budgetary constraint because high 
government deficits and debt crowd out private investment, they send up interest 
rates and fuel inflation, the two last factors of which also form part of the 
convergence criteria. Thus, the score a country receives in the set of budget-
constrained states are dependent on three factors: the country’s status with respect to 
EMU, the record of the government’s budgetary situation over previous years, and 
the expected budgetary position in the year the operation was launched. Since 
EUFORs Congo and Chad took place before the economic and financial crisis hit the 
EU in 2008, a temporary justification for a sustained or new breach of the reference 
values did not exist during the concerned time period. 
Establishing reasonable thresholds above and below which any variation on 
these factors becomes irrelevant should be relatively uncontroversial. Clearly, states 
that expected a deficit of less than 3 percent for the next reference date and financial 
liabilities of less than 60 percent of GDP, and that remained below the reference 
values in the previous three years should be considered as fully out of the set of 
budget-constrained states, irrespective of whether they already participated in EMU, 
                                                                                                                                                      
event outside the control of the state with a major impact on the financial position of the 
government, and the excess is projected to subside following the end of such an event. See 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. 
1 The EDP is also referred to as the “corrective arm” of the SGP. 
2 The UK has twice been the subject of an EDP, first in January 2006 and again in July 2008. 
Since Denmark has also opted out of CSDP, its status with respect to EMU is irrelevant. 
 110 
 
were to enter it in the future or had decided not to enter at all. Similarly, status is 
irrelevant for permanent fiscal transgressors. States with an expected deficit-to-GDP 
ratio of more than 3 percent and an expected debt-to-GDP-ratio of 60 percent 
forecast for the next reference date at the time when decisions on troop 
contributions were made are coded as full members in the set of budget-constrained 
states if the figures for these two criteria have also exceeded the reference values in 
the previous three years, meaning that the state had been subject to an EDP for quite 
some time and was likely to face intensified repudiation.  
Since EDP sets in, however, once any one or both of the reference values 
have been exceeded, the status of a state with respect to EMU matters in all other 
scenarios. Most fundamentally, a hierarchy can be established whereby the gravity of 
the financial excess is reflected. EU member states with an EMU opt-out 
arrangement, albeit bound by the EDP, neither face the same formal consequences as 
participating states nor are they exposed to the same environment of peer pressure 
for due correction and the risk of losing their moral credibility, as happened in 2005 
when Germany–the most demanding member state with regards to the 
establishment of the convergence criteria–continued to defy meeting the very fiscal 
discipline it insisted on in the first place and orchestrated a revision of the SGP in 
collaboration with France. Future members are most seriously affected by non-
compliance because they are more closely monitored by the European Commission 
and the European Central Bank, and their governments have to show to their 
electorates a serious commitment to fulfilling their promise of taking the country 
into the “Euro-club”.1 Thus, prospective membership incurs higher costs for states in 
cases of non-compliance than existing membership, which itself incurs higher costs 
in such cases than non-membership with no obligation to change this status. 
Based on these arguments, our calibration scheme for the set of states with 
high budgetary constraints takes into account a country’s budgetary history, its 
expected budget situation, its status with respect to EMU and whether the deficit or 
                                                          
1 Overall, a majority of citizens in the ten central and eastern European countries which 
acceded in 2004 and 2007 were in favor of the Euro at that time. The only four countries 
where opinion was negative were Lithuania, Estonia, Cyprus and Malta. See Flash 
Eurobarometer 214 “Introduction of the Euro in the New Member States”, November 2007, for 
detailed figures. The Accession Treaties stipulate the duty to join the Eurozone once all 
convergence criteria have been met. Opt-outs such as those received by Denmark and the UK 
are not possible for the Central and East European member states. 
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the debt criterion or both were concerned. The calibration scheme is summarized in 
Table 8 below. 
Calibration of Target Factor 
The budget performance figures and resulting scores for budget constraint 
severity based on the scheme presented in Table 8 are provided in Table 9. If the 
deficit or debt ratio limit had been breached in the year before an operation, the 
country was categorized as having a highly constrained budget. Table 15 at the end 
of this document lists all set membership values. 
 
Table 8. Measurement scheme for budget constraint severity  
Criteria bcs
No breach of deficit or debt ratio limits in preceding three years 0.00
Deficit or debt ratio limit breached once but not in preceding year 0.10
Deficit and debt ratio limit breached once but not in preceding year 0.20
Deficit or debt ratio limit breached twice but not in preceding year 0.30
Deficit and debt ratio limit breached twice but not in preceding year 0.40
Deficit or debt ratio limit breached in year before operation 0.50
Deficit and debt ratio limit breached in year before operation 0.60
Deficit or debt ratio limit breached twice in preceding years 0.70
Deficit and debt ratio limit breached twice in years before operation 0.80
Deficit or debt ratio limit breached continuously in preceding three years 0.90
Deficit and debt ratio limits breached continuously in preceding years 1.00
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Table 9. Budget performance and budget constraint severity 
  deficit debt bcs 
Country EMU 2003a) 2004a) 2005a) 2006a) 2003a) 2004a) 2005a) 2006a) Congo Chad 
Austria 1999 -0.7 -4.4 -1.7 -1.5 65.3 64.7 64.2 62.3 0.90 0.90 
Belgium 1999 -0.1 -0.1 -2.5 0.4 98.4 94.0 92.0 88.0 0.90 1.00 
Bulgaria pros -0.4 1.9 1.0 1.9 44.4 37.0 27.5 21.6 NA 0.00 
Cyprus 2008 -6.6 -4.1 -2.4 -1.2 69.7 70.9 69.4 64.7 0.95 0.90 
Czech Rep. pros -6.7 -2.8 -3.2 -2.4 28.6 28.9 28.4 28.3 0.50 0.10 
Estonia 2011 1.7 1.6 1.6 2.5 5.6 5.0 4.6 4.4 0.05 0.00 
Finland 1999 2.6 2.5 2.9 4.2 44.5 44.4 41.7 39.6 0.00 0.50 
France 1999 -4.1 -3.6 -2.9 -2.3 62.9 64.9 66.4 63.7 0.90 1.00 
Germany 1999 -4.2 -3.8 -3.3 -1.6 64.4 66.2 68.5 68.0 1.00 1.00 
Greece 2001 -5.6 -7.5 -5.2 -5.7 97.4 98.6 100.0 106.1 1.00 1.00 
Hungary pros -7.3 -6.5 -7.9 -9.4 58.6 59.5 61.7 65.9 0.95 0.90 
Ireland 1999 0.4 1.4 1.7 2.9 30.7 29.5 27.3 24.6 0.00 0.00 
Italy 1999 -3.6 -3.5 -4.4 -3.4 103.9 103.4 105.7 106.3 1.00 1.00 
Latvia pros -1.6 -1.0 -0.4 -0.5 14.7 15.0 12.5 10.7 0.05 0.00 
Lithuania pros -1.3 -1.5 -0.5 -0.4 21.0 19.3 18.3 17.9 0.05 0.00 
Luxumb. 1999 0.5 -1.1 0.0 1.4 6.2 6.3 6.1 6.7 0.00 0.00 
Malta 2008 -9.0 -4.6 -2.9 -2.7 66.0 69.8 68.0 62.5 0.95 0.90 
Netherlands 1999 -3.1 -1.7 -0.3 0.5 52.0 52.4 51.8 47.4 0.10 0.00 
Poland pros -6.2 -5.4 -4.1 -3.6 47.1 45.7 47.1 47.7 0.95 0.90 
Portugal 1999 -3.7 -4.0 -6.5 -4.6 59.4 61.9 67.7 69.4 0.90 1.00 
Romania pros -1.5 -1.2 -1.2 -2.2 21.5 18.7 15.8 12.4 NA 0.00 
Slovakia b) 2008 -2.8 -2.4 -2.8 -3.2 42.4 41.5 34.2 30.5 0.05 0.50 
Slovenia 2007 -2.7 -2.3 -1.5 -1.4 27.2 27.3 26.7 26.4 0.05 0.00 
Spain 1999 -0.3 -0.1 1.3 2.4 48.8 46.3 43.2 39.7 0.00 0.00 
Sweden opt -1.0 0.6 2.2 2.3 51.7 50.3 50.4 45.3 0.00 0.00 
UK opt -3.4 -3.5 -3.4 -2.7 39.1 41.0 42.2 43.3 0.90 0.40 
a) European Commission (2013), “Government Deficit and Debt”, (Eurostat database) 
(Accessed on 14 November 2013 at. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/ 
government_finance_statistics/data/database). 
b) Joined EMU in 2009, but was a prospective member at the time when the operations were 
planned. 
c) Joined in January 2007. Adjustment on for EUFOR Congo. 
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Condition Factor: Election Distance (ED) 
Factor levels: large (l) / small election distance (s) 
Base variable: time from operation reference date until next election (tre) 
Operationalization of Base Variable 
The impact of electoral calculations on the decision to deploy troops has 
generated a rich body of literature, but considerable disagreement about the effect of 
electoral calculations on decisions to send armed forces abroad persists.1 While 
supporters of diversionary theories of war expect political leaders to use the 
deployment of military force to draw the general public’s attention away from 
domestic problems, literature on democratic peace and casualty aversion expects 
decision-makers to be careful not to upset the public by resorting to military means. 
With respect to EU peacekeeping operations, the latter theory appears to enjoy much 
higher applicability for two reasons. First, both operations involved the use of force 
on only a relatively small scale, large enough to draw public attention but insufficient 
for diversionary tactics (Fordham, 1998: 570). And second, although being in favor 
of CSDP, in most European countries the public has expressed skepticism towards 
the usefulness of military means, making electoral punishment more probable than 
rewards, even if an operation is perceived as successful (Brummer, 2007). 
The political risks of contributing to an operation can therefore be assumed to 
outweigh its gains, possibly even to the extent that no electoral pay-offs exist at all at 
any stage of the electoral cycle. Right after a general election, we thus expect other 
factors than electoral ones to influence decisions on contributions to CSDP 
operations. However, towards the end of an electoral cycle, when there is nothing to 
gain but only much to lose in electoral terms from contributing to military 
adventures abroad, executives should attempt to keep the country’s burden as low as 
possible, or even try and abstain altogether (Gaubatz, 1991; Nincic, 1990). The 
proximity of the next general election to an operation should thus affect a country’s 
eventual contribution.  
We consider two events important. First, between the initial mentioning of a 
possible operation and the adoption of a Council Joint Action policy-makers are 
under most pressure to reach a decision. We thus define this point as an operation’s 
reference date. The crucial mentioning and adoption dates are 27 December 2005 
                                                          
1 For a review of this literature, see Aldrich et al. (2006). 
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and 27 April 2006 for EUFOR Congo, and 21 May 2007 and 15 October 2007 for 
EUFOR Chad. Second, we use the ParlGov database to determine the date of a 
country’s next general election (Döring & Manow, 2012). In order to determine the 
length of the period between these points, we simply take the time in days (tre) from 
the reference date drd to the date of a country i’s next election dne,i as given by 
equation (7): 
 trei=dne,i-drd. (7) 
Calibration of Target Factor 
If the reference date is more than one year away from the next general 
election, the country is categorized as having elections at large distance. The 
resulting figures are given in Table 10 below. Table 15 at the end of this document 
lists all set membership values. 
Condition Factor: Parliamentary Powers (PP) 
Factor levels: significant (s) / insignificant parliamentary powers (i) 
Base variable: parliamentary powers and government situation (ppg)  
Operationalization of Base Variable 
The condition factor parliamentary powers reflects the variance in 
parliamentary control over executive decisions on troop deployments (Wagner, 
2006). Countries in which parliamentary approval was necessary prior to the 
deployment of troops abroad are assigned a base variable score above 0.5. However, 
these countries still vary in two important ways. First, parliaments that have to 
consent to an operation prior to the signing of a Council Joint Action are more 
powerful that parliaments for which this prerogative does not apply. Due to the 
difficulty for a government to repeal its pledges after having committed to a Joint 
Action, the latter are often confronted with a fait accompli (Born et al., 2008: 29;  
Wagner, 2006). And secondly, parliaments are expected to have more influence in 
countries governed by minority government because consent from parliamentarians 
of non-governmental parties is required. 
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Table 10. Base variable figures for election distance 
Country Next election EUFOR Congo tre Next election EUFOR Chad tre 
Austria 01/10/2006 218 28/09/2008 423 
Belgium 10/06/2007 470 13/06/2010 1046 
Bulgaria NA NA 05/07/2009 703 
Cyprus 21/05/2006 85 22/05/2011 1389 
Czech Rep. 03/06/2006 98 29/05/2010 1031 
Estonia 04/03/2007 372 06/03/2011 1312 
Finland 18/03/2007 386 17/04/2011 1354 
France 10/06/2007 470 10/06/2012 1774 
Germany 27/09/2009 1310 27/09/2009 787 
Greece 16/09/2007 568 16/09/2007 45 
Hungary 09/04/2006 43 25/04/2010 997 
Ireland 24/05/2007 453 25/02/2011 1303 
Italy 09/04/2006 43 13/04/2008 255 
Latvia 07/10/2006 224 02/10/2010 1157 
Lithuania 12/10/2008 960 12/10/2008 437 
Luxemburg 07/06/2009 1198 07/06/2009 675 
Malta 08/03/2008 742 08/03/2008 219 
Netherlands 22/11/2006 270 09/06/2010 1042 
Poland 19/10/2007 601 19/10/2007 78 
Portugal 27/09/2009 1310 27/09/2009 787 
Romania NA NA 30/11/2008 486 
Slovakia 17/06/2006 112 12/06/2010 1045 
Slovenia 21/09/2008 939 21/09/2008 416 
Spain 09/03/2008 743 09/03/2008 220 
Sweden 01/10/2006 204 19/09/2010 1144 
UK 06/05/2010 1531 06/05/2010 1008 
 
Parliaments can still play a constraining role in the absence of approval 
powers, namely when the executive is obliged to consult or inform about its 
decisions. Countries where this is the case are assigned a base variable score below 
0.5. But again, parliaments in this second group are more powerful when facing a 
minority government. This measurement scheme is summarized in Table 11. 
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Calibration of Target Factor 
Information on parliamentary powers is based on a survey of parliamentary 
war powers as of spring 2003 for the then 25 EU member and accession states 
(Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2010). This information was supplemented with 
three more recent sources to account for later developments (Biehl, Giegerich & 
Jonas, 2013; Born, Fuior & Lazzarini, 2008; Peters, Wagner & Deitelhoff, 2010). 
Information on Bulgaria and Romania was also retrieved from these publications. 
The ParlGov database was used to assess whether a country was governed by a 
minority government (Döring & Manow, 2012). The country data are provided in 
Table 12. If not only information or consultation, but explicit parliamentary 
approval was required for military deployment, or if a minority government was in 
place at the time when contributions to an operation were discussed, the country 
was categorized as having significant parliamentary war powers. Table 15 at the end 
of this document lists all set membership values. 
 
Table 11. Measurement scheme for parliamentary powers and government situation 
Classification Main Criterion ppg 
Approval required before Joint Action and minority 
government 
Prior approval required 
1.0 
Approval required before Joint Action or minority 
government 
0.8 
Approval required before troop deployment and 
majority government 
0.6 
Consultation parliament required and minority 
government Information or 
consultation rights 
0.4 
Consultation parliament required and majority 
government 
0.2 
No role parliament No formal role 0.0 
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Table 12. Parliamentary powers and government situation 
Country Prior Approval Before Joint Action Consultation Minority Government 
    Congo Chad 
Austria ×  × ×  
Belgium   ×  × 
Bulgaria    NA  
Cyprus ×  ×   
Czech Rep. ×  ×  × 
Estonia ×  ×   
Finland × × ×   
France   ×   
Germany ×  ×   
Greece      
Hungary   ×  × 
Ireland ×  ×   
Italy ×  ×   
Latvia ×  × ×  
Lithuania ×  ×  × 
Luxembourg × × ×   
Malta ×  ×   
Netherlands ×  ×   
Poland   × ×  
Portugal   × × × 
Romania    NA × 
Slovakia ×  × ×  
Slovenia   ×   
Spain ×  × × × 
Sweden × × × ×  
UK   ×   
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Condition Factor: Executive Partisanship (EP) 
Factor levels: right (r) / left executive partisanship (l) 
Base variable: executive ideological orientation (eio)  
Operationalization of Base Variable 
The calculation of executive ideological orientation draws on the ParlGov 
database, which measures party positions on a scale from 0 to 10 based on the mean 
values of information from party expert surveys (Döring & Manow, 2012). In line 
with previous studies, we aggregate all government party positions (n) into an 
overall measure of executive ideological orientation (eio) by summing up each 
party’s (j) ideological position on the left-right scale (pp), weighted by its proportion 
of the total number of seats (s), as specified in equation (8) (Mello, 2012: 436; 
Palmer, 1990: 486). 
 eioi=  sjppjn
n
j=1
. (8) 
Calibration of Target Factor 
We categorize an executive as right if it scores at least 5 on the ideology scale. 
The base variable values resulting from the application of equation (8) are given in 
Table 13. Table 15 at the end of this document lists all set membership values. 
Condition Factor: Legislative Partisanship (LP) 
Factor levels: right (r) / left legislative partisanship (l) 
Base variable: parliamentary ideological orientation (pio)  
Operationalization of Base Variable 
The calculation of parliamentary ideological orientation draws on the ParlGov 
database, which measures party positions on a scale from 0 to 10 based on the mean 
values of information from party expert surveys (Döring & Manow, 2012). In line 
with previous studies, we aggregate all party positions (n) into an overall measure of 
parliamentary ideological orientation (pio) by summing up each party’s (j) 
ideological position on the left-right scale (pp), weighted by its proportion of the 
total number of seats (s), as specified in equation (9) (Mello, 2012: 436f; Palmer, 
1990: 486). 
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Table 13. Executive ideological orientation 
Country Congo  Chad 
Austria 6.80  5.08 
Belgium 4.99  5.12 
Bulgaria NA  4.10 
Cyprus 2.46  2.72 
Czech Rep. 3.98  6.99 
Estonia 5.37  7.47 
Finland 4.84  6.14 
France 7.40  7.50 
Germany 5.06  5.06 
Greece 6.70  6.70 
Hungary 3.01  2.90 
Ireland 6.27  5.89 
Italy 7.31  2.58 
Latvia 6.73  6.96 
Lithuania 3.71  5.38 
Luxemburg 5.26  5.26 
Malta 5.70  5.70 
Netherlands 6.29  4.98 
Poland 7.70  7.02 
Portugal 4.00  4.00 
Romania NA  6.07 
Slovakia 4.29  4.51 
Slovenia 6.81  6.81 
Spain 3.70  3.70 
Sweden 3.40  7.21 
UK 4.40  4.40 
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 pioi= 
sjppj
n
n
j=1
. (9) 
Calibration of Target Factor 
We categorize a parliament as right if it scores at least 5.25 on the ideology 
scale. The base variable values resulting from the application of equation (9) are 
given in Table 14. Table 15 at the end of this document lists all membership values. 
Table 14. Parliamentary ideological orientation 
Country Congo  Chad 
Austria 5.28  5.30 
Belgium 5.67  5.67 
Bulgaria NA  5.15 
Cyprus 4.30  4.81 
Czech Rep. 6.32  4.70 
Estonia 5.09  6.19 
Finland 6.14  5.29 
France 4.63  5.66 
Germany 5.55  4.63 
Greece 4.71  5.55 
Hungary 5.63  4.65 
Ireland 5.45  5.69 
Italy 5.63  4.68 
Latvia 5.09  5.90 
Lithuania 5.46  5.36 
Luxemburg 5.00  5.46 
Malta 5.16  5.01 
Netherlands 6.12  4.81 
Poland 4.76  6.12 
Portugal 5.46  4.76 
Romania NA  4.96 
Slovakia 5.45  5.62 
Slovenia 4.90  5.44 
Spain 5.29  5.45 
Sweden 5.28  5.22 
UK 5.67  5.29 
  
 
Table 15. Summary of Condition and Outcome Membership by Capability Indicator (GDP, population, percent average GDP 
and population) 
  Outcome  Condition Factors 
  CS{·}  PT{·}  CD{·}  TV{·}  PS{·}  BC{·}  ES{·}  PP{·}  EP{·}  LP{·} 
Case  CO a) CH b)  CO CH  CO CH  CO CH  CO CH  CO CH  CO CH  CO CH  CO CH  CO CH 
Austria  u, u, u o, o, o  s s  s s  s s  l l  h h  s l  s s  r r  r r 
Belgium  o, o, o e, o, o  w w  i s  l l  h h  h h  l l  i i  l r  r r 
Bulgaria  − o, u, u  − s  − s  − s  − h  − l  − l  − i  − l  − l 
Cyprus  o, e, o o, e, o  w w  i i  s s  h h  h h  s l  s s  l l  l l 
Czech Rep.  u, u, u u, u, u  s w  s i  l s  h h  h l  s l  s s  l r  l l 
Estonia  u, u, u u, u, u  w w  s s  l s  h h  l l  l l  s s  r r  r r 
Finland  e, e, e o, o, o  s s  i s  l s  l l  l h  l l  s s  l r  l r 
France  o, o, o o, o, o  s s  i i  l l  h h  h h  l l  i i  r r  r r 
Germany  e, e, e u, u, u  w w  i i  l s  h h  h h  l l  s s  r r  l l 
Greece  u, u, u u, u, u  w w  i i  s s  h h  h h  l s  i i  r r  r r 
Hungary  u, u, u u, u, u  s s  s s  s s  h h  h h  s l  i i  l l  l l 
Ireland  u, u, u o, o, o  s s  s s  l s  l l  l l  l l  s s  r r  r r 
Italy  u, u, u u, u, u  w w  i i  l s  h h  h h  s s  s s  r l  r l 
Latvia  u, u, u u, u, u  w w  s i  s s  h h  l l  s l  s s  r r  r r 
Lithuania  u, u, u o, u, e  w w  s s  l s  h h  l l  l l  s s  l r  l r 
Luxembourg  e, o, o e, o, o  w w  i i  l s  h h  l l  l l  s s  r r  r r 
Malta  u, u, u u, u, u  w w  i i  s s  l l  h h  l s  s s  r r  l l 
Netherlands  e, e, e e, e, e  w w  i i  l l  h h  l l  s l  s s  r l  l l 
a) EUFOR Congo; b) EUFOR Chad/CAR. 
  
 
Table 15. (continued) 
  Outcome  Condition Factors 
  CS{·}  PT{·}  CD{·}  TV{·}  PS{·}  BC{·}  ES{·}  PP{·}  EP{·}  LP{·} 
Case  CO a) CH b)  CO CH  CO CH  CO CH  CO CH  CO CH  CO CH  CO CH  CO CH  CO CH 
Poland  o, e, o o, o, o  s s  s i  l s  h h  h h  l s  i i  r r  r r 
Portugal  o, o, o u, u, u  s s  i i  l l  h l  h h  l l  i i  l l  l l 
Romania  − u, u, u  − s  − s  − s  − h  − l  − l  − i  − r  − l 
Slovakia  u, u, u u, u, u  s s  s s  s s  h h  l h  s l  s s  l l  r r 
Slovenia  e, u, e o, o, o  w w  s s  s s  h h  l l  l l  i i  r r  r r 
Spain  e, e, e u, u, u  w w  i i  l s  h h  l l  l s  s s  l l  r r 
Sweden  e, o, o o, o, o  s s  s i  l s  l l  l l  s l  s s  l r  l l 
UK  u, u, u u, u, u  w w  s s  l s  l l  h l  l l  i i  l l  r r 
a) EUFOR Congo; b) EUFOR Chad/CAR. 
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QCA of UNIFIL II 
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Abstract 
Why did some democracies carry a disproportionately large share of the 
burden of the 2006 reinforcement of UNIFIL, while others hardly contribute at all? 
Although the division of the burden of UN peacekeeping operations has attracted a 
considerable amount of scholarly attention, neither the impact of domestic variables, 
nor the interaction between the domestic and international determinants of 
peacekeeping contributions has been systematically analysed. This article aims to fill 
this gap in academic research. First, insights from research on peacekeeping burden 
sharing, democratic peace theory and integrated decision models are combined in a 
multi-causal framework. Subsequently, two-step fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis is used to assess whether this model explains diverging contributions to the 
2006 enhancement of the UNIFIL operation. The results of this analysis show that 
contributions result from a complex interplay between domestic and international 
conditions. Two combinations of international level conditions allowed for large 
contributions. In the absence of significant military engagements, military capable 
states and states with a high level of prior involvement in UNPOs had an incentive to 
participate. Actual contributions, however, only materialized if such a conductive 
international context was combined with favourable domestic conditions: only states 
governed by a left-leaning government that was not constrained by either proximate 
general elections or a right-leaning parliament with extensive veto powers 
participated in the operation.  
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Introduction 
Following the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War, the United Nations Interim Force 
in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was reinforced significantly. The EU member states carried 
the brunt of the burden of this reinforcement. However, while many member states 
made sizeable personnel contributions, others did not contribute at all. This article 
aims to explain the pattern of contributions to UNIFIL II. Hereby, it addresses a 
substantial gap in the academic literature on peacekeeping burden sharing (e.g. 
Bobrow & Boyer, 1997; Shimizu & Sandler, 2010). The bulk of the research on the 
subject consists of empirical tests of collective-action-based models. Scarce studies 
that do take into account a wider range of conditions almost exclusively focus on 
international-level determinants. Hereby, the impact of domestic-level conditions 
remains largely unexamined.  
A rare exception to this fixation on external explanations are the many studies 
that establish a link between a states’ level of democracy and its propensity to 
contribute to (UN) peacekeeping operations. Several scholars have posited that 
democracies are more likely to contribute personnel to United Nations peacekeeping 
operations (UNPOs) than non-democracies (e.g. Andersson, 2002; Lebovic, 2004; 
Victor, 2010: 226). Explanations for this correlation generally build on the normative 
model of democratic peace: democracies are more inclined to participate in UNPOs 
because the latter’s goal of promoting the peaceful resolution of conflict corresponds 
to their domestic political norms. More recently however, democratic peace research 
has emphasized the significant variation across democratic political systems, which, 
in turn, affects their international behaviour (e.g. Ireland & Gartner, 2001; Prins & 
Sprecher, 1999). Based on this logic, the domestic differences between democracies 
can be expected to affect their propensity to contribute to UNPOs. Unfortunately, 
previous studies have not systematically explored the impact of cross-democratic 
domestic variation on contributions to UNPOs.  
The lack of attention to domestic conditions not only contrasts sharply with 
recent democratic peace research, but also with studies that build on integrated 
models to explain contributions to multilateral operations (e.g. Auerswald, 2004; 
Bennett, Lepgold & Unger, 1994). The latter consistently conclude that contributions 
result from a complex interplay between domestic and international conditions. 
However, such integrated models have been exclusively used to explain diverging 
contributions to operations conducted by coalitions of the willing or under the aegis 
of NATO or the EU. In consequence, a structured analysis that links cross-
democratic domestic variation to participation in UNPOs, let alone examines the 
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complex interplay between domestic and international conditions, has not yet been 
produced. 
This study aims to fill this gap. It combines international and domestic 
conditions in an integrated model that aims to explain varying contributions to 
UNPOs. It focusses on the 2006 reinforcement of the United Nations Interim Force 
in Lebanon (UNIFIL II) because this is one of the few recent UNPOs to which 
traditional Western democracies made pivotal troop contributions. In consequence, 
it constitutes a particularly suited case for testing a model that aims to explain 
varying democratic contributions to UN-peacekeeping. Two-step fuzzy set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis is used to examine whether the model can explain 
the varying contributions to this operation. The results of the analysis reveal that 
personnel contributions to UNIFIL II indeed depend on a complex interplay 
between domestic and international conditions. Contributions are only possible if 
the absence of military stretch is combined with either a high level of prior 
involvement in UNPOs or sizeable military capabilities. However, for large 
contributions to materialize, these international level conditions must be combined 
with favourable domestic conditions, more specifically with a left-leaning executive 
that is neither constrained by proximate elections or a right-leaning parliament with 
extensive veto powers. 
The article proceeds as follows. The first section builds on the comprehensive 
literature on peacekeeping burden sharing and democratic peace theory to develop 
an integrated model that aims to explain diverging contributions to UNPOs. The 
next section justifies the case selection, introduces the methodological approach and 
discusses the operationalization of the condition and the outcome. The third section 
presents the results of the analysis, before the conclusions recapitulate the study’s 
major findings. 
Democratic Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations 
I build on three partially overlapping areas of academic research to develop an 
integrated model for explaining democratic contributions to UNPOs. First, I derive 
plausible international level explanations from previous research on peacekeeping 
operations. Subsequently, I draw on democratic peace theory to identify cross-
democratic differences that could be relevant for explaining varying contributions to 
UNPOs. Lastly, I build on integrated decision models to formulate hypotheses on 
how contribution decisions are produced by specific combinations of international 
and domestic conditions. Although the resulting framework integrates hypotheses 
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from the prevailing theories on military burden sharing and democratic peace, it 
does not incorporate all explanatory variables raised in previous research. Most 
importantly, the quality of a state’s democracy is not included in the framework, 
since this study aims to explain the contributions of states that adhere to the 
fundamental standards of democratic governance, any variation above which should 
be explanatorily irrelevant. In consequence, an assessment of the impact of 
democratic quality on a state’s propensity to participate in UNPO’s is beyond the 
scope of this study. 
International Level Explanations 
The rich literature on UN peacekeeping offers a range of plausible 
international level determinants for contributions to UNPOs. The vast majority of 
academic research focusses on testing public goods theory (e.g. Bobrow & Boyer, 
1997; Shimizu & Sandler, 2010). Peacekeeping produces a variety of public benefits. 
At the most general level, UN peacekeeping aims to achieve greater worldwide peace 
and stability, which benefits all nations, regardless of whether they contribute to 
operations. A testable implication of the public goods model is that peacekeeping 
burdens are expected to be shared unevenly. More specifically, because the 
contributions of larger states are expected to satisfy the amount of peacekeeping 
desired by smaller states, the former are expected to shoulder a disproportionately 
large share of the burden of UNPOs (Olson & Zeckhauser, 1966; Shimizu & Sandler, 
2002: 655).  
A number of empirical studies demonstrates that larger states indeed carry a 
disproportionately large burden of peacekeeping operations, hereby confirming 
public goods models (e.g. Khanna, Sandler & Shimizu, 1998; Shimizu & Sandler, 
2002). Recent research suggests that public benefits are especially important for UN-
financed operations, which are expected to be less driven by self-interest than non-
UN operations (e.g. Gaibulloev, Sandler & Shimizu, 2009; Shimizu & Sandler, 2010). 
This is in line with studies that examine the pattern of UN involvement in violent 
conflicts, which generally conclude this closely reflects the degree to which a conflict 
poses a threat to international peace and security, not the “parochial” interests of the 
members of the UN Security Council (e.g. Beardsley & Schmidt, 2012; Gilligan & 
Stedman, 2003). 
Although empirical tests of public goods models generally focus on financial 
burden sharing, public goods theory is expected to have explanatory value for 
personnel contributions to specific operations. More specifically, states without 
sizeable military capabilities are unlikely to contribute solely to secure public 
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benefits, since they can only hope to have a marginal impact on the total available 
amount of benefits, which, if public, cannot be denied to them if they do not 
participate (Baltrusaitis, 2010: 20). Previous research suggests that military 
capabilities are indeed positively correlated with personnel contributions. In a study 
of African contributions to peacekeeping operations, Victor (2010: 225), for 
example, concludes that “states with larger armed forces tend to deploy more 
peacekeepers”. Similarly, the study of Bove and Elia (2011: 712) convincingly 
demonstrates that “the size of a state’s military predicts the contribution to UN 
peacekeeping”. States with large military capabilities can thus be expected to have an 
incentive to contribute to secure the public benefits of UNPOs. 
While empirical evidence supports public goods models, previous research 
suggests that two country specific benefits also increase the likelihood and/or size of 
personnel contributions. First of all, several studies demonstrate that geographic 
proximity to the target country increases a state’s inclination to contribute to a 
peacekeeping operation (e.g. Bove & Elia, 2011; Perkins & Neumayer, 2008). This 
correlation can be attributed to the specific benefits peacekeeping produces for states 
situated closer to a conflict, such as reduced refugee inflows, more secure supply 
lines, enhanced trade flows following the return of regional stability etc. (Khanna, 
Sandler & Shimizu, 1998: 182; Shimizu & Sandler, 2002: 656; Shimizu & Sandler, 
2010: 1480). Geographic proximity can therefore be expected to provide states an 
incentive to contribute to UNPOs. 
A second contributor specific benefit are the status gains from being 
recognized as a major promoter of world peace (Khanna, Sandler & Shimizu, 1998: 
182). Although these gains are available to all potential contributors, states that 
invested a large amount of resources to support the UN peacekeeping system in the 
past can reasonably be expected to attach more importance to its benefits. This 
corresponds to the conclusion of Bobrow and Boyer (1997: 731) that peacekeeping 
“activism can become a habit” and Lebovic (2004: 928), whose findings indicate that 
a country’s level of previous commitment to UNPOs is a significant determinant of 
future participation. In consequence, prior peacekeeping involvement is expected to 
have a positive impact on a state’s propensity to contribute to UNPOs. 
Previous research thus suggests several possible international incentives for 
contributing to UNPOs. However, conditions situated at the international level can 
also constrain a state’s ability to contribute. A particular important constraint is the 
extent to which a state’s military capabilities are stretched by engagements in other 
operations. Evidently, troops deployed in parallel operations can impossibly 
participate in a UNPO. Furthermore, states whose available military resources are 
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already strained might not be willing to further constrain their future freedom of 
action by committing resources to a UNPO (Bove & Elia, 2011; Lebovic, 2004: 915). 
Victor (2010: 223, 225) and Lebovic (2004), for example, conclude that states that are 
engaged in external conflicts are less likely to participate in peacekeeping operations, 
Bove and Elia (2011) draw similar conclusions on the impact of the number of 
operations sustained at the same time as the UNPO. Military stretch can thus be 
expected to constrain a state’s ability to contribute personnel to UNPOs. 
Domestic Level Explanations 
In contrast to the extensive research on the international determinants of 
peacekeeping contributions, few studies have examined the impact of conditions 
situated at the domestic level. A state’s level of democracy is one of the few domestic 
factors that is consistently linked to peacekeeping contributions. The results of 
Andersson (2002), for example, reveal that democracies are significantly more 
committed to UN interventions than anocracies and autocracies. Similarly, Lebovic 
(2004: 933) demonstrates that a state’s level of democracy “accounts for whether and 
how much countries contributed personnel”; while Perkins and Neumayer (2008: 
710) show that it is “one of the most influential determinants governing the 
probability of country participation”.  
The link between democracy and peacekeeping contributions parallels the 
strong academic consensus that democracies behave different from non-democracies 
in international relations (cf. inter alia Hegre, 2014; Maoz & Russett, 1993). Studies 
on the subject generally focus on examining whether and why democracies are less 
war-prone than non-democracies (Hegre, 2014: 624). A more recent strand of 
democratic peace research, however, emphasizes the significant differences between 
democracies, which, in turn, affects their propensity to resort to military force (cf. 
e.g. Ireland & Gartner, 2001; Mello, 2012; Palmer, London & Regan, 2004). Based on 
this logic, domestic differences between democracies can also be expected to affect 
contributions to UNPOs. However, previous studies have not systematically 
explored the link between cross-democratic domestic variation and participation in 
UNPOs. 
A first set of cross-democratic differences that might have an impact on 
peacekeeping contributions is the variation in institutional constraints on executive 
action. Building on the structural model of democratic peace, several scholars 
showed that states in which parliament has a veto on military deployments are less 
likely to resort to the use of force. Reiter and Tillman (2002: 824), for example, 
conclude that “greater legislative controls over foreign policy […] is associated with 
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lower propensity to initiate disputes”, while Choi (2010: 438) shows that legislative 
constraints “are likely to discourage democratic executives’ use of force”. Similarly, 
Auerswald (1999) concludes that executives are more reluctant to use force if 
parliaments can overturn its decision to do so. Evidently, parliaments with extensive 
war powers can also constitute a veto point against contributions to a UNPO, and 
consequentially, prevent states from participating. The level of parliamentary veto 
powers is therefore expected to affect whether states contribute to UNPOs. 
A second, possible, domestic determinant of democratic contributions to 
UNPOs is the temporal distance towards the next general election. Since governing 
parties might fear suffering at the polls for resorting to the use of force, several 
studies expect that democratic leaders will not initiate international conflict when 
elections are nearby (Auerswald, 1999: 474; Gaubatz, 1991). In contrast, research 
building on “diversionary theory of war” predicts that executives will be more 
inclined to initiate conflict at the end of an electoral cycle, since this constitutes an 
opportunity to create a rallying around the flag effect and, hereby, improve their 
prospects for re-election (Meernik & Waterman, 1996). However, UNPOs cannot 
reasonably be expected to create such an effect, since there are generally no distinct 
adversaries in these operations. In contrast, governing parties might fear the negative 
electoral ramifications of contributing to UNPOs, which their domestic 
constituencies might consider superfluous. Therefore, electoral proximity is expected 
to have a negative impact on a political leader’s inclination to contribute. 
Lastly, several studies have examined the impact of party politics on the 
foreign policy of established democracies. Building on evidence that the electoral 
platforms of right-leaning parties are generally more pro-military than the elctoral 
platforms of left-leaning parties; Palmer, London and Regan (2004: 2) assert that the 
former should be more inclined to support the use of force in international relations. 
Their results confirm this inference. Similarily, Stevens (2015) asserts that supporters 
of right-leaning parties are less likely to disapprove war and Schuster and Maier 
(2006) conclude that rightist parties were more inclined to support the 2003 Iraq-
war. Unlike the operations examined in the afore-mentioned studies, UNPOs are 
however “deployed to support the implementation of a ceasefire or peace 
agreement” and guided by three basic principles: “consent of the parties, impartiality 
and non-use of force”. In consequence, the distinction between the pro-military 
right and pro-peace left seems inadequate to explain participation in UNPOs.  
Rathbun (2004) offers a more elaborate three-dimensional model on the link 
between ideology and the use of military force. This not only expects leftist parties to 
be more antimilitaristic, but also to prefer pursuing their interests through 
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multilateral frameworks and to follow a more inclusive conception of the national 
interest, which comprises the promotion of the welfare of other countries (Rathbun, 
2004: 18-21). Rightist parties on the other hand, have a more narrow conception of 
the national interest, consider the use of force an acceptable instrument in 
international relations and are more reluctant to delegate control to multilateral 
institutions. 
Rathbun’s model induces the expectation that leftist parties will be more 
supportive of UNPOs than of other military operations. The general goal of 
promoting peace and stability corresponds to their inclusive conception of national 
interests, supporting the UN peacekeeping system complies with their preference for 
multilateralism. Moreover, contributing to UNPOs does not contradict their 
averseness to the use of military means. Leftist parties are antimilitaristic because 
they consider the use of force an act of subordination, which strengthens inequality 
between nations (Rathbun, 2007). This is however not the case for UNPOs, since 
consent of local actors is a fundamental principle of UN Peacekeeping. Given their 
exclusive conception of national interests, rightist leaders will be less inclined to 
support UNPOs solely for securing the public good of greater worldwide stability. 
On top of that, they have less “trust” in multilateral institutions, which makes them 
more susceptible to the fear that others will free-ride on their efforts (Rathbun, 2011: 
245, 254-255). Therefore, a history of contributing to UNPOs is not expected to 
induce support from rightist parties. Right-leaning parties can however be expected 
to participate in UNPOs when their state risks being affected by the negative 
externalities of a conflict, which depends on the spatial distance towards the target 
conflict.  
Integrated Decision Model 
Starting with a seminal article of Bennett, Lepgold and Unger (1994), several 
scholars have developed integrated decision models to explain contributions to 
collective military operations (e.g. Auerswald, 2004; Baltrusaitis, 2010). The latter 
generally incorporate both international and domestic conditions, and formulate 
hypotheses on how specific combinations of domestic and international conditions 
produces contribution decisions. In line with these studies, personnel contributions 
to UNPOs can be expected to result from a complex interplay between the 
aforementioned conditions.  
States with a high level of prior involvement in UN peacekeeping, sizeable 
military capabilities, or situated close to the area of operations are expected to have 
an incentive to make large personnel contributions; but only if their capabilities are 
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not stretched by other military engagements. The impact of these international level 
conditions is however expected to depend on domestic conditions. Whether a 
specific incentive leads to actual contributions is contingent on the ideological 
preferences of the relevant actors. Whereas left-leaning parties are expected to 
support contributing to UNPOs to continue their state’s peacekeeping tradition or to 
provide the public good of greater world-wide stability, right-leaning parties will 
only contribute if it is deployed to mitigate the negative externalities of nearby 
conflict. 
Party politics not only interact with international level incentives, but also 
with parliamentary veto power. Choi (2010: 441) contends that the level of 
parliamentary constraints only increases if legislative veto players and the executive 
have different ideological orientations. Similarly, Mello (2012: 427) maintains that 
only the combination of a left-leaning parliament with extensive war powers could 
create an effective veto point against a right-leaning executive’s decision to 
participate in the Iraq war. Parliamentary veto power can thus only constrain 
contributions if the legislative and executive branch have a different ideological 
orientation. 
Several causal paths towards large personnel contributions can be derived 
from the above discussion. These are summarized in the integrated model presented 
in Figure 1. In the absence of military stretch, states with large military capabilities 
or a high level of past involvement in UNPOs are expected to have an incentive to 
contribute. In combination with a leftist government, that is neither constrained by 
upcoming elections or a right parliament with extensive veto powers, this is expected 
to cause large personnel contributions. States without significant competing 
deployments and situated closely to the area of operations, in turn, are expected to 
participate if they are governed by a right-leaning executive that is not constrained 
by upcoming elections or a left parliament with veto power over military 
deployment. 
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Research Design 
Empirical Domain 
The empirical focus of the study is on the 2006 enhancement of the United 
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Although this operation has been 
deployed in Lebanon since 1978, its troop levels were augmented significantly 
following the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War (Engberg, 2014). This reinforcement 
provides a rare opportunity for testing a model that aims to explain democratic 
contributions to UNPOs, since it is one of the few recent UN operations to which 
traditional Western democracies made pivotal troop contributions (Bellamy & 
Williams, 2009: 43). Due to their long-established tradition of democracy, the latter 
can be expected to most closely resemble “ideal type” cases for testing the domestic 
side of the integrated model (Goertz, 2006: 83).  
The brunt of the reinforcement’s burden was carried by the European Union 
member states, who contributed around 80% of the required forces. This significant 
European contribution was a consequence of Israel’s insistence on the participation 
of European troops and the direct involvement of the European Council in the 
planning of the operation (Mattelaer, 2009). The resulting pressure on the EU 
member states produced considerable personnel contributions from, inter alia, 
France, Italy, Poland and Belgium (Engberg, 2014: 78). Other member states, 
however, did not contribute to the operation at all. Since the EU members are all 
full-fledged democracies, UNIFIL’s reinforcement constitutes a most likely case of 
democratic contributions to UNPO’s. In consequence, the diverging contributions 
to the reinforcement of UNIFIL constitutes a particularly suited population for this 
research, including both positive and relevant negative cases of democratic 
contributions to UNPOs.1 
  
                                                          
1 Three EU members are excluded from the analysis: Cyprus because the role of its armed 
forces is exclusively limited to the defence of its territorial security; Malta because its limited 
military capabilities and pacifist constitution prevent it from participating in military 
operations abroad and Denmark because comparable data on its deployable forces is not 
available due to its opt out from the European Defence Agency (Pace, 2013; Samokhvalov 
2013). 
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Methodological Approach 
Whether the integrated model explains the pattern of contribution to UNIFIL 
II is tested with Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), an analytical technique 
geared towards establishing set-theoretic connections between one case property -
defined as the outcome- and other properties -defined as the causal conditions 
(Wagemann & Schneider, 2010: 380). Such set-theoretic connections can be 
interpreted in terms of sufficient and/or necessary causes. The assessment of 
necessity and sufficiency is based on two parameters of fit: consistency and coverage 
(Ragin, 2008: 44-68). The former provides a descriptive measure of the extent to 
which the empirical data confirms sufficiency or necessity, the latter indicates the 
empirical relevance of a sufficient or necessary condition. Consistency approaches 
unity as the data provides stronger evidence for sufficiency or necessity, coverage as 
a condition becomes more relevant.1  
QCA can however be used to examine a more complex form of causality, 
generally captured under the expression “multiple conjunctural causation”. This 
implies that there can be multiple paths towards the same outcome, each of which 
might consist of a specific combination (or conjunction) of conditions (Rihoux, 
2003: 353; Wagemann & Schneider, 2010: 383-385). QCA’s ability to deal with this 
complex conception of causality makes it particularly apt to test the integrated 
model. This comprises several pathways towards making large contributions, which 
each consist of a specific combination of international and domestic conditions. 
This study applies the fuzzy set variant of QCA (fsQCA), which allows to 
account for differences-in-kind between cases (qualitative difference) as well as 
difference-in degree (quantitative difference) between qualitatively identical cases. 
Fuzzy membership scores vary between 1 and 0, depending on the degree to which a 
case belongs to a set (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 28). The qualitative status of a 
case depends on its position towards the 0.5 anchor, which constitutes “the threshold 
between membership and non-membership in a set – the qualitative distinction that 
is maintained in fuzzy sets”. (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 28). The assignment of 
fuzzy membership scores, or calibration, is of utmost importance in fsQCA and is 
detailed in the next section. 
                                                          
1 Consistency and coverage are respectively calculated with the formula 
∑ ( min (Xi,Yi) ∑ (Xi)⁄  and ∑ ( min  (Xi,Yi) ∑ (Yi)⁄ , in which X denotes the membership 
scores in the alleged subset and Y the scores in the alleged superset. 
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Calibration 
With the exception of parliamentary veto power, the conditions and the 
outcome were calibrated using the direct method of calibration (Ragin, 2008: 85-94). 
This was carried out with the fsQCA 2.5 software, which employs a logistic function 
to fit raw data between three qualitative breakpoints: full membership (1), the cross-
over point (0.5) and full non-membership (0) (Ragin & Davey, 2014). The following 
paragraphs discuss the base variables and qualitative breakpoints that were used to 
calibrate the conditions. The base variables, membership scores and qualitative 
breakpoints are respectively presented in Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3. 
Table 1. Base variables 
  Outcome  Conditions 
cases  LC  MC MS PI GP LE LP ED 
AT  0  2050 60 4.82 2128.81 -2.89 -10.24 68 
BE  1.71  6984 10.79 0.37 2957.74 -16.98 -12.24 320 
CZ  0  4566 19.69 1.27 2164.32 -10.87 0.67 1404 
DE  0.6  63004 12.73 0.12 2381.23 11.81 6.36 1160 
EE  0  563 39.26 0.6 2841.88 1.66 2.79 222 
ES  1.98  39617 5.07 0.25 2623.43 -12.39 -2.83 593 
FI  1.87  6000 11.77 6.35 2934.18 -16.3 -14.03 236 
FR  1.35  91000 11.35 1.08 2433.55 -7.73 -9.92 320 
GB  0  74570 22.14 0.58 3319.78 -3.09 3.07 1381 
GR  1.63  22182 7.93 0.3 717.25 -17.59 -13.44 418 
HU  0.04  2122 33.23 3.13 1795.41 10.68 -3.82 1354 
IE  1.4  850 73.42 5.49 3863.67 -6.58 -9.98 303 
IT  2.25  54800 9.17 0.36 1650.23 -17.71 11.71 1719 
LT  0  1140 19.48 0.07 2307.73 10.27 5.22 822 
LU  0.09  311 11.9 0 2921.26 -18.79 -17.21 1048 
LV  0  947 17.43 0 2434.19 1.52 -0.73 74 
NL  0  17724 12.7 0.58 3002.86 12.6 6.4 120 
PL  1.79  24300 17.29 10.47 1922.55 -1.14 -0.47 451 
PT  1.39  7168 10.84 1.54 3728.24 -10.56 -6.85 1160 
SE  0.2  3122 25.37 1.81 2812.02 -18.32 -4.33 54 
SI  0  1579 19.76 0.63 2090.48 -3.66 -5.08 789 
SK  0  641 98.76 22.03 1907.34 -11.01 -4.7 1418 
LC: Large Personnel Contributions; MC: Military Capabilities; MS: Military Stretch; PI: Prior 
Peacekeeping Involvement; GP: High Geographic Proximity; LE: Left Executive; LP: Left 
Parliament; ED: Large Electoral Distance. 
 136 
 
Table 2. Fuzzy membership scores 
  Outcome  Conditions 
cases  LC  MC MS PI GP LE LP ED PV 
AT  0.05  0.05 1 1 0.32 0.7 0.96 0.02 1 
BE  0.89  0.51 0.06 0.02 0 0.99 0.98 0.91 0.2 
CZ  0.05  0.22 0.48 0.69 0.27 0.96 0.45 1 0.8 
DE  0.23  0.96 0.1 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.13 1 0.8 
EE  0.05  0.02 0.95 0.08 0.01 0.38 0.3 0.66 0.8 
ES  0.95  0.86 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.98 0.7 1 1 
FI  0.93  0.42 0.08 1 0 0.99 0.99 0.71 0.8 
FR  0.74  0.99 0.07 0.56 0.07 0.91 0.95 0.91 0 
GB  0.05  0.98 0.58 0.07 0 0.72 0.28 1 0 
GR  0.87  0.71 0.03 0.01 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.98 0 
HU  0.05  0.05 0.88 1 0.65 0.04 0.76 1 0.8 
IE  0.77  0.02 1 1 0 0.88 0.95 0.88 0.8 
IT  0.98  0.94 0.04 0.02 0.74 1 0.03 1 0.4 
LT  0.05  0.03 0.46 0 0.14 0.04 0.17 1 1 
LU  0.06  0.02 0.08 0 0 1 0.99 1 0.8 
LV  0.05  0.02 0.32 0 0.07 0.39 0.55 0.03 1 
NL  0.05  0.65 0.1 0.07 0 0.02 0.13 0.12 0.8 
PL  0.91  0.73 0.31 1 0.56 0.58 0.54 0.99 0.2 
PT  0.76  0.51 0.06 0.83 0 0.96 0.89 1 0.2 
SE  0.08  0.1 0.69 0.92 0.01 1 0.79 0.01 0.8 
SI  0.05  0.04 0.48 0.1 0.37 0.75 0.82 1 0.2 
SK  0.05  0.02 1 1 0.57 0.96 0.8 1 0.8 
LC: Large Personnel Contributions; MC: Military Capabilities; MS: Military Stretch; PI: 
Prior Peacekeeping Involvement; GP: High Geographic Proximity; LE: Left Executive; 
LP: Left Parliament; ED: Large Electoral Distance; PV: Parliamentary Veto. 
 
The ratio between the number of troops contributed to UNIFIL II and a state’s 
GDP was used as base variable for the outcome, large contribution (in line with 
Bobrow & Boyer, 1997: 731-736; Shimizu & Sandler, 2002; Shimizu & Sandler, 2010). 
This was calculated according to the following equation (1): 
 lci=
(PCi/∑PCi)
(GDPi/∑GDPi)
 (1)
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Table 3. Thresholds calibration 
  Outcome  Conditions 
cases  LC  MC MS PI GP LE LP ED 
1  2  60,000 40 2 1,000 -10 -10 365 
0.5  1  6,500 20 1 2,000 0 0 180 
0  0  2,000 10 0.5 2,500 10 10 90 
LC: Large Personnel Contributions; MC: Military Capabilities; MS: Military Stretch; PI: 
Prior Peacekeeping Involvement; GP: High Geographic Proximity; LE: Left Executive; LP: 
Left Parliament; ED: Large Electoral Distance. 
 
where PCi is the total number of a country’s active personnel in UNIFIL II in 
November 2006, when the mission reached full deployment, and GDPi a country’s 
GDP in 2006 (Engberg, 2014: 78).1 The following qualitative anchors were used to 
calibrate this interval-level variable: the threshold for full inclusion was fixed at 2, 
corresponding to contributions twice the size of what could be expected by a state’s 
GDP; the crossover threshold at 1, corresponding to contributions fully proportional 
to a state’s GDP; the threshold for full non-membership at 0, corresponding to the 
absence of personnel contributions. 
The base variable for military capabilities is the number of deployable forces, 
retrieved from the European Defence Agency (2008).2 The following qualitative 
anchors were used to calibrate this interval-level variable. The threshold for full 
inclusion was fixed at 60,000, separating the three large EU members, France, the 
UK and Germany, from the other cases (Brummer, 2006). The threshold for full 
exclusion was fixed at 2,000, in the significant gap between Austria and Slovenia. 
The crossover threshold was set to 6,500. This value corresponds to the median and 
is located in the significant gap between Belgium and Finland.3 
                                                          
1 Personnel contributions are derived from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 
https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_ archive.shtml; data 
on GDP was retrieved from IMF (2013) 
2 As data for 2006 was incomplete, data for 2007 was used to fill the gaps 
3 To test the robustness of the results, I assessed whether the solution would be the same if 
another breakpoint was used for full inclusion in the set “Military Capabilities” (cf. Skaaning, 
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The base variable for prior peacekeeping involvement takes into account the 
size of past contributions to UNPOs and the dispersion of these contributions across 
operations (in line with Thiem & Haesebrouck, 2014). The latter is accounted for 
because high absolute contributions can be a consequence of extraordinary large 
contributions to a single operation, which could be motivated by immediate security 
interests. In line with Thiem and Haesebrouck (2014), the dispersion parameter Di 
was calculated according to the following equation (2): 
 Di=1- ∑ P² (2)
where Pj is the proportion of personnel contributed to operation j = 1, 2,…, k.. 
Subsequently, the level of prior involvement was calculated and relativized by GDP 
according to the following equation (3): 
 ppii=
(Pi*Di ∑ (PCi*Di))⁄
(GDPi/∑GDPi)
  (3)
where Pi is the absolute personnel contribution to UNPOs.1 The following 
qualitative anchors were used to calibrate this indicator: the threshold for full 
inclusion was fixed at 2, corresponding to a level of prior contributions twice the size 
of what could be expected by a state’s GDP; the crossover threshold at 1, 
corresponding to a level of contributions fully proportional to a state’s GDP; the 
treshold for full exclusion at 0.5, corresponding to a level of prior contributions half 
of what would be expected by its GDP. 
The operationalization of high geographic proximity builds on the minimum-
distance measure, which calculates the distance between the two closest physical 
locations of a country dyad (Gleditsch & Ward, 2001; Weidmann, Kuse & Gleditsch, 
2010). The following qualitative anchors were used to calibrate this indicator: the 
                                                                                                                                                      
2011). The result of this robustness check, presented in the appendix, demonstrate that 
changing this breakpoint does not have a significant impact on the results. 
1 Personnel contributions of the fifteen years preceding the reinforcement of UNIFIL are 
taken into account. For the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia, 
only personnel contributions since one year after their independence in 1995, 1993, 1992, 
1992, 1995 and 1992, respectively, are taken into account. Personnel contributions are based 
on the contributions in December of each year, based on data from the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations, https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/ statistics/ 
contributors_archive. shtml; data on GDP was retrieved from IMF (2013). 
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threshold for full inclusion was fixed at 1,000 km, corresponding to Gleditsch and 
Ward’s assertion that states “that are more than 1,000 km apart can hardly be 
considered geographically close” (Gledtisch & Ward, 2001: 745). The crossover 
threshold is fixed at 2,000 km; the threshold for full exclusion at 2,500 km.  
To accurately reflect the impact of simultaneous military deployments on the 
resources available to contribute, the base variable for military stretch takes into 
account the size of a country’s parallel deployments and its total available resources. 
In line with Thiem and Haesebrouck (2014), this was accomplished by setting the 
cases’ deployed troops in 2006 (DT) in relation to their total deployable troops 
(DAT), according to the following equation (4):1 
 msi=
DTi
DATi,
  (4)
The following qualitative anchors were used to calibrate the indicator. The anchor 
for full inclusion was fixed at 40%. This corresponds to the deployability target for 
ground forces to which the NATO countries agreed at their 2004 Istanbul Summit. 
Since this target is also used by the European Defence Agency for internal 
assessments, it constitutes an appropriate threshold for assessing the extent of 
military stretch of the EU member states (International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 2008a: 13). The crossover threshold and threshold for full exclusion at 
respectively half (20%) and a quarter of this target (10%).  
The base variable for the ideological orientation of the cases’ government 
(right executive) and legislature (right parliament) draws on the Right-Left (RILE) 
indicator of the Comparative Manifesto Project, which is based on quantitative 
content analyses of election programmes (Volkens et al., 2013). In line with previous 
studies (Mello, 2012: 436-437; Palmer, London & Regan, 2004), party positions (n) 
were aggregated into an overall measure of executive ideological orientation by 
summing up each government party’s (i) ideological position on the RILE scale (rl), 
weighted by its proportion of the total number of government seats (s), as specified 
in the following equation (5): 
                                                          
1 Data on deployed forces was retrieved from International Institute for Strategic Studies 
(2008a: 14), troops deployed in UNIFIL II have been subtracted. 
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Similarly, the positions of the parties represented in parliament (n) were 
aggregated into an overall measure of parliamentary ideological orientation by 
summing up each party’s (j) ideological position on the RILE scale (rl), weighted by 
its proportion of the total number of seats in parliament (s). The following 
thresholds were used to calibrate the indicators for legislative and executive ideology: 
the crossover threshold was fixed at 0, since this score corresponds to parties that 
make an equal amount of right and left statements in their manifestos; the threshold 
for full inclusion in left executive/parliament was fixed at -10, the anchor for full 
exclusion at 10. 
Large Electoral Distance was calculated by measuring the timespan between 
the decision on troop contributions and the date of the next general election. The 
reference date for the former is July 25th 2006, the first informal meeting of 
prospective troop contributors.1 The following thresholds were used to calibrate the 
resulting indicator. Since the research of Gaubatz (1991) has demonstrated that 
electoral considerations are expected not to matter if the next general elections are 
still over a year away, the threshold for full inclusion is fixed at 365 days. On the 
basis of the tested assumption that electoral considerations matter most during 
electoral quarters, the threshold for full exclusion is fixed at 90 days (Meernik & 
Waterman, 1996: 580; Ostrom & Job, 1986: 534). The crossover threshold is fixed at 
180 days, situating governments that face elections within half a year more in than 
out of the set.  
The calibration of the condition parliamentary veto power is based on 
categorical differences between the cases.2 Since an ex ante veto is generally 
considered the strongest form of parliamentary oversight, cases were assigned a 
score above 0.5 if parliamentary consent was required before troop deployments 
(Mello, 2012: 432). Such cases still vary in two important ways. First, parliaments are 
                                                          
1 Electoral dates were retrieved from the ‘parlgov database’ (Döring & Manow, 2012) To 
account for early elections, which could not have been anticipated at the time contribution 
decisions were made, the actual date of the next general election was only used if it was less 
than one year away. Otherwise, the length of an electoral cycle was added to the date of the 
last election. 
2 A detailed description of the cases’ parliamentary war powers is available in the appendix. 
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expected to have a stronger veto if prior legislative approval constitutes a legal 
obligation rather than an unwritten rule (Hänggi, 2004: 14). Second, parliaments 
have more influence if consent from non-governmental parties is required, which is 
the case for countries governed by minority governments (Thiem & Haesebrouck, 
2014). A score of 1 was assigned to cases that meet both requirements, a score of 0.8 
to cases that meet one requirement and a score of 0.6 to cases with an ex ante 
parliamentary veto that meet neither of the two requirements. A score of 0.4 was 
assigned to cases where parliamentary approval was required after troops are 
deployed, since the military, strategic and reputational costs of calling troops back 
render such an ex post veto far less effective than an ex ante parliamentary veto 
(Wagner, Peters & Glahn, 2010: 19). Cases where the executive was only obliged to 
consult or inform parliament about its decisions were assigned a score of 0.2. A score 
of 0 was assigned to states where the legislature hardly played any role in military 
deployment decisions. 
Analysis and Results 
This section presents the results of the analysis, which was carried out with the 
fsQCA 2.5 software. The analysis of sufficiency builds on the truth table algorithm 
(Ragin, 2008: 124-144). A truth table lists all possible combinations of conditions 
and the associated outcomes. The cases’ membership scores in the truth table rows 
are calculated with Boolean multiplication. Every row that contains at least one case 
with a membership score above 0.5 is assigned an outcome value, based on its 
consistency as a sufficient condition for the outcome. The remaining rows are 
considered logical remainders; combinations of conditions without members. Such 
remainders are problematic because, depending on the choices made during the 
analysis, they can either render the results too complex to interpret in a theoretically 
meaningful way or, conversely, oversimplify them (Schneider & Wagemann, 2006: 
758).  
To dramatically reduce the number of logical remainders, this study follows 
the two-step approach suggested by Schneider and Wagemann (2006). In two-step 
QCA, conditions are divided into remote and proximate conditions. Only the 
former are included in the first step of the analysis. This results in combinations of 
remote conditions that make the outcome possible, which are considered “outcome-
enabling contexts”. In the second step, each of these outcome-enabling contexts is 
analysed together with the proximate conditions, in order to find the specific 
combinations of domestic conditions that are sufficient in each context. In this 
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study, the international level conditions are expected to constitute outcome-enabling 
contexts, since states are expected not to contribute in the absence of international 
level incentives. Therefore, they are modelled as the remote conditions. Domestic 
factors are modelled as the proximate conditions, since actual contributions are only 
expected if there is a match between them and the international context. 
Necessity 
The results of the analysis of necessity, presented in Table 4, reveal that three 
conditions are necessary. The consistency scores of two conditions exceed the 
recommended 0.9 threshold: left executive and large electoral distance (Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2012: 278). With a consistency of 0.87, the absence of military stretch 
only nearly misses this threshold. The coverage of the three necessary conditions is 
however quite low, which suggests they might be trivial necessary conditions. 
Table 4. Results necessity LC 
 Consistency Coverage 
MC 0.709342 0.694915 
~MC 0.432526 0.285171 
MS 0.250288 0.247153 
~MS 0.870819 0.571104 
PI 0.516724 0.477103 
~PI 0.579008 0.398097 
P 0.313725 0.558522 
~GP 0.764706 0.387040 
LE 0.933103 0.529797 
~LE 0.164937 0.212481 
LP 0.806228 0.494342 
~LP 0.324106 0.357506 
ED 0.960784 0.483740 
~ED 0.103806 0.188285 
PV 0.500577 0.328788 
~PV 0.652826 0.643182 
“~”  indicates the absence of a condition; LC: Large Personnel 
Contributions; MC: Military Capabilities; MS: Military Stretch; 
PI: Prior Peacekeeping Involvement; GP: High Geographic 
Proximity; LE: Left Executive; LP: Left Parliament; ED: Large 
Electoral Distance; PV: Parliamentary Veto. 
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The relevance of the (alleged) necessary conditions is further assessed by 
constructing xy-plots. Figure 2, 3 and 4 show the scores of the cases on the outcome 
and respectively large electoral distance, left executive and absence of military 
stretch. Cases are generally situated close to the vertical right axis in all three xy-
plots, but especially in the plot of large electoral distance (Schneider & Wagemann, 
2012: 146). This indicates the latter is strongly present in most cases,  irrespective of 
whether they display the outcome, which further suggests large electoral distance 
constitutes a trivial necessary condition (Ragin, 2008: 60). The xy-plot of “absence 
military stretch” shows that one of the cases is a true logically contradictory case: 
Ireland has a score of 0 on the causal condition and a score of 0.77 on the outcome. 
This strongly disconfirms the necessity of the absence of military stretch, since it 
indicates that the outcome can be strongly present in the absence of the condition. 
 
Figure 2. Large Electoral Distance 
 
 
CZ,GB, HU, 
LT, SI, SK 
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Figure 3. Left Executive 
 
 
Figure 4. ~Military Stretch 
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Step One Sufficiency: International Level Conditions 
Only the international level conditions are included in the first step of the 
two-step procedure. Table 5 represents the truth table, with each case located in the 
row where its membership exceeds 0.5. The consistency cut-off point, which 
separates truth table rows that correspond to outcome-enabling combinations from 
those that do not, was fixed at 0.6. This low threshold is acceptable because the 
analysis is expected to result in outcome-enabling, not sufficient combinations 
(Schneider & Wagemann, 2006: 771; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 254). The cut-
off point was established by looking for a gap in the distribution of the consistency 
scores. Taken into account that a consistency below 0.5 indicates that there is more 
evidence against the claim of sufficiency than in favour of it, there are four gaps that 
might be useful for establishing the threshold: between row 2 and 3, row 3 and 4, 
row 4 and 5 and row 5 and 6 (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 279). The cut off point 
was established in the last gap because row 5 contains two cases that have a 
membership score above 0.5 in the outcome. This nurtures the expectation that it 
corresponds to an outcome-enabling (although not sufficient) combination.  
 
Table 5. Truth table international conditions LC 
  Conditions    Outcome   
Row  MC GP PI MS  Consistency  LC  Cases 
1  1 1 0 0  0.91  1  GR, IT 
2  1 0 1 0  0.91  1  FR, PT 
3  1 1 1 0  0.83  1  PL 
4  0 0 1 0  0.68  1  CZ, FI 
5  1 0 0 0  0.61  1  BE, DE, ES, NL 
6  1 0 0 1  0.49  0  GB 
7  0 0 1 1  0.39  0  AT, IE, SE 
8  0 0 0 0  0.32  0  LT, LU, LV, SI 
9  0 1 1 1  0.27  0  HU, SK 
10  0 0 0 1  0.23  0  EE 
MC: Military Capabilities; GP: High Geographic Proximity; PI: Prior Peacekeeping 
Involvement; MS: Military Stretch; LC: Large Personnel Contributions. 
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Subsequently, Boolean minimization was used to remove logically redundant 
conditions from the rows above the threshold. Depending on the remainders 
included in the process, minimization results in different solution types. If no 
remainders are included, it results in the conservative solution; if all remainders that 
lead to a less complex solution are included, it results in the parsimonious solution. 
While the former tends to be overly complex, the latter risks resting on untenable 
assumptions (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 175, 279). Therefore, this study 
focusses on the intermediate solution, which results when only remainders that 
correspond to theoretical expectations are included in the minimization process.1 
The intermediate solution is presented in the first column of Table 6. The 
formula suggests two outcome-enabling combinations, which correspond to the first 
two pathways of the international-level-side of the model. The first confirms that the 
absence of military stretch combined with sizeable military capabilities is a 
conductive context for contributing to UNIFIL II. The second reveals that the 
absence of military stretch combined with a high level of participation in UN 
peacekeeping also constitutes an outcome-enabling context. High geographic 
proximity is not included in any of the causal paths, suggesting that it is not relevant 
                                                          
1 The following assumptions were made for the production of the intermediate solution: the 
absence of military stretch and the presence of military capabilities, prior peacekeeping 
involvement and high geographic proximity were assumed to contribute to the outcome. The 
conservative and parsimonious solutions of the analyses are presented in the appendix. 
When Schneider and Wagemann (2006) introduced the two-step approach to QCA, they 
recommended using the parsimonious formula in the first step of the analysis and use the 
conservative formula in the second step. However, the intermediate formula was not 
available when they introduced two-step QCA. Moreover, in later work, Schneider and 
Wagemann (2012: 279) argued that the “intermediate formula should be at the center of the 
substantive discussion”. A detailed discussion of the most appropriate formula for a two-step 
QCA is beyond the scope of this article. Since the intermediate and the parsimonious 
solution are identical in the first step of current analysis and the intermediate and 
conservative solution are identical in the second step, the discussion is irrelevant for this 
article’s empirical conclusions.  
  
 
 
 
Table 6. Intermediate solution LC 
 International Conditions   Domestic Conditions   
  Coverage Consis-
tency 
   Coverage  Consis-
tency 
 
Cases   Raw Unique   
 Raw Unique   
1 MC*~MS 0.694 0.396 0.749 
 MC~MS *ED*LP*LE 
 
0.517 0.112  0.885  
FR, ES, GR, BE, 
PL, PT 
 MC~MS*ED*~PV*LE 
 
0.476 0.072  0.857  
FR, IT, GR, BE, 
PL, PT 
 Total  0.588  0.869   
2 PI*~MS 0.390 0.171 0.784  PI~MS*ED*LP*LE  0.334 0.334  0.843  PT, FI, FR, PL 
  Total 0.785 0.715  Total  0.625 
 
 0.878   
 “~”  indicates the absence of a condition; multiplication “*” refers to conjunction of conditions; LC: Large Personnel Contributions; MC: 
Military Capabilities; MS: Military Stretch; PI: Prior Peacekeeping Involvement; GP: High Geographic Proximity; LE: Left Executive; LP: Left 
Parliament; ED: Large Electoral Distance; PV: Parliamentary Veto. 
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 for explaining contributions to UNIFIL II.1 This explains the necessity of “left 
executive”, since right-leaning leaders are only expected to support UNPOs if these 
are deployed in conflicts that pose a threat to their national interests.  
Step Two Sufficiency: Domestic Level Conditions  
In the second step of the analysis, the two outcome-enabling contexts are 
linked to specific domestic conditions. Since the goal is to identify sufficient 
combinations, the consistency cut-off point is fixed at 0.75. This corresponds to the 
minimal advisable threshold (Ragin 2009; Schneider & Wagemann 2012, 279). 
However, the truth table rows above this value only contain cases that are good 
instances of the outcome. This indicates that these rows do not cover true logical 
contradictory cases and, hereby, provides further support for the sufficiency of the 
corresponding combinations (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 185).2  
The truth table of the analysis with the context “military stretch absent - 
military capabilities present” is presented in Table 7, the resulting intermediate 
solution is in the second column of Table 6.3 It reveals that, in the presence of this 
context, the combination of large electoral distance, left executive and either 
parliamentary veto absent or left parliament is sufficient for the outcome. The truth 
table that results from the analysis with the context “military stretch absent – prior 
peacekeeping involvement present” is presented in Table 8. The intermediate 
solution corresponds to one sufficient path which combines the presence of the 
context with large electoral distance, left executive and left parliament. 
                                                          
1 To test the robustness of this finding, I changed qualitative breakpoints that were used to 
calibrate high geographic proximity and conducted a new analysis (cf. Skaaning, 2011). The 
result of this robustness check, presented in the appendix, strongly disconfirm that states that 
were situated closer to Lebanon were more inclined to participate in UNIFIL II. 
2 To illustrate that the rows with a consistency value above 0.75 do not contain true logical 
contradictory cases, I plotted the membership scores in these rows against the membership 
scores in the outcome. The resulting XY-plots are presented in the appendix. Because none of 
the outcome-enabling contexts includes geographic proximity, the presence of left executive 
and parliament was expected to contribute to the production of the outcome, as were the 
presence of large electoral distance and the absence of parliamentary veto power.  
3 Since none of the remainders that correspond to theoretical expectations lead to a less 
complex solution if included in the minimization process, the intermediate solution of the 
analysis of the proximate conditions equals the conservative solution. 
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Table 7. Truth table domestic conditions - ~MS*MC 
  Conditions  Consis
-tency 
 Outcome   
row  ~MS*MC LE LP PV ED   LC  Cases 
1  1 1 1 1 1  0.92  1  ES 
2  1 1 1 0 1  0.86  1  BE, FR, GR, PL, PT 
3  1 1 0 0 1  0.75  1  IT 
4  0 1 1 0 1  0.62  0  SI 
5  1 0 0 1 1  0.54  0  DE 
6  0 1 1 1 1  0.53  0  FI, IE, LU, SK 
7  0 1 0 1 1  0.47  0  CZ 
8  0 1 0 0 1  0.47  0  GB 
9  0 0 1 1 1  0.4  0  HU 
10  0 0 0 1 1  0.32  0  EE, LT 
11  0 1 1 1 0  0.28  0  AT, SE 
12  0 0 1 1 0  0.24  0  LV 
13  1 0 0 1 0  0.17  0  NL 
MS: Military Stretch; MC: Military Capabilities; LE: Left Executive; LP: Left Parliament; PV: 
Parliamentary Veto; ED: Large Electoral Distance; LC: Large Personnel Contributions. 
 
The results confirm the theoretical model. First of all, only states governed by 
left-leaning governments made a large contribution to the operation. Since high 
geographic proximity was not a relevant condition, this is in line with theoretical 
expectations on the impact of party politics on participation in UNPOs. Second, the 
results indicate that left-leaning governments were only able to contribute if the 
combination of a rightist parliament and parliamentary veto power did not 
constitute a veto point against personnel contributions. Lastly, large electoral 
distance is included in every solution term, which suggests that states only 
participate in UNPOs if elections are still far away.  
Analysis Absence Outcome 
Standards of good practice dictate that the outcome and its absence should be 
dealt with in separate analyses (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 279). The analysis of 
necessity, presented in Table 9, shows that the consistency values of the conditions 
do not exceed the 0.9 threshold, indicating that none of them is necessary for the 
outcome’s absence. 
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Table 8. Truth table domestic conditions - ~MS*PI 
  Conditions  Consis
-tency 
 Outcome   
row  ~MS*PI LE LP PV ED   LC  Cases 
1  1 1 1 0 1  0.9  1  FR, PL, PT 
2  1 1 1 1 1  0.76  1  FI 
3  0 1 1 0 1  0.67  0  BE, GR, SI 
4  0 1 0 0 1  0.55  0  GB, IT 
5  1 1 0 1 1  0.54  0  CZ 
6  0 1 1 1 1  0.53  0  ES, IE, LU, SK 
7  0 0 1 1 1  0.41  0  HU 
8  0 0 0 1 1  0.29  0  DE, EE, LT 
9  0 0 1 1 0  0.24  0  LV 
10  0 1 1 1 0  0.23  0  AT, SE 
11  0 0 0 1 0  0.16  0  NL 
MS: Military Stretch; MC: Military Capabilities; LE: Left Executive; LP: Left Parliament; PV: 
Parliamentary Veto; ED: Large Electoral Distance; LC: Large Personnel Contributions. 
 
The sufficiency of the international and domestic level conditions was 
assessed separately, since both the absence of the outcome-enabling international 
conditions, as the absence of the proximate domestic conditions are expected to be 
sufficient for the outcome’s absence. Table 10 represents the truth table of the 
international level conditions. In line with the analysis of the outcome’s presence, 
the consistency cut-off point is fixed at the 0.75 threshold. 
The intermediate solution is presented on the left-hand side of Table 11.1 The 
results show that three combinations of international-level conditions are sufficient 
for the outcome’s absence. In line with theoretical expectations, the presence of 
military stretch, and the absence of prior peacekeeping involvement, military 
capabilities and high geographic proximity are associated with the absence of large 
contributions. In contrast to the results of the presence of the outcome, the results 
thus suggest that geographic proximity matters for contributions to UNIFIL II.  
 
                                                          
1 The following assumptions were made for the production of the intermediate solution: the 
presence of military stretch and the absence of military capabilities, prior peacekeeping 
involvement and geographic proximity were assumed to contribute to the outcome. 
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Table 9. Results necessity ~LC 
 Consistency Coverage 
MC 0.294824 0.444068 
~MC 0.797449 0.808365 
MS 0.574644 0.872437 
~MS 0.504126 0.508321 
PI 0.430608 0.611289 
~PI 0.631658 0.667724 
GP 0.212303 0.581109 
~GP 0.838710 0.652656 
LE 0.602401 0.525868 
~LE 0.461365 0.913819 
LP 0.621155 0.585573 
~LP 0.463616 0.786260 
ED 0.335334 0.507955 
~ED 0.764441 0.771970 
PV 0.339085 0.547879 
~PV 0.762941 0.739636 
“~”  indicates the absence of a condition; LC: Large Personnel 
Contributions; MC: Military Capabilities; MS: Military Stretch; 
PI: Prior Peacekeeping Involvement; GP: High Geographic 
Proximity; LE: Left Executive; LP: Left Parliament; ED: Large 
Electoral Distance; PV: Parliamentary Veto. 
 
However, this might be an artefact of the theoretical assumptions made for the 
production of the intermediate solution, as it is not included in the parsimonious 
solution (presented in the appendix).  
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Table 10. Truth table international conditions ~LC 
  Conditions    Outcome   
row  MC GP PI MS  Consistency  ~LC  Cases 
1  0 0 0 1  0.99  1  EE 
2  1 0 0 1  0.99  1  GB 
3  0 1 1 1  0.92  1  HU, SK 
4  0 0 0 0  0.88  1  LT, LU, LV, SI 
5  0 0 1 1  0.78  1  AT, IE, SE 
6  0 0 1 0  0.64  0  CZ, FI 
7  1 0 0 0  0.65  0  BE, DE, ES, NL 
8  1 1 1 0  0.53  0  PL 
9  1 0 1 0  0.51  0  FR, PT 
10  1 1 0 0  0.34  0  GR, IT 
“~”  indicates the absence of the outcome; MC: Military Capabilities; GP: High Geographic 
Proximity; PI: Prior Peacekeeping Involvement; MS: Military Stretch; LC: Large Personnel 
Contributions. 
 
Table 12 represents the truth table of the international level conditions. The 
consistency cut-off point is fixed at the 0.75 threshold. The intermediate solution is 
presented on the right-hand side of Table 11.1 The results show that two 
combinations of domestic-level conditions are sufficient for the outcome’s absence. 
In line with theoretical expectations, the presence of parliamentary veto, the absence 
of left executive and the absence of distant elections are associated with the absence 
of large contributions. 
 
 
                                                          
1 The absence of left executive and parliament was expected to contribute to the production 
of the outcome, as were the absence of large electoral distance and the presence of 
parliamentary veto power. 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 11. Intermediate solution ~LC 
International Conditions 
 
Domestic Conditions 
 Coverage Consis-
tency Cases 
 Coverage Consis-
tency Cases  Raw Unique  Raw Unique 
MS*~MC 0.524 0.299 0.876 
EE, IE, SK, 
HU, AT, SE 
PV*~LE 0.407 0.242 0.973 
LT, DE, HU, 
NL, EE, LV 
~GP*MS 0.475 0.065 0.862 
IE, EE, SE, 
AT, GB 
~GP*~PI*~MC 0.410 0.185 0.908 
LU, LV, EE, 
LT, SI 
PV*~ED 0.310 0.145 0.939 
AT, LV, NL, 
SE 
Total 0.760 0.870  Total 0.551 0.946  
“~”  indicates the absence of a condition; LC: Large Personnel Contributions; MC: Military Capabilities; MS: Military Stretch; PI: Prior 
Peacekeeping Involvement; GP: High Geographic Proximity; LE: Left Executive; LP: Left Parliament; ED: Large Electoral Distance; PV: 
Parliamentary Veto. 
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Table 12. Intermediate solution ~LC 
  Conditions  Consis-
tency 
 Outcome   
row  LE LP PV ED   ~LC  Cases 
1  0 0 1 0  1  1  NL 
2  0 1 1 0  1  1  LV 
3  0 0 1 1  0.96  1  DE, EE, LT 
4  0 1 1 1  0.95  1  HU 
5  1 1 1 0  0.92  1  AT, SE 
6  1 0 1 1  0.72  0  CZ 
7  1 0 0 1  0.67  0  GB, IT 
8  1 1 1 1  0.63  0  FI, ES, IE, LU, SK 
9  1 1 0 1  0.48  0  FR, PL, PT, BE, GR, SI 
“~”  indicates the absence of the outcome; LE: Left Executive; LP: Left Parliament; PV: 
Parliamentary Veto; ED: Large Electoral Distance; LC: Large Personnel Contributions. 
 
Conclusion 
What explains democratic participation in United Nations peacekeeping 
operations? Although the division of the burdens of UN peacekeeping has attracted a 
considerable amount of academic attention, neither the impact of domestic 
conditions, nor whether specific conjunctions between domestic and international 
conditions explain contribution decisions had been systematically analysed. This 
study set out to fill this gap in academic research. Insights from studies on 
peacekeeping burden sharing, democratic peace theory and integrated decision 
models were combined in a multi-causal framework, which was tested on the 2006 
enhancement of the UNIFIL operation.  
The results revealed that a complex interplay between domestic and 
international conditions accounts for different levels of engagement in UNIFIL II. 
Two combinations of international level conditions allowed for large personnel 
contributions: in the absence of military stretch, states with sizeable military 
capabilities or a high level of prior involvement in UNPOs had an incentive to 
contribute. Actual contributions, however, only materialized if a state was governed 
by a left-leaning government that was not constrained by either proximate elections 
or a right-leaning legislature with extensive veto powers. Contrary to prior research, 
this study did not suggest that geographic proximity to the target conflict is relevant 
for explaining participation in peacekeeping operations. 
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More generally, this study confirms that domestic conditions must be taken 
into account to fully understand the circumstances under which democracies 
contribute to UNPOs. Furthermore, its results show that the impact of executive 
ideology depends on the type of military operation. While prior research suggests 
that right-leaning governments are more likely to support military engagement, this 
study shows that leftist executives are actually more inclined to participate in 
peacekeeping operations. These conclusions can however not easily be generalized, 
since this study examines only one operation. Future analysis should therefore assess 
the impact of domestic conditions on contributions to a larger population of 
peacekeeping operations. Prospective studies could specifically focus on states that 
have narrow interests at stake in the target conflict of a UNPO, in order to assess 
whether this affects the propensity of right-leaning leaders to support the operation. 
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Appendices: Democratic Contributions to UN 
Peacekeeping Operations - A Two-Step Fuzzy Set 
QCA of UNIFIL II 
Appendix 1 Parliamentary Veto Power 
This appendix provides a description of the parliamentary involvement on 
decisions on contributions to UN peacekeeping operations. It reflects the situation 
on July 25th  2006, the date of the first informal meeting of prospective troop 
contributors (Mattelaer, 2011: 101). 
In Austria, the deployment of troops required the prior approval of the main 
committee of the parliament (Born, Fuior & Lazzarini, 2008). This was composed of 
32 of the 183 members of the parliament, reflecting the composition of the entire 
parliament (Kammel, 2013). Therefore, Austria was considered a country with legal 
ex ante parliamentary veto power. Since it was governed by a minority government, 
it was assigned a score of 1.1 
Belgium was a country with weak parliamentary war powers  (Dieterich, 
Hummel & Marschall, 2010: 53). The decision to send armed forces abroad was 
exclusively in the hands of the executive (Wagner, Peters & Glahn, 2010: 34). The 
government only had to inform parliament, but not seek its prior or ex post approval 
(Biscop, 2013: 36). In line with the coding scheme, Belgium was assigned a score of 
0.2. 
In the Czech Republic, troop deployment required ex ante parliamentary 
approval. However, if the deployment was part of a peace operation following a 
decision of an international organization of which the Czech republic was a member, 
the government could decide on the troop deployments for up to 60 days (Dieterich, 
Hummel & Marschall, 2010: 50; Jires, 2013: 76). Asking prior parliamentary 
approval was however an unwritten norm in the Czech Republic (Jires, 2013: 76). 
Since it was governed by a minority government, the Czech Republic was assigned a 
score of 0.8. 
In Estonia, parliamentary approval was required before troop deployment, 
without any exception (Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2010: 17; Salu & Männik, 
                                                          
1 Based on Döring and Manow (2012), reflects situation on 25 July 2006. 
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2013: 107). Since it was not governed by a minority government, it was assigned a 
score of 0.8. 
In Finland, the government had to consult prior to each decision to deploy 
military forces abroad with the parliament’s foreign affairs committee, which had to 
approve or reject this decision (Seppo & Forsberg, 2013). According to Dieterich, 
Hummel and Marschall (2010: 20), this corresponds to a legal ante veto power. Since 
it was not governed by a minority government, Finland was assigned a score of 0.8. 
In France, there was no need for securing parliamentary approval, nor for 
informing the parliament when it decided to contribute to UNIFIL (Dieterich, 
Hummel & Marschall, 2010: 65; Irondelle & Schmitt, 2013: 129).  In consequence, it 
was assigned a score of 0. 
In Germany, prior parliamentary approval was required for all deployments 
of the armed forces (Dieterich, Hummel & Marcshall, 2010: 22; Wagner, Peters & 
Glahn, 2010: 55). The German parliament had “far-reaching rights in mandating, 
mandate renewals, and the withdrawal of German troops participating in 
international missions abroad” (Junk & Daase, 2013: 142-143). It was not governed 
by a minority government. In line with the coding scheme, Germany was therefore 
assigned a score of 0.8. 
In Greece, the government had almost total control over the deployment of 
armed forces (Economides, 2013: 157). Parliamentary approval was not required, the 
government was not even obliged to inform parliament (Dieterich, Hummel & 
Marschall, 2010: 66; Wagner, Peters & Glahn, 2010: 57). In consequence, it was 
assigned a score of 0. 
In Hungary, participation in UN peacekeeping operations required prior 
parliamentary approval (Born, Fuior & Lazzarini, 2008: 18; Tálas & Csiki, 2013: 174; 
Wagner, Peters & Glahn, 2010: 58-59). Since it was not governed by a minority 
government, Hungary was assigned a score of 0.8. 
In Ireland, parliament had an ex ante veto on participation in military 
operations abroad, without exceptions (Keohane, 2013; Wagner, Peters & Glahn, 
2010: 61). Since it was not governed by a minority government, it was assigned a 
score of 0.8. 
In Italy, parliamentary competences for troop deployments were not clearly 
defined, resulting in competing views of the legal procedures for participation in 
military operations (Wagner, Peters & Glahn, 2010: 63).The Italian government had 
many ways to deploy troops, some of which exclude parliamentary involvement. 
Consequently, there exists disagreement on parliamentary involvement on decisions 
on the use of force, with assessments ranging from very strong over medium to 
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inconclusive (Born, Fuior & Lazzarini, 2008: 19; Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 
2010: 26; Wagner, Peters & Glahn, 2010: 64). According to Marrone and Di Camillo 
(2013: 197), “international  deployment authorisation is usually based on a decree 
law issued by the government and adopted as law by parliament within the 60-day 
period foreseen in the legislation”. The use of such degree laws limited the 
parliament’s role, which gives ex post endorsement by approving these laws. 
Furthermore, according to Born, Fuior and Lazzarini (2008: 19), parliamentary 
debates usually took place after troops are deployed. Italy was therefore considered a 
state with an ex post parliamentary veto; and assigned a score of 0.4. 
In Latvia, the decision to participate in military operations had to be taken by 
the parliament, which thus had a strong ex ante veto (Dieterich, Hummel & 
Marschall, 2010: 29; Rikveilis, 2013: 210-211). Since it was governed by a minority 
government, it was assigned a score of 1. 
Lithuania’s parliament had an ex ante veto on the use of the armed forces 
beyond Lithuanian borders (Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2010: 30; Šešelgytơ, 
2013: 224). Since Lithuania was governed by a minority government, it was assigned 
a score of 1. 
In Luxembourg, prior parliamentary approval was required for participation 
in all operations (Born, Fuior & Lazzarini, 2008: 5; Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 
2010: 33; Lorenz, 2013: 233-235). Since it was not governed by a minority 
government, it was assigned a score of 0.8. 
In the Netherlands, the parliament did not have a veto on military 
deployments, but the government was obliged to inform the legislature before any 
military operation abroad (Noll & Moelke, 2013: 260; Wagner, Peters & Glahn, 2010: 
74-75). In spite of the absence of a formal veto, “political reality, however, requires 
government to obtain a majority to support its plans” (Noll & Moelke, 2013: 260). 
The Netherlands was therefore considered a country with an informal ex ante veto. 
Since it was governed by a minority government, it was assigned a score of 0.8. 
Poland’s parliament did not have a veto to block its governments decisions on 
the deployment of armed forces, it only has to be informed once a deployment 
decision has been made (Born, Fuior & Lazzarini, 2008: 18; Terlikowski, 2013: 276-
279; Wagner, Peters & Glahn, 2010: 81). In line with the coding scheme, Poland was 
therefore assigned a score of 0.2. 
Portugal’s parliament did not hold a veto position on external deployment of 
Portuguese forces, but had the right to be informed (Cardoso Reis, 2013: 283; 
Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2010: 60; Wagner, Peters & Glahn, 2010: 83). In 
consequence, Portugal was assigned a score of 0.2. 
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The Slovak Republic’s parliament had to consent prior to external military 
deployment, except when troops were dispatched for a for a maximum period of 60 
days and the deployment was part of an obligation resulting from international 
treaties on common defence (Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2010: 51). The 
reinforcement of UNIFIL did not correspond to such an exception. Since the Slovak 
Republic was not governed by a minority government, it was assigned a score of 0.8. 
In Slovenia, the parliament only held a veto in cases of “all-out war” (Wagner, 
Peters & Glahn, 2010: 86). Other decisions on the use of force were taken by the 
government, which only has to inform the parliament (Born, Fuior & Lazzarini, 
2008: 18; Malešič, 2013: 323). In line with the coding scheme, Slovenia was therefore 
assigned a score of 0.2. 
In Spain, prior authorization of parliament was mandatory for all operations 
not linked to the defence of Spain or its vital interests (Arteaga, 2013: 336; Born, 
Fuior & Lazzarini, 2008: 19). Since it was governed by a minority government, it was 
assigned a score of 1. 
In Sweden, prior parliamentary approval was required for the use of military 
force in missions abroad, but deployments of less than 3000 soldiers to peacekeeping 
operations mandated by the UN were exempt from this obligation (Dieterich, 
Hummel & Marschall, 2010: 47). However, government had a tradition of consulting 
with the parliamentary committee on foreign affairs in these cases and since 
parliament is in charge of budget control, the latter still has indirect control over 
these operations (Ruffa, 2013: 347). Consequently, Sweden can be considered a 
country with an informal ex ante parliamentary veto on military deployments. Since 
it was governed by a minority government, it was assigned a score of 0.8. 
In the United Kingdom, parliament had no power to participate in decision 
making on the deployments of troops (Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2010: 69).  
In consequence, the UK was assigned a score of 0. 
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Appendix 2. QCA Results 
This appendix presents supplementary material for the QCA presented in the 
main manuscript. The first section presents two robustness checks. The second 
section presents the XY-plots of the truth table rows that were coded 1 in the second 
step of the two-step analysis. The third section presents the conservative and 
parsimonious solutions. 
Robustness Tests 
This section presents the results of two robustness tests, in which the 
calibration of two conditions was changed. 
Robustness Test 1 
In the first test, the threshold for full inclusion in the set “Military 
Capabilities” was changed from 60,000 to 50,000, so that it includes Italy, the fourth 
largest EU member state in terms of military capabilities. Table 1 presents the fuzzy 
membership scores in MC’. The same consistency threshold and directional 
expectations were used as in the original analysis. The truth table and outcome 
enabling combinations of international-level conditions that result from this analysis 
(presented in Table 2 and Table 3 below) are identical to the solutions that resulted 
from the original analysis, although the consistency scores are slightly higher in the 
new analysis. 
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Table 1. Calibration MC’ 
 MC MC’ 
AT 0.05 0.05 
BE 0.51 0.51 
CZ 0.22 0.22 
DE 0.96 0.98 
EE 0.02 0.02 
ES 0.86 0.91 
FI 0.42 0.42 
FR 0.99 1 
GB 0.98 0.99 
GR 0.71 0.75 
HU 0.05 0.05 
IE 0.02 0.02 
IT 0.94 0.97 
LT 0.03 0.03 
LU 0.02 0.02 
LV 0.02 0.02 
NL 0.65 0.68 
PL 0.73 0.77 
PT 0.51 0.51 
SE 0.1 0.1 
SI 0.04 0.04 
SK 0.02 0.02 
MC: Fuzzy Membership scores in original analysis; MC’: Fuzzy 
membership scores in robustness check 
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Table 2. Truth table MC’ 
  Conditions    Outcome   
Row  MC’ GP PI MS  Consistency  LC  Cases 
1  1 1 0 0  0.92  1  GR, IT 
2  1 0 1 0  0.91  1  FR, PT 
3  1 1 1 0  0.83  1  PL 
4  0 0 1 0  0.67  1  CZ, FI 
5  1 0 0 0  0.61  1  BE, DE, ES, NL 
6  1 0 0 1  0.49  0  GB 
7  0 0 1 1  0.38  0  AT, IE, SE 
8  0 0 0 0  0.30  0  LT, LU, LV, SI 
9  0 1 1 1  0.25  0  HU, SK 
10  0 0 0 1  0.22  0  EE 
MC’: Military Capabilities; GP: High Geographic Proximity; PI: Prior Peacekeeping 
Involvement; MS: Military Stretch; LC: Large Personnel Contributions. 
 
 
Table 3. Intermediate solution robustness test 1 
  Coverage Consis-
tency 
  
  Raw Unique  Cases 
MC’*~MS 
 
0.71 0.41 0.75  
FR, IT, DE, ES, NL, GR, BE, PL, PT 
PI*~MS 
 
0.39 0.17 0.74  
FI, PT, PL, FR, CZ  
Total  0.80 0.72   
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Robustness Test 2 
The goal of the second robustness test is to assess the robustness of the finding 
that geographic proximity is not relevant for explaining contributions to UNIFIL II. 
A possible reason for this finding is that membership scores in high geographic 
proximity are generally rather low. Therefore, the threshold for full inclusion the set 
geographic proximity is changed from 1,000km to 2,000km, the crossover threshold 
from 2,000km to 2,500km and the threshold for full exclusion from 2,500km to 
3,000km. This results in a significant rise in the membership scores in this condition. 
 
Table 4. Calibration GP’ 
 GP GP’ 
AT 0.90 0,90 
BE 0.06 0,06 
CZ 0.88 0,88 
DE 0.67 0,67 
EE 0.11 0,11 
ES 0.32 0,32 
FI 0.07 0,07 
FR 0.60 0,60 
GB 0.01 0,01 
GR 1 1 
HU 0.99 0,99 
IE 0 0 
IT 0.99 0,99 
LT 0.76 0,76 
LU 0.07 0,07 
LV 0.60 0,60 
NL 0.05 0,05 
PL 0.97 0,97 
PT 0 0 
SE 0.13 0,13 
SI 0.92 0,92 
SK 0.97 0,97 
GP: Fuzzy Membership scores in original analysis; GP’: Fuzzy 
membership scores in robustness check 
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The same consistency threshold and directional expectations were used as in 
the original analysis. The truth table and outcome enabling combinations of 
international-level conditions that result from this analysis are presented in Table 5 
and Table 6. The inclusion of the absence of GP in the intermediate solution strongly 
disconfirms that states that were situated closer to Lebanon were more inclined to 
participate in UNIFIL II. This further strengthens the assertion that geographic 
proximity did not spur contributions to UNIFIL’s enhancement. 
 
Table 5. Truth table  GP’ 
  Conditions    Outcome   
row  MC MS PI GP'  Consistency  LC  Cases 
1  1 0 1 0  0.93  1  PT 
2  1 0 1 1  0.90  1  FR, PL 
3  1 0 0 1  0.83  1  DE, GR, IT 
4  0 0 1 0  0.81  1  FI 
5  1 0 0 0  0.67  1  BE, ES, NL 
6  0 1 1 0  0.58  0  IE, SE 
7  0 0 1 1  0.54  0  CZ 
8  1 1 0 0  0.51  0  GB 
9  0 0 0 0  0.42  0  LU 
10  0 0 0 1  0.37  0  LT, LV, SI 
11  0 1 0 0  0.31  0  EE 
12  0 1 1 1  0.21  0  AT, HU, SK 
MC: Military Capabilities; GP’: High Geographic Proximity; PI: Prior Peacekeeping 
Involvement; MS: Military Stretch; LC: Large Personnel Contributions. 
 
 
Table 6. Intermediate solution robustness test 2 
  Coverage 
Consistency 
  
  Raw Unique  cases 
~MS*MC  0.69 0.40 0.75  FR, IT, DE, ES, NL, GR, BE, PL, PT 
~MS*PI*~GP’  0.29 0.09 0.85  FI, PT 
solution  0.79 0.74   
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XY-Plots Analysis Sufficiency 
This section presents the XY-plots of the truth table rows that were coded as 
sufficient conditions in the second step of the two-step analysis. These XY-plots 
demonstrates that none of the rows cover true logically contradictory cases. There 
are no cases in the lower right quadrant of the XY-plots, which indicates that none of 
the cases with a membership above 0.5 in the rows has a membership lower than 0.5 
in the outcome. 
 
Figure 1. XY-plot Row 1 Truth Table Domestic Conditions - ~MS*MC  
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Figure 2. Row 2 Truth Table Domestic Conditions - ~MS*MC 
 
Figure 3. Row 3 Truth Table Domestic Conditions - ~MS*MC 
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Figure 4. Row 1 Truth Table Domestic Conditions - ~MS*PI 
 
Figure 5. Row 2 Truth Table Domestic Conditions - ~MS*PI 
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Conservative and Parsimonious Solutions 
Table 7. Conservative solution international conditions 
  Coverage Consist
ency 
  
  Raw Unique  cases 
~MS*MC  0.69 0.40 0.75  FR, IT, DE, ES, NL, GR, BE, PL, PT 
~MS*PI*~GP’  0.29 0.09 0.85  FI,  PT, FR, CZ 
solution  0.79 0.74   
 
Table 8. Parsimonious solution international conditions 
  Coverage Consist
ency 
  
  Raw Unique  cases 
~MS*MC  0.69 0.40 0.75  FR, IT, DE, ES, NL, GR, BE, PL, PT 
~MS*PI  0.39 0.17 0.78  FI, PT, PL, FR, CZ  
solution  0.79 0.71   
 
Table 9.  Conservative solution domestic conditions - ~MS*MC 
  Coverage Consis-
tency 
  
  Raw Unique  cases 
~MS*MC*LE*~PV*ED  0.52 0.11 0.88 FR, ES, GR, BE, PL, PT 
~MS*MC*LE*LP*ED  0.48 0.07 0.86 FR, IT, GR, BE, PL, PT 
solution  0.59 0.87  
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Table 10.  Parsimonious solution domestic conditions - ~MS*MC 
  Coverage Consis-
tency 
  
  Raw Unique  cases 
~MS*MC*LE  0.65 0.65 0.89 IT, FR, ES, GR, BE, PL, PT 
Solution 0.65 0.89  
 
Table 11.  Conservative solution domestic conditions - ~MS*PI 
  Coverage Consis-
tency 
  
  Raw Unique  cases 
~MS*PI*LE*LP*ED 0.33 0.33 0.84 PT, FI, FR, PL 
Solution 0.33 0.84  
 
Table 12.  Parsimonious solution domestic conditions - ~MS*PI 
  Coverage Consis-
tency 
  
  Raw Unique  cases 
~MS*PI*LP 0.37 0.37 0.79 FI, PT, FR, PL 
Solution 0.37 0.79 
 
 
Table 13.  Conservative Solution International Conditions ~LC 
  Coverage Consis-
tency 
  
  Raw Unique  cases 
MS*~GP 0.47 0.06 0.86 IE, EE, SE, AT, GB 
~MC*~PI*~GP 0.41 0.18 0.91 LU, LV, EE, LT, SI 
~MC*MS*PI 0.36 0.30 0.83 IE, SK, HU, AT, SE 
Solution 0.76 0.87 
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Table 14. Parsimonious solution international conditions ~LC 
  Coverage Consis-
tency 
  
  Raw Unique  cases 
MS 0.57 0.35 0.87 AT, IE, SK, EE, HU, SE, GB 
~MC*~PI 0.45 0.22 0.89 LT, LU, LV, EE, SI 
Solution 0.80 0.85  
 
Table 15. Conservative solution domestic conditions ~LC 
  Coverage Consis-
tency 
  
  Raw Unique  cases 
~LE*PV 0.41 0.30 0.97 NL, DE, HU, LT, EE, LV 
~ED*LP*PV 0.23 0.12 0.93 SE, AT, LV 
Solution 0.52 0.95 
 
 
Table 16. Parsimonious solution domestic conditions ~LC 
  Coverage Consis-
tency 
  
  Raw Unique  cases 
~LE 0.46 0.28 0.91 NL, DE, HU, LT, EE, LV 
~ED 0.33 0.15 0.93 SE, AT, LV, NL 
Solution 0.62 0.90 
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Abstract 
This study aims to explain the pattern of contributions to NATO’s military 
campaign in Libya. It combines collective action theory with hypotheses on balance 
of threat, alliance politics, and domestic constraints in a multicausal framework, 
which is tested with Qualitative Comparative Analysis. The results suggest novel 
inferences on the interactions between partisan politics, and the benefits states wish 
to secure by contributing to a multilateral operation. Contrary to conventional 
wisdom, parties situated at the left of the ideological spectrum were more inclined to 
support Operation Unified Protector than parties situated at the right. Whereas left-
wing governments participated if they had the resources to contribute significantly 
to the fulfillment of the protection mandate and either highly valued their alliance 
with the United States or were not facing imminent elections, right-wing 
governments only contributed if their countries’ interests were threatened by the 
crisis in Libya or their participation was critical for the operation’s success. 
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Introduction 
“While every alliance member voted for the Libya mission, less than half have 
participated at all, and fewer than a third have been willing to participate in the 
strike mission” Robert Gates (2011) 
 
As illustrated by this quote from Robert Gates’ farewell address as the US 
Secretary of Defense, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s operation in 
Libya revealed major differences between the member states’ willingness and ability 
to deploy military force. Unsurprisingly, the diverging levels of support to Operation 
Unified Protector revamped debates on NATO burden sharing. Over the years, the 
division of the burden of NATO’s collective defense efforts incited an extensive body 
of academic literature.1 While this research almost exclusively focused on defense 
budgets during the Cold War period, the division of the burden of out-of-area 
operations has come under an increasing level of academic scrutiny since the 1990s. 
However, despite Unified Protector’s considerable political ramifications and 
assertions that it reflected a whole “new transatlantic burden sharing model” 
(Chivviss, 2014: 4-5; Hallams & Schreer, 2012: 88), the pattern of contributions to 
the operation has not yet been systematically analyzed. 
This study provides a comprehensive analysis of the distribution of the burden 
of Operation Unified Protector. This is accomplished by combining collective action 
theory with hypotheses on balance of threats, alliance politics, and domestic 
constraints in a multicausal framework, which is tested with fuzzy set qualitative 
comparative analysis (fsQCA) (for a similar research design, see Haesebrouck, 
2015b; Thiem & Haesebrouck, 2015). The results of the analysis suggest novel 
inferences on the specific interactions between partisan politics and the benefits 
states wish to secure by contributing to a multilateral operation. Contrary to 
conventional wisdom, parties situated at the left of the ideological spectrum were 
more inclined to support Unified Protector than parties situated at the right. 
Whereas left-wing governments participated if they had the resources to contribute 
significantly to the fulfillment of the protection mandate and either highly valued 
their alliance with the United States or were not facing imminent elections, right-
                                                          
1 For a comprehensive review of this literature, see, for example, Sandler (1993), Oma (2012) 
and Sandler and Shimizu (2014) and Haesebrouck (forthcoming-a). 
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wing governments only contributed if their countries’ interests were threatened by 
the crisis in Libya or their participation was critical for the operation’s success. 
The structure of this article is as follows. The first section describes how the 
division of the burden of the Libya campaign deviates from NATO’s previous out-
of-area missions. The second section builds on the comprehensive body of literature 
on military burden sharing to develop an integrated model for explaining the 
diverging levels of support to the operation. The third section introduces QCA as an 
appropriate method to test this model and discusses the measurement of the 
variables. The fourth section presents the results of the analysis, which are 
interpreted against the backdrop of the theoretical model in the fourth section. 
NATO Burden Sharing and Operation Unified Protector 
In many respects, the Libya campaign deviates from NATO’s previous out-of-
area operations. Up till Unified Protector, the United States had taken the lead and 
carried the brunt of the burden of all the alliance’s major combat operations 
(Michaels, 2011: 57). It contributed the bulk of the necessary capabilities and flew 
over 65 percent of the strike operations during NATO’s first major combat 
operations: Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia and Operation Allied Force in 
Kosovo (Forster & Cimbala, 2005: 135). The operation in Afghanistan did not 
suggest a more equitable burden sharing relationship. Not only did the United States 
contribute 60 percent of the deployed units, many of the allies placed significant 
caveats on the use of their armed forces (Saideman & Auerswald, 2012). The United 
States carried an even larger share of the burden when it took the lead of a coalition 
of the willing. For example, it contributed around 70 percent of the military 
resources of the 1991 Desert Storm coalition and conducted 90 percent of air strikes 
during the first three months of the 2014 operation against Islamic state (Cohen & 
Scheinmann, 2014).1 
The disproportionately large contributions of the United States to NATO’s 
out-of-area operations is in line with collective action theory, which has been 
dominating research on military burden sharing ever since the seminal article of 
Olson and Zeckhauser (1966). The latter introduced the “exploitation hypothesis”, 
which expects “the ‘larger’ members [...] to bear a disproportionate share of the 
burden” (Olson & Zeckhauser, 1966: 268). The underlying assumption is that 
                                                          
1 The European allies did provide the brunt of the postconflict peacekeeping forces in Kosovo 
and Bosnia (Forster & Cimbala, 2005: 130). 
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military operations produce public benefits from which non-contributors cannot be 
excluded. Given the United States’ overwhelming military power, it is generally 
capable of achieving the goals of an operation without the help of the other allies 
(Bennett, Lepgold & Unger, 1994: 72). Since the latter cannot be denied the benefits 
of a successful operation, they have an opportunity to ride free on the United States’ 
efforts. While the exploitation hypothesis accounts for the disproportionally large 
contributions of the United States, previous studies concluded that it cannot explain 
why “America’s allies make rather costly contributions when they could have taken a 
free ride off American military might” (Bennett, Lepgold & Unger, 1994: 72; 
Davidson, 2011: 5). Such anomalous lack of free riding is generally explained by the 
alliance-dependence hypothesis, which contends that states contribute to US-led 
operations because they are dependent on the United States’ security guarantee and 
fear abandonment from Washington if they do not contribute. 
The burden sharing dynamics of the Libya operation can be expected to 
deviate from this general pattern. Although the United States dominated the first ten 
days of the operation, it withdrew its fighter aircraft after barely two weeks (Chivviss, 
2014: 65). The United States kept providing critical military capabilities to the 
operation, but the other allies had to shoulder a far larger share of its burden 
compared to previous NATO operations (Chivviss, 2014: 89, 190-191; Hallams & 
Schreer, 2012: 321). Furthermore, Washington did not take the lead of the operation. 
In consequence, the other NATO allies were less likely to assume that the United 
States’ security guarantee depended on participation in the operation. Moreover, the 
Libya operation ran parallel with NATO’s International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) operation in Afghanistan. Therefore, the allies that are most dependent on 
the United States’ security guarantee had already fulfilled their alliance obligations as 
well as stretched their military resources. In consequence, the Libya operation 
constitutes a least-likely case for the alliance-dependence hypothesis. 
While deviating from previous cases of NATO burden sharing, the Libya 
campaign might constitute a more representative case of future operations. Given 
the United States’ intention to “rebalance” Asia, it will be increasingly reluctant to 
assume a leading role in operations in and around Europe(Biscop, 2015: 170).1 In 
                                                          
1 While the United States’ reaction to Russia’s interventions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine 
in the first half of 2014 shows that Washington “remains committed to collective defence 
under NATO’s Article 5” (Biscop, 2015: 150), it can no longer be expected to “automatically 
take the lead in addressing non-Article 5 security issues around Europe”. 
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consequence, the operation constitutes a valuable case for arriving at a more 
comprehensive understanding of alliance burden sharing. Unfortunately, previous 
research on the Libya campaign has mostly been limited to atheoretical case studies 
of a small number of NATO allies, which do not systematically relate back to the rich 
theoretical literature on military burden sharing. 
Integrated Model NATO Burden Sharing 
This section introduces the study’s theoretical framework, which builds on the 
sizable academic literature on military burden sharing. The latter has been 
dominated by quantitative studies that assess the explanatory value of two 
competing collective action based theories: the pure public goods model and the 
joint product model (e.g. Sandler, 1993; Sandler & Shimizu, 2014). Following the 
research of Bennett, Lepgold and Unger (1994), an increasing number of case-
oriented studies developed integrated decision models to explain contributions to 
specific out-of-area operations (e.g. Auerswald, 2004; Baltrusaitis, 2010; Davidson, 
2011). Although these studies relate back to collective action theory, they 
consistently conclude that contributions result from a complex interplay between 
domestic and international variables. 
Collective Action 
The first theoretical accounts of military burden sharing characterized defense 
as a public good and, therefore, expected “the ‘larger’ members [...] to bear a 
disproportionate share of the burden” of collective defense efforts (cf supra; Olson & 
Zeckhauser, 1966: 268). Public good explanations are expected to be applicable to 
the Libya operation (Sandler & Shimizu, 2014: 48). One of the issues that pushed 
NATO to intervene was Qaddafi’s atrocious repression of the popular uprising 
(Davidson, 2013: 311-312). All countries with an interest in enforcing the 
responsibility to protect (R2P) can be expected to benefit from stopping such mass 
atrocities, regardless of whether they participated in the operation (Shimizu & 
Sandler, 2002: 655). Since the R2P doctrine enjoys widespread support among the 
NATO members, the protection of the Libyan population represents an alliance-
wide public benefit.1 
                                                          
1 The European states belong to the most important supporters of the doctrine (Brockmeier, 
Kurtz & Junk, 2014: 429). The United States, on its part, subscribes to the main principles of 
responsibility to protect (R2P) and has “supported it [...] during the critical junctures of the 
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The majority of the studies that focus on specific operations refer back to the 
exploitation hypothesis, although they commonly refer to it as the “collective action 
hypothesis” (Oma, 2012: 563). However, these studies generally conclude that 
collective action theory only explains the disproportionately large contribution of 
the United States (Baltrusaitis, 2010: 21; Davidson, 2011: 2; Bennett, Lepgold & 
Unger, 1997: 349). Since the latter is generally capable of successfully conducting an 
operation by itself, the efforts of the other allies are not expected to produce more 
collective benefits. Hereby, these studies imply a “threshold effect”, which suggests 
that military operations are lumpy goods (Jones & Thompson, 1990: 463). In the 
case of lumpy goods, “a target or threshold (K) must be achieved for any member of 
a group to benefit from a collective effort, beyond that threshold, no member 
benefits from additional effort” (Thompson, 1987: 436). 
Out-of-area operations indeed resemble lumpy goods: states only benefit if 
enough resources are applied to allow an operation to achieve its goals, additional 
contributions will not produce more benefits once the required resources are 
available. An actor is expected to contribute to the production of a lumpy good if the 
aggregation of the contributions of other actors does not make his or her donation 
unnecessary. Once Washington commits to an operation, other states have no 
incentive to contribute to secure public benefits because they can expect the United 
States to be able to achieve the operation’s goals without their help (Bennett, Lepgold 
& Unger, 1994: 72). However, if the United States limits its military role, as it did 
during the Libya operation, the lumpy goods condition predicts that other allies will 
increase their contribution to compensate for this reduction (Thompson, 1987: 442). 
An actor is expected to contribute to the production of a lumpy good if it is capable 
of making a contribution that increases the probability that the good will be 
produced, at a cost that does not exceed the good’s expected benefits (Jones & 
Thompson, 1990: 475; Thompson, 1987: 436). In line with the exploitation 
hypothesis, allies with sufficient resources to contribute significantly to the 
fulfillment of the operation’s mandate can thus be expected to compensate for the 
United States’ reduced commitment by carrying a larger share of its burden. Smaller 
                                                                                                                                                      
first decade of its existence” (Junk, 2014: 536). Canada, in turn, played an important role in 
the development of the principle, but the conservative Harper government has refrained 
from using R2P to justify its foreign policy decisions. However, it did justify the Libyan 
intervention as a reaction against the atrocities committed by the Qaddafi regime and, thus, 
can be assumed to value the public good of stopping these atrocities (Cooper & Momani, 
2014: 178). 
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allies are still expected to take a free ride, since they can only have a modest impact 
on the probability that the operation will be successful. 
Two general approaches have been used to define a country’s ability to 
contribute. The first takes into account the total amount of material resources from 
which a country can potentially draw, generally equated with its economic size or 
gross domestic product (GDP); the second more narrowly focuses on military 
capabilities (Baltrusaitis, 2010; Shimizu & Sandler, 2002: 661). Although both 
measures are interrelated, they have different empirical implications and are 
therefore not fully interchangeable. Evidently, a country’s military resources are a 
priori limited by its material resources. However, military capabilities also depend 
on the share of these resources devoted to defense. Many large NATO allies only 
spend a relatively small portion of their GDP on defense, whereas military 
expenditures amount to a considerable share of the GDP of some smaller member 
states (Sandler & Shimizu, 2014: 50). This study therefore considers economic size 
and military spending to be two distinct conditions, which allow to distinguish 
between their causal effects and determine the actual source of alliance free riding. 
The collective action hypothesis expects countries with a high GDP and 
significant military spending to carry a high share of the burden of the Libya 
operation. 
Balance of Threat 
The “balance of threat hypothesis” offers a second plausible explanation for 
the division of the burden of out-of-area operations. Building on Stephen Walt’s 
(1987) neorealist theory of alliance formation, several studies expect contributions to 
correlate with the extent to which the target of an operation poses a threat to the 
states’ interests (Baltrusaitis, 2010: 18-19; Bennett, Lepgold & Unger, 1994: 42). Walt 
(1987: 21-27) argues that states enter alliances to balance against threat, which is 
determined by a threatening state’s aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive 
power, and aggressive intentions. However, the Qaddafi regime neither had the 
offensive military capabilities, nor had the intention, to directly threaten the NATO 
allies. In consequence, the balance of threat hypothesis, as originally formulated by 
Walt, does not provide a plausible explanation for the division of the burden of the 
Libya operation. 
A more comprehensive definition of “threat” is provided by Davidson (2011: 
16-17) who focuses on threats to “the state’s territorial integrity or its citizens, the 
state’s economy (including significant economic interests abroad), or a natural 
resource of economic or security significance”. In the context of the Libya conflict, 
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Davidson (2013: 312) argues that a state ”considering intervention will perceive 
refugee evasion of its border controls as a threat to its territorial integrity”. The lack 
of interest of the Northern European Union members in formulating a common 
response to the potential refugee crisis indicates that the perception of this threat 
depends on the geographical distance to Libya (Lombardi, 2011: 40). In this 
connection, several studies suggest that the size of benefits received from out-of-area 
operations is related to spatial proximity (Khanna, Sandler & Shimizu, 1998; 
Shimizu & Sandler, 2002).1 
Balancing against threats produces country-specific benefits, which are taken 
into account in an alternative to the pure public goods model: the joint products 
model. This assumes that military operations produce multiple goods, varying from 
purely public to country specific and private benefits. States that were threatened by 
the crisis in Libya had some excludable benefits at stake in the operation. First, they 
had a strong incentive to participate in order to build good relations with the rebel’s 
national committee, in order to protect their interests after the fall of Qaddafi 
(Anrig, 2011: 93; Lombardi, 2011: 36). Furthermore, countries with specific interests 
in the crisis had an incentive to participate to gain some control over the operation, 
in order to ensure it was conducted in line with their interests (Chivviss, 2014: 73-
74). 
The balance of threat hypothesis expects NATO allies that are geographically 
close to Libya to carry a high share of the burden of the operation. 
Alliance Politics 
Theories of alliance politics offer a third explanation for burden sharing 
decisions. Studies building on integrated models generally draw on Glenn Snyder’s 
secondary “Alliance Security Dilemma” (1984: 466-468), and expect states that are 
dependent on a powerful ally to carry a high share of an operation’s burden 
(Baltrusaitis, 2010: 205; Bennett, Lepgold & Unger, 1994: 72). In the case of NATO 
and US-led operations, states are expected to contribute if they are dependent on the 
US’ security guarantee and fear abandonment from Washington. More recently, 
scholars have argued that alliance dependence does not constitute the only reason 
for states to value their relationship with the United States. Davidson (2011: 15), for 
                                                          
1 The theoretical framework does not take into account the potential threats to the allies 
energy supplies. The only NATO ally that is strongly dependent on Libya energy is Italy. 
However, no supply problems were reported inside Italy during the crisis (2011: 4). 
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example, contends that states “may value an ally for myriad reasons and value does 
not necessarily entail dependence”. Therefore, he prefers the term “alliance value” 
over “alliance dependence”. Similarly, Ringsmose (2010: 330-331) demonstrates that 
both allies “whose security comes in the shape of American security garantees” as 
allies that consider their special relationship with Washington “an important key to 
their security and their political clout on the international scene” shouldered a 
disproportionate burden of NATO’s ISAF operation. Alliance value produces 
excludable benefits: allies are expected to contribute to a mission, regardless of the 
direct incentives presented to them, if they believe the benefits produced by NATO 
or their relationship with the United States would otherwise be withheld 
(Ringsmose, 2010). 
The Libya operation constitutes a least-likely case for hypotheses on alliance 
politics (cf. supra). According to Marton and Eichler (2013: 10), the NATO allies did 
not perceive the United States to attach “great importance to significant 
contributions” to the Libya campaign because Washington did not take the lead of 
the operation. However, Jakobsen and Møller (2012: 109, 112) argue that Denmark 
considered the war in Libya as an opportunity to demonstrate its “relevance and 
trustworthiness to its great power allies in NATO, especially the United States”. 
Dicke et al. (2013: 52-53), in turn, found mixed support for the relevance of the 
NATO-allies political culture with regard to NATO, which provided a good 
indicator for the eventual contributions of Spain and Norway but failed to explain 
Poland’s unwillingness to participate. By including a hypothesis on alliance politics, 
the analysis aims to reveal whether and under what conditions alliance value spurred 
contributions to the Libya operation. 
The alliance politics hypothesis expects states that highly value their alliance 
with the United States to carry a high share of the burden of the operation. 
Domestic Constraints 
Studies building on integrated models indicate that external benefits “fare 
pretty well in explaining political leaders’ incentives to contribute” (Oma, 2012: 565). 
However, they argue that domestic constraints need to be incorporated to account 
for a state’s ability to contribute. First, previous research suggests that the ideological 
orientation of the executive affects decisions on the use of force. Building on 
evidence that the electorate of rightist parties is generally more promilitary than the 
electoral platforms of left parties, Palmer, London, and Regan (2004) demonstrate 
that governments of right parties are more likely to resort to military means. 
Likewise, Schuster and Maier (2006) conclude that rightist parties were more 
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inclined to support the 2003 Iraq war. Auerswald and Saideman (2014) draw similar 
conclusions with respect to the contributions to the ISAF operation. Strikingly 
however, their analysis of the Libya intervention did not consistently demonstrate 
that right-leaning parties were more eager to participate. 
A possible explanation for the seeming instability in the effect of partisanship 
is that executives only become responsive to their constituencies toward the end of 
an electoral cycle. Since governing parties might fear suffering at the polls for 
resorting to the use of force, studies building on democratic peace theory expect 
governments to be more constrained in their foreign policy behavior if elections are 
imminent (Gaubatz, 1991; Williams, 2013: 459). In contrast, diversionary theories of 
war expect national leaders to be more likely to resort to the use of force at the end of 
an electoral cycle. The results of Kisangani and Pickering (2007, 290), however, show 
that democratic leaders are less likely to deploy armed force over low-politics issues 
like humanitarian suffering if elections are less than one year in the future. All else 
being equal, political leaders should thus be less likely to carry a high share of the 
burden of the Libya operation at the end of an electoral cycle. However, since the 
electoral platforms of right-leaning parties are more promilitary, the electoral risks 
of going to war are lower for right-wing leaders. 
The domestic constraints hypothesis expects right governments and 
governments that are not facing imminent elections to contribute to the operation. 
Integrated Model for NATO Burden Sharing 
The pattern of contributions to the Libya operation is expected to result from 
a complex interplay between the aforementioned determinants, which is 
summarized in Figure 1. Nations with sizable capabilities, produced by a 
combination of economic size and military spending, are expected to contribute 
because their contribution will strongly affect the probability that the operation 
achieves its goals. Allies that are geographically close to the area of operations or 
highly value their alliance with the United States, in turn, are expected to participate 
to secure excludable benefits. However, only countries governed by right-leaning 
executives or where elections are not imminent are expected to contribute. 
Rather than constituting mutually exclusive explanations, the model thus 
assumes that sizable military capabilities and country-specific benefits, like alliance 
value and threats, are alternative paths to carrying a high burden. This corresponds 
to the conclusions of several studies that test collective-action-based models in the 
context of peacekeeping operations (Khanna, Sandler & Shimizu, 1998: 188; Shimizu
  
Figure 1. Integrated Decision Model 
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& Sandler, 2002: 665). The latter found evidence that supported the exploitation 
hypothesis, which indicates that peacekeeping had a relatively large share of public 
benefits but conclude that nation-specific benefits explain why some smaller states 
did carry a high burden. However, this is only the case if the share of country-
specific benefits is relatively low (Shimizu & Sandler, 2002: 656). By expecting both 
the most capable allies as the allies that experience the highest level of threat to carry 
a high share of the operation’s burden, the model thus assumes that the operation 
produces joint products, but that the ratio of country specific to total benefits is 
relatively low. 
Research Design 
The theoretical framework is tested with fsQCA. QCA is generally used to establish 
set-theoretic connections between one case property, defined as the outcome, and 
other properties, defined as the causal conditions. Such set relations are generally 
interpreted in terms of sufficient and necessary conditions. The latter entail a 
complex conception of causality generally captured under the expression “multiple 
conjunctural causation” (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 77). Conjunctural 
causation implies that phenomena are often produced by a combination of 
conditions, multiple causation that several of such combinations can be sufficient for 
the same outcome. QCA’s ability to capture this complex form of causality in the 
presence of a relatively small number of cases makes it particularly apt for testing the 
model’s ability to explain the diverging contributions to the Libya operation. In line 
with the notion of conjunctural causation, external pressures are only expected to 
spur sizable contributions in combination with the absence of domestic constraints. 
In line with multiple causation, the model implies several pathways toward carrying 
a high share of the operation’s burden. 
This study applies the fuzzy set variant of QCA, which allows to take into 
account the degree to which a variable is present in a case. Membership scores in a 
fuzzy set can vary between full membership (value of 1) and full nonmembership 
(value of 0; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 28). A score of 0.5 indicates the point of 
maximum ambiguity. Defining the location of this 0.5 anchor is crucial, since this 
determines whether a concept is either more present or absent in a given case. The 
assignment of fuzzy membership scores, or calibration, is described in the following 
subsections. Membership scores in the outcome and the condition alliance value are 
based on categorical differences between the cases. The calibration of the other
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conditions builds on the method of transformational assignment which uses a 
continuous function to fit the raw data between three qualitative anchors: 1, 0.5, and 
0 (Thiem & Duşa, 2013: 55).1 The calibration of the variables is described in the 
following subsections. The base variables and fuzzy membership scores are 
presented in Appendix 1. 
High Burden 
Although the debate on NATO burden sharing has been focused on 
expeditionary operations for over two decades, many studies continue to 
operationalize military burdens with indicators from the “outdated Cold War 
environment” (Forster & Cimbala, 2005: 8). In line with the standard burden sharing 
indicator of the Cold War period -percentage of GDP spent on defense- military 
burdens are generally measured by relativizing a country’s share of the deployed 
troops to its GDP (see e.g. Shimizu & Sandler, 2010: 1482).2 However, as NATO 
became involved in out-of-area operations, the risk of military casualties increasingly 
out-staged the relative size of contributions in NATO burden sharing debates 
(Ringsmose, 2010: 328). The potential image costs of causing collateral damage 
constitute another burden of military intervention. The continuous efforts to avoid 
civilian casualties throughout the air campaign demonstrate that contributing states 
were attentive to these costs during Unified Protector (Chivviss, 2014). 
This study develops a coding scheme that emphasizes the division of risks. 
The allies that carried out strike operations are assigned a score above 0.5 in the set 
“High Burden”, since these faced a higher risk of military casualties and the potential 
ramifications of causing civilian casualties. France, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States faced the highest risk at military casualties. They flew the highest 
number of sorties and conducted the first air strikes, when Libya’s air defenses were 
still intact. Moreover, France and the United Kingdom deployed attack helicopters, 
which significantly increased the risk of civilian and military casualties (Anrig, 2011: 
104; Chivviss, 2014: 126). Belgium, Canada, Denmark, and Norway also carried out 
strike missions but flew a smaller number of sorties, only joined operations after a 
                                                          
1 The calibration of the conditions was achieved with the calibrate function of the qualitative 
comparative analysis (QCA) package for R, version 1.1-4 (R Development Core Team, 2014; 
Thiem & Duşa, 2013). 
2 Important exceptions are Mello (2012: 430-431); Ringsmose (2010); and Saideman and 
Auerswald (2012). 
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few days and did not deploy helicopters (Chivviss, 2014: 80-90). However, the 
number of air sorties and strike missions flown by these allies is at least proportional 
to their size.1 In consequence, they are also assigned a score of 1. Italy, in turn, is 
assigned a score of 0.8. Although it flew around 10 percent of the strike operations 
(while only accounting for 6 percent of NATO’s GDP), Italy only started attacking 
ground targets over one month after the beginning of the operation. 
The Netherlands and Spain participated in the no-fly zone but refrained from 
attacking ground targets. In consequence, their units were only exposed to a limited 
risk of getting targeted and no risk of causing collateral damage. Therefore, they are 
assigned a score of 0.4, just below the crucial 0.5 anchor. Four states did not 
participate in the no-fly zone but contributed in other ways to the operation. 
Bulgaria and Romania each contributed a frigate to enforce the naval embargo. 
Greece contributed a frigate, an early warning and control aircraft and provided 
military bases. Turkey contributed four frigates, a logistics support ship, a 
submarine, and six F-16s in support of the naval operations (Müge & Aylin, 2013: 
601-602). Further, the air base in Izmir was provided as one of the operational 
centers for the NATO mission. Although Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and Turkey, 
thus, made sizable contributions, the risk of getting involved in combat was 
practically nonexisting. Therefore, they are assigned a score of 0.2. The remaining 
NATO countries did not contribute to the operation and are assigned a score of 0. 
Large Economy 
Data on GDP in billion US dollar, obtained from the IMF (2013), is used as 
the base variable for calibrating Large Economy. The threshold for full inclusion is 
fixed at $1,000. This qualitative anchor is located between Spain and the 
Netherlands, which is traditionally considered the biggest of the middle-sized 
European states. The crossover threshold is fixed at US$312. This value corresponds 
to the median and is located in the middle of a notable gap in the raw data between 
                                                          
1 Canada flew around 1,500, accounting for around 10 percent of the strike missions, while 
only accounting for 5 percent NATO’s gross domestic product (Chivviss, 2014: 190-191). 
Belgium, Denmark, and Norway, respectively, flew around 620, 590, and 615 sorties and 
together account for 22 percent of the strike missions, while only accounting for 1.5 percent, 
1 percent, and 1.4 percent of NATO’s GDP (Chivviss, 2014: 190-191). 
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Denmark ($334) and Greece ($290) (Rihoux & De Meur, 2009: 42). The anchor for 
full exclusion is fixed at $210. 
High Military Spending 
Military capabilities are a function of past and current military spending 
(Fordham, 2004: 637). Therefore, the average share of GDP devoted to defense in the 
ten years preceding the Libya campaign is used as the base variable for high military 
spending.1 The crucial 0.5 anchor is located at 1.99 percent. Hereby, countries that 
meet the NATO target of spending 2 percent of their GDP on defense are situated 
more in than out of the set. Allies that exceed this target by 0.5 percent are situated 
fully in the set. Countries whose military spending falls 0.5 percent below the 2 
percent target are considered to be fully out of the set. 
Spatially Proximate 
Spatial proximity is operationalized with the minimum distance measure, 
which calculates the distance between the two closest physical locations of a pair of 
countries (Gleditsch & Ward, 2001; Weidmann, Kuse & Gleditsch, 2010). The 
threshold for full inclusion is fixed at 650 kilometer, in line with the fifth continuity 
category of the “Correlates of War Direct Contiguity data” (Stinnett et al., 2002). The 
crossover threshold is located at 1,000 kilometer, corresponding to Gleditsch and 
Ward’s assertion that states “that are more than 1,000 km apart can hardly be 
considered geographically close” (2001: 745). The anchor for full exclusion is fixed at 
1,500 kilometer. 
Alliance Value 
The coding of alliance value builds on the scholarly literature, which is very 
consistent on the NATO allies that show a particularly strong interest in a good 
relationship with the United States.2 The East European states and Norway are 
                                                          
1 Data on military expenditures was obtained from the SIPRI military expenditures database 
(2013b). 
2 Alliance value is, thus, operationalized with a binary condition, which can easily be 
integrated in fuzzy set QCA (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 277). Since some of the 
consulted studies use a state’s propensity to commit forces to United States or NATO-led 
operations as an indicator of its value for its alliance with the United States, coding alliance 
value on the basis of prior studies might seem to result in tautological reasoning. However, 
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assigned a score of 1, since they perceive a resurging Russian threat and are 
dependent on NATO’s collective defense provision to balance it (Græger, 2005; 
Menon & Lipkin, 2003; Noetzel & Schreer, 2009; Ringsmose, 2010). Canada, 
Denmark, Portugal, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom are also assigned a 
score of 1. Although they are not particularly dependent on the United States’ 
security guarantee, these allies perceive themselves as particularly strong Atlanticists 
(Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013; Græger & Haugevik, 2009; Howorth, 2007; Massie, 
2014; Ringsmose, 2010). 
Electoral Distance 
The base variable for electoral distance estimates the time left in the 
constitutional interelection period on March 17, 2011, when the UN Security 
Council passed the resolution (1973) that authorized the use of force in Libya 
(Williams, 2013). To account for early elections, which could not have been 
anticipated at the time contribution decisions were made, the actual date of the next 
general election was only used if it was less than one year away. Otherwise, the 
length of an electoral cycle was added to the date of the last election.1 The crucial 0.5 
anchor is located at one year (365 days) till the next election (in line with inter alia 
Gaubatz, 1991; Kisangani & Pickering, 2007: 287). The thresholds for full exclusion 
and inclusions are fixed at, respectively, 180 days and 730 days. 
Right Executive 
In line with previous research that examines the link between partisan politics 
and military interventions (e.g. Arena & Palmer, 2009: 936; Koch, 2009: 806; Mello, 
2012: 436-437), the assessment of the executive’s ideological orientations draws on 
the right-left (RILE) indicator of the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP; Volkens 
et al., 2013). The CMP data are based on quantitative content analysis of parties’ 
election programs. The RILE scale is constructed by subtracting the percentage of 
                                                                                                                                                      
the consulted studies base a state’s relationship with the United States on a wider set of 
indicators, like historical ties with the United States, the explicit identification of a special 
relationship with Washington, geographical location, or a preference for NATO over 
alternative security institutions. 
1 Electoral dates were retrieved from the “parlgov database” (Döring & Manow, 2012) and the 
European Election Database (www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database). 
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the total statements of an election program that are grouped in the left categories 
from the percentage grouped in the right category. Party positions (n) are aggregated 
into an overall measure of executive ideological orientation by summing up each 
government party’s (i) ideological position on the RILE scale (rl), weighted by its 
proportion of the total number of government seats (s), as specified in the following 
equation: 
 sirli
s
n
i=1
. 
The crossover threshold is located at 0, since this corresponds to parties that 
make an equal amount of right and left statements in their manifestos. The threshold 
for full inclusion is fixed at 5, the anchor for full exclusion at 5. 
Analytical Results 
The fsQCA procedure involves several stages, which were carried out with the 
QCA package for R, version 1.1-4 (R Development Core Team, 2014; Thiem & Duşa, 
2013). Necessary and sufficient conditions were assessed separately, with the analysis 
of the former preceding the analysis of the latter (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 
278). Two descriptive measures are used to evaluate both types of causal relations: 
consistency and coverage (Ragin, 2008: 44-68). The former provides a descriptive 
measure of the extent to which the empirical data confirm sufficiency or necessity, 
the latter reflects the relevance of a sufficient or necessary condition. Consistency 
approaches unity as the data provides stronger support for sufficiency or necessity, 
coverage as a condition becomes more relevant.1 
The analysis of sufficiency is based on the “Truth Table Algorithm” (Ragin, 
2008: 124-144; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 178-195). A truth table contains a row 
for every possible combination of conditions. At the first stage of the analytical 
procedure, each case’s membership score in these rows is calculated with fuzzy 
multiplication. Rows without membership scores above 0.5 are considered logical 
remainders, combinations of conditions that lack good empirical instances. The 
other rows are assigned an outcome value based on their consistency as a sufficient 
                                                          
1 Consistency and coverage are, respectively, calculated with the formula 
∑ ( min  (Xi,Yi) ∑ (Xi)⁄  and ∑ ( min  (Xi,Yi) ∑ (Yi)⁄ ,in which X denotes the membership 
scores in the alleged subset and Y the scores in the alleged superset. 
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condition for outcome (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 279). Subsequently, Boolean 
algebra is used to minimize the truth table (Ragin, 2008: 145-177). Depending on the 
remainders included in the process, minimization results in different solution types. 
We focus on the intermediate formula, in line with Schneider and Wagemann’s 
(2012: 279) recommendation that this solution “should be at the center of the 
substantive discussion”. The intermediate solution results when only the remainders 
that correspond to theoretical expectations are incorporated in the minimization 
process.1 The following subsections present the results of the analyses of high burden 
and absence of high burden. 
High Burden 
The analysis of necessity reveals that none of the consistency values of the 
conditions exceed the recommended 0.9 threshold, indicating that none of them are 
necessary for the outcome.2 Table 1 represents the truth table for high burden, with 
the cases presented in the rows where their membership score exceeds 0.5. The 
consistency cutoff point, which separates truth table rows that pass as sufficient from 
those that do not, is fixed at 0.77, well above the minimal advisable threshold of 0.75 
(Ragin, 2009: 118; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 279). The rows above this 
threshold only contain cases that carried a high burden in the operation, providing 
additional evidence for the sufficiency of the corresponding combinations 
(Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 185). However, Canada, which is a high contributor, 
is a member of a row with a consistency below the threshold (row 10). This row is 
not coded as sufficient for the outcome because its consistency of 0.610 is much 
lower than the minimum advisable threshold. Moreover, it also contains a case that 
did not carry a high share of the operations burden: Poland. In consequence, Canada 
will not be covered by the resulting solution. 
 
                                                          
1 If no remainders are incorporated, minimization results in the ‘complex solution’; if all 
remainders that lead to a less complex solution are incorporated, minimization results in the 
parsimonious solution. The latter are presented in Appendix 2. 
2 The consistency scores of the analysis of necessity are presented in Appendix 2. 
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Table 1. Truth table “High Burden” 
  Conditions  Consis-
tency 
 Outcome   
row  LE MS SP AV RE ED   HB  cases 
1  1 0 0 1 0 1  1.000  1  Norway 
2  1 0 1 0 1 1  1.000  1  Italy 
3  1 1 0 0 1 1  1.000  1  US 
4  1 1 1 0 0 1  1.000  1  France 
5  1 0 0 0 0 1  0.938  1  Belgium 
6  1 1 0 1 1 1  0.909  1  UK 
7  1 0 0 1 0 0  0.788  1  Denmark 
8  1 0 1 0 0 0  0.769  0  Spain 
9  1 1 1 0 0 0  0.654  0  Turkey 
10  1 0 0 1 1 0  0.610  0  Canada, Poland 
11  0 1 1 0 0 1  0.494  0  Greece 
12  0 1 1 1 1 1  0.455  0  Bulgaria 
13  1 0 0 1 1 1  0.408  0  Netherlands 
14  0 0 0 1 0 1  0.312  0  Hungary 
15  0 1 0 1 0 0  0.227  0  Portugal 
16  0 0 0 0 0 1  0.152  0  Luxembourg, Slovenia 
17  0 0 0 1 1 1  0.084  0  
Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovakia 
18  0 1 0 0 1 0  0.000  0  Croatia 
19  1 0 0 0 1 1  0.000  0  Germany 
LE: Large Economy, MS: Military Spending, SP: Spatial Proximity, AV: Alliance Value, RE: 
Right Executive, ED: Electoral Distance 
The intermediate solution is presented in Table 2.1 Its high consistency of 
0.917 confirms that it indeed corresponds to sufficient combinations. The solution’s 
relatively low coverage of 0.59 is mainly caused by the fact that it does not cover the 
                                                          
1 The following assumptions were made for the production of the intermediate solution. The 
presence of large economy, military spending, spatial proximity, alliance value, right 
executive, and electoral distance were linked to high burden. Multiple models fared equally 
well in accounting for the data (cf. Baumgartner and Thiem (2015) on such model 
ambiguities). The presented model was selected because it is the only model that does not 
include the absence of military spending, alliance value, or spatial proximity, which are 
highly unlikely to explain the presence of high burden 
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large contribution of Canada. The solution shows that four combinations of 
conditions consistently lead to contributing. The first combines large economy with 
high military spending and distant elections. This combination covers France, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. The second path combines large economy, 
spatial proximity, and electoral distance and covers Italy and France. The third 
combination shows that states with a large economy and distant elections carried a 
high share of the burden of the Libya operation, but only if they were governed by a 
left-leaning government. This path covers Belgium and Norway. The fourth path 
combines large economy, alliance value, and a left-leaning government and covers 
Denmark and Norway. 
 
Table 2. Intermediate solution 
   Consis-
tency 
 Coverage   
 Solution   Raw Unique  Cases 
HB 
LE *MS*ED  0.971  0.346 0.186  France, UK, US 
LE *SP*ED  0.885  0.220 0.040  France, Italy 
LE*ED*~RE  0.971  0.270 0.066  Belgium, Norway 
LE*AV*~RE  0.891  0.117 0.052  Denmark, Norway 
 Solution  0.917  0.590   
~HB 
~MS*~AV*~ED  1.000  0.066 0.032  Spain 
~MS*~AV*~SP*RE  1.000  0.092 0.062  Germany 
~LE 
 
0.887 
 
0.781 0.736 
 Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Croatia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Latvia, 
Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Romania, Czech 
Republic, Portugal, 
Greece 
 Solution  0.898  0.875   
HB: High Burden, LE: Large Economy, MS: Military Spending, SP: Spatial Proximity, AV: 
Alliance Value, RE: Right Executive, ED: Electoral Distance; “~”  indicates the absence of a 
condition; multiplication “*” refers to conjunction of conditions. 
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Absence of High Burden 
The analysis of necessity reveals that none of the consistency values exceed the 
0.9 threshold, indicating that there are no necessary conditions for the outcome’s 
absence. Table 3 presents the truth table for “absence high burden”. The consistency 
cutoff point is fixed at 0.75. The rows above this threshold only contain cases that 
did not carry a high burden, providing additional evidence for the sufficiency of the 
corresponding combinations (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 185). Three rows with 
a consistency below this threshold (row 10, 11, and 14) contain cases which did not 
carry a high burden in the operation: the Netherlands, Turkey, and Poland. 
However, these rows are not coded as sufficient for absence high burden because 
their consistency is far below the minimum advisable threshold of 0.75. In 
consequence, these cases will not be covered by the solution for the outcome’s 
absence. 
Minimization of the truth table results in the intermediate solution presented 
in Table 2.1 The consistency of the solution almost equals 0.9, strongly confirming 
that it indeed corresponds to a sufficient combination. Its coverage is well above 
0.85. This indicates that the solution explains a large share of the outcome’s absence, 
in spite of the noncovered cases. Three causal paths result from the analysis. The first 
two show that the absence of military spending and alliance value is sufficient in 
combination with either the absence of distant elections or the presence of aright-
leaning executive and the absence of spatial proximity. These paths, respectively, 
cover Spain and Germany. The third path shows that the absence of a large economy 
is sufficient for not contributing, strongly confirming expectations from collective 
action theory. 
  
                                                          
1 The following assumptions were made for the production of the intermediate solution: the 
absence of large economy, military spending, spatial proximity, right executive and electoral 
distance were assumed to contribute to the absence of high burden. Multiple models fared 
equally well in accounting for the data. The presented model was selected because it is the 
only model that does not include the spatial proximity, which is highly unlikely to explain the 
absence of high burden. 
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Table 3. Truth table “~High Burden” 
  Conditions  Consis
-tency 
 Outcome   
row  LE MS SP AV RE ED   ~HB  cases 
1  0 0 0 1 1 1  1.000  1  Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovakia 
2  0 1 0 0 1 0  1.000  1  Croatia 
3  0 1 0 1 0 0  1.000  1  Portugal 
4  0 1 1 1 1 1  1.000  1  Bulgaria 
5  1 0 0 0 1 1  1.000  1  Germany 
6  1 0 1 0 0 0  1.000  1  Spain 
7  0 1 1 0 0 1  0.988  1  Greece 
8  0 0 0 0 0 1  0.848  1  Luxembourg, Slovenia 
9  0 0 0 1 0 1  0.796  1  Hungary 
10  1 0 0 1 1 1  0.714  0  Netherlands 
11  1 1 1 0 0 0  0.472  0  Turkey 
12  1 0 0 0 0 1  0.420  0  Belgium 
13  1 1 1 0 0 1  0.406  0  France 
14  1 0 0 1 1 0  0.390  0  Canada, Poland 
15  1 0 1 0 1 1  0.339  0  Italy 
16  1 0 0 1 0 0  0.212  0  Denmark 
17  1 1 0 1 1 1  0.091  0  UK 
18  1 0 0 1 0 1  0.000  0  Norway 
19  1 1 0 0 1 1  0.000  0  US 
LE: Large Economy, MS: Military Spending, SP: Spatial Proximity, AV: Aliance Value, RE: 
Right Executive, ED: Electoral Distance 
 
Interpretation 
Arriving at minimal formulas and optimal parameters of fit are not the 
ultimate goals of QCA (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 280). Instead, solutions must 
be related back to the cases and theoretical expectations (Rihoux & De Meur, 2009: 
65). The results largely confirm the collective action, balance of threat, and alliance 
politics hypotheses. In contrast, the formulas contradict theoretical expectations on 
domestic constraints. 
First, the results provide strong support for the collective action hypothesis. 
The presence of an large economy is part of every solution for the outcome’s 
presence, while its absence is sufficient for the outcome’s absence. Moreover, the 
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first sufficient combination for high burden shows that, if elections were not 
imminent, nations with a large economy and sizable military spending carried a 
large share of the burden of the Libya operation. This corresponds to collective 
action expectations for lumpy goods: the contributions of France, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States were critical for the operation’s success, which 
denied them the opportunity to ride free if they wanted to gain the benefits of the 
operation.1 Neither France nor the United Kingdom “was capable of executing the 
military campaign without the other” (Davidson, 2013: 317). Similarly, not 
contributing was not a viable option for Washington, since “approximately 90 
percent of the military actions against the Libyan regime would not have been 
possible without the support of the US” (Koenig, 2012: 3). 
Moreover, in line with the exploitation hypothesis, France and the United 
Kingdom carried a disproportionate share of the operation’s burden. While only 
accounting for 8 percent and 7 percent of NATO’s GDP, France, and the United 
Kingdom, respectively, conducted one-third and one-fifth of the strike operations. 
The United States, on its part, flew more sorties, and nearly as many strike missions, 
than the combined totals of the other members during the first ten days of the 
operation (Chivviss, 2014: 89). However, the exploitation hypothesis would have 
expected the United States to keep carrying a disproportionate share of the costs and 
risks, instead of reducing its role after barely two weeks. The latter reflected the 
United States’ changed grand strategy, which aimed to force the other allies to 
contribute more to “achieving joint transatlantic security goals” (Chivviss, 2014: 199; 
Hallams & Schreer, 2012: 321). Moreover, US restraint was possible because France 
and the United Kingdom had taken a more forward-leaning stance in the run-up to 
                                                          
1 Germany could also have made a substantial contribution in the early stages of the 
campaign because it possesses advanced Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) 
capabilities (Anrig, 2011: 93-94). Italy also possesses advanced SEAD capabilities, but did not 
deploy them in the opening of the campaign. However, the lack of these capabilities did not 
increase the risk at general failure to such an extent that it “prohibited the operation”, in 
contrast to what would have been the case if the US withheld its essential capabilities or the 
UK and France did not carry a disproportionate large share of the operation’s burden 
(Chivviss, 2014: 190). In fact, it was the French willingness to take the risk of opening the 
campaign with no dedicated SEAD aircraft and the participation of the US’ F-16CJs that 
compensated for the lack of European SEAD capabilities (Anrig, 2011; Gelfand, 2011). 
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the operation, and the operation’s difficulty was relatively low (Chivviss, 2014: 200).1 
Nevertheless, the United States was still to a large extent “prisoner to its size” 
(Ringsmose, 2010: 326). Even after limiting its role, it kept providing essential 
capabilities, flew the highest number of sorties, and contributed more aircraft than 
any other ally. 
The balance of threat hypothesis is confirmed by the second path toward high 
burden, which combines a large economy and electoral distance with spatial 
proximity. This combination covers two cases: France and Italy. Case-based 
evidence suggests that the threat caused by geographical proximity was indeed 
important in both cases. Davidson (2013: 316), for example, argues that the “threat 
to France’s borders posed by refugees fleeing violence in Libya” is an important 
factor to explain France’s reaction to the crisis. Italy’s contribution to the operation 
also seems grounded in narrow interests (Ceccorulli & Coticchia, 2015: 15). 
According to Lombardi (2011: 33, 42), Italy’s main goals during the Libyan crisis 
were avoiding a large refugee influx and preserving its economic interests in the 
country. For this reason, it only decided to support the operation once it became 
clear Qaddafi’s days were numbered and joining the coalition was the best way to 
preserve these interests. The hesitance of Italy suggests that the threats linked to 
geographic proximity do not always push governments toward intervention but 
rather incite contributions after it becomes clear that the intervention is inevitable 
and participating is the best way to preserve their interests. 
Turkey’s policy toward the intervention corresponds to the latter conjecture. 
Like Italy, Turkey is one of the NATO allies that was vulnerable to a potential 
regional blowback of the intervention (Chivviss, 2014: 75). Turkey was initially 
against the intervention and, eventually, only contributed noncombat assets. The 
Turkish reluctance to contribute can partially be explained by domestic political 
concerns and the approaching general elections (Müge & Aylin, 2013: 603). 
However, the inconsistency of Turkey’s truth table row in the analysis of the 
outcome’s absence suggests that electoral calculations are not sufficient for 
explaining its reluctance to contribute. The analysis, thus, confirms that spatial 
proximity has an impact on contributions to the Libya operation. However, the 
causal path that includes this condition covers the contribution of Italy, which was 
                                                          
1 As convincingly argued by Chivviss (2014: 68) in his comprehensive history of the Libya 
intervention, it was the imminent threat to the Libya population, rather than pressure of the 
UK and France, that eventually led to the US’ decision to intervene. 
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first very hesitant to participate in the operation. Together with the Turkish 
reluctance to contribute, this suggests that countries that face a threat from the target 
of the operation face countervailing pressures, which only incite contributions once 
states perceive participation as the best strategy to preserve their interests. 
Third, although the United States did not take the lead of the operation, 
alliance value had a positive impact on contributions. While the first and second 
combination for the outcome’s absence link the absence of alliance value to the 
absence of high burden, the third path to high burden suggests that alliance value 
spurred contributions to the operation. This path covers Denmark and Norway, 
whose contributions have been attributed to a desire to demonstrate their reliability 
and dedication to NATO (Dicke et al., 2013: 41; Jakobsen & Møller, 2012: 112). 
However, multiple sources also argue that the contribution of these countries was at 
least partially motivated by humanitarian concerns (Auerswald & Saideman, 2014: 
211; Dicke et al., 2013: 40; Jakobsen & Møller, 2012: 115). Moreover, contrary to 
theoretical expectations, the solution suggests that alliance value only leads to 
contributions from countries that were governed by a non-right executive. 
In contrast to the collective action, balance of threat and alliance politics 
hypotheses, the solutions do not confirm expectations on domestic politics. There is 
evidence that electoral distance had an impact on the outcome: its presence is part of 
three paths for the presence of high burden, while its absence is included in one 
sufficient combination for its absence. The results, however, clearly contradict the 
expectations on government ideology. Strikingly, the absence of a right executive is a 
causal condition in the third and fourth path toward high burden, whereas its 
presence is an ingredient of the second path toward its absence. 
A very plausible explanation for these unexpected causal combinations is 
related to the nature of the Libya operation, which differs from the cases that are 
generally included in studies that link military deployment to government ideology. 
The latter generally focuses on militarized interstate disputes or on the operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. Contrary to these operations, NATO pursued a humanitarian 
goal in Libya. Therefore, inferences based on the propeace attitude of leftist parties 
and promilitary attitude of rightist parties are less applicable. In a comprehensive 
study on the link between partisan politics and participation in peace enforcement 
operations, Rathbun (2004) argues that leftist parties are actually more likely to 
support humanitarian interventions, since they consider the promotion of welfare of 
other countries part of their national interest. Right-leaning parties, on the other 
hand, have a more exclusive conception of their national interest and, therefore, only 
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support crisis management operations if they believe these enhance more narrow 
national interests. 
The third and fourth pathways toward high burden indicate that the pattern of 
contributions to the Libya operation confirms Rathbun’s hypotheses. Auerswald and 
Saideman (2014: 211), for example, argue that the contributions of the left-leaning 
governments of Belgium, Denmark, and Norway were at least partially motivated by 
humanitarian concerns. In contrast, Italy’s right-wing Berlusconi government, 
covered by the second sufficient combination, only participated to secure narrow 
national interests, not to enforce the R2P doctrine. Similarly, the second sufficient 
combination toward the absence of high burden combines the absence of spatial 
proximity with the presence of right executive. This path covers Germany, which 
was governed by a conservative-liberal government under the leadership of Merkel. 
According to Hansel and Oppermann (2014: 14), “the Merkel government has put a 
strong emphasis on the German national interest in explaining its nonparticipation 
in Libya” (see also Oppermann, 2012: 514), while Miskimmon (2012: 402)contends 
that “Germany saw no clear interest in becoming involved in the NATO-operation”. 
However, case-based evidence suggests important exceptions to the cross-case 
pattern that emerges on the link between executive ideology and contributions. First 
of all, there is no conclusive evidence that Germany’s decision not to contribute is 
best explained by the combination of a right-leaning government and the absence of 
clear interests. No clear party lines were drawn in the debate on the Libya 
intervention and critique on the government’s policy toward the crisis was not 
confined to left-leaning opposition parties (Miskimmon, 2012: 398-399). In fact, 
several members of parliament of Merkel’s Christlich Demokratische Union-party 
were critical of the government’s policy and implied they might have supported 
limited military involvement (Brockmeier, 2013: 82). Furthermore, Canada and 
Poland also combine a right-wing government with the absence of spatial proximity 
but are not covered by the solution for the outcome’s absence. The nonparticipation 
of Poland confirms that right-wing executives are less likely to participate in 
humanitarian operations. Polish Prime Minister Tusk, furthermore, explained the 
decision not to participate by arguing that “the situation in Libya poses no threat to 
Poland’s interests and Poland’s security” (Dicke et al., 2013: 51). However, Canada 
was also governed by a right-wing government but nevertheless carried a high share 
of the operation’s burden. Moreover, although the conservative Harper government 
did not refer to the R2P to justify its participation, it did package “the intervention 
on normatively oriented and value-based arguments in favor of democracy, freedom 
and human rights” (Cooper & Momani, 2014: 186). In sum, although left-leaning 
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governments were generally more likely to participate, the lack of clear party lines in 
Germany in the debate on the intervention and the large contribution of Canada’s 
right-wing government, which was almost exclusively sold on value-based grounds, 
show that there are important exceptions to the general pattern of contributions. 
Conclusion 
Why did some NATO members carry a large share of the burden of the Libya 
operation while others hardly contributed at all? This study combined collective 
action theory with hypotheses on balance of threat, alliance politics, and domestic 
constraints into a multicausal model to explain the division of the operation’s 
burden. Its results suggest innovative inferences on the interactions between partisan 
politics and the reasons states contribute to operations. While left-wing governments 
carried a high share of the burden if they had the capabilities to increase the 
probability that the goals of the operation would be achieved and either highly 
valued their alliance with the United States or were not facing imminent elections, 
right-wing governments only contributed if their country’s interests were threatened 
by the crisis in Libya. NATO members whose military capabilities were critical for 
the operation’s success constitute an important exception to these inferences. These 
participated irrespective of the ideological composition of their governments, 
indicating that partisan politics only matter for nonessential contributors. 
These conclusions have significant implications for the division of the burden 
of future NATO operations. The Libya campaign suggests that the other capable 
allies can be expected to compensate if the United States reduces its role in an 
operation. However, this will only be the case if Washington makes clear from the 
outset that it is not willing to move forward without significant support. 
Furthermore, US restraint in the Libya operation was only possible because France 
and the United Kingdom had taken a more forward-leaning stance in the run-up to 
the operation and the operation’s difficulty was relatively low. During the 2014 
intervention against the Islamic state in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the United States only 
started mobilizing its allies a few weeks after it started offensive operations and was 
left carrying the brunt of the operation’s burden. Although their “security interests 
should dictate an even more robust effort against ISIS than against the Qaddafi 
regime”, France and the United Kingdom provided far less support to the operation 
against ISIS (Cohen & Scheinmann, 2014). 
The results furthermore indicate that contributions to out-of-area operations 
depend on the interaction between domestic politics and the goals of an operation. 
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The greater inclination of left-leaning executives to participate in humanitarian 
operations should apply beyond the scope of the Libya campaign. Preliminary 
evidence from NATO’s previous humanitarian intervention in Kosovo supports this 
inference. Rathbun (2004), for instance, concludes that the leftist parties of 
Germany, France, and the United Kingdom eventually supported the use of force in 
Kosovo. Moreover, most of the smaller allies that contributed to the air operations, 
such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, and Portugal, were governed by a left-
leaning government (Mello, 2014: 73-74). Prospective research could examine the 
interaction between the international incentives that spur contributions and party 
politics more systematically, to assess whether these inferences are generalizable 
beyond the Libya operation. 
This study furthermore showed that QCA is a powerful tool for research on 
military burden sharing. Building on QCA allowed to establish innovative inferences 
on the specific interactions that determine the level of contributions to NATO’s 
Libya operation. Employing this approach in future research would indubitably lead 
to a more holistic understanding of the burden sharing dynamics in multilateral 
operations. 
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Appendices: NATO Burden Sharing in Libya - A Fuzzy 
Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
Appendix 1 Base Variables and Fuzzy Membership Scores 
Table 1. Base variables 
cases  LE MS SP RE ED 
Belgium  514.794 1.2 1879.05 -75.759 1184 
Bulgaria  53.575 2.4 939.26 13.69 841 
Canada  1,778.632 1.2 5511.57 9.091 46 
Croatia  61.722 2 1084.54 21.857 253 
Czech Republic  216.061 1.7 1725.67 79.669 1168 
Denmark  333.696 1.4 2374.94 -9.897 182 
Estonia  22.564 1.9 2755.85 3.199 1450 
France  2,784.761 2.5 931.32 -114.492 415 
Germany  3,631.435 1.4 1568.71 74.697 925 
Greece  290.153 3 293.24 -9.5 932 
Hungary  138.968 1.4 1447.57 -44.623 1121 
Italy  2,196.334 1.9 445.99 11.633 758 
Latvia  28.48 1.6 2554.26 11.6 1295 
Lithuania  42.872 1.5 2336.46 105.231 575 
Luxembourg  59.308 0.6 1857.15 -53.667 1178 
Netherlands  833.519 1.5 2002.95 154.254 1180 
Norway  490.661 1.7 2776.97 -302.554 912 
Poland  515.667 1.9 1785.83 55.239 206 
Portugal  237.875 2 1727.08 -44.977 80 
Romania  182.611 1.8 1214.71 19.909 624 
Slovakia  96.158 1.6 1663.45 119.904 1183 
Slovenia  50.299 1.5 1374.3 -102.246 554 
Spain  1,455.867 1.2 980.57 -232.242 358 
Turkey  774.775 2.8 569.41 -89.738 87 
UK  2,464.639 2.5 2156.16 155.248 1511 
US  15,533.83 4 6640.27 11.14 596 
LE: Large Economy, MS: Military Spending, SP: Spatial Proximity, RE: Right Executive, ED: 
Electoral Distance. 
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Table 2. Fuzzy membership scores 
  Outcome  Conditions 
cases  HB  LE MS SP AV RE ED 
Belgium  1  0.65 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 1.00 
Bulgaria  0.2  0.00 0.90 0.59 1 1.00 1.00 
Canada  1  1.00 0.00 0.00 1 1.00 0.00 
Croatia  0  0.00 0.51 0.42 0 0.69 0.20 
Czech Republic  0  0.03 0.20 0.00 1 1.00 1.00 
Denmark  1  0.52 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.01 
Estonia  0  0.00 0.41 0.00 1 0.80 1.00 
France  1  1.00 1.00 0.60 0 0.00 0.57 
Germany  0  1.00 0.00 0.00 0 1.00 1.00 
Greece  0.2  0.39 1.00 1.00 0 0.00 1.00 
Hungary  0  0.00 0.00 0.05 1 0.05 1.00 
Italy  0.8  1.00 0.41 1.00 0 1.00 1.00 
Latvia  0  0.00 0.10 0.00 1 1.00 1.00 
Lithuania  0  0.00 0.00 0.00 1 1.00 0.79 
Luxembourg  0  0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 1.00 
Netherlands  0.4  0.88 0.00 0.00 1 1.00 1.00 
Norway  1  0.63 0.20 0.00 1 0.00 1.00 
Poland  0  0.65 0.41 0.00 1 1.00 0.07 
Portugal  0  0.14 0.51 0.00 1 0.05 0.00 
Romania  0.2  0.00 0.31 0.29 1 0.67 0.85 
Slovakia  0  0.00 0.10 0.00 1 1.00 1.00 
Slovenia  0  0.00 0.00 0.13 0 0.00 0.76 
Spain  0.4  1.00 0.00 0.53 0 0.00 0.48 
Turkey  0.2  0.84 1.00 1.00 0 0.00 0.00 
UK  1  1.00 1.00 0.00 1 1.00 1.00 
US  1  1.00 1.00 0.00 0 1.00 0.82 
LE: Large Economy, MS: Military Spending, SP: Spatial Proximity, AV: Alliance Value, RE: 
Right Executive, ED: Electoral Distance. 
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Appendix 2 QCA Results 
 
Table 1. Necessary conditions “High Burden” 
 Consistency Coverage 
LE 0.836 0.698 
~LE 0.233 0.160 
MS 0.491 0.531 
~MS 0.560 0.324 
SP 0.306 0.535 
~SP 0.776 0.373 
AV 0.490 0.320 
~AV 0.510 0.455 
RE 0.469 0.323 
~RE 0.551 0.460 
ED 0.694 0.367 
~ED 0.362 0.477 
 
 
Table 2. Complex solution “High Burden” 
  Coverage Consis-
tency 
  
  Raw Unique  Cases 
LE*~MS*~SP*AV*~RE  0.117 0.052 0.891  Norway, Denmark 
LE*~MS*~SP*~RE*ED  0.172 0.107 0.960  Belgium, Norway 
LE*MS*~SP*RE*ED  0.186 0.186 0.948  UK, US 
LE*~MS*SP*~AV*RE*ED  0.060 0.060 1.000  Italy 
LE*MS*SP*~AV*~RE*ED  0.098 0.098 1.000  France 
Solution  0.568 0.947   
 
  
 202 
 
Table 3. Parsimonious solution “High Burden” 1 
  Coverage 
Consistency 
  
  Raw Unique  Cases 
LE*~RE*ED  0.270 0.066 0.971  Belgium, Norway 
LE*AV*~RE  0.117 0.052 0.891  Norway, Denmark 
LE*SP*ED  0.885 0.220 0.885  Italy, France 
LE*MS*ED  0.346 0.186 0.971  GB, US, France  
Solution  0.590 0.917   
 
 
Table 4 Necessary conditions “~High Burden” 
  Consistency  Coverage 
LE  0.260  0.359 
~LE  0.781  0.887 
MS  0.293  0.524 
~MS  0.738  0.705 
SP  0.210  0.608 
~SP  0.839  0.667 
AV  0.630  0.680 
~AV  0.370  0.545 
RE  0.609  0.691 
~RE  0.404  0.557 
ED  0.759  0.663 
~ED  0.275  0.597 
 
  
                                                          
1 Multiple models fared equally well in accounting for the data. The presented solution is the 
parsimonious solution from which the intermediate solution presented in the main article 
was derived.  
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Table 5. Complex solution “~High Burden” 
  Coverage Consis
-tency 
  
  Raw Unique  Cases 
~LE*~MS*~SP*AV*RE*ED  0.365 0.267 0.940  
Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, 
Slovakia; Hungary 
~LE*~MS*~SP*~RE*ED 
 
0.212 0.109 0.825  Luxembourg, 
Slovenia; Hungary 
~LE*MS*~SP*~AV*RE*~ED  0.031 0.019 1.000  Croatia 
~LE*MS*~SP*AV*~RE*~ED  0.041 0.031 1.000  Portugal 
~LE*MS*SP*~AV*~RE*ED  0.049 0.037 0.988  Greece 
~LE*MS*SP*AV*RE*ED  0.054 0.030 1.000  Bulgaria 
LE*~MS*~SP*~AV*RE*ED  0.062 0.062 1.000  Germany 
LE*~MS*~SP*~AV*~RE*~ED  0.032 0.032 1.000  Spain 
Solution  0.698 0.939   
 
 
Table 6. Parsimonious solution “~High Burden” 1 
  Coverage Consis
-tency 
  
  Raw Unique  Cases 
~LE  0.781 0.736 0.887  
Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Romania, Czech Republic, 
Portugal, Greece 
~MS*~SP*~AV*RE  0.092 0.062 1.000  Germany 
~MS*~AV*~ED  0.077 0.032 1.000  Spain 
Solution  0.876 0.898   
 
  
                                                          
1 Multiple models fared equally well in accounting for the data. The presented solution is the 
parsimonious solution from which the intermediate solution presented in the main article 
was derived. 
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Appendix 3 Energy Dependence and Public Opinion  
This appendix presents two alternative analyses for the paper “NATO Burden 
Sharing in Libya: A fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis”. In the first analysis, 
public support is added to the conditions included in the theoretical framework of 
the main text; in the second analysis, energy dependence is added to the theoretical 
framework. 
Public Opinion 
A plausible explanatory variable that is not included in the analysis presented 
in the main article is the level of public support for the intervention in Libya. Since 
“public opinion is central to representation, democratic accountability and decision-
making”, it should be self-evident that it has an impact on the contributions of 
democracies to multinational operations (Aldrich et al., 2006: 477; Mello, 2014: 40-
41). Nevertheless, many scholars are skeptical on the link between public opinion 
and foreign policy. In a comprehensive review of scholarly research on the link 
between public opinion and foreign policy, Holsti (1992), for example, argues that 
public opinion was regarded as highly volatile, incoherent and not very important 
for foreign policy decisions during the first two decades after World War II. An 
increasing number of scholars challenges this pessimistic view. Results of Ostrom 
and Job (1986: 556-557) and James and Oneal (1991), for example, show that public 
aversion to war is negatively related to the probability of the use of force; Baum 
(2004: 221) concludes that public opinion had a constraining effect on the policies of 
the Bush and Clinton administration during the crisis in Somalia and Mello 
(2014:187) asserts that public support was vital for explaining contributions to the 
operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo. In consequence, the possibility that public 
opinion has an impact on contributions to Operation Unified Protector cannot be 
ruled out a priori. 
Unfortunately, reliable and comparable public opinion data is missing for 
almost half of the NATO allies. The German Marshall Fund’s 2011 Transatlantic 
Trends Survey provides the most comprehensive opinion poll on the Libya 
intervention (German Marshall Fund, 2011). This survey only covers 13 NATO 
allies. Moreover, the data is based on interviews that were conducted between May 
25th  and June 17th 2011, over a month after the start of the Libya operation. Any 
link between public opinion and participation could, thus, be a consequence of 
successful public relations efforts of the participating governments. 
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The calibration of public opinion is based on the method of 
transformational assignment, which was achieved with the calibrate function of 
the QCA package for R, version 1.1-4 (R Development Core Team, 2014; Thiem & 
Duşa, 2013). The crucial 0.5 anchor was fixed at 50%, locating NATO allies in which 
the majority of the population approved military action over Libya more in than out 
of the set. The threshold for full membership is located at 75%, the threshold for full 
non-membership at 25%. Public opinion on the Libya intervention and the fuzzy 
membership scores are presented in Table 1. 
Table 2 represents the truth table for high burden. The consistency cut-off 
point is fixed at 0.77. This corresponds to the consistency threshold of the analysis 
presented in the article and is located well above the minimum advisable threshold 
of 0.75. Moreover, the rows above this threshold only contain cases that carried a 
high burden in the operation, providing additional evidence for the sufficiency of the 
corresponding combinations. 
 
Table 1. Calibration public support 
cases  Raw Data  Fuzzy Membership Score 
Bulgaria  46  0.42 
France  58  0.66 
Germany  37  0.24 
Italy  47  0.44 
Netherlands  65  0.80 
Poland  35  0.20 
Portugal  57  0.64 
Romania  39  0.28 
Slovakia  30  0.10 
Spain  54  0.58 
Turkey  23  0.00 
UK  53  0.56 
US  59  0.68 
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 Table 2. Truth table “High Burden”- Public Support 
  Conditions  Consis
-tency 
 Outcome   
row  LE MS SP AV RE ED PS   HB   
1  1 0 1 0 1 1 0  1.000  1  Italy 
2  1 1 0 0 1 1 1  1.000  1  US 
3  1 1 1 0 0 1 1  1.000  1  France 
4  1 1 0 1 1 1 1  0.889  1  UK 
5  1 0 1 0 0 0 1  0.769  0  Spain 
6  1 1 1 0 0 0 0  0.627  0  Turkey 
7  0 1 1 1 1 1 0  0.460  0  Bulgaria 
8  1 0 0 1 1 1 1  0.460  0  Netherlands 
9  0 1 0 1 0 0 1  0.227  0  Portugal 
10  0 0 0 1 1 1 0  0.226  0  Romania, Slovakia 
11  1 0 0 0 1 1 0  0.000  0  Germany 
12  1 0 0 1 1 0 0  0.000  0  Poland 
LE: Large Economy, MS: Military Spending, SP: Spatial Proximity, AV: Alliance Value, RE: 
Right Executive, ED: Electoral Distance, PS: Public Support 
 
The minimization of the truth table results in the parsimonious and 
intermediate solutions presented in Table 3 and Table 4.1 For the production of the 
intermediate solution, the presence of large economy, military spending, spatial 
proximity, right executive, electoral distance and public support were assumed to 
contribute to the presence of high burden.  
 
Table 3. Intermediate solution “High Burden” – Public Support 
  Coverage 
Consistency 
  
  Raw Unique  Cases 
LE*SP*RE*ED  0.148 0.072 0.800  Italy 
LE*MS*RE*ED*PS  0.306 0.230 0.959  US, UK 
LE*MS*SP*ED*PS  0.181 0.106 1.000  France 
Solution  0.483 0.906   
                                                          
1 Multiple models fared equally well in accounting for the data. The presented solutions were 
selected because they do not include the absence of alliance value, which is highly unlikely to 
explain the presence of high burden 
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Table 4. Parsimonious solution “High Burden” – Public Support 
  Coverage 
Consistency 
  
  Raw Unique  Cases 
LE*MS*ED  0.519 0.107 0.976  US, France, UK 
LE*MS*PS  0.428 0.017 0.872  US, France, UK 
LE*SP*ED  0.328 0.146 0.863  Italy, France 
MS*ED*PS  0.485 0.074 0.848  US, France, UK 
Solution  0.665 0.820   
 
Table 5 represents the truth table for “absence high burden”. The consistency 
cut-off point is fixed at 0.75. This corresponds to the consistency threshold of the 
analysis presented in the article and to the minimum advisable threshold of 0.75. 
Moreover, the rows above this threshold only contain cases that did not carry a high 
burden in the operation, providing additional evidence for the sufficiency of the 
corresponding combinations. 
 
 Table 5. Truth table “~High Burden”- Public Support 
  Conditions  Consis
-tency 
 Outcome   
row  LE MS SP AV RE ED PS   ~HB  cases 
1  0 0 0 1 1 1 0  1.000  1  Romania; Slovakia 
2  0 1 0 1 0 0 1  1.000  1  Portugal 
3  0 1 1 1 1 1 0  1.000  1  Bulgaria 
4  1 0 0 0 1 1 0  1.000  1  Germany 
5  1 0 0 1 1 0 0  1.000  1  Poland 
6  1 0 1 0 0 0 1  1.000  1  Spain 
7  1 0 0 1 1 1 1  0.770  1  Netherlands 
8  1 1 1 0 0 0 0  0.508  0  Turkey 
9  1 0 1 0 1 1 0  0.357  0  Italy 
10  1 1 0 1 1 1 1  0.111  0  UK 
11  1 1 0 0 1 1 1  0.000  0  US 
12  1 1 1 0 0 1 1  0.000  0  France 
LE: Large Economy, MS: Military Spending, SP: Spatial Proximity, AV: Alliance Value, RE: 
Right Executive, ED: Electoral Distance, PS: Public Support 
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The minimization of the truth table results in the parsimonious and 
intermediate solutions presented in Table 6 and 7.1 For the production of the 
intermediate solution, the absence of large economy, military spending, spatial 
proximity, right executive, electoral distance and public support were assumed to 
contribute to the absence of high burden.  
 
Table 6. Intermediate solution “~High Burden” – Public Support 
  Coverage Consis-
tency 
  
  Raw Unique  Cases 
~LE*~PS  0.420 0.088 1.000  Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria  
~MS*~SP  0.637 0.226 0.924  
Romania, Slovakia, Germany, 
Poland, Netherlands 
~LE*~SP*~RE*~ED  0.133 0.049 1.000  Portugal  
~MS*~AV*~RE*~ED  0.068 0.007 1.000  Spain  
Solution  0.780 0.937   
 
 
Table 7. Parsimonious solution “~High Burden” – Public Support 
  Coverage Consis-
tency 
  
  Raw Unique  Cases 
~MS*~SP  0.637 0.195 0.924  
Romania, Slovakia, Germany, 
Poland, Netherlands 
~LE  0.538 0.189 0.911  
Romania, Slovakia, Portugal, 
Bulgaria 
~MS*~ED  0.230 0.007 1.000  Poland, Spain 
Solution  0.833 0.888   
 
  
                                                          
1 Multiple models fared equally well in accounting for the data. However, the other models 
each include the presence of public support and, thus, definitely do not support that popular 
opposition constraints governments. 
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When considering both the analysis of the outcome’s presence and absence, it 
seems that  empirical support for the impact of public opinion on the division of the 
burden of Operation Unified Protector is mixed at best. Public support is an element 
of the intermediate and parsimonious solutions for the outcome’s presence. 
However, the paths that include this condition in the parsimonious solution are 
logically redundant prime implicants, paths towards the outcome that only cover 
cases that are also covered by other solutions. This indicates that public support was 
not decisive for carrying a high share of Operation Unified Protector’s burden. The 
analysis of the absence of high burden confirms this conclusion. The absence of 
public support is included in the intermediate solution, but only in one of the three 
sufficient combinations. However, it is not included in the parsimonious solution, 
which indicates that its inclusion in the intermediate solution is a consequence of the 
directional assumptions made for the production of this formula. Therefore, it seems 
that public support is not a decisive determinant of the size of the NATO-allies’ 
contributions to the Libya intervention. 
Energy Dependence 
A second plausible explanatory variable that is not included in the analysis 
presented in the main article is energy dependence. The uprising against the Qaddafi 
regime sharply reduced Libyan energy exports. These normally account for a 
substantial share of the oil and/or gas supply of some of NATO’s European members 
(Libya Crisis Rocks Oil Markets 2011). In consequence, avoiding supply disruptions 
might have been an important incentive to contribute to the Libyan operation 
(Davidson, 2013; Dyson, 2013b). 
The level of dependence on Libyan energy resources is determined by the 
share of domestic energy consumption that is provided by imports from Libya. 
Because Libya exports gas and oil to NATO member states, the sum of the import of 
these products was relativized by total domestic energy consumption. The base 
variable for High Energy dependence (HED) was calculated with the following 
formula: 
ED=
IPg+IPo
C
 
where IPg is the import of Libyan gas, IPo import of Libyan oil and C the total 
domestic energy consumption. Data for European states was retrieved from Eurostat 
(2013), data for Canada and the US from the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (2013). This interval-level indicator was transformed to fuzzy data 
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with the method of transformational assignment, which was achieved with the 
calibrate function of the QCA package for R, version 1.1-4 (R Development Core 
Team, 2014; Thiem & Duşa, 2013). The threshold for full inclusion was fixed at 10%. 
Hereby, only Italy is assigned a score of 1, a country consistently described as highly 
dependent on Libyan energy (Libya Crisis Rocks Oil Markets 2011; Farge and Lewis 
2011). The crossover threshold is located at 5%. This corresponds to a significant gap 
in the data between Spain (5.65%) and France (3.84%). The anchor for full exclusion 
is fixed at 0%, locating countries that do not import energy from Libya fully out of 
the set. The base variable and the fuzzy membership scores for energy dependence 
are presented in Table 8. 
Table 8. Calibration energy dependence 
cases  raw data  fuzzy membership score 
Belgium  0.46  0.05 
Bulgaria  0  0 
Canada  0  0 
Croatia  0  0 
Czech Republic  0  0 
Denmark  0  0 
Estonia  0  0 
France  3.84  0.38 
Germany  2.17  0.22 
Greece  9.95  0.99 
Hungary  0  0 
Italy  14.78  1 
Latvia  0  0 
Lithuania  0  0 
Luxembourg  0  0 
Netherlands  1.56  0.16 
Norway  0  0 
Poland  0  0 
Portugal  6.34  0.63 
Romania  0  0 
Slovakia  0  0 
Slovenia  0  0 
Spain  5.65  0.57 
Turkey  0  0 
UK  1.32  0.13 
US  0.13  0.01 
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High Energy Dependence (HED) was added to the truth table, which is 
presented in Table 9. The consistency cut-off point is fixed at 0.77. This corresponds 
to the consistency threshold of the analysis presented in the article and is located 
well above the minimum advisable threshold of 0.75. Moreover, the rows above this 
threshold only contain cases that carried a high burden in the operation, providing 
additional evidence for the sufficiency of the corresponding combinations. 
 
Table 9. Truth Table “High Burden”- Energy Dependence 
  Conditions  Consis
-tency 
 Outcome   
 
 LE MS SP AV RE ED HED   HB   
1  1 0 0 1 0 1 0  1.000  1  Norway 
2  1 0 1 0 1 1 1  1.000  1  Italy 
3  1 1 0 0 1 1 0  1.000  1  US 
4  1 1 1 0 0 1 0  1.000  1  France 
5  1 0 0 0 0 1 0  0.972  1  Belgium 
6  1 1 0 1 1 1 0  0.897  1  UK 
7  1 0 0 1 0 0 0  0.788  1  Denmark 
8  1 0 1 0 0 0 1  0.769  0  Spain 
9  0 1 1 0 0 1 1  0.656  0  Greece 
10  1 1 1 0 0 0 0  0.654  0  Turkey 
11  1 0 0 1 1 0 0  0.610  0  Canada, Poland 
12  0 1 1 1 1 1 0  0.455  0  Bulgaria 
13  1 0 0 1 1 1 0  0.426  0  Netherlands 
14  0 0 0 1 0 1 0  0.312  0  Hungary 
15  0 0 0 0 0 1 0  0.152  0 
 
Luxembourg, 
Slovenia 
16  0 0 0 1 1 1 0  0.084  0 
 
Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovakia 
17  0 1 0 0 1 0 0  0.000  0  Croatia 
18  0 1 0 1 0 0 1  0.000  0  Portugal 
19  1 0 0 0 1 1 0  0.000  0  Germany 
LE: Large Economy, MS: Military Spending, SP: Spatial Proximity, AV: Alliance Value, RE: 
Right Executive, ED: Electoral Distance, HED: High Energy Dependence 
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The minimization of the truth table results in the parsimonious and 
intermediate solutions presented in Table 10 and Table 11.1 For the production of 
the intermediate solution, the presence of large economy, military spending, spatial 
proximity, right executive, electoral distance and high energy dependence were 
assumed to contribute to the presence of high burden.  
 
Table 10. Parsimonious solution “High Burden” – Energy Dependence 
  Coverage Consis-
tency 
  
  Raw Unique  Cases 
LE*~RE*ED  0.270 0.066 0.971  Belgium, Norway 
LE*AV*~RE  0.117 0.052 0.891  Norway, Denmark 
LE*SP*ED  0.220 0 0.885  Italy, France 
LE*ED*HED  0.237 0 0.823  Italy 
HED*RE  0.112 0 0.701  Italy 
LE*MS*ED  0.346 0.186 0.971  UK, US, France  
Solution  0.590 0.917   
 
 
Table 11. Intermediate solution “High Burden” – Energy Dependence 
  Coverage Consis-
tency 
  
  Raw Unique  Cases 
LE *MS*ED  0.346 0.243 0.971  France, UK, US 
LE *SP*ED*HED*RE  0.082 0.040 0.800  Italy 
LE*ED*~RE  0.270 0.066 0.971  Belgium, Norway 
LE*AV*~RE  0.117 0.052 0.891  Denmark, Norway 
Solution  0.590 0.919   
 
  
                                                          
1 Multiple models fared equally well in accounting for the data. The presented solutions were 
selected because they do not include the absence of spatial proximity , which is highly 
unlikely to explain the presence of high burden 
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Table 12 represents the truth table for “absence high burden”. The consistency 
cut-off point is fixed at 0.75. This corresponds to the consistency threshold of the 
analysis presented in the article and to the minimum advisable threshold of 0.75. 
Moreover, the rows above this threshold only contain cases that did not carry a high 
burden in the operation, providing additional evidence for the sufficiency of the 
corresponding combinations. 
Table 12. Truth Table “~High Burden”- Energy Dependence 
  Conditions  Consis
-tency 
 Outcome   
 
 LE MS SP AV RE ED HED   ~HB   
1  0 0 0 1 1 1 0  1.000  1  Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovakia 
2  0 1 0 0 1 0 0  1.000  1  Croatia 
3  0 1 0 1 0 0 1  1.000  1  Portugal 
4  0 1 1 1 1 1 0  1.000  1  Bulgaria 
5  1 0 0 0 1 1 0  1.000  1  Germany 
6  1 0 1 0 0 0 1  1.000  1  Spain 
7  0 1 1 0 0 1 1  0.984  1  Greece 
8  0 0 0 0 0 1 0  0.848  1  Luxembourg, 
Slovenia 
9  0 0 0 1 0 1 0  0.796  1  Hungary 
10  1 0 0 1 1 1 0  0.745  0  Netherlands 
11  1 1 1 0 0 0 0  0.472  0  Turkey 
12  1 0 0 0 0 1 0  0.398  0  Belgium 
13  1 0 0 1 1 0 0  0.390  0  Canada, Poland 
14  1 0 1 0 1 1 1  0.339  0  Italy 
15  1 0 0 1 0 0 0  0.212  0  Denmark 
16  1 1 0 1 1 1 0  0.103  0  UK 
17  1 1 1 0 0 1 0  0.017  0  France 
18  1 0 0 1 0 1 0  0.000  0  Norway 
19  1 1 0 0 1 1 0  0.000  0  US 
LE: Large Economy, MS: Military Spending, SP: Spatial Proximity, AV: Alliance Value, RE: 
Right Executive, ED: Electoral Distance, HED: High Energy Dependence 
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The minimization of the truth table results in the parsimonious and 
intermediate solutions presented in Table 13 and Table 14.1  For the production of 
the intermediate solution, the absence of large economy, military spending, spatial 
proximity, right executive, electoral distance and high energy dependence were 
assumed to contribute to the absence of high burden.  
Table 13. Parsimonious solution “~High Burden” – Energy Dependence 
  Coverage Consis-
tency 
  
  Raw Unique  Cases 
~LE  0.781 0.736 0.887  
Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Romania, Czech Republic, 
Portugal, Greece 
~MS*~SP*~AV*RE  0.078 0.014 1.000  Germany 
~MS*~HED*~AV*RE  0.092 0 1.000  Germany 
~MS*~AV*~ED  0.077 0.032 1.000  Spain 
Solution  0.878 0.897   
 
Table 14. Intermediate solution “~High Burden” – Energy Dependence 
  Coverage Consis-
tency 
  
  Raw Unique  Cases 
~LE*~HED  0.715 0.519 0.879  
Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovakia; 
Croatia, Bulgaria; 
Luxembourg, Slovenia, 
Hungary 
~LE*~AV*~RE 
 0.190 0.036 0.895  
Greece, Luxembourg, 
Slovenia 
~LE*~SP*~RE*~ED  0.096 0.030 0.765  Portugal 
~MS*~AV*~RE*~ED  0.066 0.032 1.000  Spain 
~MS*~SP*~AV*RE*~HED  0.078 0.048 1.000  Germany 
Solution  0.862 0.897   
                                                          
1 Multiple models fared equally well in accounting for the data. The presented solutions were 
selected because they do not include the presence of spatial proximity or high energy 
dependence, which are highly unlikely to explain the absence of high burden 
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High energy dependence is an element of several paths towards high burden 
of the parsimonious solution. However, each of them only covers one case, Italy, 
which is also covered by the combination of large economy, spatial proximity and 
electoral distance. The paths that include high energy dependence are thus logically 
redundant, indicating that this condition is not decisive for explaining the division 
of the burden of the Libya operation. Similarly, the absence of high energy 
dependence is included in one path towards the outcome’s absence of the 
parsimonious solution. This path only covers Germany, which is also covered by 
another path towards the outcome. In consequence, it seems appropriate to 
conclude that the level of energy dependence was not decisive for explaining the 
NATO-allies’ contributions to the Libya intervention. 
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Article 4: Democratic Participation in the Air Strikes 
against Islamic State - A Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis 
 
Status: Forthcoming in Foreign Policy Analysis 
 
Abstract 
Although over sixty partners have joined the US-led coalition against the 
Islamic State (IS), only a handful of states was willing to carry out air strikes against 
IS-targets. This article aims to explain the pattern of democratic participation in the 
air campaign. It builds on the rich literature on military burden sharing and 
democratic peace theory to develop a multi-causal model, which is tested with 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis. The results of the analysis suggest that the pattern 
of participation in the air strikes results from a complex interplay between alliance 
politics, threat perception and domestic institutional constraints. The threat posed 
by foreign fighters and a strong interest in a good relationship with the US 
constituted important incentives to participate in the air strikes, while a high level of 
parliamentary involvement in military deployment decisions inhibited participation. 
Furthermore, states that were situated in Russia’s immediate vicinity refrained from 
participating, in spite of their strong dependence on the US’ security guarantee. 
Lastly, the analysis did not provide convincing evidence that partisan politics had an 
impact on participation in the air strikes. 
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Introduction 
On August 7th 2014, the United States launched its first air strikes against the 
Islamic State (IS). Although “Operation Inherent Resolve” started as a unilateral 
intervention, the Obama administration began mobilizing a broad coalition of allies 
as the air campaign intensified. At first glance, its efforts seem very successful: 
Washington managed to enlist 58 countries as members of the “global coalition to 
degrade and defeat ISIL” (Allen, 2014). However, few allies actually committed 
military forces to the coalition. At the time of writing in July 2015, only thirteen 
countries have participated in offensive air operations. In consequence, the US kept 
playing a dominant role in the campaign, carrying out the brunt of the air strikes. 
Many states contributed to the fight against IS in other ways, for example by 
sending arms, ammunition or military instructors to reinforce Iraqi and Kurdish 
forces. However, the financial and political costs of these contributions fall far below 
the burdens involved in participating in combat operations. The latter not only 
entail more sizeable financial costs, but also a considerable risk of negative domestic 
ramifications and electoral punishment by casualty-averse constituencies (Mello, 
2014: 75). Considering these costs and risks, the meekness of most members of the 
anti-IS coalition might not be surprising. Nevertheless, several states did carry out 
air strikes, indicating that these costs were not necessarily insurmountable. 
This article aims to explain the pattern of participation in the air strikes 
against IS. It builds on the rich scholarly literature on military burden sharing and 
democratic peace theory to develop a multi-causal model, which is tested with 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis. The results of the analysis suggest that the threat 
posed by foreign fighters and a strong interest in a good relationship with the US 
constituted important incentives to participate in the air strikes, while a high level of 
parliamentary involvement in military deployment decisions inhibited participation. 
Furthermore, states that were situated in Russia’s immediate vicinity refrained from 
participating, in spite of their strong dependence on the US’ security guarantee. In 
contrast, the analysis did not provide convincing evidence that partisan politics had 
an impact on participation in the air strikes. 
The article proceeds as follows. The first section builds on the comprehensive 
research on military burden sharing and democratic peace theory to develop an 
integrated model for explaining participation in the air strikes against IS. The second 
section justifies the case selection, introduces QCA as an appropriate method to test 
the model and discusses the measurement of the variables. The third section presents 
the results of the analysis, which are interpreted against the backdrop of the 
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theoretical model in the fourth section. Lastly, the study’s major findings are 
recapitulated in the conclusions. 
Theoretical Framework 
The pattern of participation in the air strikes against IS presents a puzzle for 
two of the major theories of multilateral military operations and armed conflict: 
collective action theory and democratic peace theory. Collective action theory has 
dominated research on military burden sharing ever since the seminal article of 
Olson and Zeckhauser (1966). The latter characterized defence as a pure public 
good, which implies that non-contributors cannot be excluded from enjoying its 
benefits. In consequence, states have few incentives to contribute if a state with the 
formidable military might of the US is willing to unilaterally launch an operation. 
The disproportionately large contribution of the US to the combat operations 
against IS corresponds to expectations of the pure public goods model. However, the 
latter cannot explain why several other states contributed to the strike operations, 
instead of taking a free ride off the US. 
Research on democratic peace examines the link between democracy and 
armed conflict. Democratic peace theory contends that there is “something in the 
internal make up of democratic states” that makes them less warlike than semi-
democracies and autocracies (Maoz & Russett, 1993: 626). Although some studies 
have examined whether democracies have less frequent domestic armed conflicts, 
the brunt of democratic peace research focusses on the interstate democratic peace 
(Hegre, 2014: 624). This research almost consistently confirms that democracies 
rarely fight each other, but there is less compelling evidence that democracies are in 
general more peaceful. Since the vast majority of the anti-IS coalition are full-fledged 
democracies, the general hesitancy to participate in the air strikes suggests that 
democracies are indeed reluctant to deploy military means. However, the fact that 
several democracies did carry out air strikes suggests considerable variation among 
established democracies in their propensity to get involved in armed conflict. 
This study builds on more recent strands of the literature on military burden 
sharing and democratic peace to explain the pattern of participation in the air 
strikes. After several authors convincingly argued that the public goods model does 
not fully account for burden sharing decisions, more general joint product and 
integrated multi-causal models were introduced to the study of burden sharing (see 
e.g. Bennett, Lepgold & Unger, 1994; Sandler, 1977; Shimizu & Sandler, 2010). The 
former assumes that military operations produce multiple benefits, varying from 
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purely public to country-specific and private benefits; the latter that contributions to 
multilateral operations are caused by a complex interaction between international 
and domestic level variables. Insights from this line of research are complemented 
with insights from a recent direction in democratic peace research, which seeks to 
explain the varying conflict involvement of established democracies (Chan & Safran, 
2006; Prins & Sprecher, 1999; Schuster & Maier, 2006).  
Balance of Threats 
Integrated models generally invoke the “balance-of-threats hypothesis” to 
explain contributions to multilateral operations (e.g. Auerswald, 2004: 639; Bennett, 
Lepgold & Unger, 1994: 42-44; Davidson, 2011: 174). This hypothesis builds on 
Stephen Walt’s neo-realist theory of alliance formation, which contends that states 
enter alliances to balance against threats (Walt, 1987). In the context of military 
operations, the hypothesis expects states to contribute to operations that counter 
threats to their national interest. The benefits of balancing against threats are only 
gained by states to which the target of the intervention actually poses a threat. Such 
country-specific benefits are taken into account in an alternative to the pure public 
goods model: the joint products model (Sandler and Shimizu 2014: 46). This 
assumes that military operations produce multiple goods, ranging from purely 
public to country-specific and private benefits. If an operation mainly produces 
country-specific joint products, contributions are expected to match the operation’s 
benefits. In line with the balance-of-threats hypothesis, the joint products model 
would thus expect states that faced the highest level of threat to participate in an 
operation. 
The main threat posed by the rise of IS is the increased risk of terrorist attacks. 
Like Afghanistan, Pakistan and other recent targets of US-led interventions, IS-
controlled territory risks becoming a safe haven and training ground for 
international Jihadists (Choi & James, 2014: 6, 9). Countries that have been hit hard 
by Islamic terrorist attacks in the past can be expected to be most responsive to this 
increased terrorist threat (Sandler & Shimizu, 2014: 50). Additionally, a state’s 
concern with the rise of IS might be connected to the number of nationals that have 
gone to fight in Syria and Iraq. Governments and intelligence officials have 
expressed concerns that these volunteers might return home and use their combat 
experience and battle training to carry out attacks in their home countries (Bakker, 
Christophe & Entenmann, 2013: 4). Although it has been argued that “the threat 
presented by foreign fighters has been exaggerated”, research on the subject suggests 
that returning militants pose a risk to their home countries (Byman & Shapiro, 
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2014). Nearly 30% of the individuals involved in the twenty-six terrorist plots 
investigated by de Roy van Zuijdewijn (2014: 64) had been abroad for fighting or 
training. According to Hegghammer (2013: 11), over a quarter of all individuals 
involved in terrorist plots in the West are known to have experience as foreign 
fighters and forty-six per cent of all plots include at least one such veteran. 
Moreover, his data indicates that the presence of foreign fighters in a terrorist plot 
increases the probability that it will actually come to execution, as well as the 
probability that people will get killed in the attack.  
Since the number of western foreign fighters active in Syria is unprecedented 
in modern history, the threat to their home countries should not be underestimated 
(Lister, 2014: 88). Recognizing this threat, however, does not automatically imply it 
constitutes an incentive to participate in the air strikes. In fact, the strike operations 
are likely to increase the probability that returning IS fighters attempt to carry out 
attacks in retaliation (Lister, 2014: 97). However, countries with a large number of 
foreign fighters are likely to perceive the costs of inaction as higher. Not only did 
they experience the problem first hand and, hereby, have undeniable evidence that 
their country is fertile recruiting ground for IS fighters, returning militants also play 
an active role in radicalising new Jihadists (Hegghammer, 2013: 12). In consequence, 
states with a large number of militants active in Syria have the greatest incentive to 
avoid that IS consolidates its territory, attracts more foreign fighters and, hereby, 
becomes an even greater threat to their national security. 
Alliance Politics 
Alliance politics are a second plausible explanatory variable for the pattern of 
participation in the air strikes (e.g. Baltrusaitis, 2010: 205; Bennett, Lepgold & Unger, 
1994: 72). Integrated models generally build on Glenn Snyder’s secondary “Alliance 
Security Dilemma” (1984) to formulate expectations on the link between alliance 
politics and contributions to multilateral operations. This postulates that members 
of military alliances face two countervailing pressures: fear of abandonment and fear 
of entrapment. The former involves the risk of being deserted by an ally; the latter of 
being entangled in a conflict central to the ally’s interests, but peripheral to one’s 
own. A country’s choices in the alliance security dilemma are primarily determined 
by its relative dependence on the ally. The more a state depends on the ally for 
assistance against future security threats, the more likely the costs of abandonment 
will outweigh the costs of entrapment (Walt, 1987: 471-472).  
More recently, scholars have argued that alliance dependence does not 
constitute the only reason for states to provide support to an ally. Davidson (2011: 
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15) prefers the expression “alliance value” over “alliance dependence”, because states 
“may value an ally for myriad reasons and value does no necessarily entail 
dependence”. More specifically, he argues that alliance value also depends on the 
expected influence on an ally, which determines whether they will be “able to 
leverage their ally’s power into outcomes in their favor”. Ringsmose (2010: 330-331) 
agrees with this line of reasoning by arguing that there are two groups of NATO-
allies with a strong interest in a good relationship with the US: “Article 5ers” and 
“Traditional Atlanticists”. The first group comprises the states that focus on NATO’s 
collective defence principle, as enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In 
line with the alliance dependence hypothesis, it comprises states that perceive a 
resurging Russian threat and “realize their security comes in the shape of American 
security guarantees” (Noetzel & Schreer, 2009; Ringsmose, 2010: 331). Atlanticists, 
in turn, are allies who perceive themselves as states with a special relationship with 
Washington, which they consider “an important key to their security and their 
political clout on the international scene” (Ringsmose, 2010: 331). 
States might thus value their alliance with the US because they are dependent 
on the US’ security guarantee or perceive a special relationship with Washington. 
While “Article 5ers” perceive contributions to NATO or US-led operations as “a fee 
to obtain American protection”, “Atlanticists” considerer it “the price of political 
influence” (Ringsmose, 2010: 332). Either way, alliance politics constitute a plausible 
explanation for why states participated in the airstrikes instead of taking a free ride 
off the US’ military might. As argued by Ringsmose (2010: 325), security alliances 
produce excludable benefits: the US can “resort to the intra-alliance threats […], 
generating fear of abandonment and marginalization among the smaller powers”. 
Even if an operation mainly produces purely public benefits, states might still decide 
to participate if its leading policy makers believe that other benefits produced by 
their alliance with the US would otherwise be withheld (Ringsmose, 2010: 330-331). 
Domestic Constraints 
Studies building on integrated models suggest that international-level 
variables like threats and alliance politics “fare pretty well in explaining political 
leaders’ incentives to contribute” (Oma, 2012: 565). However, they consistently 
conclude that domestic-level conditions need to be incorporated to fully account for 
a political leader’s ability to participate. Democratic peace research is highly 
informative on which domestic-level determinants can be expected to matter. A 
more recent direction in this line of research emphasizes the significant variation 
across democratic political systems, which, in turn, is expected to affect their 
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propensity to resort to the use of force (e.g. Prins & Sprecher, 1999). Several scholars 
have argued that executives should be more constrained in parliamentary than in 
presidential systems, while coalition governments should be more constrained than 
single party governments. However, quantitative studies generally did not confirm 
these conjectures (Leblang & Chan, 2003; Reiter & Tillman, 2002: 824).  
Several scholars did find evidence for the impact of another institutional 
variable: the degree of parliamentary involvement in decision-making on the use of 
force. Democratic parliaments are expected to open up governmental decision-
making to public scrutiny, forcing “governments to give reasons for political 
decisions” (Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2008: 4). In consequence, strong 
parliamentary veto powers should significantly restrict a government’s freedom of 
military action. Kesgin and Kaarbo (2010) describe how the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly overturned its government’s decision to permit using Turkey as a base for 
the US intervention in the 2003 Iraq war. Similarly, Reiter and Tillman (2002: 824) 
conclude that “greater legislative controls over foreign policy […] is associated with 
lower propensity to initiate disputes”, while Choi (2010: 438) shows that legislative 
constraints “are likely to discourage democratic executives’ use of force”.  
Recent work on parliamentary war powers has examined the differences 
“among democracies in their respective institutional arrangements regarding 
parliamentary participation in foreign military and security policy” (Dieterich, 
Hummel & Marschall, 2010: 4). Dieterich, Hummel and Marschall (2010: 9-13) 
distinguish four power resources of parliaments regarding security policy making: 
legislative, control, communication and dismissal resources. In a study of European 
involvement in the 2003 Iraq intervention, they find a strong association between 
high parliamentary war powers and weak degrees of war involvement (Dieterich, 
Hummel & Marschall, 2010: 71). Wagner, Peters and Glahn (2010: 18) focus on one 
aspect of parliamentary control: “can parliament veto a deployment that is being 
planned by the executive?”. Although they recognize that such an ex ante veto is not 
the only resource through which parliaments can exert control, Wagner, Peters and 
Glahn (2010: 19) rightfully contend that no other instrument is likely to be as 
effective. 
Partisan politics constitute a second source of cross-democratic variation. 
Since political parties are an essential part of the domestic politics of mature 
democracies, political partisanship can be expected to impact their foreign and 
security policy (Mello, 2014: 37). In a comprehensive study on the creation of a 
European security institution outside NATO, Hofmann (2013: 204) demonstrates 
that ideological orientations structure government preferences in security policy. 
 224 
 
Studies that scrutinize the link between government ideology and military 
intervention also conclude that political partisanship matters for military 
deployment decisions. Palmer, London and Regan (2004) assume that political 
leaders, above all, want to remain in office. Since the electoral platforms of right-
leaning parties are generally more pro-military than the electoral platforms of left-
leaning parties; the former are expected to be more inclined to support the use of 
force. Their results, as well as the successive study of Arena and Palmer (2009), 
confirm this inference. Similarly, the study of Koch and Sullivan (2010) suggests that 
leaders whose base of support is on the left of the political spectrum are more 
constrained by the costs of war fighting, Stevens (2015) demonstrates that the 
potential audience costs of war are greater for left-wing than for right-wing 
governments and Schuster and Maier (2006) conclude that rightist parties were 
more inclined to support the 2003 Iraq war. States governed by a right-leaning 
executive can thus be expected to be more likely to participate in the air strikes 
against IS.  
Several recent studies suggest that partisan politics and parliamentary veto 
power should be analysed in conjunction, rather than independently. Williams 
(2014: 120), for example, argues that opposition parties are more likely to challenge 
ideological dissimilar governments, while Choi (2010: 441) contends that the level of 
parliamentary constraints only increases if legislative veto players and the executive 
have different ideological orientations. Similarly, Mello (2012: 427) integrates 
hypotheses on partisan politics and institutional structures in a sophisticated multi-
causal model, which only expects the combination of parliamentary veto power with 
a left parliament to create an effective veto point against military deployment. In 
contrast, the study of Kesgin and Kaarbo (2010) on Turkey’s involvement in the 
2003 Iraq war shows that parliaments can constitute an effective veto point even if a 
single party government enjoys a parliamentary majority. This finding resonates 
with the research of Auerswald (1999: 475-476; 480), who argues that executives will 
be reluctant to use force if its decision can be hindered or overturned by the 
legislature, irrespective of “the convergence or divergence of executive-legislative 
preferences”.  
Integrated Model 
The pattern of participation in the air campaign is expected to result from a 
complex interplay between the international and domestic variables discussed in the 
previous section. States are expected to have an incentive to participate when they 
consider the rise of IS a significant threat to their national interest or highly value 
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their relationship with the US. These incentives will however only lead to actual 
contributions if combined with a right-leaning executive that does not face a left 
parliament with a veto on military deployment. Figure 1 summarizes these 
expectations in an integrated model. 
Although the model integrates hypotheses from the prevailing theories on 
military intervention, it does not incorporate every possible explanatory variable. 
Most importantly, public opinion is not included in the model. Unfortunately, 
reliable public opinion data are only available for 11 cases. Including public opinion 
would require reducing the sample of cases by two-thirds, significantly impeding the 
generalizability of the study’s results. An empirical test of an alternative model that 
incorporates public opinion was conducted on the reduced sample (cf. appendix 1). 
This demonstrates that public opinion was not decisive for participation in 
Operation Inherent Resolve. 
Research Design 
This section justifies the case selection, introduces the methodological 
approach and discusses the measurement of the variables. 
Case Selection 
The analysis is confined to a specific category of cases: the democratic 
members of the anti-IS coalition. As argued extensively in the democratic peace 
literature, “democratic and non-democratic regimes behave differently in their 
foreign policy” (Leblang & Chan, 2003: 385). In consequence, only democracies are 
expected to share enough background characteristics to be comparable along the 
variables specified in the previous section (Berg-Schlosser & Meur, 2009: 20). 
Furthermore, the expectations on domestic constraints only apply to democracies. In 
line with previous research, states that score eight or more on the Polity IV 
autocracy-democracy scale are considered democracies, resulting in forty-three 
democratic members of the anti-IS coalition, which are presented in Table 1 (Mello, 
2014: 7). 
In line with the possibility principle, only cases where the outcome 
“participation in the air strikes” is possible are included in the analysis (Mahoney & 
Goertz, 2004). Fourteen democracies did not have fighter jets equipped to attack 
ground targets. In consequence, these were excluded as possible contributors. 
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Additionally, Taiwan is excluded from the analysis because comparative data on 
partisan politics is missing. After excluding these states, twenty-eight potential 
democratic participants remain, all of which have combat-capable aircraft and many 
of which participated in recent strike operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq 
and/or Libya. Strikingly however, only eight of them carried out airstrikes against IS. 
Ten months after the first US bombs struck IS targets, none of the remaining 
eighteen democratic members has announced it will participate in offensive air 
operations. 
Table 1. Democratic members coalition against IS 
Country a) 
Combat 
Aircraft b) 
Participate 
 
Country a) 
Combat 
Aircraft b) 
Participate 
United States 2451 Yes  Romania 36 No 
France 294 Yes  Portugal 30 No 
United Kingdom 223 Yes  Bulgaria 28 No 
Australia 95 Yes  Slovakia 20 No 
Canada 77 Yes  Austria 15 No 
The Netherlands 74 Yes  Hungary 14 No 
Belgium 59 Yes  Croatia 10 No 
Denmark 45 Yes  Albania 0 No 
Republic of Korea 468 No  Cyprus 0 No 
Taiwan 416 No  Estonia 0 No 
Turkey 352 No  Iceland 0 No 
Japan 340 No  Ireland 0 No 
Greece 262 No  Kosovo 0 No 
Italy 227 No  Latvia 0 No 
Germany 205 No  Lithuania 0 No 
Spain 168 No  Luxembourg 0 No 
Sweden 134 No  Macedonia 0 No 
Poland 106 No  Moldova 0 No 
Finland 62 No  Montenegro 0 No 
Norway 57 No  New Zealand 0 No 
Serbia 48 No  Slovenia 0 No 
Czech Republic 38 No     
a) Allen, John, R. (2014); Marshall, et. al. (2014)  
b) International Institute for Strategic Studies (2014)  
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Methodological Approach: Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
Whether the integrated model explains the pattern of participation in the air 
strikes is tested with Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), an analytical 
technique that allows for a systematic comparison of a large number of cases on 
three to eight causal conditions. QCA is an adequate methodological choice if are 
good reasons to believe that the phenomenon to be explained is the result of a 
specific kind of causal complexity”, generally described as “multiple conjunctural 
causation” (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 77). Multiple causation implies there are 
multiple paths towards an outcome; conjunctural causation that these paths consist 
of combinations of conditions. In line with the notion of multiple causation, the 
model comprises several pathways towards participation; in line with conjunctural 
causation, these consist of combinations of international and domestic conditions.  
This research builds on the multi-value version of QCA (mvQCA) . Although 
many methodologists initially took a sceptical stance on this QCA-variant, recent 
assessments have shown that mvQCA is a valuable technique for comparative 
analysis (Haesebrouck, 2013; Thiem, 2015). The choice for QCA’s multi-value 
variant is informed by the nature of the conditions and the outcome. The latter 
presents itself in a dichotomous form and, therefore, cannot easily be integrated into 
the fuzzy set variant of QCA (Rihoux et al., 2009: 169; Schneider & Wagemann, 
2012: 277). The original crisp set version of QCA, in turn, only allows dichotomous 
variables, which would entail a significant loss of information for the condition 
“Threat”. Since mvQCA allows combining multichotomous conditions with a 
dichotomous outcome, it is the most suited QCA-variant for this study.  
Measurement and Dichotomisation 
The coding of the outcome depends on whether a country participated in the 
air strikes. Countries that had participated in the air strikes by the end of 2014 are 
assigned a score of 1 on the outcome, the other cases a score of 0 (cf. Table 1). With 
the important exception of the US’s disproportionately large contribution, there are 
no decisive differences in the degree of participation among the democracies that 
carried out air strikes. All participating democratic allies of the US started deploying 
in Autumn 2014 and initially restricted strike operations to Iraq. Canada is the only 
democracy that expanded its operations to Syria, but only decided to do so in April 
2015 (Zenko, 2015). Its contribution of six CF-18 Hornet fighter aircraft, which had 
flown 673 sorties by June 2015, is similar to the contribution of the other 
democracies (Canadian Armed Forces 2015). Belgium, Denmark, and the 
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Netherlands deployed between six and eight F-16s each, which, respectively, had 
flown around 600, 375 and 600 sorties by May 2015 (Ministerie van Defensie 2015; 
Forsvarskommando 2015; Howorth 2015). France contributed nine Rafaele and six 
Mirage fighter aircraft which on average flew 10 to 15 sorties a week.1 Australia 
contributed six F/A-18 Hornets, which carried out around 500 sorties by the end of 
May 2015 (Australian Government Department of Defence 2015). The UK deployed 
eight Tornado fighters and four Reaper drones, which had carried out around 200 
strike operations by the end of March 2015 (Norton-Taylor, 2015). 
The condition “Threat” was divided into three categories, respectively 
corresponding to a high [2], intermediate [1] and low [0] level of threats. Countries 
that suffered a high number of casualties in recent terrorist acts committed by 
individuals tied to Jihadist terrorist groups or with at least 150 foreign fighters are 
coded [2]. Hereby, all countries with a high number of foreign fighters, either 
absolute or relative to their population, are comprised in the category that 
corresponds to high threat. A score of [0] was assigned to cases that had no foreign 
fighters or high-casualty terrorist attacks. An intermediate category [1] was created 
for the cases with over 50 but less than 150 reported foreign fighters. Estimates of 
each country’s foreign fighters and casualties suffered in terrorist acts committed by 
Jihadist terrorist groups between 1993 and 2013 are listed in Table 2. 
Two conditions are included that reflect expectations on alliance politics: 
“Alliance Dependence” and “Alliance Value”. The former comprises the states that 
are dependent on the US’ security guarantee, the latter the states that perceive a 
special relationship with Washington. The coding of both conditions builds on 
scholarly literature, which is very consistent on what states show a strong interest in 
a good relationship with the US (cf. inter alia Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013; Græger 
& Haugevik, 2009; Howorth, 2007: 146-160). Since some of the consulted studies use 
a state’s propensity to commit forces to US-led operations as an indicator of its value 
for its alliance with the US, coding conditions on the basis of these studies might 
seem to result in tautological reasoning. However, the consulted research generally 
bases a state’s relationship with the US on a wider set of indicators, like historical ties 
with the US, the explicit identification of a special relationship with Washington, 
                                                          
1 This contribution was augmented significantly after the Charlie Hebdo Shooting of January 
2015. Between February till April 2015, the French aircraft carrier Charles De Gaulle was 
deployed in the region with an additional twenty strike aircraft. During these two months, 
French flew an average of 60 sorties per week. 
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geographical location or a preference for NATO over alternative security 
institutions.  
 
Table 2. Balance of threats 
 Foreign Fighters Terrorism c)  
Country Estimate a) Per capita b) Attacks Fatalities Threat 
Australia 250 10.8 0 0 2 
Austria 150 17.7 0 0 2 
Belgium 440 39.3 1 0 2 
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 
Canada 100 2.8 1 0 1 
Croatia 0 0 1 1 0 
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 0 
Denmark 150 26.7 0 0 2 
Finland 70 12.9 0 0 1 
France 1200 18.2 3 8 2 
Germany 600 7.4 2 0 2 
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 
Italy 80 1.3 0 0 1 
Japan 0 0 0 0 0 
Norway 60 11.8 0 0 1 
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 
Romania 0 0 0 0 0 
Serbia 70 9.8 0 0 1 
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 
South Korea 0 0 0 0 0 
Spain 100 2.1 1 191 2 
Sweden 180 18.8 3 0 2 
The Netherlands 250 14.9 1 1 2 
Turkey 600 8 32 92 2 
United Kingdom 600 9.4 5 57 2 
United States 100 0.3 3 2997 2 
a) Neumann (2015)  
b) Per million population, based on World Bank (2014) 
c) National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) 
(2013) 
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The East-European countries were assigned a score of 1 on “Alliance 
Dependence”, since they perceive a resurging Russian threat and are dependent on 
NATO’s collective defence provision to balance it (Menon & Lipkin, 2003; Noetzel & 
Schreer, 2009; Ringsmose, 2010). Similarly, Japan and South Korea are dependent on 
support of the US in their longstanding conflicts with respectively China and North 
Korea (Baltrusaitis, 2010: 39-89; Chanlett Avery, 2011; Santoro & Warden, 2015). 
States that are not particularly dependent on the US’ security guarantee, but 
nevertheless perceive themselves as strong Atlanticists are coded 1 on “Alliance 
Value”. This category comprises Australia, Canada, Denmark, Portugal, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom (Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013; Bisley, 2013: 
403; Dobell, 2014: 395; Græger & Haugevik, 2009; Howorth, 2007: 146-160; Massie, 
2014). In line with Ringsmose (2010), Norway was assigned a score of 1 on both 
conditions. Because it shares a border with Russia, Norway is particularly dependent 
on support of the US for its national security. However, it also considers its strong 
relationship with the US as a way “to be heard in the international arena” (Græger, 
2005: 90; Græger & Haugevik, 2009: 20). 
Since an ex ante veto is generally considered the strongest form of 
parliamentary involvement in decisions on the use of force, countries where 
parliament either has a legal or a de facto veto were assigned a score of 1 (Hänggi, 
2004: 14; Mello, 2012: 432). Information on parliamentary veto powers was retrieved 
from the parlcon-dataset (Wagner, Peters & Glahn, 2010). Since this only assigns 
parliamentary war powers up till 2004 and does not include South Korea, this 
information was cross-checked and supplemented with more recent sources (i.a. 
Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013; Born, Fuior & Lazzarini, 2008; Dieterich, Hummel & 
Marschall, 2010; Konishi & Manyin, 2009).  
The level of parliamentary involvement differs significantly amongst the cases, 
ranging from a legal obligation of prior parliamentary consent for all military 
deployments, to the absence of parliamentary involvement in actual decision-
making. Three categories are situated between these two extremes. First, operations 
conducted under formal organizations are exempt from prior parliamentary 
approval in some of the cases. Since the air strikes against IS were conducted by a 
coalition of the willing, no such exception applied to the operation. In consequence, 
these countries were assigned a score of 1. Second, seeking parliamentary approval is 
not a legal norm, but constitutes an unwritten rule in the Netherlands, Norway and, 
since the government’s defeat over military action in Syria in August 2013, the UK. 
Because their governments could not reasonably be expected to participate in the air 
strikes without parliamentary consent, these countries are assigned a score of 1. A 
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third category consists of states with ambiguous legislation, but where parliamentary 
veto powers are generally considered relatively weak. In consequence, these 
countries were coded 0. Table 3 summarizes parliamentary involvement in military 
deployment decisions.  
The coding of the ideological orientation of the cases’ executive and 
parliament draws on the Right-Left (RILE) indicator of the Comparative Manifesto 
Project, which is based on quantitative content analyses of election programmes 
(Volkens et al., 2015). In line with previous studies (Mello, 2012: 436-437; Palmer, 
London & Regan, 2004), party positions (n) were aggregated into an overall measure 
of executive ideological orientation by summing up each government party’s (i) 
ideological position on the RILE scale (rl), weighted by its proportion of the total 
number of government seats (s), as specified in the following equation: 
 sirli
s
n
i=1
. 
Similarly, the positions of the parties represented in parliament (n) were 
aggregated into an overall measure of parliamentary ideological orientation by 
summing up each party’s (j) ideological position on the RILE scale (rl), weighted by 
its proportion of the total number of seats in parliament (s). Executives and 
parliaments with a positive score were coded 1, since a score above 0 corresponds to 
 
Table 3. Parliamentary war power 
Score Parliamentary Powers  Cases 
1 
Legal veto  without exception  
Austria, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Japan,  Serbia, South Korea, 
Spain and Turkey 
Legal veto without relevant 
exception 
 
Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Romania, Slovak Republic and Sweden 
De facto veto  
Netherlands, Norway and United 
Kingdom 
0 
Ambiguous veto   Italy and the United States 
No veto power  
Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, 
Greece, Portugal and Poland. 
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 parties that make more right than left statements in their manifestos. Table 4 
summarizes the aggregated RILE-scores. 
 
Table 4. Party politics 
 Executive Parliament 
Country RILE a) Right RILE a) Right 
Australia 22,98 1 5,74 1 
Austria -9,93 0 -7,75 0 
Belgium -7,15 0 -2,63 0 
Bulgaria -33,84 0 -18,04 0 
Canada 26,27 1 3,98 1 
Croatia -14,73 0 -13,55 0 
Czech Republic -18,96 0 -16,87 0 
Denmark -4,91 0 -3,53 0 
Finland -8,71 0 -8,26 0 
France -32,84 0 -21,63 0 
Germany -7,44 0 -11,41 0 
Greece 23,5 1 7,08 1 
Hungary 13,31 1 4,82 1 
Italy -5,05 0 -11,28 0 
Japan 5,6 1 -1,89 0 
Norway 10,9 1 -9,29 0 
Poland -1,71 0 5,53 1 
Portugal 14,63 1 6,19 1 
Romania -32,03 0 -34,62 0 
Serbia 19,47 1 7,92 1 
Slovakia 1,71 1 2,49 1 
South Korea -9,73 0 -0,15 0 
Spain -3,45 0 -13,51 0 
Sweden 1,46 1 -10,05 0 
The Netherlands 8,59 1 5,91 1 
Turkey -8,97 0 -12,99 0 
United Kingdom 15,52 1 8,46 1 
United States -6,45 0 12,06 1 
a) Based on Volkens et. al. (2015). 
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Analysis and Results 
The mvQCA-procedure proceeds in two steps.1 First, the data is synthesised in 
a truth table, which contains a row for every possible combination of conditions. 
Each case is attributed to the row that corresponds to its specific combination, rows 
without empirical cases are considered logical remainders. The truth table is 
presented in Table 5. 
Subsequently, Boolean algebra is used to minimize the truth table. Depending 
on the remainders included in the process, minimization results in different solution 
types. If all remainders that lead to a less complex solution are incorporated, 
minimization results in the parsimonious solution; if only the remainders that 
correspond to theoretical expectations are incorporated, it results in the intermediate 
formula.2 In line with the suggestion of Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 279), most 
recent QCA applications focus on the latter solution. However, Baumgartner (2015: 
840) has convincingly demonstrated that intermediate solution formulas cannot be 
causally interpreted and argues that resource must be made to the parsimonious 
formula if QCA is applied to test causal hypotheses (Baumgartner, 2015: 854). 
Unfortunately, the parsimonious formula is not without flaws, since it forces 
researchers to introduce untenable simplifying assumptions. 
This study presents both the parsimonious and intermediate solution. The 
former includes the conditions that distinguish combinations that are consistently 
linked to the outcome from those that are not. In line with Ragin and Fiss (2008: 
204), the terms of the parsimonious formula are considered the “core” causal 
conditions. The conditions that are added in the intermediate solution are present in 
the cases that display the outcome and can only be removed by making assumptions 
about logical remainders that are at odds with theoretical expectations. In line with 
Ragin and Fiss (2008: 204), these are considered “complementary” or “contributing” 
conditions.  
  
                                                          
1 The result in this article were generated using the R software, in particular the QCA package 
for R, version 1.1-4 (Duşa and Thiem, 2014; R Development Core Team, 2014; Thiem and 
Duşa, 2013). 
2 If no remainders are incorporated, this results in the “complex solution”. The latter is 
presented in Appendix 2. 
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Table 5. Truth table 
  Conditions  Outcome   
Row  TH AD AV RE RP PV  Strike  cases 
1  2 0 0 0 0 0  1  Belgium, France 
2  2 0 1 1 1 1  1  Netherlands, UK 
3  2 0 0 0 1 0  1  US 
4  1 0 1 1 1 0  1  Canada 
5  2 0 1 1 1 0  1  Australia 
6  2 0 1 0 0 1  1  Denmark 
7  2 0 0 0 0 1  0  Austria, Germany, 
Spain, Turkey 
8  0 1 0 0 0 1  0  Bulgaria ,Czech 
Republic, Slovakia 
9  0 1 0 1 1 1  0  Hungary, Romania, 
South Korea 
10  1 0 0 0 0 0  0  Italy 
11  0 0 0 1 1 0  0  Greece 
12  1 0 0 1 1 0  0  Serbia 
13  0 0 0 0 0 1  0  Croatia 
14  1 0 0 0 0 1  0  Finland 
15  2 0 0 1 0 1  0  Sweden 
16  0 1 0 0 1 0  0  Poland 
17  0 1 0 1 0 1  0  Japan 
18  0 0 1 1 1 0  0  Portugal 
19  1 1 1 1 0 1  0  Norway 
TH: Threat, AD: Alliance Dependence, AV: Alliance Value, RE: Right Executive, RP: Right 
Parliament, PV: Parliamentary Veto. 
 
Table 6 and 7 present the intermediate and parsimonious solutions for 
respectively the presence and the absence of the outcome.1 Two descriptive measures 
                                                          
1 The following assumptions were made for the production of the intermediate solution. The 
presence of a high or intermediate “Threat”, “Alliance Value”, “Alliance Dependence”, “Right 
Parliament” and “Right Executive” were linked to participation, as was the absence of 
“Parliamentary Veto”. 
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are used to evaluate both solution types: consistency and coverage.1 The former 
provides a descriptive measure of the extent to which the empirical data confirms 
that the solution consistently produces the outcome and approaches unity as the 
data provides stronger evidence. Coverage describes the relevance of the formulas 
and approaches unity as a causal path becomes more relevant. 
The parsimonious solution of the outcome’s presence shows that the 
combination of a high “Threat” with either the absence of “Parliamentary Veto” or 
the presence of “Alliance Value” constitute core causal paths towards participation. 
The intermediate solution indicates that these are not linked to contributing 
conditions. The third and fourth path of the parsimonious solution show that the 
combination of “Alliance Value” and an intermediate “Threat” with either the 
absence of “Parliamentary Veto” or the absence of “Alliance dependence” also 
constitute core causal paths. Both are linked to two contributing conditions: “Right 
Executive” and “Right Parliament”.  
The analysis of the outcome’s absence demonstrates that four core causal 
paths consistently lead to non-participation. The first core causal path constitutes of 
“Alliance Dependence”, which is linked to two contributing conditions: 
“Parliamentary Veto” and absence of “Right Parliament”. The second core causal 
path, the absence of “Threat”, is linked to three (combinations of) contributing 
conditions: absence “Alliance Dependence” and the combination of absence 
“Alliance Value” with either “Right Executive” absent or “Parliamentary Veto” 
present. The third causal path combines the absence of “Alliance Value” with 
“Parliamentary Veto”. The intermediate solution indicates it is linked to two sets of 
contributing conditions: the absence of “Threat” and the combination of absence 
“Alliance Dependence” with absence “Right Parliament”. The combination of 
absence “Alliance Value” with intermediate “Threat” constitutes the fourth core 
casual path, which is linked to one contributing condition: absence “Alliance 
Dependence”. 
                                                          
1 Consistency and coverage are respectively calculated with the formula 
∑ ( min  (Xi,Yi) ∑ (Xi)⁄  and ∑ ( min  (Xi,Yi) ∑ (Yi)⁄ , in which X denotes the membership 
scores in the causal combination and Y the scores in the outcome. 
  
 
 
Table 6. Parsimonious and intermediate solution “Air Strikes” 
  Parsimonious Solution  Intermediate solution   
   Coverage Consis-
tency 
  Coverage Consis-
tency 
 
Cases Path   Raw Unique   Raw Unique  
1 
 
TH{2}*AV{1} 0.5 0.375 1  TH{2}*AV{1} 0.5 0.375 1  
Denmark, 
Netherlands, UK, 
Australia 
2 
 
TH{2}*PV{0} 0.5 0.375 1  TH{2}*PV{0} 0.5 0.375 1  
Belgium, France, 
US, Australia, 
3  TH{1}*AV{1}*AD{0} 0.125 0 1  TH{1}*AV{1}*AD{0} 
*PV{0}*RE{1}*RP{1} 
0.125 0.125 1 
 
Canada 
4  TH{1}*AV{1}*PV{0} 0.125 0 1   
  Total 1 1  Total 1 1   
TH: Threat, AD: Alliance Dependence, AV: Alliance Value, RE: Right Executive, RP: Right Parliament, PV: Parliamentary Veto. 
Multiplication “*” refers to conjunction of conditions; Cases in brackets are only covered by the specific path in the parsimonious solution, 
not in the intermediate solution 
 
  
  
 
Table 7. Parsimonious and intermediate solution “No Air Strikes” 
  Parsimonious Solution  Intermediate solution  
   Coverage Consis-
tency 
  Coverage Consis-
tency 
Cases 
Path   Raw Unique   Raw Unique 
1 
 
AD{1} 0.45 0.05 1  AD{1}*PV{1}*RP{0} 0.05 0.05 1 
Norway (Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Japan, 
Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia; South Korea) 
2 
 
TH{0} 0.55 0.1 1  
TH{0}*AD{0} 0.15 0.10 1 Greece, Portugal, Croatia 
TH{0}*AV{0}*RE{0} 0.25 0.05 1 
Poland, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia 
TH{0}* AV{0}*PV{1} 0.4 0.2 1 
Hungary, Japan, Slovakia, 
Romania, South Korea 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic,  
3 
 
AV{0}*PV{1} 0.70 0.25 1  
AV{0}*PV{1}*AD{0}*RP{0} 0.35 0.25 1 
Austria, Germany, Spain, 
Sweden, Turkey, Croatia, 
Finland  
4  AV{0}*TH{1} 0.15 0.1 1  AV{0}*TH{1}*AD{0} 0.15 0.1 1 Italy, Serbia, Finland  
  Total 1 1  Total 1 1   
TH: Threat, AD: Alliance Dependence, AV: Alliance Value, RE: Right Executive, RP: Right Parliament, PV: Parliamentary Veto.; 
Multiplication “*” refers to conjunction of conditions; Cases in brackets are only covered by the specific path in the parsimonious solution, 
not in the intermediate solution. 
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Interpretation 
Arriving at intermediate and parsimonious formulas is not the ultimate goal 
of QCA (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 280). Instead, solutions must be related 
back to the cases and theoretical expectations (Rihoux & De Meur, 2009: 65). The 
results of the QCA confirm that alliance politics, threats and parliamentary veto 
power are vital determinants for participation in the air strikes. In contrast, the 
results do not decisively demonstrate a link between partisan politics and 
participation in the air strikes. 
The pattern of participation in the air strikes against IS does not convincingly 
confirm that executive or parliamentary ideology was decisive for participation in 
the air strikes. The parsimonious solutions of the outcome’s presence and absence 
do not include a single condition on political partisanship, indicating that ideological 
differences were not necessary to distinguish participants from non-participants. 
The intermediate solutions do include conditions on ideology. In line with 
theoretical expectations, the absence of either “Right Executive” or “Right 
Parliament” are contributing conditions of the first three paths for the outcome’s 
absence, while their presence is a contributing condition of the third and fourth core 
causal path towards participation in the air strikes. The latter are the only 
combinations for participation that include an intermediate rather than a high level 
of threats, suggesting that right-leaning executives require fewer threats to resort to 
the use of force. However, since it was not included in the parsimonious formulas, 
the incorporation of “Right Executive” could be an artefact of the theoretical 
assumptions made for the production of the intermediate solution. 
The lack of conclusive evidence that links partisan politics to participation 
might be related to the nature of the operation against IS, which differs significantly 
from the cases that are generally included in studies that link military deployment to 
government ideology. The latter generally focus on militarized interstate disputes or, 
more recently, on the 2003 Iraq war. Unlike the latter, the operation against IS does 
not constitute “a typical case for a conflict over which to expect partisan dispute” 
(Mello, 2012: 426). One of the reasons why the military operation was launched in 
August 2014 was the deteriorating humanitarian crisis in Northern Iraq (Henderson, 
2014: 209).1 In a comprehensive study on the link between partisan politics and 
                                                          
1 In the course of July 2014, IS had carried out horrific genocidal attacks on a range of 
Chrisian and Yezidi towns, forcing them to retreat to Mount Sinjar (Stansfield, 2014: 1337). 
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participation in peace enforcement operations, Rathbun (2004: 197, cf. also Rathbun, 
2007: 399) argues that leftist parties are actually more likely to support humanitarian 
interventions, since they consider the promotion of welfare of other countries part of 
their national interest. Right-leaning parties, on the other hand, have a more 
exclusive conception of their national interest and, therefore, only support 
operations if more narrow national interests are at stake. Since the operation against 
IS pursued humanitarian goals and countered a threat to the participants’ interests, 
both left and right-leaning parties had reasons to support the operation. In 
consequence, the air strikes definitely do not constitute a most likely case for the 
hypotheses on partisan politics. 
The results are less ambiguous with regards to the other domestic-level 
variable: parliamentary veto power. The absence of a legislative veto is a core causal 
condition of two paths towards the presence of the outcome, while its absence 
constitutes a core and/or contributing condition of several paths towards its absence. 
In line with the expectations of Auerswald (1999) and conclusions of Kesgin and 
Kaarbo (2010), the analyses show it is a relevant condition, irrespective of partisan 
politics. However, the first and last two core causal paths demonstrate that the 
prospect of legislative meddling did not inhibit participation if the combination of a 
strong threat and high alliance value provided states a strong incentive to participate. 
The results clearly confirm the balance-of-threats hypothesis. Every causal 
path of the parsimonious solution for the outcome’s presence includes either strong 
or intermediate threats, while the parsimonious solution for the outcome’s absence 
shows that the absence of threats is sufficient for non-participation. A high threat 
generally implied a relatively large number of foreign fighters, which suggests the 
latter constitutes a vital incentive for states to participate. This is remarkable, since 
experts have warned that Western intervention is “a great recruiting sergeant” for 
Islamic extremists and the air strikes increased the probability of terrorist attacks by 
returning IS fighters (Byman & Shapiro, 2014; Lister, 2014: 97; Witney, 2014). 
Nevertheless, the pattern of participation is clearly linked to the number of foreign 
fighters. 
Anecdotal evidence further confirms that foreign fighters were an important 
determinant for participation in the air strikes. An official at the Belgian ministry of 
foreign affairs, for example, suggested that the threat of returning foreign fighters 
was the single most important reason why Belgium participated in the air strikes.1 
                                                          
1 Author’s interview, Belgian ministry of foreign affairs, 21/11/2014. 
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Similarly, British Prime Minister Cameron has called the risk of British Islamist 
radicals returning from Syria and Iraq to attack Britain “the biggest national security 
threat”, while Australian Prime Minister Abbott announced that Australia would 
contribute fighter jets to the US-led coalition shortly after the Australian police 
foiled a plot by Islamic State jihadists to conduct “demonstration killings” (Feast, 
2014; Winning, 2014). Conversely, when the Czech Republic announced it would 
not participate in the air strikes against IS, its police president announced that IS did 
not pose a threat to the Czech Republic and there was no information that anyone 
from its territory was participating in the activities of the Islamic State (Willoughby, 
2014). 
Finally, the results suggest remarkable inferences on the link between alliance 
politics and military deployment. “Alliance Value” was a causal ingredient of several 
paths towards participation, while “Alliance Dependence” was sufficient for non-
participation. In line with theoretical expectations, perceiving a special relationship 
with Washington thus constituted an important incentive to participate. Strikingly 
however, dependence on the US’ security guarantee actually inhibited contributions. 
This is especially surprising for the so-called “Article 5ers” (cf. supra). Because of 
Russia’s interventions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine in the first half of 2014, the 
perceived threat for countries situated in Russia’s vicinity was at a post-Cold War 
height at the time Washington was mobilizing allies to fight IS (Allison, 2014: 1255). 
In consequence, the “Article 5ers” should be most likely cases of the alliance 
dependence hypothesis. The latter expects greater tension with an adversary to 
increase a state’s dependence on an ally, which, in turn, should increase a state’s 
propensity to provide support to its partners (Kupchan, 1988: 330-333; Snyder, 1984: 
472).  
A possible explanation for the non-participation of the “Article 5ers” is the 
waning commitment of the Central and Eastern European states to the transatlantic 
alliance. While these countries loyally supported the US during the first two decades 
after the fall of communism, the close ties with the US began to unravel after 2008 
(Longhurst, 2013; Mikulova & Simecka, 2013). The waning Atlanticism in the region 
was caused by the rebalancing of the United States’ foreign policy priorities away 
from Europe and the attempt at the beginning of the first Obama administration to 
“reset” relations with Russia, which inflicted the fear that the US would be less prone 
to take the Central and Eastern European countries’ security concerns seriously 
(Longhurst, 2013). However, at the time when the US was enlisting allies against IS, 
Washington announced several measures to enhance the credibility of its security 
guarantees. Most importantly, the US launched the European Reassurance Initiative, 
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which finances the stationing of military equipment and a rotating US presence in 
Eastern Europe (Lorenz, 2014). In consequence, countries situated in the region had 
few reasons to doubt the US’ commitment to their security when deciding on 
participation in the air strikes.  
A second, more plausible, explanation for the lack of Eastern European 
contributions is that their fighter jets were not sufficiently equipped for the 
intervention. According to the World Air Forces 2015 Report, the air forces of 
Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia are still comprised of outdated MiG 21s and MiG 
29s (Flightglobal, 2015). Other Eastern European states did have the required 
military capacity to participate. Poland, for example, has a fleet of thirty-six F16s, 
while Hungary and the Czech Republic each have twelve Gripen-C aircraft (Bell & 
Hendrickson, 2012). In the run-up to the 2011 intervention in Libya, Poland and the 
Czech Republic claimed their pilots were insufficiently trained to participate, which 
could be the reason for not participating in the air strikes against IS (Bell & 
Hendrickson, 2012: 159; Chivviss, 2014: 75). However, Norway, the only none 
Eastern European “Article 5er”, clearly did not face such technical obstacles, since its 
fighter jets accounted for a significant share of the air strikes during the air campaign 
in Libya (Chivviss, 2014: 190). 
The most convincing explanation seems that the “Article 5ers” were not 
willing to dispatch fighter jets to a foreign theatre amid increasing tensions with 
Russia. According to Neubauer et al. (2014), this is the actual reason why Norway 
only provided non-lethal assistance to the international coalition against IS. 
Likewise, Poland’s Deputy Minister of Defence stressed that the Russian-Ukrainian 
conflict was its country’s prime concern when he announced in February 2015 that 
Poland was still not willing to take part in combat operations against IS (Döring & 
Manow, 2015). Instead of deploying their military assets to demonstrate their 
commitment to the US, the “Article 5ers” thus chose to use them to balance Russian 
aggression. This does not contradict the alliance security dilemma, it only suggests 
there was no credible threat of abandonment. When introducing the alliance 
security dilemma, Snyder (1984: 474) actually argued that the risk of abandonment 
decreases if “the allies' interests that are in conflict with the adversary are shared”. 
Russia’s military interventions in Ukraine brought both the “Article 5ers” and the 
United States’ interests clearly in conflict with Russia (Heisbourg, 2015). In 
consequence, the fear of abandonment was minimized and keeping their fighter jets 
at home to deter possible Russian aggression became the most rational option for the 
“Article 5ers”. 
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Conclusions 
Why did some democratic members of the anti-IS coalition participate in the 
air campaign, while others did not? This study built on integrated burden sharing 
models and democratic peace research to develop a multi-causal framework for 
explaining democratic participation in the air strikes against IS. Its results suggest 
thought-provoking conclusions on the determinants of democratic participation in 
the air strikes. First, only democracies that had reason to perceive the rise of IS as a 
threat to their national interest participated in the operation. Remarkably, the 
analysis suggests that threat perceptions are linked to the number of foreign fighters 
in Iraq and Syria, indicating that these constituted a vital determinant for 
participation in the air campaign. Second, states with a strong interest in a good 
relationship with the US were generally inclined to participate in the operation. 
Strikingly however, this was not the case for countries that are dependent on the US’ 
security guarantees to balance Russian aggression. Given Russia’s aggressive actions 
in Ukraine, this suggests that alliance dependence does not incite contributions if the 
allies’ interests are threatened by a common adversary. Lastly, the analysis shows 
that, in the absence of strong international-level incentives, a high level of 
parliamentary involvement in military deployment decisions kept governments from 
participating. In contrast to inferences of prior research, such institutional 
constraints mattered irrespective of partisan politics. 
While the results of this study apply to all democratic members of the 
international coalition against IS, not all conclusions can easily be generalized 
beyond the scope of Operation Inherent Resolve. Given the unprecedented number 
of foreign fighters active in Syria, the operation is a most likely case for the link 
between foreign fighters and military deployment decisions. Since evidentiary 
support from a most likely case provides only limited inferential leverage, 
prospective research is necessary to assert whether this inference holds in conflicts 
with fewer foreign fighters (Levy, 2008: 12). Conversely, since both left and right-
leaning parties had reasons to support the operation, the operation does not 
constitute a most-likely case for partisan dispute. In consequence, the lack of support 
for the impact of partisan politics does not clearly contradict the results of studies 
that did establish a link between ideology and military intervention. However, it does 
confirm the conclusions of Martini (2015: 432) and Mello (2014: 38), who 
respectively argued that the impact of ideology is “tied to the context of the 
intervention” and that “political conflict does not arise equally over all types of 
military operations”. Given the resurgent Russian threat, the air strikes against IS did 
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constitute a most-likely case for the alliance dependence hypothesis. In consequence, 
the lack of support for this hypothesis does provide substantial theoretical leverage. 
 In line with one of hallmarks of Foreign Policy Analysis scholarship, the study 
indicates that integrating variables situated at both the domestic and international 
level is necessary to fully understand foreign policy decision making (Hudson, 2005: 
2, 6; Rosenau, 1968: 311-312). Moreover, this study showed that QCA provides a 
useful methodological tool to test propositions about foreign policy behaviour across 
political systems, allowing for “modest generalizations” on the impact of variables 
situated at different levels of analysis (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009: 11-12; Rosenau, 
1968: 308). An important downside of a logical method like QCA is that it does not 
explain the complex processes underlying foreign policy decisions. Prospective 
research that assesses how alliance politics, threat perceptions and institutional 
constraints were “funnelled through the subjective understandings” of domestic 
decision-makers would therefore serve as a valuable complement to this study 
(Kaarbo, 2015: 20). 
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Appendices: Democratic Participation in the Air 
Strikes against Islamic State - A Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis 
Appendix 1: Analysis Public Opinion 
This appendix presents an alternative analysis, in which public opinion is 
included as a causal condition. First, theoretical expectations on public opinion are 
discussed. Subsequently, the research design and the results of the QCA are 
presented and interpreted against the backdrop of the theoretical expectations.  
Public Opinion and Participation in Military Operations 
In contrast to the analysis presented in the main article, this analysis includes 
public opinion as an explanatory variable. Since “public opinion is central to 
representation, democratic accountability and decision-making”, it should be self-
evident that it has an impact on the contributions of democracies to multinational 
operations (Aldrich et al., 2006:477, Mello, 2014:40-41). Nevertheless, many scholars 
are sceptical on the link between public opinion and foreign policy. 
In a comprehensive review of scholarly research on the link between public 
opinion and foreign policy, Holsti (1992) argues that public opinion was regarded as 
highly volatile, incoherent and not very important for foreign policy decisions 
during the first two decades after World War II. Since the end of the 1960s, an 
increasing number of scholars has challenged this pessimistic view. Results of 
Ostrom and Job (1986:556-57) and James and Oneal (1991), for example, show that 
public aversion to war is negatively related to the probability of the use of force; 
Baum (2004:221) concludes that public opinion had a constraining effect on the 
policies of the Bush and Clinton administration during the crisis in Somalia and 
Mello (2014:187) asserts that public support was vital for explaining contributions to 
the operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo. Other recent studies however conclude 
that public opinion only had a very limited impact on military deployment. Kreps 
(2010:191), for example, contends that “public opinion hardly matters for NATO-led 
Operations in Afghanistan”, while Auerswald and Saideman (2014:21, 213) argue 
that public support does not covary with the pattern of participation in the 
operations in Afghanistan and Libya. 
Risse-Kappen (1991:480-86) steers a middle ground between the sceptic and 
optimistic view on the link between public opinion and foreign policy. Rather than 
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assuming that “the general public has a measurable and distinct impact on the 
foreign policy-making process” or, conversely, that “popular consensus is a function 
of the elite consensus”, he argues that domestic structures and coalition-building 
processes must be taken into account to understand the impact of public opinion. 
More specifically, Risse-Kappen (1991) maintains that public demands have more 
impact in states with “fragmented political institutions”, in which executive power is 
not centralized in the hands of one decision-maker. In line with these assertions, 
studies that build on integrated models suggest that parliamentary war powers 
especially constrain governments in combination with popular opposition to 
military deployment. Mello (2014:34, 41), Bennett, Lepgold and Unger (1994:71) and 
Baltrusaitis (2010:26-27) for example argue that executives are more responsive to 
public opinion if the legislature yields a great deal of influence on military 
deployment decisions. Conversely, Dieterich and Marschall (2008:5) maintain that 
“only in cases of overwhelming public war aversion are parliaments expected to 
exercise their veto powers in order to prevent the participation in such a military 
mission”.  
Research Design and Results 
The analysis only includes the eleven democracies for which reliable public 
opinion data is available. “Public support” was operationalized by subtracting the 
percentage of survey respondents who opposed participation in the air strikes from 
the percentage of respondents who supported participation. Cases with a positive 
result are assigned a score of 1, cases with a negative result a score of 0.  Table 1 lists 
public opinion on participation for the eleven countries for which reliable data is 
available. 
Since public opinion might be affected by public relations efforts of 
governments that have decided to participate in the operation, only public opinion 
before a state’s decision to participate is taken into account. Hereby, wrong 
conclusions on the direction of the causal relation between participation and public 
opinion are avoided (Holsti, 1992:453). The operationalization of public opinion is 
based on the latest poll before a government announced it would participate. This is 
because public opinion on participation was highly volatile and influenced by events 
that could not have been foreseen by the governments. For example, while only 39% 
of the French approved participation in the air strikes at the end of August, support 
for intervention rose to 53% after French jets had struck their first IS targets mid 
September and even surged to 70% after an Algerian Islamist group beheaded a 
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French tourist at the end of September (Irish, 2014; Regan, 2014; Williams, 2014).  
 
Table 1. Public support 
Country Approve Disapprove 
Net Public 
Support 
Public 
Support 
Australiaa) 54 46 8 1 
Canadab) 64 36 28 1 
Denmarkc) 42 36 6 1 
Finlandc) 26 50 -24 0 
Francec) 39 44 -5 0 
Germanyc) 26 63 -37 0 
Norwayc) 40 36 4 1 
Swedenc) 34 44 -10 0 
Turkeyd) 52 29 23 1 
United Kingdomc) 42 37 5 1 
United Statese) 45 46 -1 0 
a) Roy Morgan Research (2014) 
b) Ipsos (2014a) 
c) William (2014) 
d) Metrolpoll Group (2014) 
e) Clement (2014) 
 
Similarly, in response to the beheading of British hostages, public approval of UK air 
strikes rose from 37% in the beginning of August to 57% at the end of September 
(Dahlgreen, 2014).  
Because the analysis focusses on a smaller and more homogenous set of cases, 
two additional adjustments were made to the operationalization of the causal 
conditions. First, all cases had foreign fighters. In consequence there were only cases 
with a high level of threats and cases with an intermediate level of threats. The 
former were assigned a score of 1, the latter a score of 0. Second, in order to keep the 
number of logical remainders at an acceptable level, the condition “Alliance 
Dependence” is not included in the analysis. In fact, only one of the cases had a score 
of 1 on this condition: Norway. The resulting truth table is presented in Table 2. The 
minimization of the truth table results in the parsimonious, intermediate and 
complex solutions for the outcome’s presence and absence, respectively presented in 
Table 3 and 4 
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Table 2. Truth table 
    Conditions  Outcome    
Row   AV TH RE RP PV PS   Air Strikes  Cases 
1   0 0 0 0 0 0   1  France 
2   0 0 1 0 0 0   1  US 
3   1 1 1 0 1 1   1  Canada 
4   1 1 1 0 1 1   1  Australia 
5   1 1 0 1 1 1   1  Denmark 
6   1 1 1 1 1 1   1  UK 
7   0 0 0 1 0 0   1  Finland 
8   0 0 0 1 0 0   1  Germany 
9   1 0 0 1 0 0   0  Sweden 
10   0 0 0 1 1 1   0  Turkey 
11   1 1 0 1 1 1   0  Norway 
TH: Threat, AD: Alliance Dependence, AV: Alliance Value, RE: Right Executive, RP: 
Right Parliament, PV: Parliamentary Veto, PS: Public Support. 
 
Interpretation 
The pattern of participation in the air strikes against IS does not convincingly 
confirm that public support was decisive for participation in the air strikes. Neither 
the parsimonious solutions for the outcome’s presence or the outcome’s absence 
include public support, indicating that it is not necessary to distinguish participants 
from non-participants. The intermediate solutions do include public support. In line 
with theoretical expectations, its presence is included in the second and third 
combination for air strikes, while its absence is included in the second combination 
for no air strikes. However, this rather seems a consequence of the directional 
assumption made for the production of the intermediate solution. In fact, the first 
combination of the complex solution for the outcome’s presence shows that the lack 
of public support not necessarily impedes participation. Similarly, the fourth 
combination of the complex solution for the outcome’s absence shows that public 
support is not consistently associated with participation. 
  
 
 
Table 3. Analytical results “Air Strikes” 
   Coverage Consis-
tency 
  
  Raw Unique  cases 
Parsi-
monious 
1 PV{0}  0.667 0.500 1.000  
France, US, Canada, 
Australia 
2 AV{1}*TH{0}  0.500 0.333 1.000  Australia, Denmark, UK 
 Solution  1.000 1.000   
Interme-
diate 
1 PV{0}*TH{1}  0.500 0.333 1.000  France, US, Australia 
2 PS{1}*AV{1}*TH{1}  0.500 0.333 1.000  Australia, Denmark, UK 
3 PS{1}*PV{0}*RP{1}*RE{1}*AV{1}  0.333 0.167 1.000  Canada, Australia 
 Solution  1.000 1.000   
Complex 
1 PS{0}*PV{0}*RE{0}*AV{0}*TH{1}  0.333 0.333 1.000  France, US 
2 PS{1}*PV{0}*RP{1}*RE{1}*AV{1}  0.333 0.167 1.000  Canada, Australia 
3 PS{1}*RP{1}*RE{1}*AV{1}*TH{1}  0.333 0.167 1.000  Australia, UK 
4 PS{1}*PV{1}*RP{0}*RE{0}*AV{1}*TH{1}  0.167 0.167 1.000  Denmark 
 Solution  1.000 1.000  
TH: Threat, AD: Alliance Dependence, AV: Alliance Value, RE: Right Executive, RP: Right Parliament, PV: Parliamentary Veto, PS: Public 
Support. 
 
 
  
 
Table 4. Analytical results “No Air Strikes” 
   Coverage Consis-
tency 
  
  Raw Unique  cases 
Parsi-
monious 
 
1 PV{1}*AV{0}  0.800 0.600 1.000  
Finland, Germany, 
Sweden, Turkey 
2 PV{1}*TH{0}  0.400 0.200 1.000  Finland, Norway 
 Solution  1.000    
Interme-
diate 
 
1 PV{1}*RP{0}*TH{0}  0.400 0.200 1.000  Finland, Norway 
2 PS{0}*PV{1}*RP{0}*AV{0}  0.600 0.200 1.000  
Finland, Germany, 
Sweden 
3 PV{1}*RP{0}*RE{0}*AV{0}  0.600 0.200 1.000  
Finland, Germany, 
Turkey 
 Solution  1.000 1.000   
Complex 
 
1 PS{0}*PV{1}*RP{0}*AV{0}*TH{1}  0.400 0.200 1.000  Germany, Sweden 
2 PS{0}*PV{1}*RP{0}*RE{0}*AV{0}  0.400 0.200 1.000  Finland, Germany 
3 PV{1}*RP{0}*RE{0}*AV{0}*TH{1}  0.400 0.200 1.000  Germany, Turkey 
4 PS{1}*PV{1}*RP{0}*RE{1}*AV{1}*TH{0}  0.200 0.200 1.000  Norway 
 Solution  1.000 1.000  
TH: Threat, AD: Alliance Dependence, AV: Alliance Value, RE: Right Executive, RP: Right Parliament, PV: Parliamentary Veto, PS: Public 
Support. 
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Conclusion 
The pattern of participation in the air strikes against IS confirms the sceptical 
view on the link between public opinion and foreign policy. However, the analysis’ 
conclusion cannot easily be generalized beyond the specific case of the anti-IS 
coalition. In fact, there was no strong opposition against participation in any of the 
participating states. There were two participants where opponents of participation 
outnumbered supporters: France and the US. However, this was only with a very 
narrow margin (cf. Table 1). Moreover, in spite of being divided or opposed towards 
their own militaries taking part, public opinion generally supported the air strikes 
(Ipsos, 2014b). In consequence, the air strikes against IS definitely do not constitute 
a most-likely case of public constraints on foreign policy decisions. 
 
  
 
Appendix 2: Complex Solutions 
 
 
Table 1. Complex solution “Air Strikes” 
  Coverage Consis-
tency 
  
  Raw Unique  cases 
AV{0}*AD{0}*PV{0}*RE{0}*TH{2}  0.375 0.375 1.000  Belgium, France, US 
AV{1}*AD{0}*RP{1}*RE{1}*TH{2}  0.375 0.375 1.000  Netherlands, UK, Australia 
AV{1}*AD{0}*PV{0}*RP{1}*RE{1}*TH{1}  0.125 0.125 1.000  Canada 
AV{1}*AD{0}*PV{1}*RP{0}*RE{0}*TH{2}  0.125 0.125 1.000  Denmark 
Solution  1.000 1.000   
 
  
  
 
Table 2. Complex solution “No Air Strikes” 
  Coverage Consis-
tency 
  
  Raw Unique  Cases 
AD{0}*PV{0}*RP{1}*RE{1}*TH{0}  0.100 0.100 1.000  Greece; Portugal 
AV{0}*AD{0}*PV{1}*RP{0}*TH{2}  0.250 0.250 1.000  Austria,  Germany,  Spain,  Turkey; Sweden 
AV{0}*AD{0}*RP{0}*RE{0}*TH{1}  0.100 0.100 1.000  Italy; Finland 
AV{0}*AD{1}*PV{1}*RE{1}*TH{0}  0.200 0.200 1.000  Hungary,  Romania,  South Korea; Japan 
AV{0}*PV{1}*RP{0}*RE{0}*TH{0}  0.200 0.200 1.000  Bulgaria,  Czech Republic,  Slovakia; Croatia 
AV{0}*AD{0}*PV{0}*RP{1}*RE{1}*TH{1}  0.05 0.050 1.000  Serbia 
AV{0}*AD{1}*PV{0}*RP{1}*RE{0}*TH{0}  0.05 0.050 1.000  Poland 
AV{1}*AD{1}*PV{1}*RP{0}*RE{1}*TH{1}  0.05 0.050 1.000  Norway 
Solutions  1.000 1.000   
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Abstract 
Contrary to what Europe’s image as a civilian or soft power suggests, the EU 
member states have had 50,000– 100,000 troops deployed outside of their home 
countries for most of the post-Cold War period. Although the vast majority of these 
troops was active in operations with a strong European presence, there is significant 
variation in the member states’ patterns of military engagement. This study provides 
a systematic analysis of the member states’ contributions to military operations. 
More specifically, it examines which (combinations of) conditions consistently led to 
participation in EUFOR Congo, UNIFIL II, EUFOR Chad, the 2011 military 
intervention in Libya and the air strikes against the Islamic State. Methodologically, 
it builds on two configurational comparative methods: Most Different Similar 
Outcome/Most Similar Different Outcome and Qualitative Comparative Analysis. 
The results of the analysis show that four conditions account for most of the 
variation in the member states’ military engagements: military resources, competing 
deployments, UN peacekeeping tradition and regional trade. 
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Introduction 
Contrary to what Europe’s image as a civilian or soft power suggests, the EU 
member states have had 50,000 – 100,000 troops deployed outside of their home 
countries for most of the post-Cold War period (Giegerich & Wallace, 2004; 
Moravcsik, 2009: 409). Although the vast majority of these troops was active in 
operations with a strong European presence, there is significant variation in the 
member states’ patterns of military engagement. What explains this variation? Is 
there a generalizable and parsimonious explanation for the member states’ varying 
engagements in military operations?  
Few studies have systematically examined what conditions motivate or block 
member state participation in military operations. This constitutes an important gap 
in the extant literature on European security policy, not at least because close 
cooperation between the member states is generally considered indispensable for 
Europe to meet the continuous demand for military crisis management (Biscop, 
2015: 181). The present study aims to address this gap. More specifically, it examines 
which (combinations of) conditions consistently lead to (non)-participation in five 
operations: EUFOR Congo, UNIFIL II, EUFOR Chad, the 2011 military intervention 
in Libya and the air strikes against the so-called Islamic State (IS). This is done 
through a systematic comparison of 109 member state-operation dyads with two 
configurational comparative methods: Most Different Similar Outcome/Most 
Similar Different Outcome (MDSO/MSDO) and Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(QCA). 
The results of the analysis show that a large share of the variation in the 
member states’ patterns of participation is explained by four conditions: military 
resources, competing deployments, UN peacekeeping tradition and regional trade. 
However, these conditions are less relevant for explaining the varying contribution 
to the operation against IS, which is best explained by the varying numbers of 
foreign fighters in Syria and constitutional restrictions. Moreover, not all variation in 
the member states’ military engagements is explained by the aforementioned 
conditions, suggesting these need to be supplemented by more idiosyncratic 
explanations to fully understand the member states’ patterns of military 
participation. 
The structure of this article is as follows. The first section discusses the 
relevant literature. The second section identifies explanatory conditions. The third 
section justifies the case selection, introduces the methodological approach and 
discusses the operationalization of the conditions. The fourth section presents the 
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results of the sequential application of MDSO/MSDO and QCA, which are discussed 
in the fifth section. Finally, the conclusions recapitulate the study’s major findings. 
Prior Research 
The extant literature on European defence cooperation has devoted relatively 
little attention to the conditions that motivate member state participation in military 
operations. Studies building on constructivist theories have attributed the member 
states’ varying military engagements to their diverging preferences in security and 
defence, rooted in “idiosyncratic” strategic cultures (Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013; 
Pohl, 2013b: 368).1 If this is the true cause of the member states’ patterns of military 
participation, any attempt to arrive at a parsimonious and generalizable explanation 
can only result in failure. However, research on third-party military intervention, 
peacekeeping operations, democratic peace theory and military burden sharing 
provides ample evidence that a large share of the variation in states’ military 
engagements is explained by varying capabilities, security concerns, economic 
interests and domestic institutional or political constraints (cf. inter alia Bove & Elia, 
2011; Mello, 2014; Mullenbach & Matthews, 2008).  
Few studies have systematically examined to what extent these conditions can 
explain the pattern of EU member states’ participation in military operations. While 
the member states have been included in several studies on military operations, 
hardly any study exclusively focusses on the EU member states. The scarce studies 
that do, generally only examine a single operation or a limited number of member 
states (cf. Davidson, 2011; Davidson, 2013; Schuster & Maier, 2006).2 The most 
                                                          
1 This research has been predominately occupied with examining whether and how norms 
converge into a common European strategic culture. In a comprehensive, thoroughly-
researched, analysis of the drivers behind CSDP operations, Pohl (2014a: 20-24) makes a 
similar argument by contending that the behaviour of EU governments is grounded in 
‘domestic expectations of regional security and preferred foreign policy roles’ (cf. also Pohl, 
2013: 318; Pohl, 2014b). 
2 The member state contributions to UNIFIL II, EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad have been 
examined in prior studies (Haesebrouck, 2015b; Thiem & Haesebrouck, 2015); while some of 
the member states were included in studies on NATO burden sharing in Libya and 
democratic participation in the air strikes against IS (Haesebrouck, 2016b; forthcoming-b). 
However, the present study constitutes the first analysis that aims to explain the pattern of 
participation across the five operations. 
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systematic analysis of the varying involvement of the member states in military 
operations is presented in an outstanding study of Dorussen, Kirchner and Sperling 
(2009: 794) on EU burden sharing in security governance, which expected military 
operations to rely on the contributions of the largest EU member states. This 
expectation was however not fully confirmed by their analysis (Dorussen, Kirchner 
& Sperling, 2009: 802). In consequence, a comprehensive explanation of the member 
states’ varying military engagements has not yet been produced. 
Theoretical Framework 
Research on military burden sharing, third-party military intervention, 
peacekeeping operations and democratic peace offers a number of plausible 
explanatory conditions for the member states’ varying military engagements. These 
are structured in four categories: available resources, country-specific benefits, 
domestic constraints and partisan politics. 
Available Resources 
Starting with a seminal article by Olson and Zeckhauser (1966), research on 
military burden sharing has been dominated by collective action theory. The first 
collective action based models characterized defence as a pure public good and 
therefore expect “the ‘larger’ members […] to bear a disproportionate share of the 
burden of collective defense efforts” (Olson & Zeckhauser, 1966: 268). In line with 
this “exploitation hypothesis”, member states with sufficient resources to contribute 
significantly to the fulfilment of an operation’s mandate can be expected to 
participate. Military less powerful EU members, in turn, are expected to take a free 
ride, since their contributions can only have a modest impact on the provision of the 
public good (Mello, 2014: 42; Ringsmose, 2010: 324). The exploitation hypothesis, 
thus, expects that the military powerful member states are more likely to participate in 
military operations. 
Even the resources of the member states with substantial military capabilities 
can be stretched too thin to allow for new military engagements. For the last decade, 
European states permanently deployed around 50,000 troops. Since this corresponds 
to the EU capability target that was set during the 1999 Helsinki European Council, 
the member states cannot be expected to have a large reserve of uncommitted 
deployable military forces (Biscop, 2015: 174). Evidently, forces committed to 
simultaneous operations are unavailable for new deployments. Moreover, additional 
military engagements would make the remaining military assets harder to use if 
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other, perhaps more pressing, demands should arise (Bove & Elia, 2011: 705; 
Fordham, 1998: 576). EU member states whose resources are stretched thin by 
simultaneous deployments can therefore be expected to refrain from participation. 
Next to military manpower, military deployment requires a budget for 
sending and maintaining troops abroad (Tago, 2014: 268). Since defence is “the 
component of the budget with the greatest flexibility to accommodate fiscal 
pressure”, it is more sensitive to domestic fiscal pressures than other spending 
categories (Su, Kamlet & Mowery, 1993: 225-227). European governments faced with 
budget constraints should thus be less likely to participate in military operations.  
Country-Specific Benefits 
In contrast to the pure public good model, the joint products model assumes 
that collective defence efforts produce multiple benefits, ranging from purely public 
to country-specific benefits (Shimizu & Sandler, 2002: 656). In consequence, the 
joint products model predicts that contributions will correspond to the expected 
benefits of operations, rather than the available resources of the (potential) 
contributor. Earlier research suggests several plausible causes of variation in the 
benefits of successful crisis management. 
First, the expected benefits might be linked to the member states’ geographic 
positions (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2014: 91). In line with the conclusions of inter alia 
Kathman (2011: 863) and Perkins and Neumayer (2008: 905) on the link between 
geographic proximity and military engagements, member states situated close to the 
target of the operation can be expected to have a strong incentive to participate.  
Second, several scholars have argued that trade ties with the area of operations 
give rise to country-specific benefits (Shimizu & Sandler, 2002: 655). Empirical 
support for the link between bilateral trade and military engagement is mixed. While 
Khanna, Sandler and Shimizu (1999: 362) conclude that “countries with greater 
trading interests are more supportive of peacekeeping”, the analysis of Kathman 
(2011: 864) shows that the likelihood of intervention decreases if the level of trade 
between a third party and the conflict state increases. Kathman (2011, 850-53, 65) 
however, suggests that potential interveners can be “driven by regional, more 
economically consequential, interests”. Member states are likely to participate in 
operations to avoid that “conflict spillover would detrimentally affect a third party’s 
ability to continue its positive relationship with the region”. Member states with large 
trade volumes with the target of the operation or its wider region should thus be more 
inclined to participate in a military operation. 
 260 
 
Third, varying country-specific benefits are also connected to varying 
vulnerability to terrorist attacks (Sandler & Shimizu, 2014: 47, 57) The operation 
against IS is the only operation under investigation that was launched to avoid that 
its target became a safe haven for international terrorism. A recent study of 
Haesebrouck (forthcoming–b ) provides strong evidence that the perceived threat 
posed by the rise of IS is primarily related to the number of nationals that have gone 
to fight in Syria. Member states with a large number of foreign fighters in the target of 
the intervention should thus be more inclined to participate. 
Fourth, studies on burden sharing provide ample evidence that states are 
more likely to participate in US-led and NATO operations if they are dependent on 
the US’ security guarantee or value their relationship with the US (Bennett, Lepgold 
& Unger, 1994: 72; Davidson, 2011: 15; Ringsmose, 2010: 330-331). The relative 
importance accorded to the relationship with the US varies considerably amongst 
the member states (Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013: 389-390). The East-European 
countries accord a higher value to good relations with Washington because they are 
dependent on the US to balance potential Russian threats to their security. Countries 
like Denmark, the UK and the Netherlands, in turn, consider their special 
relationship with the US “an important key to their security and their political clout 
on the international scene” (Ringsmose, 2010: 331). Member states that accord a 
higher value to their relationship with the US should be more inclined to participate in 
NATO-operations and US-led coalitions of the willing. 
The member states’ value for their relationship with the US is not directly 
relevant for contributions to UNIFIL II, EUFOR Congo or EUFOR Chad. 
Participation in these operations also give rise to benefits that are not directly related 
to their respective goals. A country-specific benefit that is frequently invoked in the 
literature on UN peacekeeping burden sharing is the status enhancement that 
follows from being recognized as a major promoter of world peace (Khanna, Sandler 
& Shimizu, 1998: 182; Shimizu & Sandler, 2002: 656). Although available to all 
potential contributors, states that have a tradition of participating in UN 
peacekeeping operations (UNPO) can reasonably be expected to accord more 
importance to status gains (Bobrow and Boyer, 1997:731). Moreover, involvement in 
UN peacekeeping can be self-perpetuating, since it commits states to “further action 
by creating reinforcing roles, rules and expectations” (Lebovic, 2004: 915). The 
member states with a tradition of contributing to UNPOs can thus be expected to be 
more inclined to participate in UNIFIL II - which was deployed under the aegis of 
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the UN peacekeeping department- and EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad, which 
were both deployed in support of a UNPO.1 More generally, member states that have 
a strong peacekeeping tradition should be more likely to participate in (operations in 
support of) UNPOs. 
Domestic Constraints 
A third category of explanatory conditions is the varying constraints the 
member states’ governments face when deciding on military participation (Pohl & 
van Willigen, 2015: 186). First, the degree of parliamentary involvement in military 
deployment decisions varies significantly across the member states (Biehl, Giegerich 
& Jonas, 2013: 388; Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2010; Mello, 2014: 33). Strong 
parliamentary involvement significantly restricts a government’s freedom of military 
action, since it opens up decision-making to public scrutiny. In consequence, a high 
degree of parliamentary involvement in participation decisions should make 
participation less likely. 
 Second, the level of constraints on the chief executive is also related to the 
nature of the ruling coalition (Reiter & Tillman, 2002: 814). Minority governments 
should be most constrained, since parliament is always a potential veto player in this 
cabinet structure (Ireland & Gartner, 2001: 548-558; Palmer, London & Regan, 2004: 
561). In consequence, participation should be less likely for member states that are 
ruled by a minority government.  
Third, multi-party coalition governments face more constraints than single-
party majority governments, since they require members of multiple parties to agree 
on military participation (Ireland & Gartner, 2001: 552; Palmer, London & Regan, 
2004: 16). In consequence, member states governed by a single party government 
should be more likely to participate. 
Fourth, democracies show substantial differences in the type of military 
operations in which they are legally permitted to participate (Mello, 2014: 34-36). 
Military participation should be less likely if constitutional restrictions prohibit 
participation (Mello, 2014: 185-186). 
                                                          
1 EUFOR Congo was deployed to support the MONUC operation during the 2006 
presidential elections; EUFOR Chad was tasked with the protection of the personnel of the 
MINURCAT operation and was intended as a bridging mission whilst the force generation 
took place for military component of MINURCAT. 
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Fifth, prior research suggests that states are less inclined to participate in an 
operation if elections are imminent. Gaubatz (1991: 232), for example, shows that 
democracies are less likely to start a war in the pre-election period, while Kisangani 
and Pickering (2007: 290) conclude that democratic leaders are less likely use 
military force over low politics issues when elections are less than one year in the 
future. Member states can thus be expected to be less inclined to participate if elections 
are nearby. 
Partisan Politics 
Finally, the ideological composition of the member states’ government and 
parliament might impact their inclination to participate in an operation. Studies that 
examine the link between ideology and foreign policy generally expect right 
governments to be more likely to get involved in armed conflict (Palmer, London & 
Regan, 2004: 9; Schuster & Maier, 2006). However, several scholars have argued that 
the link between ideology and foreign policy preferences is more complex and 
depends on the context of the intervention (Mello, 2014: 39; Rathbun, 2004).  
In a study on the impact of government ideology on participation in peace 
enforcement operations, Rathbun (2004: 18-21) develops a three-dimensional model 
that expects leftist parties to be less militaristic, have a more inclusive conception of 
the national interest and prefer acting through multilateral frameworks. In 
consequence, left-wing parties are expected to be more likely to support operations 
with a humanitarian goal, especially if it is deployed under a multilateral framework. 
Right-leaning parties, in turn, can be expected to only support crisis management 
operations if more narrow national interests were at stake. In line with Mello (2012), 
we expect that the ideological orientation of a state’s government and parliament has 
an impact on whether or not it participates in a specific operation. 
Summary 
In sum, prior research suggests a large number of plausible explanatory 
conditions for the varying military engagements of the EU member states. Rather 
than constituting mutually exclusive explanations, participation in military 
operations can be expected to result from a complex interplay between the 
aforementioned conditions. Member states might participate in an operation for 
different reasons. While some states participate because they have close relations 
with the target of the intervention, others can decide to contribute because they are 
situated close to the area of operations, and still others because they believe 
contributing is necessary to continue receiving the benefits produced by their strong 
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relationship with the US. However, whether or not such an incentive will lead to 
participation could depend on the availability of the necessary resources, the absence 
of domestic constraints and the ideological orientation of the member state’s 
government or parliament. 
Research Design 
This section justifies the case selection, introduces the methodological 
approach and discusses the measurement of the variables. 
Empirical Domain 
The empirical focus of the study is on the member states’ contributions to five 
military operations. The first, referred to as UNIFIL II, is the expansion of the UN 
peacekeeping operation in Lebanon following the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War. The 
second and third operation are EUFOR Congo (2006) and EUFOR Chad/RCA 
(2008-09), which were deployed in respectively Congo and Chad and the Central 
African Republic under the aegis of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP). The fourth case is the 2011 intervention in Libya, which aimed to stop 
Qaddafi’s repression of the Libyan uprising and, after two weeks, came under NATO 
command. The last case is the operation against IS, which started in August 2014 
and was carried out by a US-led coalition of the willing. Given the substantial 
differences between the selected operations, one might question whether they are 
not “too dissimilar for comparative purpose” (Mello, 2014: 8). However, the cross-
case variation is necessary to achieve the goal of this study: draw out a generalizable 
pattern of the EU member states’ involvement in military operations. 
The five operations were selected according to three criteria. First, in order to 
increase the generalizability of the findings for future operations, the study focusses 
on the operations that were most recent at the time of writing. The selected 
operations were launched between 2005 and 2015. Hereby, all operations under 
investigation took place after the EU’s and NATO’s “big bang” enlargement. Second, 
the selected operations involved at least five EU Member States. Third, the cases 
represent the largest new European deployments of the last ten years. Each operation 
either involved fighter jets that took part in offensive air operations, or at least 2,000 
ground forces. Hereby, the focus is on operations that offered a large share of the 
member states the opportunity to make substantial contributions. 
The basic unit of analysis are member state-operation dyads. Several member 
states exhibit characteristics that justify their exclusion. Croatia is not included in the 
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analysis because it only joined the EU in 2013, Cyprus because the role of its armed 
forces is limited to the defence of its territorial security and Malta because its limited 
military capabilities and pacifist constitution prevent it from participating in military 
operations abroad. Due to its opt-out from the CSDP, Denmark is excluded for 
EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad; Romania and Bulgaria are not included as cases 
for EUFOR Congo because they only joined the EU in 2007. Finally, states without 
fighter jets equipped to attack ground targets are excluded as possible contributors to 
the military interventions in Libya and the air strikes against IS.1 This results in a 
sample of 109 member state-operation dyads. 
Methodological Approach 
Methodologically, this study builds on a sequential application of two 
configurational comparative methods: Most Different Similar Outcome/Most 
Similar Different Outcome (MDSO/MSDO) and crisp set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (csQCA) (Pattyn, 2014b). 
MDSO/MSDO builds on three types of pairwise comparisons to identify the 
conditions with most explanatory potential (Berg-Schlosser & De Meur, 2009: 29-30; 
De Meur & Berg-Schlosser, 1994; De Meur & Berg-Schlosser, 1996; Pattyn, 2014a). 
First, the cases where the outcome is present and that show maximum variation on 
the explanatory conditions are compared. In line with Mill’s method of agreement, 
the similarities between these most different cases are expected to explain the 
common outcome. Second, the most different cases where the outcome is absent are 
compared in order to identify their similarities, which are expected to explain the 
absence of the outcome. The third type of pairwise comparison focusses on the cases 
with a different outcome that show minimum variation on the explanatory 
conditions. In line with Mill’s method of difference, the similarities between these 
cases are likely to explain the variation in the outcome. 
After the most relevant conditions are detected with the MDSO/MSDO 
technique, QCA is used to identify the specific combinations of conditions that lead 
to (non-) participation (Ragin, 1987; Ragin, 2008; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). 
QCA is an analytical technique that allows for a systematic comparison of a large 
number of cases. It is particularly apt to examine a complex form of causality, 
generally captured under the expression “multiple conjunctural causation”. 
                                                          
1 According to the IISS (2014) military balance, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg and Slovenia do not have fighter jets. 
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Conjunctural causation implies that phenomena are often produced by a 
combination of conditions, multiple causation or equifinality that several of such 
combinations can be sufficient for the same outcome. The choice for QCA is driven 
by its ability to capture this complex form of causality, since participation in military 
operations can be expected to result from a complex interplay of conditions (cf. 
supra; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 77). Because the MDSO/MSDO technique 
makes use of binary conditions and outcomes, the study builds on QCA’s original 
crisp set version. 
Operationalization and Dichotomization 
csQCA and MDSO/MSDO require the cases to be dichotomized. A score of 1 
indicates that a condition or outcome is present in a given case, a score of 0 that it is 
absent. The dichotomisation of the outcome and the conditions is discussed below, 
the raw data and data sources are provided in appendix 1.1  
The coding of the outcome, military participation, reflects whether or not a 
state contributed to an operation. In UNIFIL II, EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad, 
member states that contributed more than 20 troops are assigned a score of 1. In the 
operations in Libya and against IS, member states are assigned a score of 1 if they 
participated in the air operations.2 
A first group of explanatory conditions is connected to the member states’ 
available resources: military capabilities, competing deployments and budget 
constraints. The two commonly used indicators for operationalizing military 
capabilities are military expenditures and military personnel. Since prior research 
provides little guidance on the capabilities required for states to be less inclined to 
ride free on the efforts of others, the arrhythmic mean is used as the dichotomization 
threshold for high expenditures and personnel, the median for median expenditures 
and personnel (Rihoux & De Meur, 2009: 42; Thiem & Duşa, 2013: 30-31). The 
impact of competing deployments depends on the ratio between the size of 
simultaneous deployments and the available resources. The latter are estimated with 
                                                          
1 The operationalization of some of the conditions in some operations builds on prior 
research (cf. Haesebrouck, 2015b; 2016b; forthcoming-a; Thiem & Haesebrouck, 2015) 
2 The coding of the operation against IS reflects the situation in 2014. In November 2015, the 
German cabinet decided to participate in the operation after terrorist attacks in Paris and the 
subsequent adoption of UN resolution 2249, which provided a legal basis for participation 
(Muller-Neuhof, 2015). 
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two indicators: the number of sustainable forces and the average number of troops 
deployed in the ten years that preceded the operation. States are assigned a score of 1 
on above average competing deployments if the number of deployed troops in the 
first year of the operation is 50% above its ten year average. A score of 1 on 
sustainable forces is assigned if more than 50% of sustainable forces were deployed. 
In line with the Maastricht criteria, member states are assigned a score of 1 on 
budget deficit if their deficit exceeds 3% of their GDP. 
The second group of conditions focusses on country-specific benefits. 
Geographic proximity is operationalized with the minimum distance measure. In line 
with Gleditsch and Ward (2001: 745), the dichotomization threshold was fixed at 
1,000 km. Bilateral trade and regional trade are operationalized as the sum of the 
member states’ imports and exports with, respectively, the country and the wider 
region of the operation, relativized by their GDP. Since there is no external guidance 
as to which trade volumes are sufficient to spur contributions, the dichotomisation 
threshold is fixed at the arrhythmic mean of the member states’ imports and exports 
with the region or country of operations.1 The dichotomisation threshold for foreign 
fighters is fixed at 100. Hereby, all countries with a high number of foreign fighters, 
either absolute or relative to their population, are assigned a score of 1 (cf. Table A12 
in appendix 1). 
Since prior research has established a strong link between contributions to the 
US-led operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the value a state places on its 
relationship with Washington, the base variable for alliance value is calculated as a 
member state’s i average share of European personnel contributions (PCi) to the 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan relativized by their share of GDP, which is 
summarized in the following equation. 
AVi=
(PCi ∑ PCi)⁄
(GDPi/∑GDPi)
  
The dichotomization threshold was fixed at 1, corresponding to a level of 
contributions to US-led operations fully proportional to a state’s GDP.2 The base 
                                                          
1 The threshold for bilateral trade with Congo was fixed at the interquartile mean, since this is 
less sensitive to the outliers Belgium and Finland. 
2 The resulting scores were cross-checked with the scholarly literature, which is very 
consistent on which member states show a particularly strong interest in a good relationship 
with the US (cf. supra). 
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variable for UN Peacekeeping Tradition is based on a state’s previous contributions 
to peacekeeping operation. However, because high absolute contributions can be a 
consequence of large contributions to a single operation, motivated by immediate 
security interests, we take the dispersion of these contributions across operations 
into account. A dispersion parameter Di was calculated according to the following 
equation (cf. Thiem & Haesebrouck, 2015): 
Di=1- ∑ P² 
where Pj is the proportion of personnel contributed to operation j = 1, 2,…, k.. 
Subsequently, the level of prior involvement was calculated and relativized by the 
member states’ GDP according to the following equation: 
PTi=
(PCi*Di ∑ (PCi*Di))⁄
(GDPi/∑GDPi)
  
where PCi is the absolute personnel contribution to UNPOs. The dichotomization 
threshold was fixed at 1, corresponding to a level of contributions fully proportional 
to a state’s GDP. 
Five conditions are related to domestic constraints. Cases are assigned a score 
of 1 on parliamentary veto power if parliamentary consent was required before troop 
deployments (Mello, 2012: 432).1 Only five member states faced constitutional 
restrictions in any of the operations. Austria, Finland and Ireland faced legal 
restrictions in the intervention in Libya and the operation against IS, Sweden and 
Germany only in the latter operation. Austria is only allowed to participate in 
operations under UN, OSCE or EU framework, Finland and Ireland prohibit 
operations without UN authorization and cannot participate in offensive operations. 
Sweden requires UN authorization to participate in an operation, “German 
constitutional law restricts military participation to […] operations within the 
institutional framework of ‘systems of mutual collective security’” (Mello, 2014: 80). 
A case is assigned a score of 1 on coalition government if it is governed by a coalition 
with more than 1 pivotal party. A score of 1 on minority government is assigned to 
cases where the government does not hold the majority of the seats in parliament. 
Finally, a case is assigned a score of 1 on distant elections if the next general election 
                                                          
1 A discussion of parliamentary veto power is provided in appendix 1. 
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is more than one year away during the planning of the operation (in line with inter 
alia Gaubatz, 1991; Kisangani & Pickering, 2007: 287).  
This study operationalizes executive and parliamentary ideology with the 
RILE-scale of the comparative manifesto project and the Chapell Hill Expert Survey 
(CHES). While the former better reflects cross-national differences within family 
groupings, the latter better reflects the costs parties incur for military deployment 
decisions (Klingemann et al., 2006: 64; Palmer, London & Regan, 2004: 20). Party 
positions (n) are aggregated into an overall measure of executive ideological 
orientation by summing up each party’s (i) ideological position (ip) weighted by its 
proportion of the total number of government or parliament seats (s), as specified in 
the following equation: 
 sirli
s
n
i=1
. 
The dichotomisation threshold for Right Executive RILE and Right 
parliament RILE is fixed at 0, which corresponds to parties that make an equal 
amount of right and left statements in their manifestos. The threshold for Right 
Executive CHESS and right parliament CHESS is fixed at 5, the ideological “Center” 
in the expert questionnaire. 
Analysis 
This section presents the sequential application of MDSO/MSDO and the 
csQCA.  
MDSO/MSDO 
The first step of the MDSO/MSDO is the systematic pairwise comparison of 
the cases in the four categories (or clusters) of conditions (De Meur & Berg-
Schlosser, 1996; Pattyn, 2014a; Pattyn, 2014b). This requires the calculation of 
Boolean distance, which corresponds to the number of conditions on which two 
cases differ. Subsequently, levels of (dis)similarities are calculated for each cluster of 
conditions. Level 0 corresponds to the lowest (or highest distance) between two cases 
in a cluster, level 1 to the lowest (or highest) distance plus (or minus 1), level 2 to the 
lowest (or highest) distance plus (or minus) 2 etc. Finally, the pairs of cases that 
reach the highest level of (dis)similarity in the largest number of categories are 
selected. In this study, we single out the pairs that reach a level of (dis)similarity level 
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of 0, 1 or 2 for the highest number of categories, resulting in 12 most different pairs 
with a positive outcome, 25 most different cases with a negative outcome and 299 
most similar cases with a different outcome.1  
Subsequently, the conditions on which the largest number of MDSO-pairs 
have the same values and MSDO-pairs have different values are identified. The 
standard MDSO/MSDO procedure counts a condition every time it is different in a 
most similar pair or similar in a most different pair. However, it is not always 
plausible that the different or similar outcome is explained by the specific value of a 
different or similar condition. For example, it is not plausible that the absence of 
military participation is explained by the presence of large military expenditures. 
Two most different cases with a negative outcome that have the presence of large 
military expenditures in common, therefore, do not provide strong evidence for the 
importance of military expenditures. In this analysis, we therefore only consider a 
pairwise comparison as evidence for the importance of a condition if it is in line with 
theoretical expectations that the cases’ value on the condition explains the outcome.2 
The number of times each condition was represented in the expected direction 
across (dis)similar pairs of cases is listed in Table 1.3 
To keep the number of possible combinations of conditions limited, the 
subsequent analysis starts with the four conditions that were mentioned most across 
the 334 pairwise comparisons: medium military expenditures (ME), large share of 
sustainable forces deployed (DF), UN peacekeeping tradition (PT) and regional 
trade (RT).  
                                                          
1 The results were produced with the MDSO/MSDO software (version 1.1 – spring 2015), 
developed by De Meur (available at http://www.jchr.be/01/v11.htm) Replication data is 
available in “replication data MDSO MSDO.txt”.  
2 In line with the hypotheses above, the presence of large and medium military expenditures, 
large and medium military personnel, geographic proximity, bilateral and regional trade, 
foreign fighters, alliance value, peacekeeping tradition and distant elections were linked to 
military participation, as was the absence of large share sustainable forces deployed, above 
average competing deployments, budget deficit, parliamentary veto power, minority 
government, constitutional restrictions and coalition government. No directional 
expectations were made on the conditions related to ideology, since their impact is 
dependent on the context of the operation. 
3 The systematic cross-case comparison is available in “comparison MDSO MSDO.xlsx”. 
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Table 1. Results MDSO MSDO 
 Most Different 
Positive 
Outcome 
Most Different 
Negative 
Outcome 
Most Similar 
Different 
Outcome  
Level 0 2 0 1 2 0 1 2  
# comparisons 11 1 3 4 18 1 55 242 Sum 
Capabilities          
Large Military Expenditures 1 0 1 2 9 0 3 18 34 
Medium Military 
Expenditures 
7 1 1 2 4 0 9 85 109 
Large Military Personnel 2 0 1 2 5 0 0 6 16 
Medium Military Personnel 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 27 
Sustainable Forces Deployed 4 0 0 2 2 0 7 73 88 
Above Average Forces 
Deployed 
9 1 0 0 0 0 10 29 49 
Government Deficit 0 0 0 0 2 0 8 42 52 
Country-Specific Benefits          
Geographic Proximity 0 0 2 1 16 0 1 10 30 
Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 3 6 0 1 20 30 
Regional Trade 2 0 0 1 7 0 4 70 84 
Foreign Fighters 0 0 3 2 14 0 2 14 35 
UN Peacekeeping Tradition 1 0 2 3 9 0 23 103 141 
Alliance Value 0 0 2 1 15 0 0 20 38 
Domestic Constraints          
Constitutional Restrictions 11 1 0 0 0 0 1 21 34 
Parliamentary Veto 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 25 29 
Minority Government 3 0 0 0 1 0 5 23 32 
Coalition Government 0 0 2 0 5 0 4 32 43 
Electoral Distance 0 1 0 0 2 0 3 32 38 
Ideology          
Right Executive RILE 2 0 0 0 1 0 13 52 68 
Right Parliament RILE 2 1 0 0 5 0 5 33 46 
Right Executive CHES 2 0 0 1 2 0 12 35 52 
Right Parliament CHES 3 0 0 3 6 0 3 25 40 
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Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
The QCA-procedure proceeds in two main steps, which were carried out 
with the QCA package for R, version 1.1-4 (R Development Core Team, 2014; 
Thiem & Duşa, 2013).1 First, the data is synthesised in a truth table, which is 
presented in Table 2. Each row of a truth table corresponds to a specific combination 
of conditions. Cases are attributed to the row that corresponds to their specific 
combination. Subsequently, an outcome-value is assigned to each row. Row 1-6 only 
contain cases in which the outcome is present and can thus be straightforwardly 
assigned a score of 1; row 13-16 only contain cases in which the outcome is absent 
and, therefore, are assigned a score of 0.  
Row 7-12 include cases with a 1-outcome and cases with a 0-outcome. In line 
with the recommendation of Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 122), we take into 
account the degree to which these contradictory rows deviate from perfect 
sufficiency to orientate their outcome. This is accomplished with the consistency 
parameter, which provides a descriptive measure of the extent to which the empirical 
data confirms sufficiency. The minimum advisable consistency level for a sufficient 
condition is 0.75 (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 279). However, in csQCA, a 
consistency score below 1 is always caused by true logical contradictory cases, which 
makes it particularly important to take case-specific information into account. On 
the basis of the consistency values and case-specific information, we assigned the 
following outcomes to the contradictory rows.  
• Row 7 is assigned a score of 1. Not only does its consistency exceed the 
minimum advisable 0.75 threshold, the four deviant cases can be explained by 
case-specific circumstances. The non-participation of Portugal in the Libya 
intervention was caused by a political crisis following the resignation of its Prime 
Minister Socrates. The three other deviant cases are non-participants in the air 
strikes against IS, which, as will be argued below, deviates from the other 
operations. 
• Row 8 is assigned a score of 1. The only deviant case, Finland - EUFOR Congo, 
can be considered a significant contributor. Although Finland only contributed 
eleven troops to EUFOR Congo, these provided crucial medical support.  
  
                                                          
1 The R-code is provided in “code.R”, replication material in “replication data QCA.txt” and 
“replication data QCA cases IS.txt”. 
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Table 2. Truth table 
 Conditions Consistency Out-
come 
 
 ME PT RT DF MP ~MP Cases 
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 NL_CO, GR_LE, NL_LE, BE_CH, 
IT_CH, NL_CH, IT_LI 
2 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 PL_CO, DK_LE, PL_LE, PL_CH 
3 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 SE_CO, PT_LE, SE_LE, SE_CH 
4 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 PT_CO, FR_CH, PT_CH 
5 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 FR_CO, FR_LE 
6 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 FI_LE 
7 1 0 1 0 0.79 0.21 1 BE_CO, IT_CO, ES_CO, BE_LE, IT_LE, 
ES_LE, ES_CH, BE_LI, FR_LI, GR_LI, 
NL_LI, ES_LI, BE_IS, DK_IS NL_IS, 
GR_IS, IT_IS, ES_IS, PT_LI 
8 0 1 0 0 0.67 0.33 1 FI_CH, IE_CH, FI_CO 
9 0 1 1 1 0.50 0.50 1/0 BG_LE, RO_LE 
10 1 0 0 0 0.40 0.60 1/0 GR_CH, GB_CH, SE_LI, GB_LI, FR_IS, 
, GB_IS, DE_IS, PL_IS, PT_IS, SE_IS 
11 1 0 0 1 0.33 0.67 1/0 DE_CO, DE_LE, DK_LI, GB_LE, 
DE_CH, DE_LI, PL_LI GR_CO, GB_CO 
12 0 1 0 1 0.15 0.85 0 AT_CH, IE_LE, AT_CO, HU_CO, 
IE_CO, SK_CO, AT_LE, HU_LE, 
SK_LE, BG_CH, HU_CH, RO_CH, 
SK_CH 
13 0 0 0 1 0.00 1 0 CZ_CO, EE_CO, LV_CO, LT_CO, 
LU_CO, SI_CO, CZ_LE, EE_LE, LV_LE, 
LT_LE, LU_LE, SI_LE, CZ_CH, EE_CH, 
LT_CH, LU_CH, SI_CH, AT_LI, CZ_LI, 
HU_LI, RO_LI, SK_LI, AT_IS, HU_IS, 
SK_IS 
14 0 0 0 0 0.00 1 0 LV_CH, FI_LI, CZ_IS, FI_IS, RO_IS 
15 0 0 1 1 0.00 1 0 BG_LI 
16 0 0 1 0 0.00 1 0 BG_IS 
Note: ME: Medium Military Expenditures, PT: UN Peacekeeping Tradition, RT: Regional 
Trade, DF: Deployed Forces, MP: Military Participation, ~ MP: absence Military 
Participation; Abbreviations of cases: “ISO-landcode_operation”, with CO: EUFOR Congo, 
LE: UNIFIL II, CH: EUFOR Chad, LI: Intervention Libya and IS: operation against IS (cf. 
appendix 2 for full list of abbreviations). Cases where the outcome is present are in regular 
font, cases where the outcome is absent are in Italic. 
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• Row 9 to 11 cannot be assigned a score of 1 or 0. Their consistency suggests they 
are not sufficient for participation or non-participation and there is no case-
specific explanation for the deviant cases.  
• Row 12 is assigned a score of 0. Its consistency for the absence of the outcome 
exceeds the 0.75 mark. Moreover, the participation of Ireland in UNIFIL II can 
be explained by its long association with UNIFIL, Austria’s contribution to 
EUFOR Chad as an attempt of the Austrian government “to show off its 
credentials as a security provider at a time when it geared up for a UN Security 
Council seat” (Pohl, 2014a: 140). 
The second step of QCA is the minimization of the truth table. Depending on 
the remainders included in the process, Boolean minimization results in different 
solution types. Since there are no remainders in our truth table, only the so-called 
conservative solution results.  
The minimized formula for the outcome’s presence is presented in Table 3. 
Military participation results if medium military expenditures (ME) are combined 
with large regional trade (RT). Similarly, member states participate in (operations in 
support of) UNPOs if they have a peacekeeping tradition (PT) and either have 
medium military expenditures (ME) or do not have a large share of their sustainable 
forces deployed (~DF). The consistency of these three causal paths equals 0.88, 
which indicates that 88% of the cases that correspond to these  paths have a score of 
1 on military participation. The solution coverage, which shows the share of the 
outcome covered by the formula, is 0.79. This indicates that the formula explains 
79% of the participation in the operations.  
The minimized formula for the outcome’s absence is presented in Table 4. 
Non-participation results if the absence of medium military expenditures (~ME) is 
combined with either the absence of UN peacekeeping tradition (~PT) or the 
absence of regional trade (~RT) and the presence of a large share of sustainable 
forces deployed (DF). The total consistency of the solution equals 0.96, the total 
coverage equals 0.71. 
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Table 3. Solution military participation 
   Consis-
tency 
 Coverage   
    Raw Unique  Cases 
1 ME*RT 
 
0.871 
 
0.562 0.458 
 NL_CO, GR_LE, NL_LE, 
BE_CH, IT_CH, NL_CH, IT_LI, 
PT_CO, FR_CH, PT_CH, 
FR_CO, FR_LE, BE_CO, IT_CO, 
ES_CO, BE_LE, IT_LE, ES_LE, 
ES_CH, BE_LI, FR_LI, GR_LI, 
NL_LI, NL_IS, ES_LI, BE_IS, 
DK_IS, PT_LI, GR_IS, IT_IS, 
ES_IS 
2 ME*PT 
 
1.000 
 
0.271 0.083 
 PL_CO, DK_LE, PL_LE, PL_CH, 
SE_CO, PT_LE, SE_LE, SE_CH, 
PT_CO, FR_CH, PT_CH, 
FR_CO, FR_LE 
3 PT*~DF 
 
0.909 
 
0.208 0.062 
 SE_CO, PT_LE, SE_LE, SE_CH, 
PT_CO, FR_CH, PT_CH, FI_LE, 
FI_CH, IE_CH, FI_CO 
Solution  0.884  0.792   
ME: Medium Military Expenditures, PT: UN Peacekeeping Tradition, RT: Regional Trade, 
DF: Deployed Forces; “~” Condition absent; Abbreviations of case have this structure: “ISO-
landcode_operation”, with CO: EUFOR Congo, LE: UNIFIL II, CH: EUFOR CHAD, LI: 
Intervention Libya and IS: operation against IS (cf. appendix 2 for list of abbreviations). 
Cases where the outcome is present are in regular font, cases where the outcome is absent are 
in Italic. 
 
The four conditions explain the outcome in almost 75% of the cases. However, 
the pattern of participation in the air strikes against IS deviates from the other 
operations. Three non-contributors to this operation are covered by the 
combination of large regional trade and medium military expenditures, which was 
generally linked to participation. Moreover, the operation against IS accounts for 
nine of the twenty-eight cases that were not explained by the solutions. A separate 
analysis was conducted for the air strikes against IS. Row 7 and 10 of the truth table 
include both participants and non-participants in the air strikes against IS. For both  
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Table 4. Solution ~military participation 
   Consis-
tency 
 Coverage   
    Raw Unique  Cases 
1 ~ME*~PT 
 
1.000 
 
0.525 0.115 
 CZ_CO, EE_CO, LV_CO, 
LT_CO, LU_CO, SI_CO, 
CZ_LE, EE_LE, LV_LE, 
LT_LE, LU_LE, SI_LE, 
CZ_CH, EE_CH, LT_CH, 
LU_CH, SI_CH, AT_LI, 
CZ_LI, HU_LI, RO_LI, SK_LI, 
AT_IS, HU_IS, SK_IS; LV_CH, 
FI_LI, CZ_IS, FI_IS, RO_IS; 
BG_LI; BG_IS 
2 ~ME*~RT*DF 
 
0.947 
 
0.590 0.180 
 CZ_CO, EE_CO, LV_CO, 
LT_CO, LU_CO, SI_CO, 
CZ_LE, EE_LE, LV_LE, 
LT_LE, LU_LE, SI_LE, 
CZ_CH, EE_CH, LT_CH, 
LU_CH, SI_CH, AT_LI, 
CZ_LI, HU_LI, RO_LI, SK_LI, 
AT_IS, HU_IS, SK_IS; AT_CO, 
HU_CO, IE_CO, SK_CO, 
AT_LE, HU_LE, SK_LE, 
BG_CH, HU_CH, RO_CH, 
SK_CH, IE_LE, AT_CH 
Solution  0.956  0.705   
ME: Medium Military Expenditures, PT: UN Peacekeeping Tradition, RT: Regional Trade, 
DF: Deployed Forces; “~” Condition absent; Abbreviations of case follow this structure: 
“ISO-landcode_operation”, with CO: EUFOR Congo, LE: UNIFIL II, CH: EUFOR CHAD, 
LI: Intervention Libya and IS: operation against IS (cf. appendix 2 for list of abbreviations). 
Cases where the outcome is present are in regular font, cases where the outcome is absent are 
in Italic. 
 
rows, each country that participated in the operation was compared with each 
country that participated, resulting in seventeen pairwise comparisons. The most 
common difference between these similar cases with a different outcome was 
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“foreign fighters” (FF), on which the cases differed in thirteen of the pairs. The four 
remaining contradictory cases all differed on one condition: constitutional 
restrictions.1 Both conditions were added to the truth table, which is presented in 
Table 5 and contains no contradictory configurations. 
Subsequently, the truth table is minimized. All remainders that lead to a less 
complex solution were included in the process, which results in the parsimonious 
solution. The latter was preferred over alternative solutions, because it is the only 
formula that is “guaranteed to reflect causation” (Baumgartner, 2015: 854).2 The 
solutions, presented in Table 6 and 7, show that the combination of foreign fighters 
(FF) and the absence of constitutional restrictions (~CR) is sufficient for 
participation, while the absence of foreign fighters (~FF) and the presence of 
constitutional restrictions (CR) are individually sufficient for non-participation. The 
consistency and coverage of these solutions is 1, indicating that they explain all 
variation in the outcome. 
Table 5. Truth table operation IS 
 Conditions  Consistency 
Outcome 
 
 ME RT DF FF CR  MP ~MP cases 
1 1 1 0 1 0  1 0 1 BE_IS, DK_IS, NL_IS 
2 1 0 0 1 0  1 0 1 FR_IS, GB_IS 
3 1 1 0 0 0  0 1 0 GR_IS, IT_IS, ES_IS 
4 0 0 1 0 0  0 1 0 HU_IS, SK_IS 
5 0 0 0 0 0  0 1 0 CZ_IS, RO_IS 
6 1 0 0 0 0  0 1 0 PL_IS, PT_IS 
7 1 0 0 1 1  0 1 0 DE_IS, SE_IS 
8 0 0 1 1 1  0 1 0 AT_IS 
9 0 0 0 0 1  0 1 0 FI_IS 
10 0 1 0 0 0  0 1 0 BG_IS 
ME: Medium Military Expenditures, RT: Regional Trade, DF: Deployed Forces, FF: Foreign 
Fighters, CR: Constitutional Restrictions; MP: Military Participation, ~ MP: absence Military 
Participation; Abbreviations of case follow this structure: “ISO-landcode_IS” (cf. appendix 2 
for list of abbreviations). Cases where the outcome is present are in regular font, cases where 
the outcome is absent are in Italic. 
                                                          
1 The cross-case comparisons are available in “contradictory cases IS.xlsx”. 
2 The conservative and intermediate solutions are presented in appendix 2. 
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Table 6. Solution military participation operation IS 
   Consis-
tency 
 Coverage   
    Raw Unique  Cases 
1 FF*~CR 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 1.000 
 BE_IS, DK_IS, NL_IS, FR_IS, 
GB_IS 
Solution  1.000  1.000   
FF: Foreign Fighters, CR: Constitutional Restrictions; “~” Condition absent; Cases where the 
outcome is present are in regular font, cases where the outcome is absent are in Italic. 
 
Table 7. Solution ~military participation operation IS 
   Consis-
tency 
 Coverage   
    Raw Unique  Cases 
1 ~FF  1.000  0.786 0.714  DE_IS, SE_IS; AT_IS, FI_IS 
2 CR 
 
1.000 
 
0.286 0.214 
 GR_IS, IT_IS, ES_IS, HU_IS, 
SK_IS, CZ_IS, RO_IS, PL_IS, 
PT_IS, FI_IS, BG_IS 
Solution  1.000  1.000   
FF: Foreign Fighters, CR: Constitutional Restrictions; “~” Condition absent; Cases where the 
outcome is present are in regular font, cases where the outcome is absent are in Italic. 
Discussion 
Interpreting the results against the backdrop of the research goal and 
theoretical framework leads to a number of conclusions. First of all, the analysis 
suggests that the pattern of member state participation in military operations is not 
random, nor is it the result of idiosyncratic political or strategic cultures. Almost 
75% of the varying involvement in the selected operations is explained by four 
conditions; 83% is explained by six conditions if the operation against IS is analysed 
separately. 
Second, the results show that the availability of military resources was of 
detrimental importance for explaining military participation. Two of the causal 
paths towards participation include medium military expenditures, while both paths 
towards non-participation include the absence of this condition. This confirms the 
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collective action based expectation that small states will ride cheap on their more 
powerful allies. However, the link between military capabilities and contributions 
can also be caused by the fact that smaller member states lack the capabilities to 
assist in certain missions (Sandler & Shimizu, 2014: 48). In line with the latter 
conjecture, military less powerful member states only participated in EUFOR Congo, 
UNIFIL II and EUFOR Chad and only if they have a peacekeeping tradition. A very 
plausible reason for the former is that the fighter jets of the smaller European allies 
were not sufficiently equipped for the operations in Libya and against IS. States with 
a peacekeeping tradition, in turn, can be expected to have the military resources 
required to participate in the remaining three operations, irrespective of their level of 
military spending (Gaibulloev et al., 2015: 733). 
Third, the analysis suggests that the availability of military resources must be 
combined with the country-specific benefits related to a strong peacekeeping 
tradition or large regional trade volumes. Peacekeeping tradition is included in two 
paths towards military participation, while its absence is included in one of the two 
paths towards non-participation; regional trade is included in the path towards 
participation with the highest coverage, its absence in one of the paths towards non-
participation. However, the operation against IS deviates from the general pattern: 
the threat posed by foreign fighters constitutes the most important condition for 
explaining participation in the air strikes, but was of no importance for the other 
operations.  
The latter suggests that the context of the operation has an impact on the 
specific incentives that spur contributions, which indicates that the conclusions of 
the present study cannot easily be generalized beyond the scope of the examined 
operations. Incentives that were not decisive for participation in the cases might 
matter in other operations. For example, the two operations for which alliance value 
was a plausible explanations can be considered least-likely cases for hypotheses on 
alliance politics. The intervention in Libya was led by France and the UK, not the 
US; while the air strikes against IS started after Russia’s interventions in Crimea and 
Eastern Ukraine. In consequence, many of the member states that highly value their 
relationship with the US, most importantly the Eastern European states, were not 
willing to dispatch fighter jets to a foreign theatre. Since the lack of support from 
least likely cases does not provide strong evidence, it cannot be ruled out that 
alliance value will be an important incentive in future operations (Levy, 2008: 12). 
Fourth, the results suggest that domestic constraints and partisan politics are 
not decisive for the member states’ military engagements. The only exception is 
“constitutional restrictions”, which was important for the operation against IS. Few 
 279 
 
member states faced constitutional restrictions in the other cases, while only four 
faced restrictions in the air strikes against IS. This indicates that constitutional 
restrictions are important, but only explain a limited share of the variation in the 
member states’ military deployments. The results suggest that the other domestic 
constraints are not relevant. However, theories on domestic-level variables cannot be 
entirely dispensed with, since studies on military burden sharing suggest that the 
latter are especially important for explaining the size and form of states’ 
contributions, which is not taken into account in this study (Bennett, Lepgold & 
Unger, 1994: 73; Oma, 2012: 565).  
Lastly, the contradictory cases indicate that idiosyncratic conditions interfere 
with the general pattern (cf. Austria’s contribution to EUFOR Chad and Portugal’s 
non-participation in Libya). Moreover, the analysis does not suggest that strategic 
culture can be entirely dismissed as an important explanation for the variation in the 
member states’ military engagements. Although the solutions explain a significant 
share of that variation in the outcome, the cases that are not covered suggest that 
strategic culture might have an impact on some of the member states’ military 
deployments. The results of the main analysis, for example, do not cover Germany’s 
behaviour in any of the operations. This suggests that its pattern of military 
engagement cannot be explained without taking into account its strategic culture, 
which is characterized by reluctance towards the use of force and conflicts with the 
demands of its allies to accept a greater share of the global security burden (Junk & 
Daase, 2013: 146-149; Schmitt, 2012).  
Conclusions 
What conditions motivate or block member state participation in military 
operations? The present study employed two configurational comparative methods 
to explain the member states’ varying engagements in five operations: EUFOR 
Congo, UNIFIL II, EUFOR Chad, the 2011 intervention in Libya and the air strikes 
against IS. The analysis shows that varying capabilities and expected benefits explain 
most (but not all) variation in the member states’ military engagements. More 
specifically, the results suggest that future European military operations will most 
likely be conducted by a coalition of military capable member states that either 
consider participation a continuation of their peacekeeping tradition or have 
economic interests in the wider region of the target of the intervention. However, 
these conditions do not explain all variation across the five operations, suggesting 
that more idiosyncratic explanations are required to fully explain their pattern of 
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military engagements. Moreover, the conditions that were most important in the 
four other operations, are not necessary to explain the pattern of contributions to the 
air strikes against IS, which indicates that it is difficult to generalize the conclusions 
of the analysis. 
Nevertheless, the study’s findings have interesting implications for the 
prospects of increased defence cooperation between the EU member states. Most 
importantly, the conclusion that the member states’ participation in military 
operations is not entirely random, nor determined by unsteady domestic conditions, 
suggests great potential for closer cooperation in the development of military 
capabilities. Increased cooperation and specialization in capability development 
yields benefits in financial and capability terms but comes at the price of reduced 
national autonomy, since each member states’ ability to conduct operations would 
depend on its partners’ willingness to grant access to their capabilities (Giegerich & 
Nicoll, 2012: 267). However, the conclusion of this study that military participation 
is mostly determined by capabilities and relatively stable conditions like 
peacekeeping tradition and regional trade interests suggests that it should be possible 
for the member states to find reliable partners for far-reaching cooperation and 
specialization in security and defence policy. 
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Appendix 1: Data Sources and Raw Data 
Table A1. Outcome 
 
EUFOR 
Congo a) 
UNIFIL 
II b) 
EUFOR 
Chad a) 
Libya c) IS d) 
Austria 3 0 169 0 0 
Belgium 59 358 64 Air strikes Air strikes 
Bulgaria NA 130 2 Maritime embargo 0 
Czech Republic 0 0 2 0 0 
Denmark NA 80 NA Air strikes Air strikes 
Estonia 0 0 0 NA NA 
Finland 11 203 62 0 0 
France 975 1,593 1,770 Air strikes Air strikes 
Germany 745 912 4 0 0 
Greece 1 225 4 Air patrol 0 
Hungary 0 2 3 0 0 
Ireland 0 163 447 NA NA 
Italy 56 2,206 104 Air strikes 0 
Latvia 0 0 0 NA NA 
Lithuania 0 0 2 NA NA 
Luxembourg 1 2 2 NA NA 
Netherland 44 171 71 Air patrol Air strikes 
Poland 125 319 421 0 0 
Portugal 53 146 30 0 0 
Romania NA 0 2 Maritime embargo 0 
Slovakia 0 0 1 0 0 
Slovenia 1 12 14 NA NA 
Spain 132 1280 112 Air patrol 0 
Sweden 50 41 120 Air patrol 0 
UK 0 0 4 Air strikes Air strikes 
a) Source: SIPRI (2015b) 
b) Source: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2015), data reflects situation in 
November 2006, when the operation reached full operational capability. 
c) Source: Chivviss (2014) 
d) Source: Howorth (2015) 
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Table A2. Military capabilities 
Military Expenditures a) Military Personnel b) 
Austria 3,450 30,151 
Belgium 5,594 34,989 
Bulgaria 1,006 37,500 
Czech Republic 2,884 22,929 
Denmark 4,611 21,708 
Estonia 454 5,163 
Finland 3,637 25,035 
France 65,169 26,1345 
Germany 47,680 233,778 
Greece 8,595 149,798 
Hungary 1,628 28,291 
Ireland 1,345 10,002 
Italy 38,153 205,643 
Latvia 404 5,352 
Lithuania 429 11,290 
Luxembourg 307 900 
Netherlands 11,658 42,624 
Poland 9,109 112,667 
Portugal 4,828 42,378 
Romania 2,595 74,746 
Slovakia 1,246 16,640 
Slovenia 694 7,147 
Spain 15,836 148,229 
Sweden 6,656 20,168 
UK 59,542 177,087 
a) Average military expenditures 2005-2014 in constant (2011) US $ 
(billions); Source: SIPRI (2015a) 
b) Average military personnel 2005-2014; Source: International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (2006-2015). 
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Table A3. Deployed forces 
Deployed Forces 
EUFOR Congo a) UNIFIL II a) EUFOR Chad b) Libya c) IS d) 
Austria 1,230 1,230 1,150 1,360 1,033 
Belgium 753 753 1,200 720 353 
Bulgaria NA 494 789 731 344 
Czech Republic 899 899 858 814 311 
Denmark NA 1,308 NA 984 242 
Estonia 221 221 197 NA NA 
Finland 706 706 616 248 572 
France 9,871 10,321 10,577 7,651 6,782 
Germany 7,275 8,015 6,280 6,988 2,733 
Greece 1,757 1,757 11,33 447 186 
Hungary 705 705 862 974 589 
Ireland 624 624 174 NA NA 
Italy 5,023 5,023 7,409 6,686 3,454 
Latvia 165 165 96 NA NA 
Lithuania 222 222 243 NA NA 
Luxembourg 37 37 34 NA NA 
Netherlands 2,205 2,250 1,905 292 623 
Poland 4,200 4,200 2,474 2,956 696 
Portugal 726 777 670 584 284 
Romania NA 1,578 1,545 2,102 486 
Slovakia 633 633 509 538 479 
Slovenia 312 312 485 NA NA 
Spain 1,877 2,007 2,946 2662 1,021 
Sweden 792 792 581 724 99 
UK 16,509 16,509 12,978 9,846 751 
a) Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (2008a); Troops deployed in EUFOR 
Congo and UNIFIL II, according to International Institute for Strategic Studies (2007), have 
been subtracted from deployed units. 
b) Source: Giegerich and Nicoll (2012: 60); Troops deployed in EUFOR Chad, according to 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (2009), have been subtracted from deployed 
units. 
c) Source: Giegerich and Nicoll (2012: 60) 
d) Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (2015) 
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Table A4. Sustainable forces 
Sustainable forces 
  EUFOR Congo UNIFIL II EUFOR Chad Libya IS 
Austria 860 860 880 982 1,738 
Belgium 1,777 1,777 1,777 1,897 1,715 
Bulgaria NA 970 974 900 1675 
Czech Republic 1,000 1,000 1,250 1,350 1,350 
Denmark NA 1,000 NA 1,000 1,000 
Estonia 230 230 227 NA NA 
Finland 2,000 2,000 2,000 1,418 1,498 
France 16,000 16,000 30,000 29,444 29,444 
Germany 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 
Greece 3,500 3,500 3,500 2,552 3,500 
Hungary 873 873 1,000 1,057 1,000 
Ireland 850 850 850 NA NA 
Italy 14,900 14,900 12,000 12,000 12,000 
Latvia 212 212 212 NA NA 
Lithuania 256 256 392 NA NA 
Luxembourg 51 51 53 NA NA 
Netherlands 3,056 3,056 3,056 5,050 2,275 
Poland 3,600 3,600 4,580 977 4946 
Portugal 1,963 1,963 1,963 2,254 2,108 
Romania NA 2,885 2,561 2,953 2,484 
Slovakia 585 585 766 722 590 
Slovenia 322 322 322 NA NA 
Spain 6,250 6,250 6,350 7,850 7,410 
Sweden 3,122 3,122 1,966 1,966 540 
UK 26,120 26,120 38,267 24,483 19,300 
Sources: European Defence Agency (2008); European Defence Agency (2009); North Atlantic 
Council (2014) and International Institute for Strategic Studies (2008a) 
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Table A5. Deployed forces / sustainable forces 
Deployed Forces / Sustainable forces 
  EUFOR Congo UNIFIL II EUFOR Chad Libya IS 
Austria 143 143 131 138 59 
Belgium 42 42 68 38 21 
Bulgaria NA 51 81 81 21 
Czech Republic 90 90 69 60 23 
Denmark NA 131 NA 98 24 
Estonia 96 96 87 NA NA 
Finland 35 35 31 17 38 
France 62 65 35 26 23 
Germany 61 67 52 58 23 
Greece 50 50 32 18 5 
Hungary 81 81 86 92 59 
Ireland 73 73 20 NA NA 
Italy 34 34 62 56 29 
Latvia 78 78 45 NA NA 
Lithuania 87 87 62 NA NA 
Luxembourg 73 73 64 NA NA 
Netherlands 72 74 62 6 27 
Poland 117 117 54 303 14 
Portugal 37 40 34 26 13 
Romania NA 55 60 71 20 
Slovakia 108 108 66 75 81 
Slovenia 97 97 151 NA NA 
Spain 30 32 46 34 14 
Sweden 25 25 30 37 18 
UK 63 63 34 40 4 
Source: author’s calculations 
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Table A6. Average deployed troops 
Average Troops Deployed 
  EUFOR Congo UNIFIL II EUFOR Chad Libya IS 
Austria 1000.9 1,000.9 1,046.6 1,091.4 1,170.8 
Belgium 1,107.8 1,107.8 1,111.9 1,055.4 841.6 
Bulgaria NA 183.4 290.8 517.1 634.5 
Czech Republic 746.8 746.8 776.3 837.4 719.2 
Denmark NA 1,133.9 NA 1,209.5 1,026.6 
Estonia 45.8 45.8 80 NA NA 
Finland 1,115.1 1,115.1 1,037.8 865.4 623.9 
France 9,423.4 9,423.4 9,685.5 10,298.1 9180 
Germany 6,075.4 6,075.4 6,613.5 7,276.5 6,950.1 
Greece 1,321.1 1,321.1 1,396.3 1,567 1,060.4 
Hungary 742.1 742.1 782.4 934.2 970.8 
Ireland 624.3 624.3 641.9 NA NA 
Italy 6,475.2 6,475.2 6,962.7 7,661.2 6,969 
Latvia 81.8 81.8 100.2 NA NA 
Lithuania 106.1 106.1 119.9 NA NA 
Luxembourg 31.2 31.2 35.1 NA NA 
Netherlands 2,192.8 2,192.8 2,196.2 2,194.4 1,483.4 
Poland 2,235.7 2,235.7 2,588.5 3,039.2 2,934.7 
Portugal 1,080.5 1,080.5 1,004.1 977 661.5 
Romania NA 884.3 973.7 1,398.2 1,667.8 
Slovakia 481.6 481.6 489.2 642.3 579.1 
Slovenia 74.1 74.1 113.7 NA NA 
Spain 2,321.6 2,321.6 2,543.5 2,845.4 2,558.9 
Sweden 772.9 772.9 813.6 845.5 766.1 
UK 10,587 10,587 11,436.5 12,224 11,741.4 
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (2008, 2013, 2014 and 2015); Giegerich 
and Nicoll (2012) 
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Table A7. Deployed forces / average deployed forces 
Deployed Forces / Average deployed forces 
  EUFOR Congo UNIFIL II EUFOR Chad Libya IS 
Austria 123 123 110 125 88 
Belgium 68 68 108 68 42 
Bulgaria NA 269 271 141 54 
Czech Republic 120 120 111 97 43 
Denmark NA 115 NA 81 24 
Estonia 483 483 246 NA NA 
Finland 63 63 59 29 92 
France 105 110 109 74 74 
Germany 120 132 95 96 39 
Greece 133 133 81 29 18 
Hungary 95 95 110 104 61 
Ireland 100 100 27 NA NA 
Italy 78 78 106 87 50 
Latvia 202 202 96 NA NA 
Lithuania 209 209 203 NA NA 
Luxembourg 119 119 97 NA NA 
Netherlands 101 103 87 13 42 
Poland 188 188 96 97 24 
Portugal 67 72 67 60 43 
Romania NA 178 159 150 29 
Slovakia 131 131 104 84 83 
Slovenia 421 421 426 NA NA 
Spain 81 86 116 94 40 
Sweden 102 102 71 86 13 
UK 156 156 113 81 6 
Source: author’s calculations 
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Table A8. Budget deficit 
  EUFOR Congo UNIFIL II EUFOR Chad Libya IS 
Austria -2,5 -2,5 -1,4 -2,6 -2,4 
Belgium 0,2 0,2 -1,1 -4,1 -3,2 
Bulgaria NA 1,8 1,6 -2 -2,8 
Czech Republic -2,3 -2,3 -2,1 -2,7 -2 
Denmark NA 5 NA -2,1 1,2 
Estonia 2,9 2,9 -2,7 NA NA 
Finland 3,9 3,9 4,2 -1 -3,2 
France -2,3 -2,3 -3,2 -5,1 -4 
Germany -1,5 -1,5 0 -0,9 0,7 
Greece -6,12 -6,12 -9,91 -10,2 -3,5 
Hungary -9,4 -9,4 -3,7 -5,5 -2,6 
Ireland 2,8 2,8 -7 NA NA 
Italy -3,6 -3,6 -2,7 -3,5 -3 
Latvia -0,6 -0,6 -4 NA NA 
Lithuania -0,3 -0,3 -3,1 NA NA 
Luxembourg 1,4 1,4 3,3 NA NA 
Netherlands 0,2 0,2 0,2 -4,3 -2,3 
Poland -3,6 -3,6 -3,6 -4,9 -3,2 
Portugal -4,3 -4,3 -3,8 -7,4 -4,5 
Romania NA -2,2 -5,6 -5,3 -1,5 
Slovakia -3,6 -3,6 -2,4 -4,1 -2,9 
Slovenia -1,2 -1,2 -1,4 NA NA 
Spain 2,2 2,2 -4,4 -9,4 -5,8 
Sweden 2,2 2,2 2 -0,1 -1,9 
UK -2,9 -2,9 -5,1 -7,6 -5,7 
Source: Eurostat (2015) 
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Table A9. Geographic proximity 
  EUFOR Congo UNIFIL II EUFOR Chad Libya IS 
Austria 4733 2129 2599 1490 2350 
Belgium 5193 2958 3057 1879 3181 
Bulgaria NA 1070 2167 939 1303 
Czech Republic 4970 2164 2840 1726 2321 
Denmark NA 2777 NA 2375 2865 
Estonia 6010 2623 3918 NA NA 
Finland 6232 2934 4128 2986 2781 
France 4246 2434 2109 931 2737 
Germany 4864 2381 2725 1569 2613 
Greece 3521 717 1596 293 1025 
Hungary 4653 1795 2542 1448 1976 
Ireland 5792 3864 3718 NA NA 
Italy 3650 1650 1516 446 1954 
Latvia 5808 2434 3707 NA NA 
Lithuania 5589 2308 3510 NA NA 
Luxembourg 5171 2921 3034 NA NA 
Netherlands 5317 3003 3179 2003 3200 
Poland 5038 1923 2939 1786 2043 
Portugal 4415 3728 2663 1727 4034 
Romania NA 1193 2424 1215 1352 
Slovakia 4873 1907 2758 1663 2050 
Slovenia 4621 2090 2489 NA NA 
Spain 4083 2842 2123 981 3149 
Sweden 5730 2812 3597 2471 2826 
UK 5448 3320 3335 2156 3546 
Source: Weidmann, Kuse and Gleditsch (2010); Values for EUFOR Chad represent the 
lowest value of the distance of member state to Chad and Central African Republic. 
 
 
 291 
 
Table A10. Bilateral Trade 
  EUFOR Congo UNIFIL II EUFOR Chad Libya IS 
Austria 0.00046 0.01358 0.00136 0.20956 0.11705 
Belgium 0.26137 0.09601 0.02497 0.07184 0.03651 
Bulgaria NA 0.16047 0.0016 0.04781 0.23477 
Czech Republic 0.00135 0.03686 0.00231 0.0496 0.09293 
Denmark NA 0.02634 NA 0.01185 0.01763 
Estonia 0.0018 0.00545 0.00002 NA NA 
Finland 0.06462 0.03129 0.00131 0.0128 0.01731 
France 0.00802 0.04882 0.00817 0.17264 0.06508 
Germany 0.00305 0.02842 0.00156 0.18867 0.04671 
Greece 0.00571 0.03886 0.00006 0.59362 0.64177 
Hungary 0.00052 0.03605 0.00059 0.02798 0.06498 
Ireland 0.00692 0.02736 0.00033 NA NA 
Italy 0.0026 0.05857 0.00117 0.88478 0.18828 
Latvia 0 0.00436 0.00042 NA NA 
Lithuania 0.0008 0.00254 0.00004 NA NA 
Luxembourg 0.0036 0.00619 0.00038 NA NA 
Netherlands 0.00896 0.03644 0.00492 0.14445 0.27542 
Poland 0.00048 0.00579 0.00086 0.00903 0.01931 
Portugal 0.01195 0.00952 0.02743 0.36375 0.0619 
Romania NA 0.15022 0.00026 0.0572 0.06796 
Slovakia 0.00008 0.03958 0.0021 0.00906 0.00708 
Slovenia 0.00032 0.013 0.00208 NA NA 
Spain 0.0016 0.02315 0.00174 0.2606 0.14146 
Sweden 0.0024 0.01616 0.00227 0.05099 0.04765 
UK 0.00099 0.01938 0.00049 0.07087 0.01411 
Sum of imports and exports member state and the operation’s target, relativized by the 
member state’s GDP, in %. The last five years before the operation are taken into account. 
Values for EUFOR Chad are the sum of trade with Chad and the Central African Republic. 
Sources: International Monetary Fund (2008, 2009, 2013, 2014). 
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Table A11. Regional trade 
  EUFOR Congo UNIFIL II EUFOR Chad Libya IS 
Austria 0.46834 0.92736 0.52982 1.54106 1.17047 
Belgium 3.02607 3.53919 2.5702 3.54904 3.07541 
Bulgaria NA 1.44629 0.7112 2.25592 2.22171 
Czech Republic 0.49271 0.91787 0.46856 1.00304 0.90944 
Denmark NA 0.79177 NA 0.77636 1.8283 
Estonia 0.36362 0.30302 0.87971 NA NA 
Finland 0.60169 1.38377 0.67311 1.51832 0.68644 
France 2.14663 1.24328 1.93486 2.34515 1.3118 
Germany 0.83807 1.13294 0.79193 1.59166 1.30566 
Greece 0.36962 2.07478 0.37071 2.69783 3.43838 
Hungary 0.4873 1.14575 0.62112 1.58003 1.53802 
Ireland 0.85943 0.82958 0.80219 NA NA 
Italy 1.43487 1.99677 1.28854 3.71301 2.50678 
Latvia 0.19668 0.39335 0.21584 NA NA 
Lithuania 0.29761 0.18069 0.28551 NA NA 
Luxembourg 0.37273 0.71095 0.31386 NA NA 
Netherlands 2.3497 2.54395 2.00252 3.73039 3.06802 
Poland 0.37089 0.32281 0.36885 0.49369 0.35973 
Portugal 3.00846 0.81363 2.39445 2.142 0.99683 
Romania NA 1.83423 0.45308 1.62802 1.41345 
Slovakia 0.22023 0.41148 0.2689 0.59968 0.26169 
Slovenia 0.55114 0.99894 0.34172 NA NA 
Spain 2.25642 1.21507 1.7875 2.61297 1.78002 
Sweden 0.65143 1.12973 0.65572 1.34881 0.95679 
UK 0.87789 1.02444 0.77638 1.24206 1.12159 
Sum of imports and exports member state and the operation’s region, relativized by the 
member state’s GDP, in %. Sources: International Monetary Fund (2008, 2009, 2013, 2014). 
 
  
 293 
 
Table A12. Foreign fighters 
 Foreign Fighters Syria 
Absolute a) Per capita b) 
Austria 150 17.7 
Belgium 440 39.3 
Bulgaria 0 0 
Czech Republic 0 0 
Denmark 150 26.7 
Estonia NA NA 
Finland 70 12.9 
France 1200 18.2 
Germany 600 7.4 
Greece 0 0 
Hungary 0 0 
Ireland NA NA 
Italy 80 1.3 
Latvia NA NA 
Lithuania NA NA 
Luxembourg NA NA 
Netherlands 250 14.9 
Poland 0 0 
Portugal 0 0 
Romania 0 0 
Slovakia 0 0 
Slovenia NA NA 
Spain 100 2.1 
Sweden 180 18.8 
UK 600 9.4 
a) Source: Neumann (2015) 
b) Per million population. Source: World Bank (2014) 
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Table A13. Alliance value 
 Libya  IS 
  
Troops 
Afghanistan/Iraq a) 
AVi b) 
Troops 
Afghanistan/Iraq a) 
AVi b) 
Austria 9 0.02 8 0.01 
Belgium 346 0.48 371 0.49 
Bulgaria 502 8.15 511 7.42 
Czech Republic 398 1.46 427 1.45 
Denmark 685 1.4 667 1.32 
Estonia 126 4.53 135 4.39 
Finland 91 0.24 108 0.27 
France 1,509 0.37 1,786 0.42 
Germany 2,816 0.53 3,297 0.59 
Greece 113 0.24 111 0.24 
Hungary 405 2.03 403 1.96 
Ireland 7 0.02 7 0.02 
Italy 2,807 0.83 3,035 0.88 
Latvia 132 3.62 129 3.25 
Lithuania 166 3.18 183 3.17 
Luxembourg 9 0.13 10 0.12 
Netherlands 1,337 1.05 1,089 0.83 
Poland 2,029 3.28 2,051 3.02 
Portugal 121 0.33 141 0.38 
Romania 1,214 5.71 1,317 5.58 
Slovakia 155 1.46 187 1.56 
Slovenia 52 0.74 58 0.79 
Spain 828 0.38 937 0.42 
Sweden 227 0.31 289 0.37 
UK 10,202 2.43 9,904 2.33 
a) Average troops deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq years before operation. Source: 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (2006-2015). 
b) Average share of European personnel contributions to the operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan relativized by their share of GDP. Source GDP: International Monetary Fund 
(2015) 
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Table A14. UN peacekeeping tradition 
  EUFOR Congo UNIFIL II EUFOR Chad 
Austria 4.14 4.14 3.99 
Belgium 0.52 0.52 0.51 
Bulgaria 4.62 4.62 4.29 
Czech Republic 0.63 0.63 0.61 
Denmark 1.55 1.55 1.57 
Estonia 0.43 0.43 0.37 
Finland 5.7 5.7 5.46 
France 1.37 1.37 1.36 
Germany 0.09 0.09 0.11 
Greece 0.2 0.2 0.24 
Hungary 2.3 2.3 2.23 
Ireland 4.34 4.34 4.36 
Italy 0.39 0.39 0.39 
Latvia 0 0 0 
Lithuania 0.04 0.04 0.05 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 
Netherlands 0.71 0.71 0.7 
Poland 9.28 9.28 9.01 
Portugal 1.29 1.29 1.44 
Romania 2.22 2.22 2.35 
Slovakia 12.49 12.49 11.94 
Slovenia 0.45 0.45 0.5 
Spain 0.28 0.28 0.3 
Sweden 1.68 1.68 1.67 
UK 0.6 0.6 0.57 
The scores take into account contribution to UNPO’s since 1991 until the year before the 
planning of the operation started. For the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia, only personnel contributions since one year after their independence 
in 1995, 1993, 1992, 1992, 1995 and 1992, respectively, are recorded. Personnel contributions 
are based on the contributions in December of each year, based on data from the UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2015). Source GDP: International Monetary Fund 
(2015). 
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Table A15. Parliamentary veto power 
  EUFOR Congo UNIFIL II EUFOR Chad Libya IS 
Austria V V V V V 
Belgium    V V 
Bulgaria NA    V 
Czech Republic V V V V V 
Denmark NA V NA V V 
Estonia V V V NA NA 
Finland V V V V V 
France      
Germany V V V V V 
Greece      
Hungary V V V NA NA 
Ireland V V V NA NA 
Italy      
Latvia V V V NA NA 
Lithuania V V V NA NA 
Luxembourg V V V NA NA 
Netherlands V V V V V 
Poland      
Portugal      
Romania NA    V 
Slovakia V V V  V 
Slovenia    NA NA 
Spain V V V V V 
Sweden V V V V V 
UK     V 
V = Ex Ante parliamentary Veto 
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The coding of parliamentary veto power is based the parlcon-dataset 
(Wagner, Peters & Glahn, 2010). Since this only assigns parliamentary war powers 
up till 2004, this information was cross-checked and supplemented with other 
sources (Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013; Born, Fuior & Lazzarini, 2008; Dieterich, 
Hummel & Marschall, 2015; Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2010; Peters, Wagner 
& Deitelhoff, 2010; Strong, 2015).  
• First, member states with a legal obligation of prior parliamentary consent for all 
military deployments are assigned a score of 1 in all operations. These are 
Austria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Spain and Sweden. 
• Second, member states where seeking parliamentary approval is not a legal 
norm, but constitutes an unwritten rule, are also assigned a score of 1. These are 
the Netherlands, Czech Republic and the UK, after the government’s defeat over 
military action in Syria in August 2013.  
• Third, parliament held a de facto veto on troop deployments due to specific 
political circumstances in Belgium during the operations in Libya and against IS 
because it was governed by a caretaker government at the time.  
• Fourth, in some member states, operations conducted under formal 
organizations are exempt from prior parliamentary approval. This was the case 
for Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, where deployments under the NATO or 
CSDP-framework are exempt from general obligation of prior approval. 
Similarly, Slovak Republic’s parliament has to consent prior to external military 
deployment, except when troops are dispatched for a for a maximum period of 
60 days and the deployment is part of an obligation resulting from international 
treaties on common defence. Therefore, it is assigned a score of 0 for the NATO 
operation in Libya. 
• Fifth, parliament did not play a significant role in military deployment decisions 
in any of the operations in France, Greece, Poland, Portugal and Slovenia. 
• Finally, parliamentary competences for troop deployments are not clearly 
defined in Italy, resulting in competing views of the legal procedures for 
participation in military operations (Wagner, Peters & Glahn, 2010: 63).The 
Italian government had many ways to deploy troops, some of which exclude 
parliamentary involvement. Consequently, there exists disagreement on 
parliamentary involvement on decisions on the use of force, with assessments 
ranging from very strong over medium to inconclusive (Born, Fuior & Lazzarini, 
2008: 19; Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2010: 26; Wagner, Peters & Glahn, 
2010: 64). According to Marrone and Di Camillo (2013: 197), ‘international 
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deployment authorisation is usually based on a decree law issued by the 
government and adopted as law by parliament within the 60-day period foreseen 
in the legislation.’ The use of such degree laws limited the parliament’s role, 
which gives ex post endorsement by approving these laws. Furthermore, 
according to Born, Fuior and Lazzarini (2008: 19), parliamentary debates usually 
took place after troops are deployed. 
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Table A16. Coalition government 
 Pivotal Parties in government 
  EUFOR Congo UNIFIL II  EUFOR Chad Libya  IS  
Austria 2 2 2 2 2 
Belgium 4 4 4 5 5 
Bulgaria NA 2 2 1 2 
Czech Republic 3 1 3 3 3 
Denmark NA 2 NA 2 2 
Estonia 3 3 3 NA NA 
Finland 2 2 2 2 4 
France 1 1 1 1 1 
Germany 2 2 2 2 2 
Greece 1 1 1 1 2 
Hungary 2 2 2 1 2 
Ireland 2 2 1 NA NA 
Italy 3 6 6 2 2 
Latvia 3 3 4 NA NA 
Lithuania 4 4 4 NA NA 
Luxembourg 2 2 2 NA NA 
Netherland 3 2 3 2 2 
Poland 1 2 2 2 2 
Portugal 1 1 1 1 2 
Romania NA 3 2 3 3 
Slovakia 3 3 3 3 1 
Slovenia 4 4 4 NA NA 
Spain 1 1 1 1 1 
Sweden 1 1 1 4 4 
UK 1 1 1 2 2 
Source: Döring and Manow (2015); The value reflects the situation on the following reference 
dates: March 20th 2006 for EUFOR Congo, when an Informal planning conference took 
place in Berlin (Engberg, 2013: 100); July 25th 2006 for UNIFIL, the data of the first informal 
meeting of prospective troop contributors (Mattelaer, 2011: 101); September 24 2007 for 
EUFOR Chad, the date of the first indicative force generation conference (Mattelaer, 2011: 
61); 17 March 2011 for the operation in Libya; when the UN Security Council passed 
resolution 1973 and 26 August 2014 for the air strikes against IS, when the US started 
mobilizing allies (Landler and Cooper 2014). 
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Table A17. Distant elections 
 Days till next election 
  EUFOR Congo UNIFIL II  EUFOR Chad Libya  IS  
Austria 614 68 1468 926 1495 
Belgium 424 297 1355 1184 1338 
Bulgaria NA 1046 620 841 40 
Czech Republic 75 1409 983 1169 1156 
Denmark NA 929 NA 241 385 
Estonia 347 220 1257 NA NA 
Finland 361 234 1271 31 236 
France 453 327 1728 458 1026 
Germany 1278 1151 725 925 1123 
Greece 545 418 1453 932 661 
Hungary 20 1354 928 1135 1461 
Ireland 430 303 1704 NA NA 
Italy 20 1719 1293 758 1279 
Latvia 201 74 1109 NA NA 
Lithuania 949 822 396 NA NA 
Luxembourg 1181 1054 628 NA NA 
Netherland 308 120 1155 1180 748 
Poland 1282 1155 25 206 409 
Portugal 1068 941 515 207 410 
Romania NA 857 431 624 827 
Slovakia 89 1423 997 1183 562 
Slovenia 928 801 375 NA NA 
Spain 725 598 172 358 451 
Sweden 181 54 1090 1282 19 
UK 1507 1380 954 1511 253 
Source: Döring and Manow (2015); The value reflects the situation on the following reference dates: 
March 20th 2006 for EUFOR Congo, when an Informal planning conference took place in Berlin 
(Engberg, 2013: 100); July 25th 2006 for UNIFIL, the data of the first informal meeting of prospective 
troop contributors (Mattelaer, 2011: 101); September 24 2007 for EUFOR Chad, the date of the first 
indicative force generation conference (Mattelaer, 2011: 61); 17 March 2011 for the operation in Libya; 
when the UN Security Council passed resolution 1973 and 26 August 2014 for the air strikes against IS, 
when the US started mobilizing allies (Landler and Cooper 2014). To account for early elections, the 
actual date of the next general election was only used if it was less than one year away. Otherwise, the 
length of an electoral cycle was added to the date of the last election. 
  
 302 
 
Table A18. Right executive RILE 
  EUFOR Congo UNIFIL II EUFOR Chad Libya IS 
Austria -2.89 -2.89 -9.13 -9.97 -9.93 
Belgium -16.98 -16.98 -16.73 -7.57 -7.15 
Bulgaria NA -14.1 -14.1 13.69 -33.84 
Czech Republic -4.51 20.79 16.41 7.97 -7.12 
Denmark NA 2.22 NA -9.9 -4.91 
Estonia 2.8 2.8 3.99 NA NA 
Finland -16.3 -16.3 -18.79 -21.62 -8.71 
France -7.74 -7.74 -12.78 -11.45 -32.84 
Germany 11.81 11.81 11.81 3.99 -7.44 
Greece -17.59 -17.59 -12.66 -21.58 23.5 
Hungary -9.02 1.98 1.98 -4.46 13.31 
Ireland -6.58 -6.58 -11.76 NA NA 
Italy 15.68 -17.71 -17.71 11.63 -5.05 
Latvia -2.48 1.52 1.71 NA NA 
Lithuania -0.13 -3.54 -3.54 NA NA 
Luxembourg -20.53 -20.53 -20.53 NA NA 
Netherland 12.12 12.43 3.06 15.42 8.59 
Poland -1.6 -1.14 -1.14 5.52 -1.71 
Portugal -10.56 -10.56 -10.56 -4.5 14.63 
Romania NA 4.41 3.8 1.99 16.72 
Slovakia 8.84 -4.03 -4.03 11.68 -9.73 
Slovenia -3.66 -3.66 -3.66 NA NA 
Spain -12.39 -12.39 -12.39 -23.22 -3.45 
Sweden -18.32 -18.32 3.46 1.46 1.46 
UK -3.09 -3.09 -3.09 15.52 15.52 
Source Rile: Volkens et al. (2015); Composition parliament: Döring and Manow (2015) 
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Table A19. Right parliament RILE 
  EUFOR Congo UNIFIL II  EUFOR Chad Libya  IS  
Austria -10.24 -10.24 -9.62 -8.16 -7.75 
Belgium -12.32 -12.32 -5.8 -1.45 -2.63 
Bulgaria NA -7.17 -7.17 13.6 -18.04 
Czech Republic 6.36 0.67 0.67 -1.97 -10.3 
Denmark NA -8.7 NA -10.18 -3.53 
Estonia 0.98 0.98 -7.42 NA NA 
Finland -14.1 -14.1 -24.33 -24.33 -8.26 
France -10.33 -10.33 -16.74 -16.27 -21.63 
Germany 6.36 6.36 6.36 -4.78 -11.41 
Greece -13.55 -13.55 -15.36 -14.68 7.08 
Hungary -1.32 -3.83 -3.83 -4.45 4.82 
Ireland -10.9 -10.9 -12.66 NA NA 
Italy 5.03 11.48 11.48 6.28 -11.29 
Latvia -0.73 -0.73 -0.61 NA NA 
Lithuania 4.06 4.06 4.06 NA NA 
Luxembourg -18.73 -18.73 -18.73 NA NA 
Netherland 6.48 6.48 4.91 7.22 5.91 
Poland -0.47 -0.47 -0.47 6.4 5.58 
Portugal -5.74 -5.74 -5.74 -2.22 6.37 
Romania NA -9.4 -9.4 -0.39 8.19 
Slovakia 16.7 -4.7 -4.7 -0.06 -0.15 
Slovenia -5.2 -5.2 -5.2 NA NA 
Spain -2.84 -2.84 -2.84 -13.96 -13.49 
Sweden -4.33 -4.33 -9.95 -10.05 -10.05 
UK 3.06 3.06 3.06 8.46 8.46 
Sources: RILE: Volkens et al. (2015); Composition parliament: Döring and Manow (2015) 
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Table A20. Right executive CHES 
  EUFOR Congo UNIFIL II  EUFOR Chad Libya  IS  
Austria 7.24 7.24 5.39 5.11 4.94 
Belgium 5.67 5.06 5.21 5.06 4.88 
Bulgaria NA 4.43 4.43 6.08 3.99 
Czech Republic 4.23 7.71 7.28 7.42 3.2 
Denmark NA 7.19 NA 7.15 4.76 
Estonia 5.31 5.31 6.96 NA NA 
Finland 4.67 4.67 5.91 6.02 5.44 
France 7.29 7.29 7.3 7.13 3.83 
Germany 5.1 5.1 5.1 6.26 5.1 
Greece 6.44 6.44 6.44 4.36 6.72 
Hungary 3.79 3.78 3.78 6.98 7.93 
Ireland 6.37 6.37 6 NA NA 
Italy 7.28 3 3 7.73 3.97 
Latvia 6.72 6.55 6.76 NA NA 
Lithuania 4 4.83 4.83 NA NA 
Luxembourg 5.58 5.58 5.58 NA NA 
Netherland 6.45 6.62 5.11 7.22 5.86 
Poland 7.76 7.14 7.14 5.86 5.66 
Portugal 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.17 6.91 
Romania NA 6.26 6.52 6.37 4.4 
Slovakia 2.54 4.74 4.74 6.65 3.69 
Slovenia 7.1 7.1 7.1 NA NA 
Spain 3.58 3.58 3.58 3.67 7.3 
Sweden 3.56 3.56 6.44 7.19 7.36 
UK 4.88 4.88 4.88 6.8 6.66 
Sources: CHES-data: Bakker et al. (2015); Government composition: Döring and Manow 
(2015) 
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Table A21. Right parliament CHES 
  
EUFOR 
Congo 
UNIFIL 
II  EUFOR Chad Libya  IS  
Austria 5.56 5.56 5.64 5.88 5.58 
Belgium 5.06 5.67 5.7 5.54 5.41 
Bulgaria NA 5.06 5.06 5.44 5.13 
Czech Republic 2.13 5.02 5.02 5.33 4.85 
Denmark NA 5.68 NA 5.7 5.48 
Estonia 6.05 6.05 5.92 NA NA 
Finland 4.94 4.94 5.12 5.47 5.4 
France 5.86 5.86 5.57 5.31 5.28 
Germany 4.75 4.75 4.75 6.19 4.56 
Greece 5.22 5.22 5.07 4.93 5.49 
Hungary 5.11 5.11 5.11 6.58 7.22 
Ireland 5.82 5.82 6.16 NA NA 
Italy 5.46 4.93 4.93 5.67 3.65 
Latvia 5.51 5.51 6.41 NA NA 
Lithuania 5.26 5.26 5.26 NA NA 
Luxembourg 5.38 5.38 5.38 NA NA 
Netherland 5.25 5.25 4.78 5.5 5.66 
Poland 6.04 6.04 6.04 6.28 6 
Portugal 5.19 5.19 5.19 4.96 5.54 
Romania NA 5.01 5.01 5.22 5.27 
Slovakia 5.23 5.68 5.68 5.32 5.05 
Slovenia 5.66 5.66 5.66 NA NA 
Spain 5.54 5.54 5.54 5.38 5.74 
Sweden 4.93 4.93 5.25 5.43 5.63 
UK 5.35 5.35 5.35 5.64 5.38 
Sources: CHES-data: Bakker et al. (2015); parliament composition: Döring and Manow 
(2015) 
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Appendix 2: Supporting Material Analysis 
 
Table A22. Abbreviations cases 
  EUFOR Congo UNIFIL II EUFOR Chad Libya IS 
Austria AT_CO AT_LE AT_CH AT_LI AT_IS 
Belgium BE_CO BE_LE BE_CH BE_LI BE_IS 
Bulgaria NA BG_LE BG_CH BG_LI BG_IS 
Czech Republic CZ_CO CZ_LE CZ_CH CZ_LI CZ_IS 
Denmark NA DK_LE NA DK_LI DK_IS 
Estonia EE_CO EE_LE EE_CH NA NA 
Finland FI_CO FI_LE FI_CH FI_LI FI_IS 
France FR_CO FR_LE FR_CH FR_LI FR_IS 
Germany DE_CO DE_LE DE_CH DE_LI DE_IS 
Greece GR_CO GR_LE GR_CH GR_LI GR_IS 
Hungary HU_CO HU_LE HU_CH HU_LI HU_IS 
Ireland IE_CO IE_LE IE_CH NA NA 
Italy IT_CO IT_LE IT_CH IT_LI IT_IS 
Latvia LV_CO LV_LE LV_CH NA NA 
Lithuania LT_CO LT_LE LT_CH NA NA 
Luxembourg LU_CO LU_LE LU_CH NA NA 
Netherland NL_CO NL_LE NL_CH NL_LI NL_IS 
Poland PL_CO PL_LE PL_CH PL_LI PL_IS 
Portugal PT_CO PT_LE PT_CH PT_LI PT_IS 
Romania NA RO_LE RO_CH RO_LI RO_IS 
Slovakia SK_CO SK_LE SK_CH SK_LI SK_IS 
Slovenia SI_CO SI_LE SI_CH NA NA 
Spain ES_CO ES_LE ES_CH ES_LI ES_IS 
Sweden SE_CO SE_LE SE_CH SE_LI SE_IS 
UK GB_CO GB_LE GB_CH GB_LI GB_IS 
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Table A23. Conservative Solution MP Analysis IS 
   Consis-
tency 
 Coverage   
    Raw Unique  Cases 
1 FF*~CR*ME*~DF 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 1.000 
 
BE_IS, DK_IS, NL_IS, 
FR_IS, GB_IS 
Solution  1.000  1.000   
FF: Foreign Fighters, CR: Constitutional Restrictions; “~” Condition absent ; Cases where the 
outcome is present are in regular font, cases where outcome is absent are in Italic. 
Table A24. Intermediate Solution MP Analysis IS1 
   Consis-
tency 
 Coverage   
    Raw Unique  Cases 
1 FF*~CR*ME*~DF 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 1.000 
 
BE_IS, DK_IS, NL_IS, 
FR_IS, GB_IS 
Solution  1.000  1.000   
ME: Military Expenditures, DF: Deployed Forces, FF: Foreign Fighters, CR: Constitutional 
Restrictions; “~” Condition absent ; Cases where outcome is present are in regular font, cases 
where outcome is absent are in Italic. 
  
                                                          
1 The presence of medium military expenditures, regional trade and foreign fighters were 
linked to military participation, as was the absence of deployed forces, and constitutional 
restrictions. 
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Table A25. Conservative Solution ~MP Analysis IS1 
   Consis-
tency 
 Coverage   
    Raw Unique  Cases 
1 ~DF*~FF*~CR  1.000  0.571 0.429  
GR_IS, IT_IS, ES_IS, 
CZ_IS, RO_IS, PL_IS, 
PT_IS, BG_IS 
2 ~ME*~DF*~RT*~FF  1.000  0.214 0.071  CZ_IS,RO_IS; FI_IS 
3 ~ME*~RT*~FF*~CR  1.000  0.286 0.143  
CZ_IS,RO_IS; 
HU_IS,SK_IS 
4 ~ME*DF*~RT*FF*CR  1.000  0.071 0.071  AT_IS 
5 ME*~DF*~RT*FF*CR  1.000  0.143 0.143  DE_IS, SE_IS 
Solution  0.956  0.705   
RT: Regional Trade, ME: Military Expenditures, DF: Deployed Forces, FF: Foreign Fighters, 
CR: Constitutional Restrictions; “~” Condition absent ; Cases where the outcome is present 
are in regular font, cases where outcome is absent are in Italic. 
Table A 26. Intermediate Solution ~MP Analysis IS2 
   Consis-
tency 
 Coverage   
    Raw Unique  Cases 
1 ~FF  1.000  0.786 0.714  DE_IS, SE_IS; AT_IS, FI_IS 
2 CR*~RT 
 
1.000 
 
0.286 0.214 
 GR_IS, IT_IS, ES_IS, HU_IS, 
SK_IS, CZ_IS, RO_IS, PL_IS, 
PT_IS, FI_IS, BG_IS 
Solution  1.000  1.000   
RT: Regional Trade, FF: Foreign Fighters, CR: Constitutional Restrictions; “~” Condition 
absent ; Cases where the outcome is present are in regular font, cases where the outcome is 
absent are in Italic. 
                                                          
1 The absence of medium military expenditures, regional trade and foreign fighters were 
linked to the absence of military participation, as was the presence of deployed forces, and 
constitutional restrictions. 
2 The absence of medium military expenditures, regional trade and foreign fighters were 
linked to the absence of military participation, as was the presence of deployed forces, and 
constitutional restrictions. 
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10 
Conclusions 
The central objective of this doctoral dissertation is to explain the variation in 
the EU member states’ military commitments. More specifically, it aims to unravel 
the conditions that motivate and block member state contributions to five military 
operations: EUFOR Congo, UNIFIL II, EUFOR Chad, the 2011 military intervention 
in Libya and the air strikes against IS. The introduction identified a wide range of 
plausible explanations, which were tested with Qualitative Comparative Analysis. 
The results of the empirical tests are presented in five articles. The first, co-authored 
with Alrik Thiem, presents a systematic analysis of the determinants of member state 
contributions to two CSDP operations: EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad. The three 
subsequent articles focus on the pattern of participation in a single military 
operation: UNIFIL II, Operation Unified Protector and Operation Inherent Resolve. 
The last article compares the member states’ contributions across the five operations.  
This final chapter aims to draw general conclusions on the research question. 
First, the results of the five articles are interpreted against the backdrop of the 
plausible explanations discussed in the literature review. The second section reflects 
on the theoretical contribution of this dissertation and its relevance beyond 
academia. The last section discusses the most important pitfalls of the present study 
and suggests areas for further research. 
Research Results 
What conditions motivate and block EU member state contributions to 
military operations? Table 1 provides an overview of the conditions that were tested 
in each article and summarizes the most important results of their respective 
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Table 1. Analytical Results 
Article 1: EUFOR Congo – EUFOR Chad 
Conditions 
PT: Strong Peacekeeping Tradition  
CD: Significant Competing Deployments 
TV: Large Trade Volumes 
PS: High Public Support 
BC: High Budget Constraints 
ED: Large Electoral Distance  
PP: Significant Parliamentary Powers 
LP: Right Legislative Partisanship 
RP: Right Executive Partisanship 
Solutions   
Overprovider Underprovider 
1. PT*TV*PS*ED 1. ~PT*~PS 
2. PT*~TV*~PS*ED 2. CD*PS*~LP 
 3. TV*~PS*LP 
Equiprovider 4. ~PT*~CD*~TV*LP 
1. ~CD*TV*PP 5. PT*CD*~TV*PS 
2. ~PT*CD*TV*PS*~PP  
  
Article 2: UNIFIL II  
Conditions  
MC: Military Capabilities 
MS: Military Stretch 
PI: Prior Peacekeeping Involvement 
GP: High Geographic Proximity 
LE: Left Executive 
LP: Left Parliament 
ED: Large Electoral Distance 
PV: Parliamentary Veto 
Solutions 
Large Contribution (LC) Absence Large Contribution (~LC) 
1. MC*~MS *LE (*ED*LP) 1. MS (*~MC) 
2. MC*~MS*LE (*ED*~PV) 2. MS (*~GP) 
3. PI*~MS*LP (*LE*ED) 3. ~PI*~MC (*~GP) 
 4. ~LE(*PV) 
 5. ~ED (*PV) 
  
[~] Condition absent; [*] refers to conjunction of conditions; Conditions between brackets 
indicate they are included in the intermediate but not in the parsimonious solution; the 
solutions of Article 1 represent results with GDP as capability indicator 
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Table 1. (Continued) 
Article 3 – Operation Unified Protector 
Conditions 
LE: Large Economy  
MS: Military Spending  
SP: Spatial Proximity  
AV: Alliance Value  
RE: Right Executive  
ED: Electoral Distance 
Solutions 
High Burden  Absence High Burden 
1. LE *MS*ED 1. ~MS*~AV*~ED 
2. LE *SP*ED 2. ~MS*~AV*~SP*RE 
3. LE*ED*~RE 3. ~LE 
4. LE*AV*~RE  
 
Article 4 – Operation Inherent Resolve 
Conditions  
TH{0}: Low Threat 
TH{1}: Intermediate Threat 
TH{2}: High Threat 
AD: Alliance Dependence 
AV: Alliance Value 
RE Right Executive 
RP Right Parliament 
PV Parliamentary Veto 
Solutions 
Air Strikes No Air Strikes 
1. TH{2}*AV 1. AD{1} 
2. TH{2}*~PV 2. TH{0} 
3. TH{1}*AV*~AD 3. ~AV*PV 
4. TH*AV*~PV 4. ~AV*TH{1} 
Article 5–EUFOR Congo and Chad, UNIFIL II, Unified Protector and Inherent Resolve 
Conditions 
ME: Medium Military Expenditures 
 PT: UN Peacekeeping Tradition 
RT: Regional Trade 
DF: Deployed Forces 
Solutions 
Military Participation  Absence Military Participation 
1. ME*RT 1. ~ME*~PT 
2. ME*PT 2. ~ME*~RT*DF 
3. PT*~DF  
  
[~] Condition absent; [*] refers to conjunction of conditions 
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 analyses.1 This section interprets the results of the five articles against the backdrop 
of the plausible explanations discussed in the literature review. The first subsection 
discusses the explanatory value of collective action theory, the second of the varying 
direct and indirect benefits member states might have hoped to gain from 
contributing. Subsequently, the third subsection elaborates on whether the results 
indicate that the examined operations mainly produced EU-wide public benefits or 
primarily yielded country-specific outputs. The fourth section discusses the 
explanatory value of domestic-level conditions and resource constraints, after which 
the conclusions summarize the study’s main findings. 
Collective Action Theory 
A first plausible explanation for the member states’ military commitments is 
offered by collective action theory. More specifically, the collective-action-based 
“exploitation hypothesis” predicts that small member states will ride free on large 
member states if an operation mainly produces public benefits. The empirical tests 
presented in this dissertation provide varying levels of support for this hypothesis.  
In line with the exploitation hypothesis, the analytical results of the second, 
third and fifth article show that (large) military commitments were associated with 
sizeable capabilities. The empirical analysis of the second article reveals that the 
presence of “military capabilities” is part of two sufficient conjunctions for carrying a 
high burden of the reinforcement of UNIFIL. Moreover, this condition’s absence is 
an element of one sufficient combination for the absence of “high burden”. Likewise, 
the results of the third article indicate that the presence of “large economy” is part of 
all sufficient paths towards “high burden” in the Libya operation, while the absence 
of “large economy” consistently leads towards the outcome’s absence. Finally, the 
results of the fifth article suggest that the member states’ military resources are vital 
determinants of contributions across the five operations. Here, the presence of 
“military expenditures” is part of two of the three causal paths towards “military 
                                                          
1 The solutions generally represent the parsimonious formula, since this is the only solution 
type that is “guaranteed to reflect causation” and its “ingredients can be considered the core 
causal factors” (Baumgartner, 2015: 854; Ragin & Fiss, 2008: 202). The solution of the second 
article also shows the conditions of the intermediate formula, since this was at the centre of 
the substantive discussion of this article. In the third and fifth article, there is no difference 
between the parsimonious and intermediate solution.  
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participation”, while the absence of this condition is an element of both paths 
towards non-participation.  
In contrast, the first article suggests that the differing contributions to EUFOR 
Congo and EUFOR Chad are not explained by the pure public goods model. The 
article assessed whether there is a rank correlation between the member states’ 
contributions and their capability to deliver these contributions. Contrary to the 
expectations of the public goods model, there was no strong association between the 
member states’ relative contributions and the indicators used to operationalize their 
capabilities. This contrasts starkly to the results of the fifth article, in which a large 
portion of the cases of EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad is covered by combinations 
towards military (non)participation that include (the absence of) “military 
expenditures”. 
There are several possible explanations for the diverging results of the first 
and fifth article. First of all, while the first article uses GDP and population as 
capability indicator, the fifth article uses military expenditures. However, given that 
the member states’ absolute levels of defence spending are strongly correlated to 
their GDP, this is probably not the cause of the seemingly contradictory results of 
the articles. A more important difference between the analyses presented in the first 
and fifth article lays in the operationalization of the outcome. While the first article 
relativizes the contributions of the member states by their capabilities, the outcome 
variable of the fifth article only indicates whether or not a state participated in the 
operation. In consequence, the varying levels of support for the collective-action-
based hypotheses offered by the analyses presented in these articles thus suggests 
that the larger member states were more inclined to participate in EUFOR Congo 
and EUFOR Chad, but not necessarily made disproportionately large contributions.  
Finally, the conclusion that there is no correlation between capabilities and 
contributions, but that sizeable capabilities are an element of several paths towards 
the outcome is not necessarily contradictory.1 The solutions presented in the fifth 
article suggest that “medium military expenditures” only lead to military 
participation if combined with high “regional trade” or “UN peacekeeping 
tradition”. If the latter two conditions are absent, sizeable capabilities can be 
associated with the absence of military participation. Moreover, “medium military 
                                                          
1 A comprehensive discussion of the differences between the set-relations that result from 
QCA and correlations that result from traditional quantitative methods is provided in Ragin 
(2008: 13-68; 177-189) and Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 83-91) 
 316 
 
expenditures” is not an element of one of the three paths towards “military 
participation”, which covers many of the small contributors to EUFOR Congo and 
EUFOR Chad. The solutions of the fifth article thus indicate that there are small 
states that participate in these CSDP operations and large member states that do not 
participate, which, in turn, might explain why there is no strong correlation between 
capabilities and contributions to the operations.  
In sum, the evidence presented across the articles suggests that capabilities are 
an important determinant of contributions to EUFOR Congo, EUFOR Chad, 
UNIFIL II and Operation Unified Protector. In contrast, there is no evidence that 
the variation in the member states’ capabilities had an impact on their contributions 
to Operation Inherent Resolve. The solutions of the fourth article fully explain the 
pattern of participation in the air strikes against IS without taking the size or 
capabilities of the democratic members of the anti-IS coalition into account. 
Likewise, the parsimonious solution that results from the separate analysis of 
Operation Inherent Resolve presented in the fifth article does not include “military 
expenditures”, which indicates that this condition was not vital for explaining the 
pattern of participation in the air strikes against IS. A plausible explanation for why 
the differences in the member states’ military capabilities were less important for 
Operation Inherent Resolve is that the US only started mobilizing allies a few weeks 
after it started offensive operations. Hereby, the US indicated that it was willing to 
act against IS without allied support. In consequence, all member states had the 
opportunity to take a free ride, irrespective of their military capabilities. As such, the 
analyses of the air strikes against IS are in line with the conclusion of Bennett, 
Lepgold and Unger (1997) that the collective action hypothesis does not explain why 
states participate in military interventions that are dominated by the US. 
With the exception of Operation Inherent Resolve, the results of the articles 
demonstrate that capabilities are an important determinant of member state 
contributions to the operations under investigation. In line with the exploitation 
hypothesis, this suggests that the operations mainly produce public benefits that are 
highly valued amongst the member states. There are two important caveats to this 
conclusion. First, the criterion for membership in conditions that reflect capabilities 
is generally located at the median of the included cases.1 The analyses thus mainly 
                                                          
1 In fact, the results of the MDSO/MSDO analysis that is presented in the fifth article suggest 
that “medium military expenditures” is a more relevant condition than “large military 
expenditures”. 
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demonstrate that the small member states are generally less inclined to participate in 
military operations, but not that middle-sized member states take a free ride on the 
largest member states. This suggests that the link between military capabilities and 
contributions might also be explained by the fact that small member states have 
fewer opportunities to contribute to multilateral military operations because they 
lack the capabilities to participate in certain missions (Sandler & Shimizu, 2014: 48). 
Many of the EU member states with a small economic base, for example, do not have 
(sufficiently equipped) fighter jets to participate in the air campaign over Libya, 
which at least partially explains why “large economy” is a decisive condition for 
explaining the division of the burden of this operation. A second caveat to the 
conclusion that the examined operations mainly produce benefits that are strongly 
valued by all member states is that capabilities are generally combined with country-
specific incentives. This suggests that the direct and indirect benefits member states 
might hope to gain from participating in crisis management operations varies and 
has an impact on their military commitments. 
Direct and Indirect Benefits of Military Engagements 
A second category of explanatory conditions comprises the direct and indirect 
benefits member states (hope to) gain by participating in operations. First of all, the 
second and third article assess whether the geographical distance towards the target 
of an operation has an impact on contributions to the operations under 
investigation. While the analysis presented in the second article demonstrates that 
“geographic proximity” is not important for contributions to UNIFIL II, the third 
article reveals that “spatial proximity” is part of one path towards “high burden” in 
the 2011 intervention in Libya. These diverging results are not surprising, given that 
Libya is situated much closer to the EU than Lebanon. This suggests that distance 
only provides a strong incentive if the target of an intervention is situated in the 
respective member state’s immediate vicinity. Since this was not the case for the 
large majority of the member states in the operations under investigation, the 
differences in their geographical location only explains a limited share of the 
variation in their military commitments. The fifth article provides systematic 
evidence for this conclusion: the MDSO/MSDO suggests that geographic proximity 
was one of the least relevant conditions.  
Second, the analyses presented in the articles test the explanatory value of 
several conditions linked to economic interests. The appendix of the third article 
assessed whether energy dependence was important for explaining contributions to 
the intervention in Libya, but did not find convincing evidence for this conjecture. 
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Bilateral trade fares somewhat better. The solutions of the first article link “large 
trade volumes” to proportional and large contributions to EUFOR Congo and 
EUFOR Chad. However, the results of this article are rather ambiguous on the 
impact of “trade volumes”: the presence of this condition is also an element of the 
third path towards underprovision, while its absence is part of the second path 
towards overprovision. Moreover, the MDSO/MSDO analysis presented in the fifth 
article does not suggest that bilateral trade is one of the most relevant conditions. In 
contrast, this analysis did identify “regional trade” as one of the four most important 
conditions across the five operations. In combination with “medium military 
expenditures”, this condition covers more than half of the cases of “military 
participation” in the operations examined in the fifth article. This confirms the 
conclusion of Kathman (2011: 864) that potential interveners do not solely base 
intervention decisions on economic interests in the civil war country itself, but are 
also driven by “regional, more economically consequential, interests”. 
Third, the analyses presented in the fourth and fifth article provide strong 
evidence that contributions to the air campaign against IS were primarily linked to 
the member states’ varying numbers of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria. In the 
fourth article, every causal path of the parsimonious solution for the outcome’s 
presence either includes “high” or “intermediate threat”, while the parsimonious 
solution for the outcome’s absence shows that “low threat” is sufficient for non-
participation. Given that a high level of threats generally implied a relatively large 
number of foreign fighters, this suggests the latter constitutes a vital incentive for 
states to participate. Likewise, the analysis of the air strikes against IS presented in 
the fifth article indicates that the combination of a large number of “foreign fighters” 
and the absence of “constitutional restrictions” was sufficient for participation in 
Operation Inherent Resolve. 
In the category of indirect incentives, the analyses provide very strong 
evidence that the member states’ prior engagement in UN peacekeeping operations 
(UNPOs) is relevant for explaining their military commitments. The results of the 
first and second article link this condition to high contributions to EUFOR Congo, 
EUFOR Chad and UNIFIL II. Moreover, two of the three paths towards “military 
participation” of the fifth article’s solution include “peacekeeping tradition”. The 
member states with a strong tradition of participating in UNPOs were thus clearly 
more inclined to contribute to operations that were launched in support of the UN 
peacekeeping system. This confirms the liberal institutionalist argument of Lebovic 
(2004:915) that institutional involvement tends to be self-perpetuating. However, the 
strong support for this condition also resonates with theories on strategic culture, 
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which expect historical experience and foreign policy traditions to have an impact 
on military commitments.  
Finally, the member states that accord a higher value to their relationship with 
the US were expected to be more inclined to contribute to the NATO operation over 
Libya and the US-led coalition against IS. The results of the analyses suggest that 
“alliance value” was indeed an important condition in these operations, but was less 
decisive than suggested by prior research on NATO and US-led operations. In the 
solutions of the third article, “alliance value” was an element of one sufficient 
combination towards carrying a “high burden” in Operation Unified Protector. 
However, this path only covers one member state: Denmark. In the fourth article, 
alliance value is an element of the first sufficient combination towards participation 
in the air strikes against IS, which covers three member states: the UK, Denmark and 
the Netherlands.1  
Many of the member states that are generally considered Atlanticists, like 
Poland or the Czech Republic, thus did not participate in Operation Unified 
Protector nor in Operation Inherent Resolve. This might indicate that the traditional 
division between member states with an Atlanticist and member states with a 
European orientation is becoming less relevant (Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013: 390). 
However, it is difficult to generalize this conclusion beyond Operation Unified 
Protector and Operation Inherent Resolve. The former constitutes a least-likely case 
for the alliance dependence hypothesis since Washington did not take the lead of the 
operation. The air strikes against IS, in turn, started in very specific circumstances. 
Because of Russia’s interventions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine in the first half of 
2014, the perceived threat for countries situated in Russia’s vicinity was at a post-
Cold War height at the time Washington was mobilizing allies to fight IS. In 
consequence, the member states that were dependent on the US’ security guarantees 
did not participate in Operation Inherent Resolve, but instead decided to keep their 
fighter jets at home to deter possible Russian aggression.2  
In sum, in the category of direct benefits, “regional trade” stands out as the 
most relevant condition across the five operations, while geographic proximity had 
an impact on contributions to Operation Unified Protector and countering the 
                                                          
1 The third and four sufficient combination for participation in the air strikes also include 
“alliance value”, but only cover Canada. 
2 The fact that alliance dependence was sufficient for not participating in the air strikes 
provides strong evidence for this conclusion. 
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threat posed by foreign fighters was the most important incentive for participation 
in the air strikes against IS. In the category of indirect benefits, the analyses show 
that prior involvement in UN peacekeeping is a relevant explanatory condition for 
contributions to (operations in support of) UNPOs. A strong interest in a good 
relationship with the US also provided an incentive to participate in Operation 
Unified Protector and Operation Inherent resolve, but was less important than in 
earlier NATO and US-led operations. 
EU-Wide Public Benefits or Member State Specific Incentives? 
The previous sections argued that conditions derived from different strands of 
academic research are relevant for explaining member state contributions to the five 
operations under investigation. In line with the public goods model, the analyses 
suggest that larger member states were more inclined to contribute. However, the 
results also demonstrate that varying direct and indirect benefits have an impact on 
the member states’ military commitments, which suggests that the joint-product 
model is the best description of burden-sharing patterns in the operations under 
investigation. It is theoretically not possible that both the pure public goods model 
and the joint product model explain the division of the burden of an operation, since 
the former applies if collective action only produces purely public benefits and the 
latter if it produces both public and private benefits. Nevertheless, the analyses 
clearly show that larger member states are also more inclined to participate in 
operations that yield country-specific benefits.  
First of all, the analyses suggest that country-specific benefits that result from 
balancing threats to economic or security interests only lead to substantial 
contributions in combination with sizeable capabilities. The third article, for 
example, shows that the country-specific benefits related to “geographic proximity” 
only leads to “high burden” in combination with “large economy”. Likewise, the fifth 
article indicates that “regional trade” only results in “military participation” in 
combination with “medium military expenditures”. These conjunctions can be 
explained by the fact that balancing threats does not necessarily result in excludable 
benefits. In fact, states that are faced with significant threats can take a free ride if 
other states are willing and able to balance these threats without their assistance.1 
                                                          
1 This has been suggested by Christensen and Snyder (1990: 141), who argue that states can 
fail to balance rising threats because “some states try to ride free on other states' balancing 
efforts”. Likewise, Davidson (2011:17) maintains that states that are faced with threats can 
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Even if a small member state has security or economic interests at stake in an 
operation, it can thus still be expected to take a free ride on the larger member states. 
Second, the results indicate that sizeable capabilities and country-benefits can 
be elements of alternative paths for large contributions. In the second and fifth 
article, every single path towards large contribution either includes peacekeeping 
tradition or sizeable military capabilities. This suggests that the only small member 
states that contributed to the operations under investigation had a peacekeeping 
tradition and were thus expected to accord more importance to the status gains that 
result from contributing to UNPOs. Smaller member states thus only participated if 
these excludable benefits were at stake, whereas the larger member states also 
contributed if only non-excludable benefits were at stake. 
An alternative explanation for this interplay between capabilities and country-
specific benefits is that smaller member states lack the capabilities to assist in certain 
missions. In spite of having a strong incentive to contribute, capability shortfalls can 
cause small member states to refrain from participating. This might explain why 
only the combination of country-specific incentives with at least intermediate 
capabilities leads to participation. Capabilities and peacekeeping traditions might 
operate as functional equivalents because states with a peacekeeping tradition can be 
expected to have the military resources required to contribute to the operations that 
were deployed in the framework of a UNPO, irrespective of their level of military 
spending. 
To sum up, the analyses indicate that some country-specific benefits only lead 
to substantial contributions in combination with sizeable capabilities, while others 
can motivate contributions irrespective of a member state’s capabilities. Although 
the results of the articles clearly demonstrate that capabilities are an important 
determinant of contributions to the operations under investigation, the variation in 
the direct and indirect benefits the member states hope to gain from contributing 
does have an impact on their military commitments. Member states will thus be 
most inclined to contribute to an operation if they have sizeable capabilities and 
specific interests at stake. 
                                                                                                                                                      
take a free ride on the US if the latter is willing to counter the threat on its own, while the 
integrated model of Bennett, Lepgold and Unger (1994: 70) suggests that states will ride free 
if security is considered a “public good provided by others in sufficient quantity even if the 
state does not contribute”. 
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Domestic Conditions and Resource Constraints 
A third category of explanatory conditions comprises domestic-level 
conditions and resource constraints. First of all, the analyses presented in the articles 
tested whether the level of institutional constraints on member states’ governments 
has an impact on their military commitments. The MDSO/MSDO presented in the 
fifth article indicates that neither the difference between majority and minority 
governments, nor the difference between single-party and coalition governments is 
decisive for the member states’ military commitments. Likewise, this analysis 
suggests that “constitutional restrictions” is one of the least relevant conditions for 
explaining contributions across the five operations. The fifth article does provide 
strong evidence that this condition is important for explaining contributions to 
Operation Inherent Resolve: the presence of “constitutional restrictions” is sufficient 
for not participating in the air strikes against IS. However, the majority of the 
member states did not face legal restrictions in any of the operations. This  suggests 
that “constitutional restrictions” is an important condition, but only explains a 
limited share of the variation in the member states’ military deployments. 
The results of the analyses are rather ambiguous with regards to a last 
institutional variable: the degree of parliamentary involvement in military 
deployment decisions. While the MDSO/MSDO presented in the fifth article 
indicates that “parliamentary veto” was amongst the least relevant conditions, the 
other articles suggest that legislative involvement does have an impact on 
contributions to EUFOR Congo, EUFOR Chad, UNIFIL II and Operation Inherent 
Resolve. These seemingly contradictory results suggest that parliamentary 
involvement might not be decisive for whether or not a member state participates, as 
tested in the fifth article; but does determine the size of a participating state’s 
contributions.1 The results of the first article provide evidence for this conjecture, 
since significant parliamentary powers are linked to equiprovision, but not to 
underprovision. Likewise, in the fourth article, the sufficient combination that links 
“parliamentary veto” to non-participation in the air strikes against IS mainly covers 
                                                          
1 As argued in the fifth article, this corresponds to the conclusions of several studies on 
military burden sharing, which  suggest that the domestic constraints are especially 
important for explaining the size and form of states’ contributions (Bennett, Lepgold & 
Unger, 1994: 73; Oma, 2012: 565).  
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member states that did make non-offensive contributions to Operation Inherent 
Resolve, like Germany, Spain, Sweden and Finland. 
A second domestic-level condition is the temporal distance towards the next 
election. The first three articles provide strong evidence that executives are less 
inclined to participate in military operations if elections are nearby. The results of 
the first article suggest that the member states contributed more than expected to 
EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad when distant elections are combined with a 
strong peacekeeping tradition. Likewise, the second article shows that “large 
electoral distance” is a necessary condition for large contributions to UNIFIL II, 
while the results of the third article indicate that “electoral distance” is part of three 
of the four sufficient paths towards “high burden” in Operation Unified Protector. 
In contrast, the articles do not provide convincing evidence for a third 
domestic-level condition: public opinion. The analyses presented in the appendices 
of the third and fourth article indicate that public support was not decisive for 
contributions to the military intervention in Libya or the air strikes against IS. 
However, this dissertation definitely does not provide conclusive evidence that 
public opinion does not matter for the member states’ military commitments. First 
of all, there was no reliable public opinion data for three of the operations under 
investigation. On top of that, public opinion data for the Libya operation was 
retrieved from a survey that took place after the start of the air strikes and only 
includes eleven member states, while reliable information on public support for 
military action against IS could only be retrieved for six member states.  
Results are dissimilar across the operations with regards to the impact of 
political partisanship. The results of the second and third article are in line with 
theoretical expectations on the link between political partisanship and military 
engagements. The analysis presented in the second article shows that “left executive” 
was a necessary condition for large contributions to the reinforcement of UNIFIL, 
while each sufficient path of the parsimonious solution of “large contribution” either 
includes “left executive” or “left parliament” as an explanatory condition. In the 
third article, the absence of “right executive” is an element of two sufficient 
combinations for carrying a “high burden” in Unified Protector, while its presence is 
an element of one path towards the absence of high burden. Hereby, both articles 
confirm that left-leaning governments are more likely to support operations with 
inclusive goals, as was suggested by Rathbun (2004). 
In contrast, the first and fourth article do not provide strong evidence that 
partisanship had an impact on the member states’ military commitments. The 
analysis presented in the fourth article suggests that neither executive nor 
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parliamentary ideology was important for explaining the pattern of participation in 
the air strikes against IS. However, since Operation Inherent Resolve countered a 
threat to the participants national interests and pursued humanitarian goals, both 
left and right parties had reasons to support the operation. A plausible reason for 
why the first article does not confirm expectations on the impact of partisan politics 
is that the operationalization of ideology is based on expert surveys.1 In contrast, the 
other articles operationalized ideology with the RILE-scale of the comparative 
manifesto project, which better reflects cross-national differences within party-
family groupings and, therefore, can expected to be better suited for cross national 
comparison (Mello, 2014).  
Finally, in the category of resource constraints, the analyses do not suggest 
that “budget constraints” had an impact on the member states’ military 
commitments. “Competing deployments”, in turn, stands out as one of the most 
important explanatory conditions for some of the operations under investigation. 
The analyses presented in the first and second article indicate that “competing 
deployments” and “military stretch” were relevant conditions for explaining member 
state contributions to EUFOR Congo, EUFOR Chad, and UNIFIL II. In contrast, the 
third and fourth article explain (a large share) of the variation in the contributions to 
Operation Unified Protector and Operation Inherent Resolve without taking this 
condition into account. This suggests that military stretch was especially important 
for the operations that were launched at the beginning of the timeframe of this 
dissertation.  
The results of the fifth article confirm this conjecture. The absence of a large 
number of “deployed forces” is an element of one of the three pathways towards 
“military participation”, while its presence is part of one of the two sufficient 
combinations for non-participation. EUFOR Congo, UNIFIL II and EUFOR Chad 
account for the bulk of the cases covered by these paths. This might be an artefact of 
the indicator that is used to operationalize competing deployments. The latter only 
takes the number of deployed ground forces into account, which is less relevant for 
air operations like Unified Protector and Inherent Resolve. However, it also indicates 
                                                          
1 Executive ideology is not included in the solutions with the GDP-based capability indicator, 
presented in Table 1. The solutions with the combined capability indicator, which is 
presented in the text of the article, link “right-leaning executive” to “overprovision”. Since 
few member states had strong interests at stake in the examined CSDP operations, this 
contradicts the expected interactions set out in the introduction. 
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that competing deployments had less impact on operations that were launched over 
the last five years, when the number of externally deployed European troops had 
already decreased significantly (cf. Figure 1 Introduction). 
To sum up, in the category of domestic conditions, the analyses show that 
electoral distance and, depending on the goals of an operation and the interests that 
were at stake, partisan politics have an impact on the member states’ military 
commitments. In addition, this dissertation suggests that parliamentary veto power 
has an impact on the size of military contributions. Constitutional restrictions, in 
turn, were important for contributions to the air strikes against IS, but in general, 
only explain a limited share of the variation in the member states’ military 
deployments. Finally, the analyses indicate that simultaneous military engagements 
significantly constrained member state contributions to EUFOR Congo, EUFOR 
Chad and the reinforcement of UNIFIL. 
What Conditions Motivate and Block Member State Participation in 
Military Operations? 
The results of the articles suggest that member states were inclined to 
participate in the five military operations under investigation if sizeable military 
resources were combined with country-benefits related to regional trade, geographic 
proximity and threat posed by foreign fighters. In addition, states with a high level of 
prior involvement in UNPOs were inclined to participate in operations deployed in 
support of the UN peacekeeping system, irrespective of their military resources. 
However, actual contributions only materialized in the absence of competing 
deployments, while proximate elections and parliamentary veto power resulted in 
lower levels of military support. Finally, depending on the goals of an operation and 
the national interests at stake, the ideological orientation of the member states’ 
governments can also have an impact on their military commitments.  
Theoretical and Empirical Relevance 
Having outlined the main findings of this doctoral dissertation, this section 
elaborates on its most important scholarly and empirical contributions.  
By examining the determinants of contributions to the five operations under 
investigation, this study contributes to the vast body of academic research on 
military intervention and crisis management operations. First of all, some of the 
ingredients of the articles’ theoretical frameworks had not been systematically tested 
in earlier studies. The first, second and fifth article, for example, demonstrate that 
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military stretch was one of the most important determinants of contributions to 
EUFOR Congo, EUFOR Chad and the reinforcement of UNIFIL. Few studies had 
examined the impact of this condition on military commitments. The scarce 
analyses that did, generally operationalized competing deployments with binary 
indicators of concurrent mission involvement, which do not reflect the impact of 
parallel operations on a country’s available resources. Likewise, the fourth and fifth 
article showed that contributions to the air campaign against IS were linked to the 
level of threat posed by foreign fighters, a variable that had not been included in 
prior research.  
Furthermore, this dissertation is one of the first studies to provide systematic 
evidence that left-wing parties are more inclined to support operations with 
inclusive goals. The analysis of the air strikes against IS, in turn, shows the limits of 
the alliance dependence hypothesis. More specifically, it indicates that alliance 
dependence does not incite contributions if both the large and the dependent ally’s 
interests are threatened by a common adversary. Conversely, by examining 
operations that were not dominated by the US, this dissertation demonstrates that 
collective action theory can account for more than only the disproportionately large 
contribution of the US to military operations.  
Finally, this research widens the scope of empirical research on the use of 
force and participation in military operations. Prior studies generally focused on 
militarized intrastate disputes or US-led military operations. The bulk of the 
academic literature on participation in peacekeeping operations, in turn, consists of 
empirical tests of collective-action-based models or exclusively focusses on 
international-level determinants. As such, this dissertation provides the first 
systematic study of contributions to CSDP operations, as well as the first analysis 
that combines international and domestic conditions to explain varying 
contributions to a UNPO.  
Next to these scholarly contributions, the results of this study also have some 
empirical implications. This dissertation started by arguing that the sizeable 
European troop deployments of the last two decades suggest that Europe is not 
(only) a soft or civilian power. As Figure 1 of the introduction indicates, there is a 
clear downward trend in the number of externally deployed European troops after 
2006. This decline can mainly be attributed to the withdrawal from Iraq and the 
reduced deployments in the Balkans, Lebanon and Afghanistan (Giegerich & Nicoll, 
2012: 59). However, when looking at the turmoil swirling around Europe’s 
immediate and wider neighbourhood, one can only conclude that military 
operations will, in all likelihood, continue to be a necessary instrument to protect the 
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interests of the EU member states. Given the decreasing willingness of the United 
States to assume a leading role in operations in and around Europe, the member 
states will be more and more required to meet demands for military crisis 
management themselves. Moreover, operations where one member state is willing 
and able to successfully conduct the operation with minimal support from the rest of 
the EU will probably not become the standard for European military intervention. In 
consequence, Europeans will need to collaborate to foster sufficient resources to 
meet the continuous demands for military crisis management. 
This dissertations provides a number of reasons to be modestly optimistic on 
the likelihood that the member states will be able to collectively meet this demand if 
clear EU interests are at stake. To begin, the results of this study indicate that 
member states are more inclined to participate if the target of an intervention poses 
a threat to their economic or security interests. A large number of member states 
would, for example, have a specific incentive to participate if an operation was 
deployed in Libya to counter the expansion of IS or support a unity government. 
More specifically, this study suggests that both member states with a large number of 
foreign fighters and member states situated close to Libya can be expected to 
participate in such an operation. However, even in operations that clearly concern 
broad EU interest, some member states would probably refrain from contributing. 
Given their continuing concerns over Russia and the absence of specific interests, the 
Central and Eastern European member states would, for example, probably not 
participate in a possible operation in Libya. Moreover, collective European military 
action will be far more difficult if an operation does not clearly concern the interests 
of many of the member states, as was recently demonstrated by difficult force 
generation process of the EUFOR RCA operation. 
Another reason to be optimistic about the member states ability to collectively 
tackle future security threats is that domestic-level conditions were not decisive 
determinants of their military commitments. While nearby elections and 
parliamentary veto power act as constraints on the member states’ governments, the 
results of the fifth paper indicate that these domestic conditions primarily determine 
the level of military engagement, not whether or not a member state participates. 
Constitutional restrictions, in turn, only matter for a few member states, and only 
for specific types of operations. Finally, military stretch was identified as the most 
important constraint on the member states for the three operations that were 
launched at the beginning of the timeframe of this dissertation, but mattered less for 
the two other operations. Given that the number of externally deployed European 
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troops is still at a relatively low level, the member states’ military resources are 
currently probably not stretched by their military deployments. 
Limitations and Paths for Further Research 
As is the case with all research, this dissertation faces a number of 
shortcomings and limitations, which offer starting points for future studies. This 
final section elaborates on six of the most important limitations of this dissertation. 
A first limitation of the present study is that the explanatory value of several 
conditions is not examined in the first four articles. For example, whether or not the 
difference between coalition and single-party governments has an impact on the 
member states’ military commitments is only tested in the MDSO/MSDO analysis 
presented in the fifth article. The results of the latter analysis suggest that the 
number of  parties in government was not amongst the most relevant conditions. 
However, this was also the case for parliamentary veto power, a condition which, as 
the other articles of this dissertation indicate, does have an impact on the size of 
member states’ contributions (cf. supra). Conversely, the fifth article showed that the 
member states’ level of trade with the area of operations’ wider region was an 
important determinant of their military commitments. In consequence, it would 
have been very interesting to further test the explanatory value of this condition in 
the other articles.  
Second, none of the articles of the empirical part of this thesis test whether 
differences between the member states’ strategic cultures have an impact on their 
military commitments. This constitutes an important limitation, given that this 
study’s results do not suggest that strategic culture can be entirely dismissed as an 
important explanation for the variation in the member states’ military engagements. 
The solutions of the fifth article, for example, do not explain Germany’s 
contributions to any of the operations. Given Germany’s specific history, cultural 
variables can be expected to be particularly important for explaining its pattern of 
military engagements. For example, the solutions of the third article attribute 
Germany’s decision not to contribute to Operation Unified protector to the 
combination of a right-leaning government with a lack of clear interests in Libya.  
However, Germany’s response to the Libya crisis also indicates that its strategic 
culture continues to demonstrate “significant reluctance when it comes to the 
aggressive use of military force” (Miskimmon, 2012: 393). Likewise, the results of the 
third article show that executive ideology is not relevant for the disproportionately 
large contributions of France and the UK to the Libya operation, which confirms 
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Matlary and Petersson’s (2013: 17) suggestion that states with “military cultures that 
are strategic in nature” are less influenced by political factors. Cultural theories thus 
definitely provide relevant insights into the member states’ military commitments. 
In consequence, a study that systematically examines and compares the member 
states military engagements from a strategic culture perspective would serve as a 
valuable complement to this dissertation.  
Third, the objective of this dissertation was to arrive at a general, 
parsimonious, explanation for the member states’ contributions to the operations 
under investigation. However, at times, more idiosyncratic, case-specific, 
circumstances offer at least part of the explanation for a member state’s decision 
(not) to contribute to an operation. Portugal’s non-participation in the Libya 
operation can, for example, be attributed to the political crisis that led to the 
resignation of the Socrates government just five days after the start of the air 
campaign. Spain’s decision not to participate in the air strikes against IS, in turn, was 
probably influenced by the analogy with the 2003 intervention in Iraq (Di Stefani 
Pironti, 2014). Given that the 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid were seen as a 
consequence of Spain’s participation in the Iraq War, this might explain why it 
refrained from conducting air strikes against IS. However, in spite of not taking such 
case-specific explanations into account, the analyses managed to explain a large 
share of the variation in member state contributions to the operations. This suggests 
that the member states’ military commitments are to a large extent determined by 
more structural conditions. 
A fourth limitation is related to the method that was used in this dissertation: 
QCA. Applying QCA allowed to identify the combinations of conditions that 
consistently led to participation and non-participation. However, QCA-results do 
not provide an account of the complex causal processes underlying decisions (not) 
to contribute. More in-depth case-based knowledge would have shed additional light 
on some of the hypotheses of this dissertation. A detailed account of the negotiations 
over troop commitments that preceded the operations would, for example, provide 
information on whether the small member states were indeed attempting to take a 
free ride. Moreover, the main problem for most of the operations was finding 
specific capabilities, like tactical air transport in EUFOR Congo and medical facilities 
in EUFOR Chad. It would have been interesting to focus on the member states that 
disposed of such capabilities, and examine which of them eventually agreed to make 
them available to the operation. In depth case-studies of the decision-making 
process that took place within the member states’ governments and parliaments 
would also complement the present research. For example, it would, have been 
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interesting to examine whether left-wing parties of coalition governments were more 
inclined to support humanitarian and peacekeeping operations than their right-
leaning coalition partners. 
While the previously discussed shortcomings concern the limitations of this 
study for explaining contributions to the operations under investigation, there are 
also some limitations related to case-selection. As mentioned in the introduction, 
this study does not include some of the largest operations that involve a significant 
number of European forces, like the Multinational Force in Iraq and the ISAF 
operation in Afghanistan. However, given that these have been thoroughly examined 
in other studies, analysing member states’ contributions to these operations does not 
constitute an interesting avenue for future research. A more interesting case for 
further study is EUFOR RCA, the most recent military CSDP operation that 
involved ground forces. In contrast to the operations examined in the this study, two 
small member states that do not have a peacekeeping tradition made a sizeable 
contribution to this operation: Estonia and Latvia. It would be interesting to examine 
why these member states decided to participate in this operation, which, at first 
glance, did not provide them specific benefits. Other interesting cases for future 
research are the two naval operations deployed under the aegis of the CSDP: 
EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUNAVFOR Sophia. Since the composition of these 
operations changes constantly due to the frequent rotation of units, this would 
require a different research design than the one applied in this dissertation. 
Finally, the empirical part of this study focussed on operations to which at 
least five member states made sizeable contributions. To arrive at a more complete 
understanding of the determinants of the member states’ military commitments, 
such operations with a relatively large European presence could be compared with 
cases of member state inaction.1 Likewise, it would be interesting to examine what 
determines whether and to what extent member states cooperate to address security 
challenges. For example, why did the bulk of the member states participate in the 
military operations in Afghanistan and the Balkans, but not in the interventions in 
Iraq and Libya? Why did France act unilaterally in Mali in 2013, while it pushed for a 
CSDP-operation in Chad in 2007 and cooperated with the UK for the intervention 
in Libya? A comparative study of the diverging European reactions to international 
and internal crises could shed light on these issues and, hereby, serve as a valuable 
complement to this study. 
                                                          
1 The studies of Kreutz (2015) and Pohl (2014b) shed some light on this research question. 
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